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BOOK     150.T393    c   1 
THORNDIKE    #    ELEMENTS    OF 
PSYCHOLOGY 


3    T153    00DD3Sm    2 


THE  ELEMENTS  OF 
PSYCHOLOGY 


THE  ELEMENTS  OF 
PSYCHOLOGY 


BY 
EDWARD  L.  THORNDIKE 

Professor  o*  Educational  Psychology  in  Teachers  Colicgt 
Columbia  University 

^SECOND  EDITION) 


Nev/  Ycbe 
A.  G.  SEILER 

1912 


ISO 


Copyright,   1905,   1907 
By  E'DWard  L.  Thorndike 


The  MASON-HENRY  Press 

SYRACUSE,    NEW    YORK 


INTRODUCTION 

I  have  been  invited  to  contribute  a  preface  to  this 
book,  though  when  I  ask  myself,  why  any  book  from 
Professor  Thorndike's  pen  should  need  an  introduction 
to  the  public  by  another  hand,  I  find  no  answer.  Both 
as  an  experimental  investigator,  as  a  critic  of  other  in- 
vestigators, and  as  an  expounder  of  results,  he  stands  in 
the  very  forefront  of  American  psychologists,  and  his 
references  to  my  works  in  the  text  that  follows  will,  I 
am  sure,  introduce  me  to  more  readers  than  I  can  intro- 
duce him  to  by  my  preface. 

In  addition  to  the  monographs  which  have  been  pour- 
ing from  the  press  for  twenty  years  past,  we  have  by  this 
time,  both  in  English  and  in  German,  a  very  large  num- 
ber of  general  text-books,  some  larger  and  some  smaller, 
but  all  covering  the  ground  in  ways  which,  so  far  as  stu- 
dents go,  are  practical  equivalents  for  each  other.  The 
main  subdivisions,  principles,  and  features  of  descriptive 
psychology  are  at  present  well  made  out,  and  writers  are 
agreed  about  them.  If  one  has  read  earlier  books,  one 
need  not  read  the  very  newest  one  in  order  to  catch  up 
wnth  the  progress  of  the  science.  The  differences  in 
them  are  largely  of  order  and  emphasis,  or  of  fondness 
on  the  authors'  parts  for  certain  phrases,  or  for  their 
own  modes  of  approach  to  particular  questions.  It  is  one 
and  the  same  body  of  facts  with  which  they  all  make  us 
acquainted. 

Some  of  these  treatises  indeed  give  much  more  promi- 
nence to  the   details  of  experimentation   than   others — 


vi  Introduction 

artificial  experimentation,  I  mean,  with  physical  instru- 
ments, and  measurements.  A  rapid  glance  at  Professor 
Thorndike's  table  of  contents  might  lead  one  to  set  him 
down  as  not  belonging  to  the  experimental  class  of  psy- 
chologists. He  ignores  the  various  methods  of  proving 
Fechner's  psycho-physic  law,  and  makes  no  reference  to 
chronoscopes,  or  to  acoustical  or  optical  technics.  Yet 
in  another  and  psychologically  in  a  more  vital  sense  his 
book  is  a  laboratory  manual  of  the  most  energetic  and 
continuous  kind. 

When  I  first  looked  at  the  proofs  and  saw  each  sec- 
tion followed  by  a  set  of  neatly  numbered  exercises, 
problems,  and  questions  in  fine  print,  I  confess  that  I 
shuddered  for  a  moment.  Can  it  be,  I  thought,  that  the 
author's  long  connection  with  the  Teachers  College  is 
making  even  of  him  a  high-priest  of  the  American  "text- 
book" Moloch,  in  whose  belly  living  children's  minds  are 
turned  to  ashes,  and  whose  ritual  lies  in  text-books  in 
which  the  science  is  pre-digested  for  the  teacher  by  every 
expository  artifice  and  for  the  pupil  comminuted  into 
small  print  and  large  print,  and  paragraph-headings,  and 
cross-references  and  examination  questions,  and  every 
other  up-to-date  device  for  frustrating  the  natural  move- 
ment of  the  mind  when  reading,  and  preventing  that  irre- 
sponsible rumination  of  the  material  in  one's  own  way 
which  is  the  soul  of  culture?  Can  it  be,  I  said,  that 
Thorndike  himself  is  sacrificing  to  machinery  and  dis- 
continuity ? 

But  I  had  not  read  many  of  the  galleys  before  I  got 
the  opposite  impression.  There  are,  it  is  true,  discon- 
tinuities in  the  book  which  might  slightly  disconcert  a 
critic  with  a  French  turn  of  taste,  but  that  is  because  of 
the  intense  concreteness  with  which  the  author  feels  his 
subject  and  wishes  to  make  his  reader  feel  it.     The  prob- 


Introduction  vii 

lems  and  questions  are  uniquely  to  that  end.  They  are 
laboratory  work  of  the  most  continuous  description,  and 
the  text  is  like  unto  them  for  concreteness.  Professor 
Thorndike  has  more  horror  of  vagueness,  of  scholastic 
phrases,  of  scientific  humbug  than  any  psychologist  with 
whom  I  am  acquainted.  I  defy  any  teacher  or  student  to 
go  through  this  book  as  it  is  written,  and  not  to  carry 
away  an  absolutely  first-hand  acquaintance  with  the  work- 
ings of  the  human  mind,  and  with  the  realities  as  distin- 
guished from  the  pedantries  and  artificialities  of  psy- 
chology. The  author's  superabounding  fertility  in  famil- 
iar illustrations  of  what  he  is  describing  amounts  to 
genius.  I  might  enter  into  an  exposition  of  some  of  the 
other  peculiarities  of  his  treatise,  but  this  quality  of  ex- 
ceeding realism  seems  to  cap  the  others  and  to  give  it 
eminence  among  the  long  list  of  psychology-books  which 
readers  now-a-days  have  to  choose  from. 

It  is  not  a  work  for  lazy  readers,  however;  and  lazy 
reading  also  has  a  sacred  place  in  the  universe  of  educa- 
tion. But  I  seem  to  foresee  for  it  a  powerful  anti- 
pedantic  influence,  and  I  augur  for  it  a  very  great  suc- 
cess indeed  in  class-rooms.  So,  with  no  more  pref- 
atory words,  I  heartily  recommend  it  to  all  those  who  are 
interested  in  spreading  the  knowledge  of  our  science. 

William  James. 
Harvard   University. 


PREFACE 

The  aim  of  this  book  is  to  help  students  to  learn  the 
general  principles  of  psychology.  Those  facts  which 
can  most  profitably  be  made  the  subject  matter  of  a 
course  in  general  psychology  are  presented  with  an 
abundance  of  concrete  illustrations,  experiments,  exer- 
cises and  questions,  by  which  the  student  may  secure  real 
rather  than  verbal  conceptions  and  may  test,  apply  and 
make  permanent  his  knowledge. 

A  good  method  of  studying  the  book  is  probably  ( i ) 
to  read  a  section  through  quickly,  then  (2)  to  read  it  with 
care,  jotting  down  in  a  note  book  every  question  that 
seems  to  be  answered  by  the  text.  Next  (3)  without  the 
book  try  to  answer  those  questions ;  hunting  out  the 
answers  when  unable  to  give  them  from  memory.  (4) 
Do  the  printed  exercises,  writing  down  each  answer  or, 
if  it  is  too  long,  its  main  point.  (5)  Do  any  experiments 
in  connection  with  the  section.  (6)  When  the  several 
sections  of  a  chapter  have  all  been  thus  studied,  write 
down  the  general  questions  which  the  whole  chapter  has 
answered,  and  after  an  interval  of  several  days  try  to 
give  clear  and  reasonably  adequate  answers  to  these 
questions  in  writing. 

The  references  for  further  reading  noted  at  the  end 
of  each  chapter  may  best  be  read  only  after  the  text  itself 
is  mastered.  The  references  marked  A  are  for  students 
in  general,  those  marked  B  are  for  students  especially 
desirous  of  increasing  their  knowledge  of  psychology  and 
capable  of  studying  difficult  treatises.     Additional  read- 


Preface  ix 

ings  on  special  topics  will  be  found  at  the  end  of  the 
book.  In  the  references  Roman  numerals  refer  to  the 
chapters.  §  i,  §  2,  §  3,  etc.,  refer  to  sections.  Arabic 
numerals  alone  refer  to  pages.  'Titchener,  Outline'  re- 
fers to  the  third  edition,  that  of  1899;  'Wundt,  Physiolo- 
gische  Psychologic'  refers  to  the  fifth  edition. 

The  references  to  Wundt  through  Chapter  VI  are 
available  in  the  English  translation  by  Professor  Titchener 
{Principles  of  Physiological  Psychology,  Vol.  i).  Fur- 
ther volumes  of  this  English  version  will  appear  in  the 
near  future. 

Through  the  great  kindness  of  Professor  L.  F. 
Barker  of  Chicago  University,  Professor  Dr.  L.  Edinger 
of  Frankfurt-a.M.,  Professor  A.  von  Kolliker  of  Wiirz- 
burg.  Professor  M.  v.  Lenhossek  of  Budapest,  Professor 
M.  Allen  Starr,  Dr.  E.  Leaming  and  Dr.  O.  S.  Strong  of 
Columbia  University,  and  Professor  A.  Van  Gehuchten 
of  Lou  vain,  I  am  able  to  reproduce  photographs  and 
drawings  of  the  finer  structure  of  the  nervous  system 
such  as  are  rarely  seen  in  elementary  books  on  either 
psychology  or  physiology. 

To  Professor  William  James  I  owe  the  common  debt 
of  all  psychologists  due  for  the  genius  which  has  been 
our  inspiration  and  the  scholarship  which  has  been  our 
guide.  The  obligation  is  patent  in  every  chapter.  In- 
deed, the  best  service  I  wish  for  this  book  is  that  it  may 
introduce  its  readers  to  that  masterpiece  of  thought  and 
expression,  the  Principles  of  Psychology.  I  owe  also 
a  personal  debt  for  unfailing  kindness  and  encourage- 
ment which  can  only  be  acknowledged,  never  repaid. 


PREFACE  FOR  TEACHERS 

This  book  is  designed  to  serve  as  a  text-book  for  stu- 
dents who  have  had  no  previous  training  in  psychology, 
who  will  not  in  nine  cases  out  of  ten  take  any  consider- 
able amount  of  advanced  work  in  psychology,  and  who 
need  psychological  knowledge  and  insight  to  fit  them  to 
study,  not  the  special  theories  of  philosophy,  but  the  gen- 
eral facts  of  human  nature.  For  such  students  training 
in  methods  and  technique  alone  is  almost  futile :  they  are 
not  to  be  expert  psychologists,  but  intelligent  men  and 
women.  Training  in  the  analysis  of  the  process  of 
thought  is  equally  inadequate:  they  need  more  than  an 
introduction  to  logic  and  philosophy.  A  course  which  re- 
duces psychology  to  a  mass  of  technical  words  and  defi- 
nitions is  criminal :  it  hides  realities  from  the  student  and 
either  encourages  him  in  verbal  quibbling  or  destroys  all 
interest  in  the  study  of  mental  facts.  It  is  the  right  and 
the  duty  of  the  psychologist  as  a  thinker  to  specialize, 
to  be  an  experimentalist,  or  analyst,  or  comparative  psy- 
chologist. But  it  is  the  right  of  the  student  in  a  general 
course  on  psychology  to  demand  a  fair  representation  of 
the  science  as  a  whole.  This  book  is  therefore  eclectic  in 
subject  matter  and  in  method.  Description,  definition, 
analysis,  experimentation,  comparative  and  genetic 
studies — no  one  of  these  can  wisely  be  omitted. 

This  book  represents  no  particular  kind  of  psychology 
peculiar  to  the  author,  nor  any  radical  departures  from 
the  general  usage  of  modern  text-books  on  psychology. 
Some  of  its  features  do,  however,  vary  from  those  of  the 
elementary  text-books   and  so  deserve  comment. 


Preface  for  Teachers  xi 

The  description  of  the  brain  and  sense  organs 
follows  the  recent  views  instead  of  those  current  in  the 
early  eighties.  By  thus  discarding  the  unprofitable 
geography  of  'convolutions/  'centers'  and  'tracts'  and 
utilizing  the  real  facts  of  the  constitution  of  the  nervous 
system,  we  not  only  give  the  student  knowledge  of  a 
truly  explanatory  sort  which  he  can  apply  to  psychologi- 
cal facts,  but  also  supplant  an  incoherent  mass  of  detail 
by  a  simple  and  clear  hypothesis.  The  length  in  pages 
of  Part  II  is  due  to  the  photographs  and  drawings  and 
represents  a  shortening  rather  than  a  lengthening  of  the 
student's  time  and  effort. 

The  descriptive  or  structural  psychology  has  been 
sharply  separated  from  the  dynamic  psychology.  For 
instance,  instead  of  taking  up  in  one  chapter  both  the 
nature  of  percepts  and  the  laws  of  mental  action  in- 
volved in  perception  and  illusion,  I  have  put  the  latter  in 
Part  III  along  with  such  topics  as  instinct,  habit  and  the 
association  of  ideas.  The  older  custom  is  a  relic  of  the 
'faculty  psychology'  and  inevitably  disposes  the  student 
to  believe  that  perception,  memory,  reasoning  and  the 
like  are  subtle  dynamic  forces  acting  on  mental  proces- 
ses. By  the  separation  the  real  value  of  the  terms,  sensa- 
tions, percepts,  images,  memories,  judgments,  emotions 
and  the  like, — namely,  their  value  as  terms  describing 
qualitative  differences, — is  preserved.  Needless  to  say, 
the  newer  arrangement  is  not  only  truer  to  the  facts,  but 
also  more  teachable. 

Dynamic  psychology  is  given  a  place  in  this  book 
more  in  accord  with  the  place  it  holds  in  present  psy- 
chological thought  than  is  customary  in  elementary  books. 
It  is  surely  wnse  to  give  adequate  space  to  the  facts  and 
laws  of  instinct,  capacity,  habit,  discrimination,  analysis, 
assimilation,    pre-perception,    the    association    of    ideas, 


xii  Preface  for  Teachers 

selective  thinking,  ideo-motor  action  and  choice.  They 
are  the  least  technical  but  at  the  same  time  the  best 
organized  and  most  instructive  topics  in  psychology. 

In  one  particular  the  author  abandons  the  accepted 
doctrine  of  the  psychology  books.  That  images  of  the 
resident  or  remote  sensations  produced  by  a  movement 
should  be  the  usual  excitant  to  the  movement,  he  cannot 
believe  and  has  neve:  taught.  In  the  view  presented  in 
the  text  he  has  the  support  of  the  opinions  reached  by 
Kirkpatrick,  Woodworth  and  Bair  in  the  course  of  actual 
investigations  of  voluntary  action.  The  text  states 
frankly  that  the  majority  of  psychologists  believe  other- 
wise. 

The  exercises  and  experiments  are  intended  to  serve 
the  purpose,  not  of  interesting  puzzles  or  theses  to  be 
argued,  but  rather  that  served  by  the  problems  of  the 
algebra  or  physics  book,  by  the  sentence-writing  of  a 
text-book  in  Latin  or  French,  and  by  the  experiments 
and  demonstrations  of  a  course  in  chemistry.  They  are 
to  give  the  student  some  very  definite  thing  to  do,  which 
he  can  do,  and  which  can  be  definitely  corrected  or  ap- 
proved by  the  instructor.  It  is  difficult  to  get  such  defi- 
nite material  for  study  and  practice  in  the  mental  sciences 
other  than  logic,  but  it  is  a  prime  necessity  for  successful 
teaching,  especially  in  large  classes. 

The  sharp  division  of  the  book  into  descriptive  psy- 
chology, physiological  psychology  and  dynamic  psychol- 
ogy makes  some  difficulty  in  the  selection  of  reference 
readings.  Strictly  parallel  readings  are  impossible  in  the 
case  of  many  chapters.  It  is  on  the  whole  best  to  follow 
Professor  Titchener's  advice  and  have  the  class  first  mas- 
ter one  coherent  account  of  the  subject  and  then  read 
one  or  more  other  elementary  text-books  and  later  still, 
if  there  is  time,  parts  of  some  general  treatise.    A  list  of 


Preface  for  Teachers  xiii 

references  for  individual  study  of  special  topics  is  given 
at  the  end  of  the  book. 

Teachers  College,  Columbia  University,  January,  1905. 


PREFACE  TO  SECOND  EDITION 

The  changes  from  the  first  edition  consist  of  altera- 
tions of  form,  especially  in  the  case  of  the  exercises,  which 
the  experience  of  teachers  who  have  used  the  book  recom- 
mends. The  content  remains  practically  identical  with 
that  c-^  the  first  edition.  The  reference  lists  are  improved 
by  the  utilization  of  the  psychological  literature  of  the 
past  two  years.  Since  an  excellent  English  version  of 
the  fifth  edition  of  Wundt's  Physiologische  Psychologie 
is  now  progressing  toward  completion,  the  references  to 
it  have  been  changed  to  fit  the  fifth,  instead  of  the  fourth, 
edition. 

Teachers  College,  Columbia  University,  December,  1906. 


CONTENTS 


INTRODUCTION 

CHAPTER  I 
The  Subject  Matter  and  Problems  of  Psychology 

§     I.    Mental    Facts I 

%    2.    A  General  View  of  Mental  States 3 

§3-/4  General  View  of  Human  Action 10 

%    4,    A  General  View  of  the  Connections  of  Mental  Facts. .  12 

PART  I 

Descriptive  Psychology 

CHAPTER  n 

Feelings  of  Things  and  Qualities  as  Present  : 

Sensations  and  Percepts 

§    5.     The    Nature    of    Sensations 19 

§    6.     The   Classification   of  Sensations 24 

§     7.     Sensation    and    Stimulus 28 

§    8.    Percepts     35 

CHAPTER  HI 
Feelings  of  Things  as  Absent:   Images  and  Memories 

§     9.     Mental  Images    43 

§  10.     Memories    50 

CHAPTER  IV 

Feelings  of  Facts  :  Feelings  of  Relationships^ 

Meanings  and  Judgments 

§  1 1.     Feelings    of    Relationship 58 

§  12.     Feelings   of  Meaning    65 

§  13.    Judgments    71 


xvi  Contents 

CHAPTER  V 
Feelings  of  Personal  Conditions:  Emotions 

§  14.     The  Nature  of  the  Emotions 74 

§  15.     The  Classification  of  the  Emotions 75 

§16.     The  Attributes   of  Emotions 81 

CHAPTER  VI 

Mental  States  Concerned  in  the  Direction  of 

Conduct:  Feelings  of  Willing 

§  17.    Definitions  and  Descriptions 85 

CHAPTER  Vn 
General  Characteristics  of  Mental  States 

§  18.     Qualities   Common   to   all   Mental  States 92 

§  19.    Attention    98 

§  20.     A  New  Classification  of  Mental  States 108 

CHAPTER  VHI 

The  Functions  of  Mental  States 

§  21.     The  Function  of  Mental  Life  as  a  Whole iii 

§  22.     The  Functions  of  Different  Groups  of  Mental  States. .   114 


PART  II 

The  Physiological  Basis  of  Mental  Life: 
Physiological  Psychology 

CHAPTER  IX 
The  Constitution  of  the  Nervous  System 

§  23.     Gross    Structure 120 

I  24.    Finer    Structure 125 

CHAPTER  X 
The  Action  of  the  Nervous  System 

§25.     The  Functions   of  the   Neurones 144 

§26.     The    Arrangement    of   the   Neurones 147 

§  27.    The  Laws  of  Brain  Action 162 


Contents  xvii 

CHAPTER  XI 
The  Nervous  System  and  Mental  States 

In   General    169 

The  Physiological  Correlates  of  Particular  Groups  of 
Mental  States   170 


PART  III 

Dynamic  Psychology 

§  30.    Introduction    184 

CHAPTER  XII 
Original  Tendencies  to  Connections 

§  31.     Instincts    187 

§  32.     Capacities    191 

§  33.    Further  Attributes  of  Original   Tendencies 193 

CHAPTER  XIII 
The  Law  of  Association 

The   Growth    of   Instincts   into   Habits 199 

The  Formation   of  Connections  in  General 203 

The  Control  of  the  Formation  of  Connections 209 

Response    by    Analogy 211 

CHAPTER  XIV 
The  Law  of  Dissociation  or  Analysis 

38.  The  Process    of  Analysis 215 

39.  The  Influence  of  the  Law  of  Analysis 217 

40.  The  Control  of  the  Process  of  Analysis 220 

41.  Physiological    Conditions    of  Human   Nature 222 

CHAPTER  XV 
The  Connections  Between  Sense  Stimuli  and  Mental 
States:  Connections  of  Impression 

42.  Inborn  and  Acquired   Connections   of  Impression. ..  .  224 

43.  The  Law  of  Association  in  the  Case  of  Connections  of 

Impression     227 

44.  The  Control  of  Connections  of  Impression 230 


xviii  Contents 

CHAPTER  XVI 

The  Connections  Between  One  Mental  State  and 

Another 

§  45.     Associations    of    Ideas 238 

^  46.     Memory     255 

§  47.     The  Control  of  Purely  Mental  Connections 260 

CHAPTER  XVn 

The  Connections  Between  One  Mental  State  and 

Another  {Continued) 

§  48.     Purposive    Thinking 264 

§  49.     Reasoning    267 


CHAPTER  XVni 

The  Connections  Between  Mental  States  and  Acts: 

Connections  of  Expression 

§  50.     The   General  Laws   of  Human   Action 274 

§  51.     The   Will:  Spontaneous  and  Purposive   Action 276 

§  52.     The  Nature  of  the  Mental  States  Which  Precede  Move- 
ments      281 

§  53.     Suggestion   and  Imitation 286 

§  54.    Individual  Differences  in  the  Life   of  Action 290 

§  55.     The  Control  of  the  Life  of  Action 293 


CHAPTER  XIX 
Movements 

§  56.    Acts  of  Skill  298 

§  57.     The   Connections  between  Sense  Stimuli  and  Move- 
ments       302 

§  58.    Movements   as   Antecedents 306 

CHAPTER  XX 
Selective  Processes 

§  59.    Attention    and    Neglect 309 

§  60,     Satisfaction    and    Discomfort 314 

§61.    Conclusion    of   Part   III , 316 


Contents  xix 

CONCLUSION 

CHAPTER  XXI 

The  Relations  of  Psychology 

62.  The  Science  of  Psychology  as  a  Whole  319 

62,.  The  Relations  of  Psychology  to  Other  Sciences 322 

64.  The  Relations  of  Psychology  to  the  Arts 324 

65.  The  Relations  of  Psychology  to  the  Personal  Conduct 

of   Life 327 

Topics  for  Special  Study 336 

Index   of    Illustrations 343 

Index  of  Experiments 344 

Index  of  Names  and  Subjects 345 


The  Elements  of  Psychology 

CHAPTER  I 

The  Subject  Matter  and  Problems  of  Psychology 
§    I.  Mental  Facts 

The  world  is  made  up  of  physical  and  mental  facts. 
On  the  one  hand  there  are  solids,  liquids  and  gases,  plants, 
trees  and  the  bodies  of  animals,  the  stars  and  planets  and 
their  movements,  the  winds  and  clouds,  and  so  on  through 
the  list  of  physical  things  and  their  movements.  On  the 
other  hand  are  the  thoughts  and  feelings  of  men  and  of 
other  animals ;  ideas,  opinions,  memories,  hopes,  fears, 
pleasures,  pains,  smells,  tastes,  and  so  on  through  the 
list  of  states  of  mind.  Physics,  chemistry,  astronomy, 
botany,  zoology,  geology  and  the  other  physical  sciences 
deal  with  the  former  group  of  facts.  Psychology,  the 
science  of  mental  facts  or  of  mind,  deals  with  the  latter. 
Human  psychology  deals  with  the  thoughts  and  feelings 
of  human  beings  and  seeks  to  explain  the  facts  of  intellect, 
character  and  personal  life.  How  do  you  remember 
where  you  were  a  year  ago?  Why  do  we  attend  to 
certain  sights  and  sounds  and  neglect  others?  What 
is  the  diflference  between  an  intelligent  pupil  and  an 
idiot?  What  decides  how  large  one  shall  judge  an  ob- 
ject to  be?  What  happens  when  a  student  reasons  out 
a  problem  in  geometry?  Such  are  the  questions  which 
the  science  of  psychology  tries  to  answer. 

These  questions  center  about  four  leading  topics : 
(i)   The  nature  of  the  different  kinds  of  thoughts  and 
feelings. 


2  Introduction 

(2)  The  purposes  which  they  serve  in  life. 

(3)  The  ways  in  which  they  are  related  to  the  action  of 

the   brain   or  nervous   system. 

(4)  The  laws  which  govern  their  behavior  and  that  of 

the  bodily  states  and  acts  connected  with  them. 
E.g.,   psychology   should    give   information   about : — 
(i)   Just  what  attention  is. 

(2)  In  what  way  fear  or  pain  is  useful  in  the  conduct 

of   life. 

(3)  How  softening  of  the  brain  produces  idiocy  or  how 

fever  produces  mental  confusion. 

(4)  Why  thinking  of  one  thing  makes  one  think  of  a 

certain  other  thing,  or  why  practice  makes  perfect. 

Its  task  thus  concerns  the  description  of  mental  states 

or  processes,  their  function  in  nature,  their  relation  to  the 

nervous  system  and  the  general  explanation  of  the  part 

played  by  the  mind  in  human  life. 

Exercises 

1.  Which  of  the  following  words  refer  to  mental  facts? 
Which  refer  to  physical  facts  ?  Which  refer  sometimes  to  mental 
and  sometimes  to  physical  facts? 

Gas,  tree,  sympathy,  money,  desire,  wish,  dog,  stone,  dreams, 
headache,  inventiveness,  inch,  pound,  taste,  intelligence,  heavy, 
sour,  oxygen,  electricity,  fatigue,  pleasure,  loud,  observe,  remem- 
ber, image,  teeth. 

2.  Under  which  topic,  of  (i),  (2),  (3)  and  (4)  above,  does 
each  of  the  following  questions  belong? 

a.  Is  the  fact  that  a  thing  gives  pleasure  a  sign  that  it  is 
good  for  us? 

b.  What  good  does  dreaming  do? 

c.  What  is  the   difference  between  anger  and  hate? 

d.  Why  are  certain  people  bad  spellers  in  spite  of  much  study? 

e.  Why  is  it  so  much  easier  to  say  the  alphabet  forward 
than  backward? 

f.  Why  does  great  sorrow  make  one  unconscious  of  what 
goes  on  about  him? 


The  Subject  Matter  of  Psychology  3 

g.    What  are  the  causes  of  exceptional  musical  ability? 
h.    What  are  the  causes  of  insanity? 
i.     What  feelings  guide   us  to  self-preservation? 
j.     What  feelings  guide  us  to  help  other  people  to  keep  alive? 
k.     In  what  respects  are  imagining  and  remembering  alike? 
3.     Which  of  the  four  aspects  of  psychology  does  each  of  the 
definitions  of   psychology  given  below   emphasize? 

a.  "Psychology  is  the  Science  of  Mental  Life,  both  of  its 
phenomena  and  their  conditions."     (W.  James). 

b.  .  .  .  "We  note  their  resemblances,  differences  and 
other  relations  [the  author  is  speaking  of  thoughts  and  feelings] 
and  can  thus  coordinate  them,  place  under  one  head  those  that 
are  alike,  and  give  them  a  name  by  which  to  speak  of  them." 
(J.  McCosh). 

c.  "What  these  phenomena  [thoughts  and  feelings]  actually 
are,  as  conscious  states  and  how  they  come  to  exist  and  follow 
each  other  in  the  order  which  they  in  fact  assume,  forms  the 
primary  subject  of  the  investigations  of  psychology."  (G.  T. 
Ladd). 

d.  The  science  of  psychology  attempts  "(i)  to  analyze  con- 
crete (actual)  m.ental  experience  into  its  simplest  components, 
(2)  to  discover  how  these  elements  combine,  what  are  the  laws 
which  govern  their  combination,  and  (3)  to  bring  them  into  con- 
nection with  their  physiological  [bodily]  conditions."  (E.  B. 
Titchener). 

e.  "The  business  of  psychology  is  to  furnish  a  systematic 
and  coherent  account  of  the  flow  of  psychical  process  in  its 
various  forms,  phases,  and  stages,  and  of  the  conditions  on 
which  it  depends."     (G.  F.  Stout). 

§  2.  A  General  View  of  Mental  States 

The  Classification  of  IVTental  States. — A  list  of  all 
the  different  kinds  of  thoughts  and  feelings  that  human 
beings  have  would  exceed  in  length  a  list  of  the  hundreds 
of  thousands  of  animals  and  plants.  For  convenience 
psychology  divides  this  total  group  of  mental  conditions 
into  a  few  great  classes. 

For  instance,  the  feelings  of  joy,  grief,  anger,  fear, 


4  Introduction 

sympathy  and  merriment,  are  alike  among  themselves  in 
that  each  is  a  feeling,  not  of  something  in  the  outside 
world,  but  of  some  personal  attitude  or  condition.  All 
these  and  similar  feelings  are  grouped  together  for  study, 
the  name  used  by  psychologists  in  referring  to  the  group 
being  emotions.  When  you  close  your  eyes  and  call  up 
in  imagination  your  father's  face,  or  your  room  at  home, 
when  you  call  up  the  voice  of  a  friend  or  the  melody  of 
a  familiar  song,  you  feel  in  each  case  some  thing  or  con- 
dition, but  as  not  present.  All  such  feelings  of  things, 
qualities  and  conditions  as  not  present  are  grouped  to- 
gether for  study  under  the  name  mental  images.  To  take 
another  instance,  the  sound  of  a  bell  that  you  hear  in  a 
dream,  the  faces  which  the  fever-patient  sees  in  his  delir- 
ium, the  ghosts  which  still  exist  for  the  mind's  eye,  may 
all  be  classed  together  since  they  are  all  feelings  of 
things  as  present  when  really  nothing  of  the  sort  is 
actually  present.  Such  feelings  are  called  hallucinations. 
Some  of  the  chief  groups  into  which  thoughts  and 
feelings  are  classified  are : — 


I. 

Sensations. 

2. 

Percepts. 

3. 

Mental  Im.ages. 

4. 

Memories. 

5- 

Feelings  of  Meaning. 

a.  concepts  or  general  notions. 

b.  individual    notions. 

c.  abstractions. 

6. 

Feelings  of  Relationships. 

7- 

Judgments. 

8. 

Emotions. 

9. 

Feelings  concerned   in   the   direction   of 

conduct ;    states  of  will. 

itic 

>ns  of  These  Groups. — The  exact  nature  of 

The  Subject  Matter  of  Psychology  5 

these  groups  will  be  made  clear  in  later  sections.  For 
the  present  it  will  be  sufficient  to  get  a  rough  general  idea 
of  them.  This  can  be  done  easily  by  making  actual 
observations  as   follows  : — 

1.  Sit  near  a  hot  stove. 
Touch  yourself  with  a  pencil. 
Bend  your  finger. 

Prick  yourself  with  a  pin. 

Listen  to  the  tap  of  a  stick  on  the  floor. 

Hold  a  book  at  arm's  length  for  one  minute. 
The  feelings  of  warmth,  touch,  movement,  pain, 
sound,  strain  or  fatigue  and  others  like  them  are  called 
Sensations.  Sensations  are  feelings  of  qualities  or  con- 
ditions either  of  things  or  of  one's  own  body. 

2.  Look  at  a  picture. 

Listen  to  a  chord  or  melody. 
Take  hold  of  a  key. 
You   feel  in  each  case  some  'thing'  that  is  present. 
Such  feelings  of  things  present  are  called  Percepts. 

3.  Imagine  to  yourself  the  tune  of  Yankee  Doodle. 
Imagine  the  feeling  of  velvet. 

Imagine  the  sight  of  the  moon. 
Imagine  that  your  arm  is  swinging  back  and 
forth. 
The  feelings  you  have  of  the  sound,  the  velvet,  the 
moon  and  the  arm-motion  are  called  Mental  Images.     A 
mental  image  is  the  feeling  of  a  thing  or  quality  or  condi- 
tion when  it  is  really  not  there  and  is  felt  not  to  be  there. 
4.     Think    what   you   were    doing  yesterday   at   one 
o'clock.     Think  of  what  you  ate  for  dinner  day  before 
yesterday.     Recall  the  feeling  you  have  when  you  meet 
some  one  whom  at  first  you  do  not  remember  but  finally 
remember  as  having  been  with  you  at  a  certain  place. 
These  feelings  are  called  Memories, 


6  Introduction 

The  tenn  memories  is  also  at  times  used  to  include 
mental  images.  Thus  if  any  one  calls  to  mind  the  way 
his  father  looks,  he  may  be  said  either  to  have  a  mental 
image  of  his  father  or  to  remember  his  father.  The 
words  memory  and  remember  and  forget  are  also  used 
for  habits  or  matters  of  skill  that  are  permanent.  Thus 
we  say  that  we  remember  how  to  dance,  swim  or  play  the 
piano.  A  better  name  here  would  be  'the  permanence  of 
habits/ 

5.     If  you  have  such  thoughts  as, 

'Eggs  are  nutritious.' 

'Girls  are  better  than  boys.* 

'Electricity  is  not  a  fluid.' 

*A11  teachers  should  be  paid/ 

'Shakspere  was  a  genius.' 

'Virtue  is  its  own  reward.' 

'Honesty  is  the  best  policy/ 
there  may  be  images  of  sight  or  sound  in  connection  with 
the  thought  but  they  vary  with  different  people  and  are 
not  the  important  thing  in  the  thought.  The  important 
thing  is  the  feeling  of  your  Meaning.  Thus,  in  the  fourth 
thought,  you  feel  that  you  mean  all  teachers,  though  you 
may  have  an  image  of  some  one  teacher,  or  of  the  sound 
of  the  word  'teacher,'  or  of  something  different.  These 
feelings  of  Meaning  are  very  important  in  all  higher  sorts 
of  thinking.  When  the  feeling  is  that  we  mean  every 
one  of  a  class  of  things  (e.  g.,  'all  teachers',  or  'girls') 
the  feeling  is  called  a  general  notion  or  concept.  When 
we  feel  that  we  mean  one  particular  thing  (e.  g.,  when  we 
think  'Shakspere'  or  'Napoleon'  or  'this  apple')  the  feel- 
ing is  called  an  individual  notion.  When  the  feeling  is 
that  we  mean  some  element  or  quality  or  characteristic 
apart  from  the  thing  or  person  possessing  it,  the  feeling 
i«  called  an  abstract  idea  or  abstraction. 


The  Subject  Matter  of  Psychology  y 

6.  We  feel  not  only  qualities,  conditions,  objects  and 
meanings,  but  also  the  relations  between  them.  E,  g., 
look  at  two  books,  one  of  which  is  bigger  than  the  other. 
You  feel  not  only  the  books,  but  also  their  relation  of  in- 
equality. When  you  feel  'cats  and  dogs'  you  have  not 
only  two  general  notions,  but  also  the  feeling  that  the 
things  they  mean  are  to  be  taken  together.  'Cats  without 
dogs'  would  be  felt  to  mean  something  quite  different. 
Very  important  among  such  Feelings  of  Relationships 
are  those  of  likeness  and  difference  and  of  cause  and 
effect.  Try  to  observe  in  yourself  the  feelings  you  have 
when  you  think  of  or,  nevertheless,  above,  below,  like, 
unlike,  equal,  unequal,  the  same  as, 

7.  The  entire  feelings  which  you  had  in  thinking  the 
sentences  given  to  show  feelings  of  meaning,  would  be 
called  Judgments.  They  are  feelings  that  such  and  such 
a  state  of  affairs  exists,  feelings  that  may  be  expressed  in 
declarative  sentences. 

8.  The  nature  of  the  Emotions  was  briefly  described 
in  the  second  paragraph  of  §  2.  The  following  list  of 
sample  emotions  may  serve  further  to  define  the  group : — 
Admiration,  amusement,  anger,  annoyance,  anxiety,  awe, 
envy,  fear,  gratitude,  hatred,  joy,  love,  pity,  regret,  relief, 
remorse,  restraint,  revenge,  self-complacency,  shame,  shy- 
ness, sorrow,  surprise,  suspense,  suspicion,  sympathy, 
wonder. 

9.  Notice  your  feelings  of  desire,  choice,  decision, 
effort,  conflict,  impulses  and  intentions.  These  feelings 
and  others  concerned  with  action  are  commonly  called 
States  of  Will,  or  Volitional  States. 

A  long  list  could  be  made  of  kinds  of  feelings 
which  fall  more  or  less  outside  of  these  chief  groups. 
E.g.,  there  are  feelings  of  attention,  inattention,  ennui, 
interest,  belief,   uncertainty,  inference,  etc.,  etc. 


8  Introduction 

Complex  Mental  States. — No  absolute  and  sharp 
classification  can  be  made.  It  is  not  necessary  or  even 
wise  to  make  a  cut-and-dried  classification  of  all  thoughts 
and  feelings,  since  in  the  ordinary  course  of  mental  life 
mixtures  of  different  kinds  of  mental  states  are  the  com- 
mon occurrences.  E.g.,  one  thinks  of  a  man  and  at  the 
same  time  has  feelings  of  attention  to  the  mental  image 
and  of  aversion  toward  the  man,  and  perhaps  a  judgment 
that  he  is  dishonest.  Memory  image,  attentiveness,  emo- 
tion and  judgment  thus  combine.  Nearly  all  mental 
states  are  pervaded  by  a  feeling  of  selfhood,  by  sensations 
of  one's  own  bodily  condition  and  by  a  general  feeling- 
tone  of  well-being  or  ill-being.  It  is,  however,  profitable 
in  studying  human  nature  to  analyze  complex  states  of 
mind  into  their  component  parts,  to  study  separately  the 
simpler  aspects  or  parts  of  the  total  thought  or  feeling. 

Intermediate  Mental  States. — It  is  also  true  that 
in  the  richness  of  an  actual  human  mind's  life  there  exist 
very  many  mental  states  which  do  not  fall  readily  into 
one  class  rather  than  another.  E.  g.,  is  the  sound  of  a 
bell  ringing  a  sensation  or  a  percept,  a  feeling  of  a  quality 
or  of  a  thing?  Is  the  feeling  of  impatience  an  emotion 
or  a  state  of  will?  Shall  the  feeling  of  effort  or  strain 
that  one  has  as  one  holds  the  mind  to  a  disagreeable  task 
be  called  a  sensation  or  an  emotion?  Just  as  there  are 
some  things  which  may  be  called  either  animals  or  plants, 
just  as  there  are  some  streams  which  are  equally  well 
classified  as  brooks  or  as  rivers, — so  there  are  in  mental 
life  intermediate,  halfway  stages  between  sensation  and 
perception,  perception  and  image,  sensation  and  state  of 
will,  etc.  It  would  be  misleading  to  suppose  that  a  man's 
mind  was  by  nature  divided  up  into  a  number  of  neat 
bundles,  one  of  sensations,  one  of  percepts,  and  the  like, 
and  that  each  bundle  was  quite  distinct  and  separate  from 


The  Subject  Matter  of  Psychology  g 

all  the  rest.  The  division  is  not  absolute,  but  is  like  that 
made  when  a  city  is  divided  into  a  Chinese  quarter,  Italian 
quarter,  Jewish  quarter,  and  the  like.  The  divisions 
grade  into  each  other  imperceptibly. 

Exercises 

1.  In  studying  which  of  the  following  studies  does  one 
make  the  most  use  of  (a)  the  emotions,  (b)  feelings  of  meaning, 
(c)  percepts,  (d)  states  of  will? — Botany,  Music,  Grammar, 
Literature  ? 

2.  What  kind  of  a  mental  fact  is  referred  to  by  each  sentence, 
except  (h),  in  the  following  passages? — 

(a)  "An  unaccountable  dread  seized  him.  (b)  He  heard 
only  the  rustle  of  the  wind  in  the  trees,  (c)  Before  his  mind's 
eye  came  a  vision  of  the  man  whom  he  had  been  compelled  to 
forsake,  (d)  Halting  between  the  choice  from  two  apparently 
equal  evils,  he  could  make  up  his  mind  neither  to  go  forward 
nor  to  return,     (e)   'I  shall  lose  in  any  case,'  he  mused." 

(f)  ''In  utter  amazement,  Silas  fell  on  his  knees  and  bent 
his  head  low  to  examine  the  marvel :  (g)  it  was  a  sleeping  child 
— a  round,  fair  thing,  with  soft  yellow  rings  all  over  its  head, 
(h)  Could  this  be  his  little  sister  come  back  to  him  in  a  dream — 
his  little  sister  whom  he  had  carried  about  in  his  arms  for  a  year 
before  she  died,  when  he  was  a  small  boy  without  shoes  or 
stockings?  (i)  But  along  with  that  question,  and  almost 
thrusting  it  away,  there  was  a  vision  of  the  old  home  and  the  old 
streets  leading  to  Lantern  Yard — and  within  that  vision  another, 
of  the  thoughts  which  had  been  present  with  him  in  those  far- 
off  scenes."     {Silas  Marner.) 

3.  Which  sort  of  mental  fact  is  usually  expressed  by  a 
proper  noun?     By   an  interjection?     By  a  preposition? 

4.  What  varieties  of  mental  states  may  verbs  express? 
Give  an  illustration  in  each  case. 

5.  Give  illustrations  of  a  noun  expressing  a  percept,  as 
when  a  baby  says  'Man,  Man';  of  a  noun  expressing  a  general 
notion,  as  when  one  says,  'Men  are  mortal' ;  of  a  noun  expressing 
an  emotion,  as  when  one  says,  'Man  alive!' 


lO  Introduction 

%  ^.  A  General  View  of  Human  Action 

Since  the  majority  of  human  actions  are  directly  con- 
nected with  thoughts  or  feelings,  psychology  deals  with 
not  only  the  mental  states,  but  also  the  acts  or  conduct 
of  men. 

Conduct  Equals  Movements  and  Their  Connec- 
tions.— All  acts  are  reducible  to  movements  of  the  body 
brought  about  by  the  contraction  and  relaxation  of  mus- 
cles. The  common  notion  of  an  act,  however,  includes, 
besides  the  mere  act  itself,  the  thoughts  and  feelings 
leading  to  it  and  the  circumstances  under  which  it  occurs. 
Thus  we  commonly  regard  Caesar's  crossing  the  Rubicon 
as  an  act  of  unique  importance,  although  the  act  itself 
was  really  only  a  series  of  alternate  muscular  contractions 
identical  with  the  act  of  going  to  breakfast.  The  mere 
act  of  saying  'Yes'  is  the  same  whether  it  be  a  slice  of 
bread  or  a  husband  that  is  accepted.  The  million  things 
a  man  does  from  birth  to  death  are  at  bottom  only  some 
thousands  of  muscular  contractions.  A  comparatively 
small  number  of  movements  make  up  the  infinite  variety 
of  human  conduct  by  being  combined  in  different  ways, 
caused  by  different  feelings  and  employed  in  different 
circumstances.  Thus  the  movements  of  speech  are  only 
varied  enough  to  produce  some  hundreds  of  sounds, 
degrees  of  loudness  and  qualities  of  pitch  and  timbre,  but 
these  few  elementary  movements  combine  to  produce 
hundreds  of  languages,  each  with  thousands  of  words, 
capable  of  making  millions  of  statements  and  questions, 
each  of  which  may  be  an  act  of  many  differing  meanings 
according  to  the  intentions  and  circumstances  of  its  utter- 
ance. Human  conduct  is  then  made  up  of  (i)  acts 
proper,  or  movements,  and  (2)  the  connections  between 
these  movements  and  the  various  circumstances  of  life. 


The  Subject  Matter  of  Psychology  II 

The  Classification  of  Movements. — The  common 
classifications  of  acts,  as  right  and  wrong,  conscious  and 
unconscious,  normal  and  abnormal,  and  the  like,  are 
classifications  not  of  acts  proper,  but  of  the  circumstances 
under  which  they  occur.  The  same  movement — e.  g., 
winking, — may  of  course  be  now  right,  now  wrong,  now 
conscious,  now  unconscious. 

Acts  proper  or  movements  may  be  classified  in  three 
ways: — (i)  according  to  their  composition,  (2)  accord- 
ing to  their  location,  and  (3)  according  to  their  function 
or  use.  The  last  is  the  classification  of  importance  to 
psychology. 

1.  Movements  are  simple  or  complex.     A  complex 

movement  is  one  that  is  made  up  of  simpler 
movements.  A  simple  movement  is  one  that 
is  not. 

2.  Movements  are  /iawc?-movements,  ^jr^-movements, 

chest-mowtmtnis,  etc. 

3.  Movements  are  physiological,  expressive  and  effec- 

tive. Movements  of  physiological  function,  such 
as  those  involved  in  swallowing,  in  the  contrac- 
tion of  the  heart,  in  the  peristalis  of  the  intes- 
tines, or  in  the  expansion  of  the  lungs,  have  as 
their  chief  direct  function  to  keep  the  body  alive. 

Movements  of  expression,  such  as  those  in- 
volved in  laughing,  crying,  staring  and  groan- 
ing, have  as  their  chief  direct  function  to  reveal 
inner  conditions, — states  of  mind. 

Movements  of  effect,  such  as  those  involved 
in  running,  striking,  grasping  and  dropping, 
have  as  their  chief  direct  function  to  bring 
about  results  in  things  or  persons. 


12  Introduction 

Exercises 

1.  Describe  cases  in  which  the  same  movement  results  froni 
several   different  mental  states. 

2.  Describe  cases  in  which  the  same  mental  state  results  in 
several  different  movements. 

3.  Describe  cases  in  which  four  or  five  movements  result  in 
ten  or  twelve  different  actions  (in  the  common  meaning  of  the 
word)  according  to  the  ways  in  which  the  movements  are  con- 
nected. 

4.  Classify  the  following  acts  into  acts  of  physiological  func- 
tion, acts  of  expression  and  acts  of  effect:  (a)  wrinkling  the 
forehead,  (b)  lifting  the  arm,  (c)  curling  the  fingers  in,  (d) 
sneezing,  (e)  coughing,  (f)  walking,  (g)  pushing,  (h)  raising 
the  eye-brows. 

5.  Into  which  of  the  three  classes  mentioned  in  the  fourth 
question  would  (a)  movements  of  the  arms  generally  fall? 
(b)  Movements  caused  by  facial  muscles?  (c)  Movements  of  the 
stomach  ? 

§  4.  ^  General  View  of  the  Connections  of  Mental  Facts 

The   Classification    of    Mental    Connections. — The 

stuff  out  of  which  a  human  life  is  made  is  mental  states 
and  movements.  What  sort  of  a  life  it  shall  be  depends 
upon:  first,  what  mental  states  and  movements  compose 
it,  and  second,  how  these  are  connected.  To  understand 
a  man's  intellect  we  must  know  not  only  what  thoughts 
and  feelings  he  has,  but  also  in  what  circumstances,  that  is, 
in  what  connections,  he  has  them :  to  understand  his  char- 
acter we  must  know  not  only  what  are  his  acts,  but  also  in 
what  connection  he  performs  them.  All  men  feel  love : 
the  question  is  what  they  love.  All  men  drink  :  the  differ- 
ence between  the  total  abstainer  and  the  drunkard  lies  in 
the  stimulus  that  provokes  the  act  of  drinking.  Psy- 
chology, to  study  human  life  fully,  must  study  not  only 
mental  states  and  bodily  acts,  but  also  their  connections. 
And  since  both  thoughts  and  movements  are  aroused  by 


The  Subject  Matter  of  Psychology  13 

events  in  the  physical  world^  which  stimulate  the  organs 
of  sense,  psychology  must  study  also  the  connections 
between  (i)  processes  in  the  sense  organs  and  (2)  men- 
tal states  or  movements. 

The  connections  to  be  studied  are  then: — 
(i)  Connections  between  processes  in  the  sense  organs 

and  a  thought  or  feeling, 
(la)   Connections   between    processes    in    the    sense   or- 
gans and  a  movement. 

(2)  Connections   between    one   thought   or    feeling   and 

another. 

(3)  Connections  between   a   thought  or   feeling  and  a 

movement. 

E-  g.,  feeling  hot  when  one  goes  near  the  fire  is  a  case 
of  (i)  :  for  it  is  a  connection  between  the  outside  event, 
rapid  molecular  motion,  and  our  sensation  of  heat.  The 
contractions  of  the  stomach  when  it  contains  food  illus- 
trate (la).  Thinking  of  C  when  one  thinks  of  A  B  is  a 
case  of  (2).  Going  to  get  food  when  one  becomes  hun- 
gry is  a  case  of  (3). 

Connections  between  Movements  and  Mental 
States. — One  might  expect  to  study  also  connections 
between  a  movement  and  a  mental  state  and  between  one 
movement  and  another,  but  as  a  matter  of  fact,  movements 
do  not  arouse  mental  states  or  other  movements  directly, 
but  only  by  first  connecting  with  some  happening  in  a 
sense  organ.  The  (la)  group  of  connections  (between 
a  stimulation  of  a  sense  organ  and  a  movement)  are  more 
properly  a  part  of  physiology  than  of  psychology,  since 
they  do  not  involve  any  mental  fact.  I  shall  therefore 
not  discuss  them  further. 

^  Thus  pressure  on  the  body  makes  one  feel  pain ;  rapid  molec- 
ular motion  makes  one  feel  warm  :  certain  chemical  conditions  in 
the  body  make  one  feel  hungry. 


14  Introduction 

Unlearned  and  Learned  Connections. — Each  of 
these  three  divisions  may  be  subdivided  into: — 

A.  Unlearned  or  original  or  native  connections. 

B.  Learned  or  acquired  connections. 

The  former  are  called  instincts ;  the  latter,  habits. 
The  connection  between  a  blow  and  a  pain  is  already 
made  in  us  apart  from  experience  or  training  (lA),  while 
the  connection  between  the  presence  of  the  letters  dog  on 
a  page  and  the  thought  of  the  familiar  domestic  animal 
has  to  be  acquired  by  experience,  has  to  be  learned  (iB). 
So  also  for  the  connections  between  a  sweet  taste  and 
the  act  of  sucking  (3A),  and  the  thought  T  have  only 
two  minutes  to  catch  the  train'  and  the  act  of  running 
{3B).  The  second  group  of  connections  are  in  nearly 
all,  if  not  in  all,  cases  acquired.  That  between  the 
thought  of  the  discovery  of  America  and  the  thought  of 
Columbus  is  a  sample. 

Classes  (i),  (2),  and  (3)  may  be  called  connections 
of  Impression,  Association  and  Expression  respectively. 
There  are  then  : — 

(lA)   Native  or  unlearned  connections  of  impression. 
(iB)   Acquired  or  learned  connections  of  impression. 
(?)  (2 A)  Native  or  unlearned  connections  of  association. 
(2B)   Acquired  or  learned  connections  of  association. 
(3A)   Native  or  unlearned  connections  of  expression. 
(3B)  Acquired  or  learned  connections  of  expression. 
Each  of  the  six  classes  so  far  made  could  be  subdivided 
again  to  almost  any  extent  according  to  the  kind  of  out- 
side events,  mental  states  and  bodily  movements  involved. 
Thus    (2B),    acquired    habits    of    association,    could   be 
divided  into  associations  between  sensations  and  concepts, 
images  and  emotions,  images  and  images,  emotions  and 
impulses,  judgments  and  judgments,  etc. 


The  Subject  Matter  of  Psychology  15 

In  the  case  of  class  (3)  it  is  useful  to  subdivide  also 
according  to  the  extent  to  which  the  connection  of  the 
bodily  act  with  the  feeling  is  modified  and  controllable. 
Some  connections  {e.  g.,  the  contraction  of  the  pupil  of 
the  eye  in  response  to  the  brightness  of  the  light)  cannot 
be  altered.  Others,  forming  the  great  majority,  can 
(^-  S'i  grasping  certain  objects  in  response  to  seeing 
them). 

Further  Classification. — The  following  names  used 
in  psychology  books  for  certain  kinds  of  connections  need 
explanation  either  because  they  are  technical  terms  or  are 
common  words  used  with  a  special  meaning: — Reflexes, 
Instincts,  Habits,  Powers,  Capacities,  Associations  of 
Ideas,   Inferences,  Reasonings. 

Reflexes  include  those  connections  of  events  in  the 
body, — sometimes  felt  in  sensation,  sometimes  not, — with 
mxOvements,  in  which  the  act  follows  the  impression  auto- 
matically, without  either  intention  or  control  on  our  part 
{e.g.,  turning  in  the  toes  when  the  sole  of  the  foot  is 
tickled,  the  contraction  of  the  pupil  of  the  eye  in  response 
to  light,  or  sneezing  when  the  membrane  of  the  nose  is 
irritated). 

Instincts,  as  now  commonly  defined,  include  reflexes 
and  all  other  connections  or  tendencies  to  connections 
amongst  thoughts,  feelings  and  acts  which  are  unlearned, 
— are  in  us  apart  from  training  or  experience.  x\nything 
that  we  do  without  having  to  learn  to  do  it,  in  brief,  is  an 
mstinct.  Thus,  crying  when  pain  is  felt,  starting  at  a  sud- 
den noise,  feeling  fear  at  large,  strange,  moving  objects 
seen  in  the  dark,  feeling  anger  when  food  is  snatched 
away  from  one  and  laughing  when  tickled,  are  instincts 
of  babyhood ;  to  feel  jealousy  when  rivalled  by  one  of  the 
same  sex  and  to  act  conspicuously  when  attracted  by  one 
of  the  opposite  sex,  are  instincts  of  youth.     The  common 


l6  Introduction 

usage  of  the  words  instinct  and  instinctive  differs  from 
the  psychologist's  usage.  People  commonly  say  that  they 
do  or  feel  certain  things  instinctively  when  they  act  or 
feel  without  deliberation  or  forethought  or  clear  con- 
sciousness of  what  or  why ;  e.  g.,  "He  instinctively  lifted 
the  glass  to  his  lips."  *'By  instinct  I  realized  that  the 
only  way  of  escape  was  directly  through  the  fire." 
Neither  of  these  cases  would  be  called  instinctive  by  the 
psychologist.  For  to  him  an  instinct  means  an  act  that 
is  the  result  of  mere  inner  growth,  not  of  training  or 
experience. 

Habits. — Tendencies  to  respond  which  are  created  in 
whole  or  in  part  by  experience,  practice  or  training  are 
called  Habits.  The  instinctive  tendencies  become  habits 
as  soon  as  experience  alters  them.  Practically  all  of 
human  behavior  is  a  series  of  illustrations  of  habits.  In 
common  talk  the  word  is  used  only  of  tendencies  to  re- 
spond which  have  become  very  frequent  and  very  habitual, 
such  as  eating  three  meals  a  day,  taking  off  our  clothes 
when  we  go  to  bed,  bowing  to  acquaintances,  thinking 
four  when  we  see  2+2,  and  the  like.  But  the  essential 
nature  of  the  behavior  is  the  same  whether  the  habit  is 
partially  formed  and  rarely  used  or  fully  formed  and 
always  used.  Indeed,  for  psychology  every  tendency  for 
anything  to  go  with  anything  else  is  either  a  case  of  a 
pure  instinct  or  of  habit. 

Powers. — Habits  not  in  action  and  possibilities  of 
forming  habits  are  called  Pozvers.  For  instance,  that 
man  has  the  power  to  avoid  theft  who  would  be  habitually 
honest,  though  tempted,  or  who  will  habitually,  when 
tempted,   not  thieve. 

Capacities. — The  inborn  qualities  which  are  the  partial 
basis  for  the  development  of  mental  powers  might  be 
called   instincts  of  possibility   rather  than   of  fact,  they 


The  Subject  Matter  of  Psychology  ly 

being  qualities  which  will  result  in  the  presence  of  the 
powers  or  habits  corresponding  to  them  when  the  proper 
circumstances  arise.  The  common  word  for  these  in- 
stincts of  possibility  is  Capacities.  Thus  the  capacity  for 
composing  music  means  the  qualities  which,  though  them- 
selves unknown,  will,  when  the  proper  opportunity  comes, 
blossom  out  into  the  power  to  compose  music  and  the 
habit  of  doing  so. 

Associations  of  Ideas. — Those  habits  of  thought  by 
which  any  one  state  of  mind  tends  to  call  up  another  state 
of  mind  are  called  Associations  of  Ideas.  Thus  we 
should  say  that  the  thought  of  AB  calling  up  the  thought 
of  C,  or  the  thought  of  90  degrees  calling  up  the  thought 
of  heat  or  of  a  right  angle,  were  cases  of  the  association 
of  ideas,  or,  more  clearly,  of  habits  in  the  realm  of  ideas. 

Inferences. — When  one  thought  or  judgment  calls  up 
another  leading  on  to  some  related  conclusion  the  process 
is  called  an  Inference.  Thus,  whereas  we  would  call  the 
sequence,  'John  is  sick.  I  like  John,'  a  mere  association 
of  ideas,  we  should  regard  as  an  inference  the  sequence, 
*John  has  the  measles.  Fred  has  been  playing  with  him. 
Fred  will  probably  have  the  measles.'  A  series  of  such 
directed  thoughts  or  inferences  is  called  Reasoning  or 
Rational  Thinking. 

In  general  the  term  Situation  is  used  for  any  total  set 
of  circumstances  in  the  outside  world  and  in  one's  body 
by  which  the  mind  is  influenced ;  Stimidiis  is  used  for  any 
particular  part  of  a  situation ;  Reaction  and  Response  are 
used  for  the  act,  and  sometimes  for  the  mental  state,  that 
occurs  as  a  result  of  the  stimulus. 

Exercises 

I.     Classify  the  following  cases  of  connection  as  (lA),  (iB), 
(2A),    (2B),   (3A)  or   (3B),  or  at  least  as   (i),   (2)    or   (3). 
2 


i8  Introduction 

a.  Shutting  the  eyes  when  a  bright  light  is  flashed  into 

them. 

b.  Bowing  to  an  acquaintance  seen. 

c.  Hearing  ten  times  eight  and  thinking  eighty. 

d.  Seeing  a  pin  and  picking  it  up. 

e.  Feeling  pain  at  a  severe  blow. 

f.  Thinking  of  an  engagement  at  a  distance  and  taking 

one's  hat  and  coat  and  starting. 

g.  Thinking  of  '1  cannot  tell  a  lie'  and  then  of  George 

Washington. 

h.  Feeling  disbelief  at  seeing,  "England  has  voted  to 
do  away  with  the  King  and  the  House  of  Lords." 

i.  Seeing  red  when  light  waves  of  460  billion  vibrations 
per  second  strike  the  retina  of  the  eye,  and  violet 
when  the  waves  have  a  vibration  rate  of  790  bil- 
lions per  second. 

j.     Thinking  of  8  after  thinking  i,  2,  3,  4,  5,  6,  7. 

2.  Which  of  the  cases  above  are  reflexes?  Which  are 
associations  of  ideas? 

3.  Why  might  ideo-motor  connections  or  ideo-motor  ac- 
tions be  a  suitable  name  for  d  and  f  ? 

4.  Name  two  connections  between  a  mental  state  and  a  bod- 
ily act  which  are  acquired.     Two  that  are  unlearned  or  native. 

5.  What  are  some  common  connections  between  thoughts 
that  are  acquired  in  the  study  of  arithmetic?  In  the  study  of 
Latin?  Of  what  sort  are  the  connections  formed  in  learning  to 
play  the  piano? 

6.  Give  cases  illustrating  the  difference  between  mere  as- 
sociation  of  ideas  and  inference. 

7.  Name  two  or  three  beneficial  instincts.  Two  or  three 
undesirable  ones. 

References 

A.  Tames,  Briefer  Course,  L,  XXIIL 
Stout,  Manual,   1-14,  56-70. 
Titchener,   Outline,  §§   1-4,  61. 

B.  Ebbinghaus,  Grundziige,  §§   i,  2,  3,  12. 
James,  Principles,  L,  XXIH. 

Wundt,     Physiologische     Psychologie,     Einleitung     (or. 
Principles  of  Physiological  Psychology,  Introduction). 


PART  I 

DESCRIPTIVE  PSYCHOLOGY 

CHAPTER   II 

Feelings  of  Qualities  and  Things  as  Present: 
Sensations  and  Percepts 

The  topic  of  this  and  of  the  next  five  chapters  will  be 
the  nature  of  the  dififerent  groups  of  mental  states.  These 
six  chapters  may  be  grouped  together  under  the  general 
title,  Descriptive  Psychology. 

§  5.  The  Nature  of  Sensations 

Definitions. — The  word  Sensations  is  used  by  writ- 
ers of  psychology  with  several  different  meanings. 
Sometimes  they  include  under  this  term  only  feelings  of 
brightness,  color,  size,  pitch,  loudness,  timbre  or  tone- 
quality,  taste,  smell,  touch,  pressure,  resistance,  move- 
ment, heat,  cold,  pain,  position,  rotation,  hunger,  thirst 
and  other  feelings  of  definite  qualities  of  things  and  well 
known  conditions  of  the  body.  But  often  they  include 
also  the  feelings  of  fatigue  of  different  sorts,  of  effort  or 
strain,  of  suspense  or  expectancy,  of  shock,  shuddering, 
trembling,  well-being,  malaise,  dizziness  and  other  feel- 
ings of  vague  and  little  understood  bodily  conditions. 

Ordinarily  they  include  only  the  simple,  bare,  uncom- 
bined  feelings  under  the  ■  term  sensation  and  treat  the 
actual  complex  feelings  (e.g.,  of  the  taste  of  a  mouthful 

19 


20  Dynamic  Psychology 

of  acid,  the  smell  of  the  woods  or  the  touch  of  a  pin,  as 
mixtures  or  combinations  of  simpler  elementary  feelings. 
But  they  also  use  the  word  more  vaguely  for  all  direct 
feelings  of  the  qualities  of  things  or  of  conditions  of  the 
body  which  are  not  the  definite  feelings  of  things  classed 
as  percepts  or  the  rich  combinations  of  feelings  classed  as 
emotions.  This  being  the  usage,  the  complex  sound  of  a 
city  street,  the  taste  of  coffee  or  the  shock  of  a  cold  plunge 
would  be  called  a  sensation.  Sensations  are  sometimes 
defined  as  the  primitive,  bare  elements  of  mental  life,  the 
first  things  in  consciousness.  From  this  point  of  view 
only  the  original  appearance  of  any  feeling  may  be  called 
sensation ;  after  that  the  mental  state  equals  sensation 
plus  association  or  experience. 

The  fact  of  importance  that  appears  from  these  va- 
rious definitions,  is  that  they  and  all  others  are  arbitrary, 
that  in  fact  we  cannot  draw  clear  lines  of  distinction 
between  sensations  of  qualities  of  things  and  sensations 
of  bodily  conditions, — between  sensations  from  special, 
well-known  stimuli  like  sounds  and  from  vague,  ill- 
known  stimuli  like  the  condition  of  the  blood  or  the 
gnawings  of  dyspepsia, — between  atomic,  indivisible  bits 
or  brightness  or  pain  or  bitter  and  complex  masses  of 
color,  toothache  or  tones, — between  the  first  sensation  of 
any  sort  and  the  subsequent  ones  modified  by  it.  Nor 
can  we  draw  a  clear  line  around  sensations  (taken  in 
the  broad  sense  shown  by  the  group  of  samples  above)  so 
as  to  infallibly  separate  sensations  from  percepts  or  from 
emotions  or  from  certain  feelings  of  relationships.  It  is 
indeed  as  important  to  know  that  these  mental  states 
shade  off  the  one  into  the  other  as  to  know  the  general 
features  of  difference  which  lead  us  to  separate  them  into 
groups. 

Realizing  then  that  definitions  must  be   rough,  one 


Feelings  of  Things  as  Present  21 

may  say  that  sensations  are  direct  feelings  of  qualities  of 
things  or  of  conditions  of  the  body.  Pure  sensations  are 
such  feelings  when  uninUnenced  by  previous  experiences. 
Elementary  sensations  are  such  feelings  so  simple  or 
minute  as  to  be  unanalysable  into  simpler  ones. 

Pure  Sensations. — Except  in  the  first  experiences  of 
early  infancy,  pure  sensations  are  not  found.  The  ways 
in  which  the  outside  w^orld  and  our  own  bodily  states  are 
felt  are  the  result  of  original  tendencies  combined  with 
practice.  Thus  artists  who  wish  to  get  back  to  the  bare, 
immediate  sizes  and  colors  of  things,  apart  from  the 
influence  of  our  habitual  interpretations  of  them,  have  to 
undergo  special  training  to  free  themselves  from  the,  for 
their  purposes,  disadvantageous  tendencies  of  experience. 
Although  in  actual  mental  life  pure  sensations  are  not 
found,  it  is  possible  in  thought  to  regard  any  sensation  as 
a  pure  sensation  plus  the  modifications  in  it  due  to  experi- 
ence, and  to  argue  about  the  pure  sensation's  factor  or 
share  or  aspect  by  itself. 

Elementary  Sensations.  —  Elem.entary  sensations 
are  not  real  fragments  of  our  mental  states,  but  abstrac- 
tions invented  to  aid  our  understanding  of  mental  life. 
They  exist  in  the  sense  that  lines  without  breadth  or  thick- 
ness exist.  Just  as  an  actual  boundary  wall  is  not  a  sum 
of  such  lines,  so  the  sensations  we  have  are  not  sums  or 
collections  of  tiny  atomic  sensations.  An  intense  salt 
taste  is  not  the  sum  of  a  thousand  slightly  salt  tastes,  any 
more  than  the  thought  of  a  chair  is  the  thought  of  c  plus 
the  thought  of  h  plus  the  thought  of  a  and  so  on.  Our 
feelings  of  the  outside  world  can  in  thought  be  analyzed 
into  elements  of  colors,  sounds,  pressures  and  the  like,  but 
in  actual  experience  they  are  felt  as  complex  total  feelings. 
Nor  does  the  mind  in  its  sense  life  grow  from  a  start- 
ing-point of  elementary  sensations  by  the  addition  of  more 


S2 


Descriptive  Psychology 


and  more  of  them  and  by  building  them  into  complex 
wholes.  On  the  contrary,  the  first  sensations  are  ex- 
tremely vague,  rich,  complicated  feelings  of  comfort, 
discomfort,  bodily  disturbances  and  such  appearances  of 
external  things  as  are  well  characterized  by  Professor 
James'  phrase  'a  big,  blooming,  buzzing  confusion.'  The 
progress  of  the  mind  is  by  the  differentiation  of  vague 
feelings  into  more  and  more  definite  and  detailed  feelings. 
The  clean-cut  reds  and  blues,  A  flats  and  C  sharps,  sweets 
and  sours,  hards  and  softs  which  we  call  elementary  sen- 
sations are  the  result  of  slow  growth.  The  world  of 
sense  comes  not  as  a  building  constructed  of  small  pieces 
of  bricks  and  mortar  and  glass,  but  as  a  landscape  grad- 
ually clearing  up  from  the  obscurity  of  a  fog.  The  child 
comes  to  feel  hot,  cold,  red  and  green  as  we  come  to  dis- 
tinguish the  constituents  of  a  salad-dressing,  the  sounds 
of  the  different  instruments  in  an  orchestra,  or  the  char- 
acteristic odors  of  a  slum. 

It  is  nevertheless  desirable  to  try  to  analyze  any  actual 
sensation  into,  or  replace  it  in  thought  by  such  fictitious 
elements.  Fictitious  in  the  sense  of  being  elements  of 
mental  states  which  when  put  together  give  the  sensation, 
they  are  real  in  the  sense  of  corresponding  to  elementary 
processes  in  the  brain  which,  when  happening  together, 
do  produce  in  mental  life  the  sensation.  The  sensation 
produced  in  the  mind  when  one  plunges  the  hand  into 
cold  water  is  not  the  equivalent  of  a  thousand  feelings  of 
little  cold  spots  plus  a  thousand  feelings  of  little  slipper- 
inesses  and  elasticities,  but  the  brain  process  which 
produces  the  feeling  of  a  cold  and  wet  hand  is  the  equiva- 
lent of  thousands  of  component  processes. 

The  Attributes  of  Sensations. — Every  sensation,  and 
indeed  every  mental  state  of  any  sort,  is  in  time,  lasts 
so  long,  possesses  Duration  as  an  attribute. 


Feelings  of  Things  as  Present  23 

Every  sensation  possesses  Intensity,  by  which  we  mean 
that  there  is  a  certain  amount  of  it  which  can  be  con- 
ceived to  have  possibly  been  more  or  less. 

That  every  sensation  is  felt  as  possessing  Bigness  or 
Extensity  is  held  to  be  true  by  some  psychologists. 
Others  would  limit  the  attribute  of  spatial  quality  more 
narrowly;  e.g.,  to  sensations  from  the  eyes  and  skin  and 
joints.  Others  even  deny  it  to  all  sensations,  arguing 
that  by  itself  a  sensation  is  felt  as  nowhere  and  of  no  size, 
that  only  in  the  connection  of  many  sensations  with  one 
another  does  the  feeling  of  'thereness'  and  Voluminous- 
ness'  appear.  Those  announcing  this  third  view  pre- 
sumably refer  only  to  elementary  sensations. 

Every  sensation  possesses  Quality,  which  can  be  de- 
fined provisionally  by  examples:  color,  pitch  and  sweet- 
ness are  qualities  of  sensations. 

If  anyone  examines  his  own  sensations,  he  will  find 
that  they  may  differ  from  one  another  in  these  four  ways : 
One  may  last  a  longer  or  shorter  time  than  another ;  may 
be  more  or  less  vigorous  or  intense;  may  be  bigger  or 
smaller ;  i.e.,  may  fill  more  or  less  space ;  may  be  different 
in  mental  stuff,  in  its  very  nature.  In  all  but  the  last  case 
sensations  may  be  ranged  in  a  series  according  to  the 
amount  of  some  attribute  they  possess;  they  may  be 
ranked  by  the  quantity  of  time,  or  energy,  or  extent 
belonging  to  them.  The  fourth  case  of  differences  can- 
not be  expressed  as  differences  of  quantity,  but  only  as 
of  the  kind  or  quality  of  the  feelings.  When  the  differ- 
ences between  sensations  fail  to  resolve  themselves  into  a 
series  of  amounts  of  any  one  thing  they  are  therefore 
called  differences  of  Quality.  Thus  with  red  and  green, 
the  touch  of  velvet  and  that  of  soft  soap,  the  feeling  of 
nausea  and  that  of  a  toothache.     The  quality  of  a  sensa- 


24  Descriptive  Psychology 

tion  is  thus  the  attribute  of  it  which  distinguishes  it  from 
any  other  sensation. 

§  6.  The    Classification    of   Sensations 

By  Their  Quality. — Sensations  may  be  classified 
according  to  their  degrees  of  difference  in  quality.  All 
colors  are  more  like  each  other  in  quaht)^  than  they  are 
like  tastes.  All  reds  are  more  like  each  other  than  they 
are  like  blues,  but  are  more  like  blues  than  they  are  like 
tastes.  Touches  are  more  like  pressures  than  they  are 
like  smells.  We  thus  classify  sensations  according  to  the 
sense  to  which  they  belong. 

Within  each  sense  we  have  further  classification ;  for 
instance,  of  sensations  of  vision  into  the  different  colors 
or  of  sensations  of  hearing  into  noises  and  tones.  Al- 
though in  the  spectrum  red  shades  off  into  orange,  orange 
into  yellow  and  yellow  into  green  and  so  on,  we  feel  the 
change  to  be  more  abrupt  at  certain  places  than  at  others 
and  so  group  color-sensations  into  reds,  oranges,  yellows, 
greens  and  the  like.  So  also  sounds  are  grouped  into 
noises  and  tones,  though  a  tone  that  lasts  but  a  very  short 
time  is  indistinguishable  from  a  noise  and  certain  com- 
binations of  noises,  such  as  the  sound  of  certain  machines 
heard  at  a  distance,  take  on  the  likeness  of  tones. 

By  the  Sense  Organs  Causing  Them. — Sensations 
are  also  classified  according  to  the  sense  organ  the  activity 
of  which  arouses  them.  Every  educated  person  knows 
that  his  feelings  of  color  are  due  to  the  influence  of  light 
rays  upon  the  visual  sense  organ,  the  eye ;  that  his  sensa- 
tions of  sound  are  due  to  the  influence  of  air  vibrations 
upon  the  auditory  sense  organ,  the  ear.  It  is  equally  true 
that  tastes,  smells,  heat,  cold,  pressures  and  other  varieties 
of  sensation  correspond  each  to  the  activity  of  one  kind 


Feelings  of  Things  as  Present 


25 


of  sense  organ  or  combination  of  sense  organs.  Some  of 
these  sense  organs, — e.g.,  the  eyes,  ears,  and  nose, —  are 
influenced  by  stimuH  exterior  to  the  body,  such  as  ether 
vibrations  and  air  vibrations.  Some  are  influenced  by 
StimuH  within  the  body,  such  as  the  rubbing  of  the  sur- 
faces of  the  joints,  changes  in  the  blood  supply,  inflam- 
mation of  the  tissues  and  the  like. 

The  large  groups  resulting  from  a  classification  on  the 
basis  of  the  sense  organs  concerned  are: — 
A.  Sensations  from  the  periphery  of  the  body :   External 
Sensations. 

Sensations  from  the  eyes, 
ears, 
nose, 
mouth, 
skin, 
internal  organs  of  the  body: 


B 


Sensations  from  the 
Internal  Sensations. 

Sensations  from  the  semicircular  canals  in  the  inter- 
nal ear. 
Sensations  from  the  muscles, 
tendons. 

surfaces  of  the  joints, 
alimentary  canal, 
circulatory  system, 
lungs. 

brain  and  nerves  themselves, 
sex-organs, 
these  groups  a  finer  grouping  can 
The  skin  or  cutaneous  sensations, 
e.g.,  are  apparently  due  to  different  sorts  of  nerve  endings 
in  the  skin  and  may  accordingly  be  divided  into  feelings 
of  pressure,  heat,  cold,  pain,  and  perhaps  of  traction  (due 
to  pulling  the  skin  or  hairs  outward)  touch,  tickling  and 


Within  each  of 
often  be  made  out. 


26  Descriptive  Psychology 

others.  The  mouth  is  perhaps  furnished  with  four  differ- 
ent sorts  of  nerve-endings,  each  the  source  of  a  special 
variety  of  taste  (sweet,  sour,  salt  and  bitter). 

Finally  each  variety  of  sense  organ  may  be  capable  of 
arousing  many  different  sensations,  according  to  the  dif- 
ferent ways  in  which  it  may  behave, — the  differences  in 
action  of  which  it  is  capable.  Thus  in  the  retina  of  the 
eye  the  so-called  'rods'  and  'cones,'  which  are  the  nerve- 
endings  concerned  in  vision,  are  apparently  each  capable 
of  arousing  hundreds  of  different  shades  of  color  and 
degrees  of  brightness. 

In  a  classification  resulting  from  perfect  knowledge, 
the  main  classes  will  correspond  to  the  kind  of  sense 
organ  involved,  the  sub-classes  to  the  kinds  of  activity 
of  each  kind  of  sense  organ. 

The  Two  Types  of  Classification  Compared. — With 
respect  to  the  more  obvious  and  more  important  groups  of 
sensations  the  classification  on  the  basis  of  felt  resem- 
blances parallels  that  on  the  basis  of  the  sense  organ  con- 
cerned. The  differences  between  the  two  classifications 
are  due  first  to  the  fact  that  common-sense  judgments  of 
qualities  often  put  compound  sensations  into  a  single 
group  although  they  involve  very  different  sense  organs. 
Thus  when  what  common  sense  calls  tastes  are  found  to 
be  due  largely  to  stimulation,  not  of  the  gustatory  nerve- 
endings  in  the  mouth,  but  of  the  olfactory  nerve-endings 
in  the  nose,^  psychology  changes  popular  usage  and 
reserves  the  word  tastes  for  the  bare  sweets,  sours,  salts, 
bitters  (and  possibly  alkaline  and  metallic  tastes)  and 
classifies  the   rich  savors   of   foods   as   smell  sensations. 

^  Hence  the  loss  of  'taste'  when  one  has  a  cold  in  the  head. 
One  can  gain  experimental  evidence  of  the  share  of  the  nose  in 
taste  by  testing  some  friend,  who  with  eyes  shut  and  nose  carefully 
plugged,  tries  to  distinguish  raw  potato  from  apple,  maple  syrup 
from  molasses,  soup  from  salt  water. 


I 


Feelings  of  Things  as  Present  sy 

Even  expert  analysis  sees  no  difference  between  the  sen- 
sations from  the  rods  in  the  retina  and  those  from  the 
cones  and  has  always  made  a  single  class, — visual  sensa- 
tions. Yet  it  is  perhaps  true  that  the  rods  act  only  when 
the  light  is  dim,  and  give  no  sensations  at  all  for  green. 
On  the  basis  of  the  sense  organ  involved  a  classification 
into  sensations  in  a  dim  light  and  sensations  in  a  bright 
light  would  be,  perhaps,  more  scientific  and  fundamental 
than  one  into  colors  and  brightness. 

Classifications  by  felt  quality  and  by  known  sense 
organ  differ  in  the  second  place  because  clear  and  impor- 
tant differences  can  often  be  felt  whore  no  corresponding 
difference  in  the  nerve-endings  involved  has  been  dis- 
covered. For  example,  sweets  and  sours  and  bitters 
deserve  separate  classes  from  their  felt  unlikeness,  but  no 
proof  of  different  nerve-endings  for  each  class  has  yet 
been  offered. 

Two  general  cautions  are  necessary  in  connection  with 
the  classification  of  sensations.  First,  in  trying  to  pick 
out  the  different  kinds  of  sensations  one  should  not  forget 
that  the  actual  stream  of  mental  life  rarely  offers  a  single 
kind  of  sensation  at  a  time.  Our  feelings  of  the  outside 
world  are  feelings  of  complex  things  involving  many 
diff'erent  sensations,  or  of  numerous  qualities  at  the  same 
time.  The  feeling  of  a  lifted  weight,  for  example,  is  a 
complex  due  to  the  action  of  sense  organs  in  the  skin,  on 
the  surfaces  of  the  joints  and  in  the  muscles  themselves. 
Second,  the  fact  that  only  the  more  definite  and  frequent 
sensations,  such  as  sights,  sounds  and  tastes,  are  easily 
classified  should  not  blind  one  to  the  existence  and  impor- 
tance of  the  vaguer  sensations,  such  as  fatigues,  aches, 
hunger  and  the  like.  The  condition  of  the  body  as  a 
whole,  the  state  of  its  muscular  tension,  circulation, 
digestion,   and   other   obscurer   activities,   influences  the 


28  Descriptive  Psychology 

little  known  internal  sense  organs,  and  so  causes  those 
mental  states  which  verge  from  sensations  toward  emo- 
tions.    These  must  not  be  neglected. 

§  7.  Sensation    and  Stimulus 

Sensations  correspond  to  and  are  due  to  physical 
causes  and  happenings  without  and  within  the  body, 
which  cause  activity  in  the  sense-organs.  Such  a  physi- 
cal cause  of  activity  in  a  sense-organ  is  called  the 
Stimulus  to  the  sensation. 

The  Threshold  of  sensibility  for  any  variety  of  sensa- 
tion is  the  least  possible  stimulus  that  will  cause  it,  i.e.,  the 
softest  sound,  the  weakest  light,  the  slightest  touch. 

The  Range  of  sensibility  in  any  sense  is  the  range  of 
physical  stimuli  below  and  above  which  the  stimulus 
causes  no  sensation.  For  instance,  the  range  of  pitch  is 
from  about  16  vibrations  of  the  air  per  second  to  about 
30,000  vibrations  per  second  ;^  the  range  of  color  vision 
is  from  about  450  billion^  to  about  790  billion  vibrations 
of  the  ether  per  second  f  i.e.,  from  the  extreme  of  red  to 
the  extreme  of  violet. 

It  would  be  possible,  though  not  in  the  present  con- 
dition of  knowledge  especially  useful,  to  classify  sensa- 
tions by  the  physical  facts  which  cause  them,  by  the 
nature  of  their  stimuli.  We  should  then  have  as  the  two 
chief  groups: 

A.  Feelings  caused  by  the  qualities  of  outside  objects. 

B.  FeeHngs  caused  by  qualities  of  the  body  itself. 

*  These  figures  vary  among  different  individuals,  and  different 
values  have  been  assigned  to  them  by  different  investigators.  The 
low  limit  is  almost  certainly  between  8  and  30, 

''A  billion  means  here,  following  the  European  usage,  a  million 
millions. 

^  Under  favorable  circumstances  a  red  of  only  412  billion  vibra- 
tions can  be  distinguished  and  a  color  beyond  the  violet  end  of  the 
spectrum  of  912  billion  vibrations.  The  range  varies  with  indi- 
viduals as  in  the  case  of  sound. 


Feelings  of  Things  as  Present  29 

Under  A  we  should  have: 

A  I.     Feelings  caused  by  light,  i.e.,  by  ether  vibra- 
tions. 
A  IT.    Feelings  caused  by  molecular  motions. 

A  II  I.     By  tones,  i.e.,  periodic  wave  motions. 
A  II  2.     By  noises,  i.e.,  non-periodic  motions. 
A  II  3.     By  temperature,  i.e.,  inner  molecular 
motions. 
A  III.  Feelings  caused  by  gross  mechanical  forces. 
A  III  I.  By  weight. 
A  III  2.  By  elasticity. 
Etc. 
A  VI.  Feelings  caused  by  chemical  forces. 

A  IV  I.  In  gaseous  form    (causing  sensations 

of  smell). 
A  IV  2.  In  liquid  form  (causing  sensations  of 
of  taste). 
Under  B    (feelings  caused  by  qualities  of  the  body 
itself)  the  movements  of  the  ether  and  of  sound  waves 
would  play  a  small  if  not  a  zero  role  while  electrical  forces 
might  perhaps  be  found  to  influence  feelings  as  they  do 
not  when  acting  through  outside  objects.     To  such  clas- 
sifications  on   the  basis   of   the   nature   of   the   physical 
stimulus  are  due  the  terms :  the  chemical  senses,  for  taste 
and  smell ;  the  mechanical  senses,  for  touch,   pressure^ 
etc. ;   the  distant  senses,  for  vision  and  hearing. 

The  richness  of  the  contribution  of  sensations  to  men- 
tal life  hardly  requires  comment.  The  number  of  quali- 
ties of  things  felt  in  vision  or  hearing  or  touch  alone  or 
the  multitude  of  bodily  conditions  of  which  the  organic 
senses,  including  pain,  warn  us,  is  certainly  astounding. 
The  loss  of  a  single  sense  deprives  a  human  life  of  a 
whole  kingdom  of  facts.  It  is  more  necessary  to  call 
attention  to  the  fact  that  although  the  number  of  the  dif- 


30  Descriptive  Psychology 

ferent  sensations  that  a  human  being  feels  seems  almost 
infinite,  they  represent  the  influence  on  us  of  only  a  part 
of  the  world's  forces.  Sensations  are  aroused  only  by  a 
selected  few  of  the  events  about  us  and  in  our  bodies. 
Sounds  are  due  to  air  waves,  but  waves  above  thirty  or 
forty  thousand  vibrations  per  second  cause  no  sensations 
of  sound  in  man,  though  they  apparently  do  in  some  in- 
sects. The  x-rays  and  the  emanations  from  radio-active 
bodies  cause  no  sensations  directly.  All  about  us  there 
may  be  forces  in  nature  to  which  our  senses  are  not 
susceptible.  What  we  feel  are  the  comparatively  few 
series  of  stimuli  to  which  our  senses  are,  so  to  speak, 
tuned.  The  growth  of  tissues,  the  action  of  certain 
glands,  and  the  destruction  of  dangerous  substances  by 
the  white  blood  corpuscles  are  samples  of  important 
events  within  the  body  which  leave  us  unfeeling.  To 
only  a  few  of  the  multitudinous  events  of  our  bodily  lives 
are  we  sensitive.  Our  sensations  warn  us  of  only  a  frac- 
tion of  the  happenings  of  the  universe  within  and  without. 

Exercises 

1.  Of  the  feelings  referred  to  in  the  list  of  words,  phrases 
or  sentences  given  below  which  are  most  like  emotions? 

2.  Which  are  most  like  feelings  of  relationships? 

3.  Which  would  be  called  sensations  without  any  hesitation? 

4.  Which   might   possibly   be  called  elementary    sensations? 

5.  Which  might  possibly  be  called  pure  sensations? 

6.  Which   are   internal   sensations? 

7.  Which  are   compounds  caused  by  at  least  two  different 
senses? 

a.  The  child's   feeling  when  it  first  burns  itself. 

b.  Hunger. 

c.  The   sound   of  a  tuning  fork. 

d.  The  general  feeling  of  being  well  or  ill. 

e.  The  faintest  possible  taste  of  bitter. 

f.  Feelings    of   weight. 


Feelings  of  Things  as  Present  31 

g.    Nausea. 

h-     Feelings    of    distance. 

i.      The    taste    of    coffee. 

j.      An  unrecognized  smell. 

k.    The  ringing  in  the  ears   that  results  from   a  large 

dose  of  quinine. 
I.      Sleepiness. 

m.   Hearing  a  note  sung  crescendo. 
n.    Lassitude. 
o.     Restlessness. 
p.     The  sight  of  a  light  by  a  four-weeks-old  baby. 

8.  Show  how  the  author  of  the  following  passage  classifies 
sensations  partly  on  the  basis  of  felt  likeness  and  partly  on  the 
basis  of  the  sense  organs  concerned: 

"Different  Classes  of  Sensation. — Passing  now  to  the 
enumeration  and  comparison  of  the  different  classes  of  sensation 
we  may  begin  with  the  following  provisional  list:  Sensations  of 
sight,  of  hearing,  of  contact  and  pressure ;  those  due  to  the  vary- 
ing states  of  muscles,  joints,  and  tendons  as  dependent  on  the  po- 
sition and  movement  of  the  limbs ;  sensations  of  smell,  of  taste, 
of  temperature,  and  finally  organic  sensations.  The  last  head 
requires  some  explanation.  Under  the  term  'organic  sensation* 
are  included  sensations  due  to  the  state  of  the  internal  organs  of 
the  body,  such  as  headache,  thirst,  muscular  cramp,  or  fatigue, 
nausea,  etc."     (G.  F.  Stout,  Groundwork  of  Psychology,  p.  42.) 

9.  Which  groups  in  this  classification  most  need  further  sub- 
division. 

10.  What  criticism  may  be  made  of  a  description  of  a  group 
of  feelings  as  "those  due  to  the  varying  states  of  the  muscles, 
joints  and  tendons  as  dependent  on  the  position  and  movement 
of  the  limbs"? 

11.  Criticise  the  following  classification: 

"Sensation.  There  are  two  classes  of  sensations, — General 
and  Special. 

General  Sensations  include  all  those  which  do  not  belong  to 
the  "five  senses," — those  which  constitute  our  bodily  comfort  or 
discomfort ;  they  may  be  classed  as  follows  : 

Muscular  Sensations  of  injury,  fatigue,  and  repose. 

Nervous  Sensations  arising  from  the  state  of  the  nervous 
system,  as  when  we  feel  the  exhilaration  of  perfect  health  or  are 
weakened  by  care  or  suffering. 


3« 


Descriptive  Psychology 


Vital  Sensations,  depending  on  the  condition  of  the  vital 
organs,  as  those  of  hunger  and  thirst  and  their  opposites,  the  pain 
of  indigestion,  the  feeHng  of  suffocation  when  breathing  impure 
air. 

Special  Sensations  are  of  five  kinds,  namely,  those  of  Touch 
(including  those  of  the  "Muscular  Sense"),  of  Sight,  of  Hearing, 
of  Taste,  and  of  Smell" 

12.  No  one  has  found  a  classification  of  smells  that  is  either 
simple  or  comprehensive  or  scientific.  It  is  interesting  to  try  to 
classify  the  odors  of  the  objects  named  below  and  compare  the 
groups  one  makes  with  those  made  by  others: 


alcohol 

apples 

bananas 

benzine 

cabbage  (cooked) 

camphor 

canteloupes 

cheese 

chloroform 

cinnamon 


orange  peel 

pine  woods 

roast  beef 

roses 

rubber 

sour  milk 

strawberries 

sulphur   (burning) 

sulphuretted    hydrogen 

violets 


coffee 

ether 

fir  balsam 

fish   (cooked) 

fish   (raw) 

hay 

kerosene 

lemons 

maple  sugar 

onions 

13.  Give  the  names  of  two  things  which  seem  to  you  to  have 
somewhat  the  same  kind  of  a  smell  that  the  thing  named  has,  in 
the  case  of  each  of  the  following: 

chloroform  coffee  tobacco 

camphor  rancid  butter      decaying  meat 

cinnamon  roses  new  mown  hay 

alcohol  apples  cheese 

benzine  onions  bananas 

14.  Make  a  list  of  senses  which  it  is  conceivable  that  human 
beings  might  have,  though  they  do  not. 

15.  Which  one  of  the  senses  provides  the  greatest  variety  of 
different  qualities? 

16.  Which  sensations  are  aroused  by    distant   objects? 

17.  Which  sensations  are  least  delusive,  most  reliable? 
Experiment  i.    Pressure  Spots. — On  the  back  of  the  hand, 

say  between  the  base  of  the  thumb  and  the  base  of  the  forefinger, 
mark  off  an  area  about  an  inch  long  and  a  half  inch  wide.  Have 
ready:  (i)  a  pyramid  of  cork  about  a  quarter  inch  square  at  the 
base,  about  one  quarter  inch  high  and  cut  to  a  point,  with  a  long 
needle  or  a  tooth  pick  stuck  into  its  base  for  a  handle;  (2)  two 


Feelings  of  Things  as  Present  33 

small  metal  rods,  such  as  knitting  needles,  or  pieces  of  wire  with 
rounded  ends,  or  better  two  hollow  metal  cylinders  drawn  to  a 
closed  point  at  one  end. 

Go  over  the  surface  of  the  skin  with  the  point  of  the  cork, 
touching  each  square  millimeter  lightly.  Note  the  location  of  any 
spots  where  the  touch  of  the  cork  arouses  a  much  more  pro- 
nounced feeling  of  pressure  (of  what  is  commonly  called  touch) 
than  it  does  in  general.  Does  the  touch  of  the  cork  in  some  spots 
arouse  a  feeling  of  coolness?     If  so,  locate  these. 

Experiment  2.  Cold  Spots. — Go  over  the  surface  of  the  skin 
with  one  of  the  rods  cooled  to  say  50°  Fahrenheit  (if  the  hollow 
rods  are  used,  they  need  only  to  be  filled  with  cold  water)  and 
note  the  location  of  any  spots  where  the  touch  arouses  a  much 
more  pronounced  feeling  of  coolness  than  it  does  in  general. 
Touch  these  spots  with  the  cork.  What  sensation  results?  Touch 
them  with  the  second  rod  warmed  slightly  above  the  temperature 
of  the  room.     What  sensation  results? 

As  an  aid  to  remembering  the  location  of  the  pressure  spots 
and  cold  spots,  it  will  be  useful  to  draw  on  paper  an  enlarged 
outline  of  the  area  marked  off  on  the  hand,  or  to  mark  the  hand 
itself  with  a  tiny  spot  of  ink  or  paint. 

Experiment  3.  The  Threshold  for  Pressure. — ]\Iake  5  cylin- 
ders of  wood  about  4  millimeters  in  diameter  and  i,  2,  4,  8,  and  16 
millimeters  in  height.  Have  each  one  smooth  at  top  and  bottom, 
Fasten  to  the  center  of  the  top  of  each  by  a  bit  of  glue,  a  fine, 
flexible  thread  of  silk.  Tie  the  thread  to  one  end  of  a  small  stick 
(tooth  picks  will  serve),  letting  the  length  from  the  cylinder  to 
the  stick  be  about  two  inches.  Holding  the  stick  at  the  end 
removed  from  the  thread,  lower  the  cylinder  gradually  till  it  rests 
on  some  smooth  surface,  as  a  table-top.  Each  cylinder  should, 
when  thus  lowered,  have  the  plane  of  its  bottom  surface  parallel 
with  the  table-top. 

Let  a  friend  be  seated  with  eyes  closed,  fore-arm  resting  on  a 
table,  and  the  palm  of  the  hand  upward.  Say  to  him :  'T  shall 
give  as  a  signal  the  word  ready.  Then  at  the  end  of  two  seconds 
I  shall  either  put  a  very  light  weight  on  your  hand  or  I  shall  do 
nothing.  If  you  feel  a  weight,  say  *Yes,'  if  you  do  not  feel  any, 
say  nothing."  Then  say,  'Ready,'  and  lower  a  cylinder  gently  till 
it  rests  on  the  center  of  the  palm.  Note  the  answer  given,  and 
remove  the  cylinder  slowly.  Record  the  answer.  Repeat  with 
another  and  so  on  through  the  following  series:  the  i6mm.  cyl- 

3 


34  Descriptive  Psychology 

inder,  the  8,  o  (that  is,  none  at  all),  i6,  o,  2,  4,  2,  16,  0,  i,  8,  8,  2,  i, 
4,  16,  I,  8,  I,  8,  I,  16,  2,  o,  I,  2,  0,  0,  2,  o,  16,  I,  I,  8,  o,  16,  16,  8,  2,  o, 
o,  4,  4,  16,  0,  8,  8,  o,  16,  0,  4,  o,  2,  16,  0,  I,  I,  16,  I,  4,  2,  2,  8,  4,  o,  16, 
4,  4,  4,  16,  16,  o,  0,  16. 

Record  the  answers  by  drawing  a  line  under  the  figure  denot- 
ing the  cylinder  used  if  the  subject  answers  yes,  and  a  line 
through  it  if  he  says  nothing.  This  method  of  scoring  serves  also 
to  keep  track  of  which  cylinder  is  the  next  to  be  used. 

Which  weights  are  below  the  threshold?  (Unless  a  cylinder 
was  felt  in  eight  cases  out  of  ten  it  was  probably  not  really  sensed 
at  all,  for  mere  guessing  would  of  course  give  fifty  per  cent,  of 
correct  answers.) 

Try  the  same  experiment  placing  the  weights  on  the  back  of 
the  wrist  or  fore-arm.  Which  weights  are  below  the  threshold 
here? 

Experiment  4.  The  Mixture  of  Taste  and  Smell. — Arrange 
for  a  friend  to  give  you  a  half  hour  of  his  time.  Prepare  4 
pieces  (cubes  about  one  quarter  of  an  inch  long)  of  each  of  the 
following:  raw  apple,  raw  onion,  raw  celery,  cooked  chicken, 
cooked  beef,  cooked  lamb;  and  have  ready  a  half  spoonful  each 
of  honey,  maple  syrup,  molasses,  cinnamon,  clove  and  nutmeg,  a 
medicine  dropper  (a  plain  glass  rod  will  do)  and  a  salt  spoon  or 
a  visiting  card  cut  lengthwise  into  six  or  seven  strips. 

Let  the  subject  of  the  experiment  be  seated,  with  eyes  closed 
and  nose  carefully  plugged  with  cotton.  Say  to  him,  "I  shall  put 
something  in  your  mouth;  taste  it  and  tell  me  what  it  is  before 
you  swallow  it."  Require  the  subject  to  answer  at  once  before 
the  odor  can  penetrate  to  the  nose  through  the  passage  at  the 
back  of  the  mouth  cavity.  Then  place  a  piece  or  drop  or  pinch 
of  the  food,  say  a  pinch  of  cinnamon,  on  his  tongue  and  record 
his  answer.  Give  the  different  substances  in  a  mixed-up  order, 
using  each  two  times,  and  recording  the  substance  and  the 
answer  in  each  case. 

After  these  24  trials  have  been  made,  remove  the  filling  from 
the  subject's  nose  and  repeat  the  24  trials. 

Compare  the  number  of  errors  in  the  two  cases.  Why  would 
it  be  desirable  to  repeat  the  experiment  on  another  person,  test- 
ing him  first  with  nose  open  and  later  with  nose  plugged? 


Feelings  of  Things  as  Present  35 

References 

A.  James,  Briefer  Course,  II.    (9-16),  III.,  IV.,  V.,  VL 
Stout,  Manual,  1 17-124,   141-198. 

Titchener,  Outline,  §§  7-26. 
Angell,  Psychology,  V. 

B.  Ebbinghaus,  Grund::uge,  §§  13-36. 
James,  Principles,  XVII.   (1-9). 

Wundt,  Physiologischc  Psychologie,  VII.,  VIIL,  X. 

§  8.  Percepts 

The  Nature  and  Attributes  of  Percepts. — Our  con- 
sciousness of  the  world  is  commonly  not  of  confused 
blurs  and  masses  of  colors,  sounds,  tastes,  and  the  like, 
but  of  unified  wholes  which  we  call  'things.'  We  can  in 
thought  analyze  our  feelings  of  the  outside  world  into 
elements  of  colors,  sounds,  pressures,  etc.,  but  in  reality 
they  appear  as  complex  total  feelings.  The  feeling  of  a 
'thing'  as  actually  present  is  called  a  Percept  if  the  thing 
is  actually  present;  an  Illusion  if  it  is  not  present  but 
something  else  is  which  gives  us  the  feeling;  an  Hal- 
lucination if  nothing  is  actually  present  to  cause  the  feel- 
ing. Thus  my  feelings  of  the  page  I  see,  the  pen  I 
hold,  the  chords  being  played  on  the  piano  or  the  puffing 
of  an  engine  are  percepts.  My  feelings,  as  I  lie  dozing, 
of  a  page  seen,  when  really  only  a  dirty  blotter  is  seen, 
and  of  the  puffing  of  an  engine,  when  really  only  my  own 
breathing  is  heard,  are  illusions.  My  feeling  of  music 
heard  in  a  dream,  when  really  no  sound  at  all  is  audible, 
is  an  hallucination. 

Feelings  of  things  are  most  commonly  based  on  sight 
and  touch,  less  commonly  on  hearing,  still  less  commonly 
on  taste,  smell  or  pain,  and  almost  never  on  the  feelings 
of  nausea,  dizziness,  muscle-strain  and  other  inner  bodily 
conditions.  We  rarely  say  or  think,  T  have  a  sourness,' 
or  'There  are  four  dijzzinesses  in  this  room.' 


36  Descriptive  Psychology 

Percept  and  Stimulus. — The  same  outside  thing  may 
arouse  different  percepts,  different  feehngs  of  it,  in  dif- 
ferent people  according  to  the  amount  and  nature  of 
their  previous  experiences  of  it.  To  the  man  without 
musical  training  the  song  sung  by  a  chorus  is  a  vague 
total  of  sounds,  but  to  the  trained  musician  it  is  a 
balanced  harmony  in  which  all  the  different  parts  are 
clearly  felt.  To  the  five  year  old  a  page  of  print  is  an  in- 
definite smear  of  black  specks  on  a  white  ground;  to  his 
teacher  it  is  a  definite  series  of  letters  and  words ;  to  the 
printer  it  is  not  only  that,  but  also  10  point  type.  To 
the  baby  all  our  'things'  are  as  yet  a  misty,  chaotic  mud- 
dle of  feeling. 

We  learn  our  feelings  of  the  commonest  things  as 
truly  as  we  learn  the  multiplication  table  or  the  Latin 
language.  The  differences  are  that  we  learn  the  former 
mainly  in  the  earliest  years  of  life,  that  the  constant  pres- 
ence of  things  and  the  need  of  getting  on  with  them 
makes  the  acquaintance  with  them  almost  universal  and 
brings  to  pass  far  greater  similarities  amongst  men  in 
their  percepts  than  in  the  more  elaborated  connections 
between  ideas.  These  similarities  should  not,  however, 
blind  us  to  the  differences  which  do,  as  has  been  pointed 
out,  exist,  or  to  the  fact  that  even  by  the  age  of  entrance 
to  school  the  feelings  of  things  which  adults  have  long 
taken  for  granted  may  be  absent  or  only  partially  de- 
veloped. 

One  of  the  results  of  experience  is  that  less  and  less 
of  the  outside  thing  is  required  to  arouse  the  feeling  of  it. 
Our  eyes  really  see  and  our  ears  hear  only  a  part  of  what 
we  feel  as  visual  and  auditory  percepts.  In  all  prob- 
ability a  number  of  readers  of  this  book  did  not  actually 
see  the  of  in  the  first  line  of  this  paragraph  or  the  the  in 
the  second  line  or  the  last  e  of  outside.     If  the  reader 


Feelings  of  Things  as  Present  37 

will  read  very  rapidly  the  passage  printed  on  page  38  and 
then  re-read  it  very  slowly,  looking  at  each  word,  he  will 
probably  discover  that  in  the  first  reading  his  senses  must 
have  taken  in  only  partial  glimpses  of  the  words  and  that 
his  mind  supplied  their  customary  accompaniments  out 
of  whole  cloth.  In  listening  to  a  foreign  language  one 
is  surprised  at  the  small  number  of  articulate  sounds  that 
he  hears :  the  rest  seem  a  mere  jangle.  Of  conver- 
sation in  our  own  language  our  ears  really  hear  only  a 
few  sounds  clearly,  but  these  serve  as  a  sufficient  basis 
for  a  total  series  of  clear  percepts.  Repeat  to  a  group  of 
people  the  lines  below  and  you  may  be  surprised  to  find 
the   changes  unnoticed. 

Mary  had  a  little  lamb. 

Its  fleece  was  white  is  snow ; 

And  every  pair  that  Mary  went, 
The  lamb  was  sure  to  go. 

Percepts  and  Sensations  Compared. — Between  sen- 
sations and  percepts,  between  feelings  of  the  qualities 
of  things  and  feelings  of  the  things  themselves,  no  sharp 
line  can  be  drawn.  E.g.,  is  my  feeling  of  the  sound  of 
the  watch  ticking  to  be  called  a  sensation  of  the  sound,  a 
quality  of  the  watch,  or  a  percept  of  a  thing,  a  ticking 
sound?  If  by  sensations  are  meant  what  were  called  pure 
sensations,  the  clear  distinction  can  be  drawn  that  every 
percept  involves  experience,  that  'every  perception  is  an 
acquired  perception.'  But  since  pure  sensations  exist 
only  in  the  dawn  of  mental  life,  this  distinction  is  as  use- 
less as  it  is  clear.  Again  between  elementary  sensations 
and  percepts  the  clear  distinction  can  be  drawn  that  every 
percept  is  caused  by  a  number  of  sensory  stimulations, 
requires  the  co-operation  of  many  brain  processes,  is 
divisible   in   analysis   into  parts.     But   since   elementary 


38  Descriptive  Psychology 


We,  the  people  of  the  United  States,  in  order  to  form 
a  more  perfect  union,  estabHsh  justice,  insure  domestic 
tranquilHty,  provide  for  the  common  defence,  promote  the 
general  welfare,  and  secure  the  blessings  of  liberty  to 
ourselves  aud  our  posterity,  do  ordain  and  establish  this 
Constitution  for  the  United  Stales  of  America. 

All  legislative  powers  herein  granted  shall  be  vested 
in  a  Congress  of  the  United  States,  which  shall  consist 
of  a  Senate  and  House  of  Representatives. 

The  House  of  Representatives  shall  be  composed  of 
members  chosen  every  second  year  by  the  people  of  the 
several  States,  and  the  electors  in  each  State  shall  have 
the  qualifications  requisite  for  electors  of  tho  most  nu- 
merous branch  of  the  State  legislature. 

No  person  shall  be  a  Representative  who  shall  not 
have  attained  the  age  of  twenty-five  years,  ard  been  seven 
years  a  citizen  of  the  United  States,  and  who  shall  not, 
when  elected,  be  an  inhabitant  of  that  State  in  which  he 
shall  be  chosen. 

Representatives  and  direct  taxes  shalt  be  apportioned 
among  the  several  States  which  may  be  included  within 
this  Union,  according  to  their  respoctive  numbers,  which 
shall  be  determimed  by  adding  to  the  whole  number  of 
free  persons,  including  those  bound  to  service  for  a  term 
of  years,  and  excluding  Indians  not  taxed,  three  fifths  of 
all  other  persons.  The  actual  enumeration  shall  be  made 
within  three  years  after  the  first  meeting  of  the  Congress 
of  the  United  States,  and  within  every  subsequent  term 
of  ten  years,  in  such  manner  as  they  shall  by  law  direct 


Feelings  of  Things  as  Present  39 

sensations  do  not  have  real  existence,  it  may  be  objected 
that  there  is  no  great  advantage  in  distinguishing  any- 
thing from  them. 

The  facts  are  that  sensations  and  percepts  are  words 
that  divide  between  jthem  the  work  of  naming  our  feehngs 
of  the  outside  world  as  present ;  that  in  their  general  use 
the  former  refers  to  our  feelings  when  they  emphasize 
simple  qualities  such  as  of  color,  pitch,  heat,  cold,  and  the 
like,  while  the  latter  refers  to  our  feelings  when  they 
emphasize  things  or  groups  of  qualities  that  go  together. 

The  Classification  of  Percepts. — There  is  literally 
no  end  to  the  variety  of  the  feelings  of  things  possible  to 
a  human  mind.  In  an  hour's  walk  in  a  city  one  may  have 
five  thousand  different  percepts,  each  of  a  human  face. 
In  an  evening  at  the  opera  one  may  add  thousands  of 
percepts  of  tones.  A  classification  in  any  detail  of  the 
perceptual  life  of  a  mind  would  thus  be  a  long  labor. 
There  may  be  as  many  and  as  different  percepts  in  the 
mind  as  there  are  things  in  the  world,  indeed  more.  For 
the  same  thing  may  arouse  different  feelings  according 
as  it  is  seen  near  or  at  a  distance,  in  the  light  or  in  the 
dark,  from  one  side  or  from  the  other,  and  so  on  through 
many  possible  changes. 

For  purposes  of  study  a  classification  according  to 
which  sense  furnishes  the  main  features  of  the  percept  is 
useful.  Thus  we  have  visual  percepts,  auditory  percepts, 
etc.  The  word  main  must  be  emphasized  in  our  thought, 
for  in  many  percepts  different  senses  combine. 

Another  classification  useful  for  purposes  of  study 
would  be  into  extensive,  temporal  and  merely  qualitative. 
For  many  of  our  feelings  are  of  things  as  in  space,  as  so 
big,  of  such  a  shape,  at  such  a  distance,  and  the  spatial 
or  form-size  character  of  things  is  highly  important  in 
the  sciences  and  arts.     So  also  the  precepts  of  language 


40  Descriptive  Psychology 

and  music  in  which  elements  successive  in  time  become 
joined  into  unitary  feelings  of  words  or  melodies  well 
deserve  separate  study.  The  group  left  over — the  feel- 
ing of  things  through  taste,  smell,  pressure  and  the  rest 
— is,  however,  a   very  mixed  and  unwieldy  group. 

In  discussions  of  the  development  of  our  knowledge 
of  things  or  of  the  education  of  the  senses,  percepts  may 
best  be  grouped  according  to  their  clearness,  detail  and 
number  of  connections  with  images  and  other  percepts. 
Thus  the  vague,  coarse  and  isolated  percept  of  its 
mother's  face  which  an  infant  has  would  be  put  in  one 
group;  the  percept  of  the  same  face  which  the  child  will 
feel  in  a  year  or  two  would  be  put  in  a  second  group; 
while  the  exact  definition  and  complete  detail  of  the  per- 
cept of  the  same  face  felt  by  a  friend  who  was  painting 
the  mother's  portrait  would  be  put  in  a  third  class. 

Percepts  might  also  be  classified  as  single  or  col- 
lective. The  sight  of  a  pencil  or  the  sound  of  a  tone  are 
examples  of  the  former ;  the  sight  of  a  forest  or  an  army 
or  the  sound  of  a  melody  or  of  a  pattering  of  rain  are 
examples  of  the  latter. 

The  Constitution  of  Percepts. — Elementary  sensa- 
tions are  said  to  combine  to  form  percepts.  When  the 
combination  is  by  the  juxtaposition  in  space  of  the  ele- 
ments, as  when  different  bits  of  blue  make  a  blue  surface 
or  different  bits  of  pressure  give  the  feeling  of  a  hand 
pressed  against  the  brow,  the  combination  is  called 
colligation.  When  the  elements  do  not  each  exclude  the 
other  from  occupying  the  same  space,  as  when  different 
tones  combine  to  form  a  chord,  or  when  tastes  and  smells 
and  touch  combine  to  form  the  total  'taste'  of  celery,  the 
combination  is  called  fusion.  This  combination  is  really 
a  combination,  not  of  feelings,  but  of  the  processes  in 
the  brain  upon  which  they  depend. 


Feelings  of  Things  as  Present  ,\ 

Exercises 

1.  Give  illustrations  of  illusions  and  of  hallucinations  from 
your  own  and  from  your  friends'  experiences. 

2.  a.     Which  senses  provide  percepts  of  the  form  of  objects? 

b.  Which    senses    provide    percepts    of    the    texture    of 

obj  ects  ? 

c.  Which  senses  provide  percepts  of  the  weight  of  ob- 

jects? 

3.  What  terms  in  grammar  refer  respectively  to  single  and 
collective  percepts? 

4.  Give  three  illustrations  of  the  influence  of  training  in 
replacing  vague  and  coarse  percepts  by  definite  and  detailed  per- 
cepts. 


Fig.  I 


B 


5.     What  paragraphs  in  the  text  bring  out  the  facts  stated  in 
these  quotations?     For  a.  see  §  6;  for  b.  and  c.  see  §  8. 

a.  "Consciousness  is  never  composed  of  a  single  sensa- 

tion."    (Titchener). 

b.  "The  consciousness  of  particular  material  things  pres- 

ent    to     sense     is     nowadays     called     perception." 
(James). 

c.  "Every     perception      is      an      acquired      perception," 

(James). 
Experiment  5.     Sensations  and  Percepts. — a.     Look  at  Fig. 
I  A.     Find  the  two  frogs.     Notice  the  change  from  a  vague  blur 
of  lines  to  a  definite  picture  as  the  frogs  spring  into  view. 

b.  Look  at  a  landscape  with  the  head  turned  upside  down; 
then  with  the  head  in  its  usual  position. 

c.  Look  through  the  pages  of  an  illustrated  magazine,  held 


42  Descriptive  Psychology 

upside  down  or  turned  through  an  angle  of  135  degrees  from  its 
usual  position.  When  a  picture  appears  as  a  mere  chaos  of 
sensations,  turn  the  magazine  to  its  usual  position  and  note  the 
difference  in  the  picture's  definiteness  and  'thingness.' 

Experiment  6.  Percept  and  Stimulus. — Look  at  Fig.  i  B. 
What  is  it?  Continue  looking  until  you  find  another  animal 
shown.  Show  the  figure  to  six  or  eight  people,  letting  each  one 
tell  at  once  what  it  is.  What  sentence  in  the  text  (page  36)  do 
the  results  illustrate? 

References 

A.  James,  Briefer  Course,  XX.    (312-315). 
Stout,  Manual,  312-391. 

Titchener,  Outline,  §§  43-51. 
Angell,  Psychology,  VI.,  VII. 

B.  Ebbinghaus,  Grundsiige,  §§  37-41. 
James,  Principles,  XIX.    (76-82). 

Wundt,  Physiologische  Psychologie,  XII.-XV. 

^  I  am  indebted  to  the  publishers  of  St.  Nicholas  for  permission 
to  use  Fig.  i  A. 


CHAPTER  III 

Feelings  of  Things  as  Absent  :  Images  and  Memories 

§  9.  Mental  Images 

Definition  and  Classification. — The  term  Imagery 
or  Images  is  often  restricted  to  feelings  of  things  as  not 
present.  A  more  useful  meaning  and  one  that  prevails 
in  recent  books  on  psychology,  is  feelings  of  things,  quali- 
ties and  conditions  of  all  sorts  as  not  present.  In  this 
sense  of  the  word  there  may  be  an  image  to  correspond 
to  every  sensation,  percept,  impulse  or  emotion.  There 
may  be  images  of  fatigue,  fear,  lonesomeness  and  tickling, 
as  well  as  of  faces  or  tunes.  The  most  frequent  images 
are  however  of  sights,  sounds  and  movements. 

Images  are  naturally  classified  according  to  the  kind 
of  sensation  or  percept  or  impulse  or  emotion  to  which 
they  correspond.     The  most  important  groups  are : 

Images   of  sights: — Visual   Images. 

Images  of  sounds : — Auditory  or  Audile  Images. 

Images  of  feelings  of  movement: — Motor  or  Mo- 
tile Images. 

Images  of  touches  : — Tactile  Images. 

Images    of    tastes : — Gustatory    Images. 

Images    of   smells : — Olfactory    Images. 
The  readers  may  be  unable  to  get  images  of  all  these 
different  kinds.     Images  of  tastes  and  of  smells  are  com- 
paratively rare  and  some  individuals  can  be  found  who 
apparently  lack  visual  and  auditory  images. 

43 


44  Descriptive  Psychology 

A  group  of  images  which  is  of  much  practical  impor- 
tance is  formed  by  images  of  words.  More  of  human 
thinking,  especially  of  that  of  educated  men  and  women, 
is  done  by  imaged  words  than  by  imaged  objects.  It 
should  be  noted  that  whereas  for  images  of  objects  the 
order  of  frequency  is  visual,  auditory,  motor,  the  order 
of  frequency  for  images  of  words  is  probably  motor 
auditory,  visual.  Possibly  auditory,  motor,  visual  is  the 
order,  but  common  opinion  often  mistakes  a  motor  for  an 
auditory  image.  The  more  one  observes  his  images  of 
words,  the  more  he  will  find  motor  factors  and  approach 
agreement  with  the  following  statement  by  Bain: 

'When  we  recall  the  impression  of  a  word  or  sentence, 
if  we  do  not  speak  it  out,  we  feel  the  twitter  of  the  organs 
just  about  to  come  to  that  point.  The  articulating  parts 
— the  larynx,  the  tongue,  the  lips — are  all  sensibly 
excited;  a  suppressed  articulation  is  in  fact  the  material 
of  our  recollection,  the  intellectual  manifestation,  the 
idea  of   speech.'^ 

Generic  Images. — In  certain  cases  the  conditions 
are  especially  favorable  for  the  production  of  vague, 
hazy,  incomplete  images ;  namely,  when  many  things 
alike  in  certain  features  and  unlike  in  others  have  been 
experienced.  For  instance,  the  many  different  percepts 
that  have  been  associated  v/ith  the  word  dog  result  in  a 
tendency  of  the  process  of  reproduction  toward  an  image 
of  a  dog  of  indefinite  and  fleeting  size,  color  and  shape. 
In  such  cases  the  different  percepts  contribute  elements 
which  in  some  cases  agree  enough  to  reinforce  each  other, 
in  others  are  so  contradictory  as  to  annihilate  each  other, 
and  in  all  cases  tend  somewhat  to  give  way  in  succession 
to  each  other.  We  may  compare  the  process  to  that  of 
making  composite  photographs  in  which  each  of  a  hun- 

^  Quoted  by  James,  Principles  of  Psychology,  vol.  II.,  p.  64. 


Feelings  of  Things  as  Not  Present  45 

dred  or  so  faces  has  its  share.  Or  the  process  may  be 
likened  to  the  clamor  of  a  thousand  men  saying  some- 
thing alike  in  part  and  different  in  other  parts.  Out  of 
it  all  comes  to  the  listener  a  vague  feeling  of  the  general 
thought  of  the  assembly.  A  mental  image  which  pos- 
sesses clearly  only  the  commonest  features  of  a  class  of 
objects,  being  incomplete  and  hazy  and  changing  in  all 
minor  details,  is  called  a  Generic  Image. 

''In  dreams,  one  sees  houses,  trees  and  other  objects, 
which  are  perfectly  recognisable  as  such,  but  which  re- 
mind one  of  the  actual  objects  as  seen  'out  of  the  corner 
of  the  eye,'  or  of  the  pictures  thrown  by  a  badly-focused 
magic  lantern.  A  man  addresses  us  who  is  like  a  figure 
seen  by  twilight ;  or  we  travel  through  countries  where 
every  feature  of  the  scenery  is  vague ;  the  outlines  of  the 
hills  are  ill-marked,  and  the  rivers  have  no  defined  banks. 
They  are,  in  short,  generic  ideas  of  many  past  impres- 
sions of  men,  hills,  and  rivers.  An  anatomist  who  oc- 
cupies himself  intently  with  the  examination  of  several 
specimens  of  some  new  kind  of  animal,  in  course  of  time 
acquires  so  vivid  a  conception  of  its  form  and  structure, 
that  the  idea  may  take  visible  shape  and  become  a  sort  of 
waking  dream.  But  the  figure  which  thus  presents  itself 
is  generic,  not  specific.  It  is  no  copy  of  any  one  speci- 
men, but,  more  or  less,  a  mean  of  the  series."^ 

Variation  in  Images. — Images  differ  greatly  in 
clearness,  in  fidelity  and  in  susceptibility  to  control.  One 
may  have  a  perfect  distinct  image  of  his  father's  face, 
one  which  accurately  corresponds  detail  for  detail  with 
the  real  percept  and  which  can  be  gotten  at  any  time  and 
retained  before  the  mind's  eye  at  will ;  but  his  image  of 
a  certain  house  or  of  a  regular  polygon  of  twenty  sides 
may  be  vague,  rough  and  fleeting.  Between  individuals 
the  difference  is  even  more  marked.  One  may  be  able  at 
will  to  feel   'before  his  mind's  nose'  the  odor  of  roast 

^Huxley's  'Hume/  p.  113. 


46  Descriptive  Psychology 

beef  as  a  clear  exact  correspondent  of  the  real  sensa- 
tion. Another  may  be  utterly  unable  to  feel  it  at  all 
unless  it  is  there.  The  following  cases  illustrate  extreme 
cases  of  imagery  of  various  sorts : — 

(i)  "This  morning's  breakfast-table  is  both  dim  and 
bright;  it  is  dim  if  I  try  to  think  of  it  when  my  eyes  are 
open  upon  any  object;  it  is  perfectly  clear  and  bright  if  I 

think  of  it  with  my  eyes  closed All  the  objects  are 

clear  at  once,  yet  when  I  confine  my  attention  to  any  one 

object  it  becomes  far  more  distinct I  have  more 

power  to  recall  color  than  any  other  one  thing;  if,  for 
example,  I  were  to  recall  a  plate  decorated  with  flowers, 
I  could  reproduce  in  a  drawing  the  exact  tone,  etc.  The 
color  of  anything  that  was  on  the  table  was  perfectly 
vivid. — There  is  very  little  limitation  to  the  extent  of  my 
images:  I  can  see  all  four  sides  of  a  room,  I  can  see  all 
four  sides  of  two,  three,  four,  even  more  rooms  with  such 
distinctness  that  if  you  should  ask  me  what  was  in  any 
particular  place  in  any  one,  or  ask  me  to  count  the  chairs, 
etc.,  I  could  do  it  without  the  least  hesitation. — The 
more  I  learn  by  heart,  the  more  clearly  do  I  see  images  of 
my  pages.  Even  before  I  can  recite  the  lines,  I  can  see 
them  so  that  I  could  give  them  very  slowly  word  for 
word,  but  my  mind  is  so  occupied  in  looking  at  my  print- 
ed image  that  I  have  no  idea  of  what  I  am  saying,  of  the 
sense  of  it,  etc.  When  I  first  found  myself  doing  this,  I 
used  to  think  it  was  merely  because  I  knew  the  lines  im- 
perfectly ;  but  I  have  quite  convinced  myself  that  I  really 
do  see  an  image.  The  strongest  proof  that  such  is  really 
the  fact  is  I  think,  the  following: 

*T  can  look  down  the  mentally  seen  page  and  see  the 
words  that  commence  all  the  lines,  and  from  any  one  of 
these  words  I  can  continue  the  line.  I  find  this  much 
easier  to  do  if  the  words  begin  in  a  straight  line  than  if 
there  are  breaks."^ 

(2)  'T  am  unable  to  form  in  my  mind's  eye  any 
visual  likeness  of  the  table  whatever.  After  many  trials 
I  can  only  get  a  hazy  surface,  with  nothing  on  it  or  about 

^James,  Principles  of  Psychology,  vol.  11. .  p.  56. 


Feelings  of  Things  a^  Not  Present  47 

it.  I  can  see  no  variety  in  color,  and  no  positive  limita- 
tions in  extent,  while  I  cannot  see  what  I  see  well  enough 
to  determine  its  position  in  respect  to  my  eye,  or  to  en- 
dow it  with  any  quality  of  size.  I  am  in  the  same  posi- 
tion as  to  the  word  dog.  I  cannot  see  it  in  my  mind's 
eye  at  all ;  and  so  cannot  tell  whether  I  should  have  to 
run  my  eye  along  it,  if  I  did  see  it."^ 

(3)  "Imagination  also  takes  the  auditory  form. 
'When  I  write  a  scene,'  said  Legouve  to  Scribe,  'I  hear; 
but  you  see.  In  each  phrase  which  I  write,  the  voice  of 
the  personage  strikes  my  ear.  Vous,  qui  etes  le  theatre 
meme,  your  actors  walk,  gesticulate  before  your  eyes; 

I  am  a  listener,  you  a  spectator' 'Nothing  more 

true,'  said  Scribe.  'Do  you  know  where  I  am  when  I 
write  a  piece?     In  the  middle  of  the  parterre.'^ 

(4)  "If  I  wish  to  imagine  that  I  am  walking,  I  have 
to  combine  feelings  in  the  parts  of  the  body  concerned  in 
walking.  This  feeling  is  in  my  case  most  vivid  in  the 
upper  part  of  the  thigh.  For  every  step,  which  I  wish 
to  imagine,  I  have  to  revive  expressly  such  a  feeling  in 
the  upper  part  of  the  thigh,  just  as  if  I  wished  to  really 
move  it  forward,  to  make  a  real  step." 

"If  I  try  to  call  up  in  memory  the  walking  move- 
ment of  another  person,  say  of  a  soldier  marching,  and 
in  such  wise  as  to  imagine  him  first  in  one  position  (for 
instance  with  both  legs  on  the  ground  and  then  as  lifting 
his  leg  at  the  order  March  and  putting  it  forward  so  as 
to  take  a  step),  I  notice  that  I  am  thinking  of  the  upper 
part  of  one  of  my  own  thighs. 

"If  I  wish  to  imagine  him  lifting  his  left  leg,  I  am 
aware  of  something  in  the  upper  part  of  my  left  thigh ; 
if  I  seek  to  imagine  him  as  lifting  his  right  leg,  the  feel- 
ing passes  back  to  my  right  thigh." 

"My  memories  of  the  movements  of  all  inanimate 
objects  are  for  the  most  part  connected  with  feelings  in 
the  eye  muscles.  If  I  wish  to  represent  to  myself  the 
motion  of  the  clouds,  I  have  to  add  the  feeling  of  my 
eyes  following  the  clouds.     If  I  try  to  suppress  this  feel- 

*  James,  Principles  of  Psychology,  vol.  II.,  pp.  57-6o. 


48  Descriptive  Psychology 

ing,  the  image  of  the  movement  is  at  once  inhibited,  the 
clouds  seem  unable  to  move.  The  case  is  the  same  with 
my  images  of  the  flight  of  a  bird,  of  smoke  rising,  of  a 
wagon  passing  by. 

"1  cannot  imagine  the  sound  b  without  feelings  in 
my  lips.  No  more  can  I  call  up  the  feeling  in  my  lips 
of  b  without  thinking  of  the  sound. "^ 

(5)  "Auditory  Mental  Imagery.  I  find  the  audi- 
tory mental  imagery  in  my  case  to  be  almost  as  import- 
ant a  factor  in  my  mental  life  as  is  the  visual,  being  a 
mental  reproduction  of  the  sounds  I  have  heard — musi- 
cal or  otherwise.  They  are  comparable  with  real 
sounds,  not  so  much  in  intensity,  but  perfectly  in  timbre, 
pitch  and  duration.  I  can  estimate  a  minute  with  much 
greater  exactness  "mentally  if  I  listen  to  the  auditory 
mental  imagery  of  a  piece  of  music  which  takes  about 
a  minute  to  perform. 

'The  auditory  mental  imagery,  I  would  say,  includes 
all  the  actual  word  thinking  that  I  do,  which  is  almost 
always  done  by  means  of  writing. 

"Olfactory  Mental  Imagery.  These  are  in  my  own 
case   extremely   numerous,    probably  because   to   me   so 

many  things  have  a  smell,  often  a  distinctive  smell 

These  mental  images  have  to  m^e,  like  those  of  the  other 
senses,  quite  distinctive  qualities.  The  mental  image  of 
the  smell  of  new-mown  hay  is  totally  unlike,  even  as  a 
purely  mental  occurrence,  that  of  the  aroma  of  forest  leaf- 
mold.  And  the  words  'tea'  and  'coffee'  are  represented 
in  my  mind  by  two  mental  images,  totally  unlike."^ 

Types  of  Imagination. — Individuals  may  often  be 
classified  under  types  according  to  the  kind  of  imagery 
which  predominates  in  their  streams  of  thought.  Thus 
Dr.  Strieker,  the  author  of  the  fourth  quotation  given 
above,  would  be  put  under  the  motor  type,  while  the 
author  of  the  first  quotation  would  be  called  a  visualizer. 

^  S.  Strieker,  Bewegungsvorstellungen,  pp.  12-14,  ^^d  Sprach- 
vorstellungen,  pp.  9-10. 

^  Wilfrid  Lay,  Mental  Imagery,  pp.  36-37. 


Feelings  of  Things  as  Not  Present  49 

So  would  Dr.  Lay,  who  found  that  2,500  recorded  mental 
images  of  his  own  were  distributed  as  follows: 

Per  Cent,  Per  Cent.  Per  Cent. 

Visual    57.4  Gustatory    ...   .6  Organic   . . . .  i.i 

Auditory    28.8     Thermal    2.0     Motor   3 

Olfactory    5.9     Tactile    3.8  Emotional   ....I 

The  majority  of  individuals  do  not,  however,  show  so 
emphatic  a  predominance  of  one  kind  of  imagery  as  to 
be  put  surely  in  any  one  class.  They  are  mixed  types. 
For  instance  the  reader  will  probably  find  that  he  or  she 
has  visual  images  most  frequently,  auditory  next  and 
motor  next,  as  do  the  majority;  that  in  his  class  or  among 
his  friends  cases  of  the  almost  exclusive  use  of  any  one 
kind  of  imagery  are   rare. 

Image  and  Percept. — The  image,  as  defined,  is 
never  the  exact  duplicate  of  the  sensation  or  percept  to 
which  it  corresponds.  If  it  were,  one  would  feel  the 
thing  as  present  and  act  as  if  it  were.  Indeed  the  most 
useful  characteristic  of  an  image  is  that  it  does  not  du- 
plicate the  sensation  or  percept.  Otherwise  we  should 
all  be  like  sleep-walkers  and  madmen,  confusing  fact 
with  fancy  in  the  most  absurd  and  dangerous  ways. 

Images,  like  percepts,  are  the  result  of  a  process  of 
acquisition.  At  the  start  of  life  we  have  neither,  and  for 
some  time  the  two  are  confused, — at  least  in  memory,  as 
is  Vv^itnessed  by  the  innocent  lies  of  three  year  olds  who 
tell  of  lions  running  down  the  street  and  of  dogs  as  big 
as  houses  or  as  small  as  mice. 

Productive  Imagination. — So  far  only  those  images 
have  been  described  which  at  least  roughly  correspond 
to  real  things  and  conditions.  There  also  occur  images 
which  correspond  to  nothing  real,  but  are  new  combina- 
tions.    One  can  picture  a  beast  with  an  elephant's  head, 

4 


50  Descriptive  Psychology 

a  lion's  body  and  a  giraffe's  legs.  There  is  in  these  cases 
a  correspondence  not  of  the  total  image  with  some  real 
thing,  but  only  of  parts  of  the  image  with  parts  or  ele- 
ments of  real  things.  In  our  fancies  and  dreams  we 
thus  make  the  most  extraordinary  and  elaborate  com- 
binations of  the  old  famiUar  elements.  The  names  (i) 
Reproductive  Imagination  and  (2)  Productive  Imagina- 
tion are  used  for  ( i )  the  capacity  of  getting  images  that 
repeat  whole  things  experienced  and  (2)  the  capacity  of 
getting  images  of  things  never  experienced  on  a  basis  of 
old   elements  and  parts. 

The  capacity  to  thus  create  a  new  world  from  the 
ruins  of  past  experiences  is  one  of  the  primary  sources 
of  human  achievement.  When  directed  by  wise  insight 
it  becomes  a  part  of  the  creative  genius  of  poets,  in- 
ventors and  men  of  science.  On  the  basis  of  the  same 
experiences  one  man  imagines  the  steam  engine,  another 
man  nothing;  out  of  the  same  stuff  one  man  creates  a 
tawdry  play  of  revenge,   another  a   Hamlet. 

§  10.  Memories 

Definitions. — In  the  common  usage  of  language  the 
words  memory  and  to  remember  refer  to  four  distinct 
things : — 

( 1 )  The  presence  of  mental  images ;  e.g.,  'Can  you 
remember  his  face?'  usually  means,  'Can  you  call  up  a 
visual  image  of  his  face?' 

(2)  The  feeling  of  a  thing  as  having  been  experi- 
enced ;  e.g.,  'I  remember  your  face  but  I  cannot  place  it.' 
Recognition  is  a  better  name  for  this  sort  of  feeHng. 

(3)  The  feeling  of  a  thing  or  event  as  belonging  to 
some  definite  experience  of  one's  own  in  the  past,  or,  in 
the  words  of  Professor  James,  ''Knowledge  of  an  event, 
or  fact,  of  which  meantime  we  have  not  been  thinking. 


I 


Feelings  of  Things  as  Not  Present  51 

with  the  additional  consciousness  that  we  have  thought 
or  experienced  it  before;"  e.g.,  'Do  you  remember  how 
you  fell  from  your  horse  here  last  summer?'  means,  'Can 
you  call  to  mind  the  event,  and  feel  that  you  experienced 
it?' 

(4)  The  continued  existence  of  connections  that 
have  been  formed  between  ideas  or  feelings  and  acts 
or  acts  and  acts;  e.g.,  *Do  you  remember  your  Latin?', 
'Do  you  remember  how  to  write  shorthand?',  and  'Do 
you  remember  how  to  throw  an  out  curve?'  refer  to  the 
presence  not  of  feelings  of  things  past  but  of  connections 
made  in  the  past.  Permanence  of  connections  or  as- 
sociations is  a  better  name  for  these  facts. 

Memory  Proper. — The  word  memory,  or  rather 
memories,  may  best  be  kept  rather  strictly  for  the  feelings 
of  class  (3)  of  the  above.  Such  feelings  are  evidently 
complex.  They  involve  far  more  than  the  mere  repe- 
tition of  a  feeling.  Like  images  they  are  feelings  of  a 
thing  or  event  as  not  present.  They  also  involve  the 
perception  of  time,  since  they  are  feelings  of  things  or 
events  as  having  been  present  in  the  past  The  conscious- 
ness of  self  enters,  also,  since  they  are  feelings  of  a 
thing  or  event  as  having  been  in  one's  ow^n  past  ex- 
perience. Like  judgments  they  imply  an  affirmation 
that  such  a  state  of  affairs  is  (here  was)  the  case.  It 
would  indeed  not  be  unfair  to  define  memories  (mean- 
ing by  the  word  class  (3)  above)  as  judgments  con^ 
cerning  one's  own  past  experience. 

The  facts  about  the  permanence  of  connections  will 
be  presented  in  Part  III,  since  they  are  explainable  by 
the  laws  of  the  mind's  action, — belong,  that  is,  to  dy- 
namic psychology.  Why  different  individuals  possess 
different  degrees  of  ability  in  retaining  connections  once 
formed,  what  decides  whether  one  shall  be  able  to  call 


52  Descriptive  Psychology 

up  a  given  fact  or  not,  how  connections  may  most 
readily  be  made  permanent, — are  samples  of  the  ques- 
tions that  will  arise. 

Exercises 

1.  Study  carefully  the  picture  your  mind  calls  up  of  your 
breakfast-table  of  this  morning  as  Galton  directs  in  his  'Questions 
on  Visualizing'  and  then  write  down  your  answers  to  the  first 
three  questions  of  his  list.  Where  would  you  class  yourself  in 
visual  imagery  and  in  color  representation,  using  Galton's  scale 
(printed  on  page  55  f.)  ? 

2.  Make  the  observations  and  answer  the  questions  as 
directed  by  Galton,  so  far  as  you  have  time.  What  kinds  of 
images  do  you  lack  entirely?  What  kinds  are  little  developed? 
What  kinds  are  most  prominent?  Compare  your  answers  with 
those  of  three  or  four  of  your  friends. 

In  answering  the  questions  one  must  beware  of : — 
(i)     Confusing  the  image  of  the  name  of  a  thing  with  the 
image  of  the  thing  itself.     That  I  can  call  up  the  word  bitter  does 
not  mean  that  I  can  have  an  image  of  a  bitter  taste. 

(2)  Confusing  the  fact  that  one  can  act  as  if  a  feeling  were 
present  in  his  mind  with  the  fact  of  the  real  presence  of  the  feel- 
ing. The  same  act  may  have  various  antecedents.  That  I  can 
draw  my  finger  around  an  oblong  space  in  the  air  does  not  imply 
that  I  can  have  a  visual  image  of  an  oblong.  That  I  shiver  when 
someone  is  hurt  does  not  imply  that  I  feel  an  image  of  pain. 

(3)  Confusing  the  knowledge  that  something  happened 
with  an  image  of  its  happening.  That  I  can  now  feel  that  I  was 
angry  does  not  mean  that  I  feel  a  mental  image  of  the  em.otion, 
anger. 

(4)  Confusing  the  process  of  arousing   certain   conditions 
■  and  so  having  a  certain  real  feeling,  with  the  process  of  arousing 

an  image  of  that  feeling.  That  I  can,  by  thinking  of  certain 
events,  get  a  feeling  of  anger,  does  not  mean  that  I  can  get  an 
image  of  the  feeling  of  anger.  That  by  calling  up  thoughts  of  the 
country  I  can  arouse  a  feeling  of  desire  does  not  mean  that  I  can 
feel  an  image  of  the  feeling  of  desire. 


Feelings  of  Things  as  Not  Present  53 

Galton^s  'Questions  on  Visualizing  and  Other  Allied 
Faculties' 

"The  object  of  these  Questions  is  to  elicit  the  degree  in  which 
different  persons  possess  the  power  of  seeing  images  in  their 
mind's  eye,  and  of  reviving  past  sensations. 

From  inquiries  I  have  already  made,  it  appears  that  remark- 
able variations  exist  both  in  the  strength  and  in  the  quality  of  these 
faculties,  and  it  is  highly  probable  that  a  statistical  inquiry  into 
them  will  throw  light  upon  more  than  one  psychological  problem. 

Before  addressing  yourself  to  any  of  the  Questions  .... 
think  of  some  definite  object — suppose  it  is  your  breakfast-table 
as  you  sat  down  to  it  this  morning — and  consider  carefully  the 
picture  that  rises  before  your  mind's  eye. 

1.  Illumination. — Is  the  image  dim  or  fairly  clear?  Is  its 
brightness  comparable  to  that  of  the  actual  scene? 

2.  DeHnition. — Are  all  the  objects  pretty  well  defined  at  the 
same  time,  or  is  the  place  of  sharpest  definition  at  any  one  moment 
more  contracted  than  it  is  in  a  real  scene? 

3.  Colouring. — Are  the  colours  of  the  china,  of  the  toast, 
bread  crust,  mustard,  meat,  parsley,  or  whatever  may  have  been 
on  the  table,  quite  distinct  and  natural? 

4.  Extent  of  Held  of  view. — Call  up  the  image  of  some  pano- 
ramic view  (the  walls  of  your  room  might  suffice).  Can  you 
force  yourself  to  see  mentally  a  wider  range  of  it  than  could  be 
taken  in  by  any  single  glance  of  the  eyes?  Can  you  mentally 
see  more  than  three  faces  of  a  die,  or  more  than  one  hemisphere 
of  a  globe  at  the  same  instant  of  time? 

5.  Distance  of  images. — Where  do  mental  images  appear  to 
be  situated?  Within  the  head,  within  the  eye-ball,  just  in  front 
of  the  eyes,  or  at  a  distance  corresponding  to  reality?  Can  you 
project  an  image  upon  a  piece  of  paper? 

6.  Command  over  images. — Can  you  retain  a  mental  picture 
steadily  before  the  eyes  ?  When  you  do  so,  does  it  grow  brighter 
or  dimmer?  When  the  act  of  retaining  it  becomes  wearisome,  in 
what  part  of  the  head  or  eye-ball  is  the  fatigue  felt? 

7.  Persons. — Can  you  recall  with  distinctness  the  features  of 
all  near  relations  and  many  other  persons?  Can  you  at  will 
cause  your  mental  image  of  any  or  most  of  them  to  sit,  stand,  or 
turn  slowly  round?  Can  you  deliberately  seat  the  image  of  a 
well-known  person  in  a  chair  and  see  it  with  enough  distinctness 


54  Descriptive  Psychology 

to  enable  you  to  sketch  it  leisurely  (supposing  yourself  able  to 
draw)  ? 

8.  Scenery. — Do  you  preserve  the  recollection  of  scenery 
with  much  precision  of  detail,  and  do  you  find  pleasure  in  dwell- 
ing on  it?  Can  you  easily  form  mental  pictures  from  the 
descriptions  of  scenery  that  are  so  frequently  met  with  in  novels 
and  books  of  travel? 

9.  Comparison  with  reality. — What  difference  do  you  per- 
ceive between  a  very  vivid  mental  picture  called  up  in  the  dark, 
and  a  real  scene?  Have  you  ever  mistaken  a  mental  image  for 
a  reality  when  in  health  and  wide  awake? 

ID.  Numerals  and  dates. — Are  these  invariably  associated  in 
your  mind  with  any  peculiar  mental  imagery,  whether  of  written 
or  printed  figures,  diagrams,  or  colours?  If  so,  explain  fully, 
and  say  if  you  can  account  for  the  association. 

11.  Specialties. — If  you  happen  to  have  special  aptitudes  for 
mechanics,  mathematics  (either  geometry  of  three  dimensions  or 
pure  analysis),  mental  arithmetic,  or  chess-playing  blindfold, 
please  explain  fully  how  far  your  processes  depend  on  the  use 
of  visual  images,  and  how  far  otherwise? 

12.  Call  up  before  your  imagination  the  objects  specified  in 
the  six  following  paragraphs,  numbered  A  to  F,  and  consider 
carefully  whether  your  mental  representation  of  them  generally, 
is  in  each  group  very  faint,  faint,  fair,  good,  or  vivid  and  com- 
parable to  the  actual  sensation: — 

A.  Light  and  colour. — An  evenly  clouded  sky  (omitting  all 
landscape),  first  bright,  then  gloomy.  A  thick  surrounding  haze, 
first  white,  then  successively  blue,  yellow,  green,  and  red. 

B.  Sound. — The  beat  of  rain  against  the  window  panes,  the 
crack  of  a  whip,  a  church  bell,  the  hum  of  bees,  the  whistle  of  a 
railway,  the  clinking  of  tea-spoons  and  saucers,  the  slam  of  a 
door. 

C.  Smells. — Tar,  roses,  an  oil-lamp  blown  out,  hay,  violets, 
a  fur  coat,  gas,  tobacco. 

D.  Tastes. — Salt,  sugar,  lemon  juice,  raisins,  chocolate,  cur- 
rant jelly. 

E.  Touch. — Velvet,  silk,  soap,  gum,  sand,  dough,  a  crisp 
dead  leaf,  the  prick  of  a  pin. 

F.  Other  sensations. — Heat,  hunger,  cold,  thirst,  fatigue, 
fever,  drowsiness,  a  bad  cold. 


Feelings  of  Things  as  Not  Present  55 

13.  Music. — Have  you  any  aptitude  for  mentally  recalling 
music,  or   for  imagining  it? 

14.  At  different  ages. — Do  you  recollect  what  your  powers 
of  visualizing,  etc.,  were  in  childhood?  Have  they  varied  much 
within  your  recollection?"  (F.  Galton,  Inquiries  Into  Human 
Faculty,  pp.   378-380.) 

Galton's  Scale  or  Vividness  and  Fidelity 
IN  Visual  Imagery 

"Highest. — Brilliant,  distinct,  never  blotchy. 

First  Suboctile. — The  image  once  seen  is  perfectly  clear  and 
bright. 

First  Octile. — I  can  see  my  breakfast-table  or  any  equally 
familiar  thing  with  my  mind's  eye  quite  as  well  in  all  particulars 
as  I  can  do  if  the  reality  is  before  me. 

First  Quartile. — Fairly  clear;  illumination  of  actual  scene  is 
fairly  represented.  Well  defined.  Parts  do  not  obtrude  them- 
selves, but  attention  has  to  be  directed  to  different  points  in  suc- 
cession to  call  up  the  whole. 

IMiddlemost. — Fairly  clear.  Brightness  probably  at  least  from 
one-half  to  two-thirds  of  the  original.  Definition  varies  very 
much,  one  or  two  objects  being  much  more  distinct  than  the 
others,  but  the  latter  come  out  clearly  if  attention  be  paid  to  them. 

Last  Quartile. — Dim,  certainly  not  comparable  to  the  actual 
scene.  I  have  to  think  separately  of  the  several  things  on  the 
table  to  bring  them  clearly  before  the  mind's  eye,  and  when  I 
think  of  some  things  the  others  fade  away  in  confusion. 

Last  Octile. — Dim  and  not  comparable  in  brightness  to  the 
real  scene.  Badly  defined  with  blotches  of  light;  very  incom- 
plete; very  little  of  one  object  is  seen  at  one  time. 

Last  Suboctile. — I  am  very  rarely  able  to  recall  any  object 
whatever  with  any  sort  of  distinctness.  Very  occasionally  an 
object  or  image  will  recall  itself,  but  even  then  it  is  more  like  a 
generalised  image  than  an  individual  one.  I  seem  to  be  almost 
destitute  of  visualising  power  as  under  control. 

Lowest. — My  powers  are  zero.  To  my  consciousness  there 
is  almost  no  association  of  memory  with  objective  visual  impres- 
sions.   I  recollect  the  table,  but  do  not  see  it 


56  Descriptive  Psychology 

IN  COLOUR  REPRESENTATION 

Highest. — Perfectly   distinct,  bright  and  natural. 

First  Suboctile. — White  cloth,  blue  china,  argand  coffee-pot, 
buff  stand  with  sienna  drawing,  toast — all  clear. 

First  Octile. — All  details  seen  perfectly. 

First  Quartile. — Colours  distinct  and  natural  till  I  begin  to 
puzzle  over  them. 

Middlemost. — Fairly  distinct,  though  not  certain  that  they  are 
accurately  recalled. 

Last    Quartile. — Natural,    but    very    indistinct. 

Last  Octile. — Faint;  can  only  recall  colours  by  a  special 
effort   for    each. 

Last  Suboctile. — Power  is  nil. 

Lowest. — Power  is  nil."     (Inquiries  Into  Human  Faculty,  pp. 

93-94.) 

First  suboctile  means  the  ability  exceeded  by  one  sixteenth 
of  people;  first  octile  means  the  ability  exceeded  by  one  eighth; 
first  quartile  means  the  ability  exceeded  by  one  fourth ;  last  quar- 
tile means  the  ability  exceeded  by  three  fourths ;  last  octile  means 
the  ability  exceeded  by  seven  eighths,  last  suboctile  means  the 
ability  exceeded  by  fifteen  sixteenths. 

3.  Compare  the  imagery  of  the  author  of  the  following 
statement  with  that  of  the  individuals  quoted  in  §  9. 

"When  I  seek  to  represent  a  row  of  soldiers  marching,  all 
I  catch  is  a  view  of  stationary  legs  first  in  one  phase  of  move- 
ment and  then  in  another,  and  these  views  are  extremely  im- 
perfect and  momentary.  Occasionally  (especially  when  I  try  to 
stimulate  my  imagination  as  by  repeating  Victor  Hugo's  lines 
about  the  regiment, 

'Leur  pas  est  si  correct,  sans  tarder  ni  courir, 

Qu'on  croit  voir  des  ciseaux  se  fermer  et  s'ouvrir,') 
I  seem  to  get  an  instantaneous  glimpse  of  an  actual  movement, 
but  it  is  to  the  last  degree  dim  and  uncertain.  All  these  images 
seem  at  first  to  be  purely  retinal.  I  think,  however,  that  rapid 
eye-movements  accompany  them,  though  these  latter  give  rise  to 
such  slight  feelings  that  they  are  almost  impossible  of  detection. 
Absolutely  no  leg-movements  of  my  own  are  there ;  in  fact,  to 
call  such  up  arrests  my  imagination  of  the  soldiers.  My  optical 
images  are  in  general  very  dim,  dark,  fugitive  and  contracted. 
It   would  be  utterly  impossible  to  draw  from  them,  and  yet  I 


Feelings  of  Things  as  Not  Present  57 

perfectly  well  distinguish  one  from  the  other.  My  auditory 
images  are  excessively  inadequate  reproductions  of  their  origi- 
nals. I  have  no  images  of  taste  or  smell.  Touch-imagination  is 
fairly  distinct,  but  comes  very  little  into  play  with  most  objects 
thought  of.  Neither  is  all  my  thought  verbalized;  for  I  have 
shadowy  schemes  of  relation,  as  apt  to  terminate  in  a  nod  of  the 
head  or  an  expulsion  of  the  breath  as  in  a  definite  word.  On 
the  whole,  vague  images  or  sensations  of  movement  inside  of 
my  head  towards  the  various  parts  of  space  in  which  the  terms 
I  am  thinking  of  either  lie  or  are  momentarily  symbolized  to  lie 
together  with  movements  of  the  breath  through  my  pharynx  and 
nostrils,  form  a  by  no  means  inconsiderable  part  of  my  thought- 
stuff  "     (James,  Principles  of  Psychology,  vol.  II.,  p.  65.) 

Experiment  7.  After  Images  and  Recalled  Images. — Cut  out 
of  a  sheet  of  black  paper,  say  10  inches  square,  a  cross  with  arms 
each  an  inch  wide  and  two  inches  long.  Fasten  the  sheet  against 
the  glass  of  a  window  so  that  a  bright  light  comes  through  the 
cross  shaped  opening.  Sitting  at  a  distance  of  six  or  eight  feet, 
look  steadily  at  the  center  of  the  cross  for  a  minute  and  a  half  or 
longer.  Then  look  at  a  white  screen  (for  instance  a  sheet  or 
towel  hung  against  the  wall).  A  duplicate  of  the  cross,  but  dark 
with  a  light  background  will  be  seen.  How  does  this  so-called 
after  image  differ  from  the  visual  image  you  call  up  in  memory 
of  a  dark  cross  on  a  light  background: — (a)  in  persistence,  (b) 
in  seeming  a  real  object,  (c)  in  location,  (d)  in  modification  by 
your  will,  (e)  in  intensity? 

References 

A.  James,  Briefer  Course,  XVIII.    (287-288),  XIX. 
Stout,  Manual,   393-417,  435-446. 

Titchener,  Outline,  §§  70-80. 
Angell,  Psychology,  VIII.,  IX. 

B.  Ebbinghaus,  Grundziige,  §§  48-50. 

James,  Principles,  XVI.    (643-652),  XVIII. 
Wundt,    Physiologische    Psychologic,    XVIII.    (§    3),    XIX. 
(§6). 


CHAPTER  IV 

Feelings  of  Facts:   Feelings  of  Relationships, 
Meanings  and  Judgments 

§  II.  Feelings  of  Relationships 

Contrasted  with  Feelings  of  Things  and  Quali- 
ties.— As  you  look  at  this  page  you  are  conscious  not 
only  of  the  words,  'Feelings  of  Relationships,'  but  also 
of  the  fact  that  these  words  are  at  the  top  of  this  page ; 
you  feel,  that  is,  the  'abovenes/  of  these  words.  As 
you  think  of  this  chapter  you  are  aware  also  that  it  is 
a  part  of  the  whole  book;  you  feel,  that  is,  its  relation- 
ship to  the  whole.  You  feel,  too,  the  unlikeness  of  the 
black  letters  to  the  white  page.  As  you  read  in  the 
first  sentence  the  not  only,  you  feel  the  incompleteness 
of  the  idea  immediately  to  come;  and  as  you  read  the 
but  also,  you  feel  the  belonging-together-ness  or  to-be- 
added-to-ness  of  the  next  coming  idea  with  the  idea, 
'percepts   of   words.' 

We  may  thus  feel  things  and  qualities  and  conditions, 
not  as  mere  bare  existences,  but  as  related  in  space  and 
time, — as  more  than,  less  than,  equal  to,  part  of,  whole 
containing,  like,  unlike,  opposite  to,  derived  from,  super- 
ior to  or  inferior  to  some  other  fact.  Amongst  parts  of 
speech,  prepositions  and  conjunctions  express  feelings, 
not  of  things  or  qualities,  but  of  relationships.  There 
are  feelings  of  in-ness,  beside-ness,  beyond-ness,  with- 
ness,  if-ness,  but-ness  and  although-ness  as  truly  as  of 
the  sun  or  moon,  of  black  or  white,  of  fatigue  or  pleasure. 

58 


Feelings  of  Facts  59 

These  feelings  are  among  the  commonest  features  of 
mental  life.  Witness  how  much  disappears  from  any 
statement, — e.g.,  the  preamble  to  the  United  States  Con- 
stitution,— when  words  expressing  feelings  of  relation- 
ship are  omitted  from  the  text. 

''We  the  people  the  States  form  perfect,  establish 
justice,  insure  domestic  tranquillity,  the  defense,  the  wel- 
fare, the  blessings  liberty  ourselves  posterity  do  ordain 
establish    this    Constitution    States    America."^ 

Their  Attributes. — It  is  hard  to  describe  feelings  of 
relationships.  Anyone  knows  that  when  he  thinks,  *He 
is  sick :  nevertheless/  he  feels  a  different  expectation 
toward  the  coming  thought  than  if  he  heard  or  thought, 
*He  is  sick,  therefore.'  But  it  would  be  impossible  to 
describe  the  feeling  to  one  who  had  not  felt  it  himself 
and  it  would  take  rather  long  statement  to  describe  it 
to  oneself.  Two  characteristics  feelings  of  relation- 
ships almost  invariably  possess.  In  the  first  place  they 
are  fleeting,  evanescent,  intangible  mental  states.  No 
sooner  does  one  try  to  examine  them  than  they  are 
gone.  One  can  keep  the  same  percept  in  mind  for  some 
time ;  can  hold  the  same  image  constant  for  at  least  a 
number  of  seconds.  But  one  rarely  thinks  nevertheless- 
ness  ur  but-ness  or  above-ness  for  any  appreciable  time. 
Feelings  of  relationship  are  among  those  transitory 
states  of  mind  which  Professor  James  calls  the  fringes 
of  thought;  they  are  the  almost  unseen  web  of  con- 
nections in  which  are  set  the  obvious  percepts  and 
images  and  the  somewhat  less  obvious  feelings  of  mean- 
ing. In  the  second  place  they  almost  invariably  occur, 
not  by  themselves  alone  but  in  a  context  either  as  ele- 

'  Some  of  the  words  retained  are  relational  if  we  consider  their 
real  meaning.  Form  and  establish,  ordain  and  secure  may  thus  be 
held  to  express  a  feeling  of  causing ;  domestic  and  posterity  to  ex- 
press feelings  of  unlikeness. 


6o  Descriptive  Psychology 

ments  of  complex  mental  states, — 'fringes'  or  'tenden- 
cies' of  percepts  and  images,  or  as  transitive,  inter- 
mediate feelings,  joining  two  mental  states.  We  feel, 
not  more  alone  but  more  than  some  given  thing;  not 
merely  and  but  John  and  James.  We  feel  things  as 
relative  or  as  related  rather  than  things  and  relations.^ 
To  supplement  this  account  of  the  nature  of  these 
elusive  feelings,  I  quote  from  Professor  William  James, 
who  first  emphasized  their  importance. 

"If  there  be  such  things  as  feelings  at  all,  then  so 
surely  as  relations  between  objects  exist  in  rerum  natura, 
so  surely,  and  more  surely,  do  feelings  exist  to  which 
these  relations  are  known.  There  is  not  a  conjunction 
or  a  preposition,  and  hardly  an  adverbial  phrase,  syn- 
tactic form,  or  inflection  of  voice,  in  human  speech,  that 
does  not  express  some  shading  or  other  of  relation  which 
we  at  some  moment  actually  feel  to  exist  between  the 
larger  objects  of  our  thought 

We  ought  to  say  a  feeling  of  and,  a  feeling  of  if,  a 
feeling  of  but  and  a  feeling  of  by,  quite  as  readily  as  we 
say  a  feeling  of  blue  or  a  feeling  of  cold." 

"When  we  read  such  phrases  as  'naught  but,'  'either 
one  or  the  other,'  'a  is  b,'  'but,'  'although  it  is,  neverthe- 
less,' 'it  is  an  excluded  middle,  there  is  no  tertium  quid,' 
and  a  host  of  other  verbal  skeletons  of  logical  relation,  is 
it  true  that  there  is  nothing  more  in  our  minds  than  the 
words  themselves  as  they  pass?  What  then  is  the  mean- 
ing of  the  words  which  we  think  we  understand  as  we 
read  ?  What  makes  that  meaning  different  in  one  phrase 
from  what  it  is  in  the  other?  'Who?'  'When?'  'Where?' 
Is  the  difference  of  felt  meaning  in  these  interrogatives 
nothing  more  than  their  difference  of  sound?     And  is  it 

^Occasionally  perhaps  the  pure  feeling  of  a  relationship  holds 
the  field  by  itself.  The  mere  feeling  of  unity  or  of  difference 
seems  to  enthrall  us  without  our  being  cble  to  say  what  is  thus 
unified  or  similar.  The  following  sentence,  e.  g.,  seems  to  repre- 
sent nothing  more  than  jumbled  feelings  of  relationship.  "There 
are  no  differences  but  differences  of  degree  between  different  de- 
grees of  difference  and  no  difference." 


Feelings  of  Facts  6i 

not  (just  like  the  difference  of  a  sound  itself)  known 
and  understood  in  an  affection  of  consciousness  correla- 
tive to  it,  though  so  impalpable  to  direct  examination? 
Is  not  the  same  true  of  such  negatives  as  *no/  'never,' 
'not  yet?' 

The  truth  is  that  large  tracts  of  human  speech  are 
nothing  but  signs  of  direction  in  thought,  of  which  direc- 
tion we  nevertheless  have  an  acutely  discriminative  sense, 
though  no  definite  sensorial  image  plays  any  part  in  it 
whatsoever.  Sensorial  images  are  stable  psychic  facts; 
\VQ  can  hold  them  still  and  look  at  them  as  long  as  we 
like.  These  bare  images  of  logical  movement,  on  the 
contrary,  are  psychic  transitions,  always  on  the  wing,  so 
to  speak,  and  not  to  be  glimpsed  except  in  flight.  Their 
function  is  to  lead  from  one  set  of  images  to  another. 
As  they  pass,  we  feel  both  the  waxing  and  the  waning 
images  in  a  way  altogether  peculiar  and  a  way  quite 
different  from  the  way  of  their  full  presence." 

"Every  definite  image  in  the  mind  is  steeped  and 
dyed  in  the  free  water  that  flows  around  it.  With  it 
goes  the  sense  of  its  relations,  near  and  remote,  the  dying 
echo  of  whence  it  came  to  us,  the  dawning  sense  of 
whither  it  is  to  lead.  The  significance,  the  value,  of  the 
image  is  all  in  this  halo  or  penumbra  that  surrounds  and 
escorts  it, — or  rather  that  is  fused  into  one  with  it  and 
has  become  bone  of  its  bone  and  flesh  of  its  flesh ;  leav- 
ing it,  it  is  true,  an  image  of  the  same  thing  it  was  be- 
fore, but  making  it  an  image  of  that  thing  newly  taken 
and  freshly  understood."^ 

Classification. — The     more     important     feelings     of 
relationship   may   be   classified   as   follows : — 
Feelings   of   Objective  Relationships — 
Of  Relationships  of  Space. 
''  Time. 

"  Substance    and    QuaHty. 
Feelings  of  Logical  or  Intellectual  or  Subjective  Re- 
lationships— 

^  James,  Principles  of  Psychology,  vol.  I.,  pp.  245-255  passim. 


6z  Descriptive  Psychology 

Of  Relationships  of  Identity. 

"  Equality. 

"  Likeness. 

"  Unlikeness. 

"  Opposition. 

"  Part  and  Whole. 

"  Cause   and   Effect. 

"  Condition    and    Result. 

"  Concession. 

Feelings  of  Relationships  and  Logical  Thought. — 
Feelings  of  Relationships  are  essential  features  of  logi- 
cal thinking.  Especially  important  for  it  are  feelings 
of  the  intellectual  relationships,  such  as  likeness  and 
difference,  and  cause  and  effect.  Compare,  for  instance, 
the  paragraph  A,  which  requires  no  thought  and  which 
leads  mainly  to  a  series  of  images  in  a  scholar's  mind, 
with  the  paragraph  B,  which  involves  thought  and  leads 
to  real  comprehension.  Count  the  number  of  words 
standing  for  relationships  in  each. 


The  Nile  overflows  annually.  The  land  in  Egypt  is 
fertile.  The  soil  of  the  hills  to  the  south  is  rich.  The 
river  deposits  the  soil.  The  land  produces  great  crops  of 
wheat.  The  river  plains  of  China  produce  large  crops  of 
rice.  Egypt  used  to  be  called  the  granary  of  Rome, 
The  method  of  cultivation  in  Egypt  is  by  hand  labor. 
The  people  are  uninventive.     The  people  are  uneducated. 

B. 

Because  of  the  annual  overflow  of  the  Nile  the  land  in 
Egypt  is  fertilized  by  a  deposit  of  rich  soil  brought  down 
from  the  hills  to  the  south.  The  land  thus  produces 
great  crops  of  wheat  for  the  same  reason  that  the  river 
plains  of  China  produce  large  crops  of  rice.  Hence 
Eg>'pt  used  to  be  called  the  granary  of  Rome.  The  in- 
ferior methods  of  cultivation,  largely  by  hard  labor,  are 


Feelings  of  Facts  63 

due  to  the  lack  of  inventiveness  and  of  education  among 
the  population  who  sow  by  hand. 

The  dependence  of  logical  thinking  or  reasoning  upon 
feelings  of  relationships  is  shown  also  by  a  comparison 
of  studies  like  grammar  or  geometry,  which  are  conspic- 
uously rational,  with  one  like  spelling,  ability  in  which  is 
consistent  with  almost  all  degrees  of  reasoning  power. 
Grammar  bristles  with  relationships  of  subject,  object, 
modifier  and  modified,  dependent  and  independent,  actor 
and  acted  upon,  condition,  concession  and  the  like. 
Geometry  is  practically  a  series  of  propositions  based  on 
the  relationships  of  identity,  equality,  greater  than  and 
less  than.  Spelling,  however,  is  chiefly  a  matter  of  clear, 
accurate  percepts  of  words  and  permanent  associations 
of  their  images  with  the  sounds  and  meanings  of  the 
words.  Only  occasionally  are  there  words  whose  spell- 
ing is  to  be  inferred  from  their  likeness  to  others  or 
from  their  being  wholes,  the  parts  of  which  are  known. 

The  Development  of  Feelings  of  Relationships. — 
Feelings  of  relationships  develop  later  in  childhood  than 
feelings  of  things  and  qualities;  e.g.,  conjunctions  are 
among  the  latest  words  learned,  and  complex  sentences 
involving  the  expression,  in  clauses,  of  feelings  of  condi- 
tion, cause,  opposition,  and  the  like,  appear  much  later 
than  simple  sentences.  Children  asked  to  give  the  word 
meaning  the  opposite  of  a  given  word,  to  give  the  word 
meaning  just  what  the  given  word  does  not  mean,  will 
answer  correctly  and  quickly  in  the  case  of  words  like 
day,  work,  rich,  empty,  or  to  hate,  at  an  age  when  they 
would  answer  only  partially  and  slowly  in  the  case  of 
with,  different,  more  or  part,  and  would  in  most  cases 
fail  utterly  with  and,  because  or  if.  The  feelings  of 
space-  and  time-relationships  are  felt  much  earlier  than 


64  Descriptive  Psychology 

the  so-called  logical  relationships  such  as  cause,  condi- 
tion or  concession. 

The  ease  with  which  feelings  of  relationships,  espe- 
cially of  relationships  other  than  those  of  space  and  time, 
are  acquired  and  the  extent  to  which  they  are  used  by  any 
individual,  are  in  direct  ratio  to  his  intellectual  capacity. 
The  brighter  the  child,  the  more  they  will  be  in  evidence. 
Very  weak  minded  children  never  come  to  feel  them. 

Exercises 

1.  Make  a  list  of  ten  or  more  words  expressing  feelings  of 
relationships  other  than  those  of  time  and  space. 

2.  Give  instances  of  other  parts  of  speech  than  conjunctions 
and  prepositions  which  may  express  feelings  of   relationships. 

3.  Of  the  following,  which  depends  the  more  on  feelings 
of  relationship :  (a)  ability  in  computation  or  (b)  ability  in  doing 
arithmetical  problems  ? 

4.  Answer  the  same  question  in  the  case  of  (a)  knowledge 
of  syntax  and   (b)  knowledge  of  vocabularies. 

5.  Name  parts  of  speech  that  never  express  feelings  of  re- 
lationships. 

6.  Pick  out  the  words  or  phrases  expressing  feelings  of 
relationship  contained  in  the  two  quotations  below.  Which  quo- 
tation has  the  more  words  expressing  intellectual  relationships? 

"At   the  helm 

A  seeming  mermaid  steers :  the  silken  tackle 
Swell  with  the  touches  of  those  flower-soft  hands. 
That  yarely  frame   the  office.  •  From  the  barge 
A  strange  invisible  perfume  hits  the  sense 
Of  the  adjacent  wharfs.     The  city  cast 
Her  people  out  upon  her;  and  Antony, 
Enthroned  i'  the  market-place,  did  sit  alone, 
Whistling  to  the  air ;  which,  but   for  vacancy, 
Had  gone  to  gaze  on  Cleopatra  too. 
And  made  a  gap  in  nature." 

Antony  and  Cleopatra;  Act  H,  Scene  IL 
"What  is  the  task  which  philosophers  set  themselves  to  per- 
form ;  and  why  do  they  philosophize  at  all  ?  Almost  every  one  will 
immediately  reply;  They  desire  to   attain  a  conception  of  the 


Feelings  of  Facts  65 

frame  of  things  which  shall  on  the  whole  be  more  rational  than 
that  somewhat  chaotic  view  which  every  one  by  nature  carries 
about  with  him  under  his  hat.  But  suppose  this  rational  concep- 
tion attained,  how  is  the  philosopher  to  recognize  it  for  what  it 
is,  and  not  let  it  slip  through  ignorance?  The  only  answer  can 
be  that  he  will  recognize  its  rationality  as  he  recognizes  every- 
thing else,  by  certain  subjective  marks  with  which  it  affects  him. 
When  he  gets  the  marks,  he  may  know  that  he  has  got  the 
rationality."     (W.   James,  The  Will  to  Believe,  p.  63.) 

7.  Copy  the  first  page  of  this  text  book  omitting  all  words 
that  express  and  arouse  feelings  of  relationships.  Observe  the 
result. 

8.  Make  up  intelligible  sentences  which,  like  the  example 
below,  shall  be  composed  in  the  main  of  words  expressing  feel- 
ings of  neither  things  nor   emotions   nor   sensible   qualities    nor 

feelings  meaning  such,  but  only  of  relationships.    "Although 

is  not  a  product  and  cannot  be  equal  to  a  derivative  still 

the  addition  on  the  one  hand  and  the  subtraction  on  the  other  of 
necessity  counteract  each  other.  The  total  result  therefore  may 
be  just  the  same  as  it  was  in  the  previous  process."  The  only 
words  here  which  in  order  to  make  sense  need  be  the  names  of 
things  are  the  two  to  be  supplied  in  the  blank  spaces. 

9.  Try  to  express  the  law  of  gravitation  or  any  theorem  in 
geometry,  or  to  explain  the  change  of  the  seasons,  without  using 
words  that  express  and  arouse  feelings  of  relationships.  Try  to 
express,  subject  to  the  same  limitation,  the  experiences  of  an 
hour  in  a  storm.  Why  is  the  second  task  easy  of  accomplishment 
and  the  first  so  hard? 

§  12.  Feelings  of  Meaning 

Their  Nature  and  Attributes. — Sensations,  percepts, 
images  and  emotions  are  direct  feelings  of  things,  qualities 
and  conditions.  The  feeling  appears  to  he  the  thing. 
But  we  can  feel  that  we  mean  or  refer  to  a  thing  without 
directly  feeling  it.  Thus  one  can  think  of  or  mean  or 
refer  in  thought  to  his  father  without  at  the  time  seeing 
him  or  having  a  mental  image  of  his  appearance.  That 
this  power  of  meaning  objects,  in  addition  to  and  apart 

5 


66  Descriptive  Psychology 

from  feeling  them  as  present  or  as  absent,  exists,  can  be 
proved  by  examining  one's  thoughts  and  also  by  the  fact 
that  we  can  mean  or  refer  to  objects,  perceptions  or 
images  of  which  are  impossible.  For  instance  you  can 
think  of,  though  you  cannot  see  or  imagine,  ten  million 
pine  trees  growing  in  one  row,  or  a  line  one  millionth  of 
an  inch  long,  or  a  thousand  angels  all  standing  on  one  pin 
head,  or  Romulus  and  Remus,  or  King  Alfred  of  Eng- 
land, or  a  flying  machine  without  wings  or  balloons. 
Furthermore  a  dozen  men  may  each  have  a  similar  feel- 
ing of  meaning  although  the  sensed  and  imaged  parts  of 
their  thoughts  are  to  the  last  degree  dissimilar.  Thus 
though  one  man  hears  'Cinq  et  cinq  font  dix,'  another 
*Fiinf  und  fiinf  sind  zehn,'  and  a  third,  'Five  and  five  are 
ten ;'  though  the  first  man  has  a  visual  image  of  5-(-5^io, 
the  second  a  motor  image  of  the  incipient  movements  of 
saying  'Fiinf  und  fiinf  sind  zehn,'  and  the  third  no  image 
at  all,  yet  the  feeling  of  the  meaning  may  be  the  same  in 
each  case. 

The  bulk  of  our  thinking  is  in  fact  not  concerned 
with  direct  feelings  of  things,  but  with  mere  references  to 
them.  We  can  do  hundreds  of  examples  about  dollars 
and  cents  and  hours,  about  feet  of  carpet  and  pounds  of 
sugar,  with  never  a  percept  of  real  money  or  carpets  and 
with  few  or  no  mental  pictures  of  the  sight  of  coins  or  the 
taste  of  sugar.  We  can  argue  about  the  climate  of  a 
country  with  few  or  no  mental  pictures  of  black  skies, 
drenched  skins,  or  muddy  soil.  It  is  sufficient  for  our 
purposes  if  we  feel  that  the  words  or  other  symbols  in 
which  we  think  stand  for  or  represent  or  refer  to  the  real 
things. 

The  sound  or  sight  or  articulation,  felt  or  imagined, 
of  a  word, — i.e.,  the  percept  or  image  of  it, — is  the  least 
important  thing  about  it.     The  word  or  symbol  need  not 


I 


Feelings  of  Facts  6y 

be  in  the  least  like  the  real  thing.  What  it  refers  to  or 
stands  for  is  the  essential.  Eleven  dollars  has  a  smoother, 
pleasanter  sound  than  sixty-six  buckets  of  gold  shekels ; 
the  word  victuals  is  as  a  word  more  painful  than  the  word 
pain ;  H,  SO4  is  a  rather  bland  and  agreeable  sound. 
Any  symbol  will  do  for  any  real  thing.  In  fact  the  whole 
body  of  language  and  of  scientific  and  mathematical  sym- 
bols has  for  one  of  its  chief  ends  to  furnish  us  a  way  to 
mean  and  think  of  things  (and  also  of  qualities,  condi- 
tions, emotions  and  relationships)  without  directly  feeling 
or  imagining  them.  The  chief  office  of  percepts  and 
images  of  words  is  to  be  carriers  of  meanings. 

So  far  I  have  described  only  feelings  meaning  things, 
but  we  can  mean  qualities,  conditions,  emotions,  impulses 
or  relationships  as  well.  The  reader  can  think,  'Red  is  a 
bright  color,'  without  any  red  in  his  actual  field  of  vision. 
He  can  think,  'Great  fatigue  overcame  the  mind  of  the 
general,'  or,  Tn  his  anger  he  smote  him  to  the  ground,' 
without  feeling  in  the  least  tired  or  angry  in  fact  or  fancy. 
He  can  think,  'A  strong  impulse  to  sneeze  nearly  betrayed 
the  servant's  presence,'  without  himself  being  tempted  to 
sneeze.  He  can  think,  'The  relation  of  condition  con- 
trar}^  to  the  fact  is  expressed  in  Latin  by  the  subjunctive,' 
without  feeling  any  unfulfilled  condition.  Anything  that 
we  have  ever  felt  in  fact  or  fancy  can  later  be  meant  or 
referred  to.  We  can  not  only  have  or,  one  might  say, 
be  our  feelings,  but  can  at  our  convenience  think  of  them 
through  symbols  devised  for  the  purpose. 

Classification. — Chief  among  our  feelings  of  mean- 
ing are: — 

I.  Feelings  that  mean  single  facts  or  feelings  of 
individual  reference.  Such  feelings  we  call  Individual 
Notions.  Examples  are  our  feelings  of  the  meanings  of 
the  italicized  words  in  the  following: — 


68  Descriptive  Psychology 

Julius  Caesar  is  dead. 

His  anger  was  terrible  to  witness. 

My  dog  is  lost. 

2.  Feelings  that  mean  groups  or  classes  of  facts  or 
any  one  or  some  part  of  a  group  or  class  of  facts.  They 
are  called  General  Notions,  Class  Ideas,  Concepts  or 
feelings  of  general  reference.     Examples  are: — 

A.  Meaning  a  group  or  class. 

Men  are  mortal. 
Hospitals  are  useful. 
Sponges  are  animals. 
Teachers  should  possess  tact. 

B.  Meaning  anyone  of  a  group  or  class. 

Any  man  is  sure  to  die. 

A  hospital  benefits  the  community. 

A  sponge  is  not  a  plant. 

A  teacher  needs  tact. 

C.  Meaning  some  part  of  a  group  or  class. 

Many  men  die  before  they  are  forty  years  old. 
Some  hospitals  are  better  managed  than  others. 
Certain    varieties    of    sponges    are    commercially 
valuable. 

3.  Feelings  that  mean  some  part  or  quality  or  aspect 
independently  of  the  thing  of  which  it  is  a  part  or  quality 
or  aspect.  Such  feelings  are  called  Abstract  Ideas  or 
Abstractions,  or  feelings  of  reference  to  a  quality  or  at- 
tribute.    Examples   are: — 

All  bodies  possess  zveight. 

The  heat  is  intolerable. 

All  is  lost  save  honor. 
Feelings   of  Meaning  and  Images. — An  individual 
notion  may  be  and  often   is  accompanied  by  an  image 
more  or  less  exact  of  the  fact  for  which  it  stands,  but  in 


Feelings  of  Facts  69 

the  nature  of  the  case  there  can  be  no  exact  image  of  the 
fact  referred  to  by  an  abstract  or  general  notion.  Of 
courage  that  is  no  particular  act  of  courage,  but  is  mere 
courage :  of  velocity  which  is  neither  fast  nor  slow, 
neither  of  a  cannon-ball  nor  of  a  feather  falling,  but  is 
mere  velocity ;  of  men  that  are  not  old  or  young,  sick  or 
well,  white  or  black,  with  legs  or  without,  intelligent  or 
idiotic,  but  are  all  men ;  of  animals  that  include  a  hundred 
thousand  different  species, — no  image  can  be  formed. 
Often  a  vague,  hazy,  mixed  and  changing  image  of  some 
of  the  facts  meant, — that  is  to  say,  a  generic  image, — • 
accompanies  a  feeling  of  absolute  or  general  meaning,  but 
still  oftener  the  image  is  not  of  the  fact  meant  at  all. 
The  commonest  image  present  is  that  of  the  word  that  is 
used  for  the  fact,  not  of  anything  like  the  fact. 

Feelings  of  Meaning  and  Reasoning. — It  is  largely 
by  means  of  these  feelings  of  meaning  or  reference  that 
the  life  of  real  thought  is  carried  on.  Individual  notions 
allow  one  to  think  of  a  fact  conveniently  without  waiting 
for  a  percept  or  image  of  it  and  to  keep  in  mind  the  same- 
ness of  a  thing  in  spite  of  its  changes.  General  notions 
present  in  a  sort  of  short-hand  the  results  of  many  ex- 
periences and  refer  to  thousands  of  possible  percepts, 
images  and  individual  actions  in  a  single  word.  By  ab- 
stract ideas  a  man  can  break  up  the  endless  complexities 
of  the  world's  objects  into  a  comparatively  small  number 
of  elements  and  can  think  the  one  quality  which  is  the 
important  subject  of  thought  at  the  time  without  being 
bothered  by  its  concrete  accompaniments — can  argue 
about  courage,  or  industry,  or  subtraction,  or  velocity 
without  having  the  mind  clouded  by  hundreds  of  images 
of  brave  deeds  or  sums  from  arithmetic  books,  or  the  like. 
From  a  comparison  of  individual  facts  he  can  derive  a 
general  notion.     From    finding   that   an   individual   fact 


yo  Descriptive  Psychology 

belongs  to  a  general  class  about  which  something  is  true, 
he  can  assert  that  that  thing  is  true  of  the  individual  fact. 
Man  thus  comes  to  work  over  the  world  of  actual 
experiences  into  a  world  of  objects  and  relations,  thought 
of,  classified  and  broken  up  into  elements.  And  through 
this  world  of  thought  he  acquires  new  knowledge  of,  and 
enlarged  control  over,  the  world  of  experience.  In  this 
world  of  thought  are  the  highest  activities  of  mental  life ; 
by  it  are  won  the  greatest  triumphs  of  man  over  his 
environment. 

Exercises 

1.  Classify  the  feelings  of  meaning  aroused  by  reading  the 
italicized  words  in  the  following  sentences  into  individual  notions, 
general    notions   and   abstractions : — 

O,  what  a  rogue  and  peasant  slave  am  /. 
He  would  drown  the  stage  with  tears 
And  cleave  the  general  ear  with  horrid  speech. 
Make  mad  the  guilty  and  appall  the  free. 

For  who  would  bear  the  zvhips  and  scorns  of  time, 
The  oppressor's  wrong,  the  proud  man's  contumely, 
The  pangs  of  despised  love,   the   law's   delay, 
The  insolence  of  office  and  the  spurns^ 
That  patient  merit  of  the  unworthy  takes. 

Since  my  dear  soul  was  mistress  of  her  choice 
And  could  of  men  distinguish,  her  election 
Hath  sealed  thee  for  herself. 

2.  Of  the  following  studies,  which  two  are  most  concerned 
with  individual  notions?  Which  two  are  most  concerned  with 
abstractions?  Latin  Grammar,  History,  Manual  Training, 
Algebra,  Chemistry. 

3.  Name  two  studies  which  do  not  deal  with  individual 
notions  at  all. 


Peelings  of  Facts  7I 

§  13.  Judgments 

Definition. — In  an  early  chapter  it  was  stated  that 
thoughts  were  rarely  strings  of  isolated  sensations,  per- 
cepts, images  or  feelings  of  meaning;  in  the  present 
chapter  the  relating,  transitional,  connecting  feelings 
which  help  to  make  the  complex  whole  thoughts  of  real 
life  have  been  described.  One  important  group  of  these 
complex  whole  thoughts  comprises  those  which  are  called 
Judgments.  They  are  feelings  that  a  certain  state  of 
affairs  is  or  is  not  the  case,  that  a  certain  relationship  does 
or  does  not  exist  between  certain  things.  They  are  feel- 
ings that  affirm  or  deny  something  about  something, — 
such  feelings  as  are  ordinarily  expressed  in  declarative 
sentences.^  According  to  many  logic  books  the  judgment 
feeling  is  always  one  that  relates  tzuo  terms,  and  such 
statements  as,  'The  dog  runs,'  and  'The  snow  falls,'  really 
mean,  The  dog  is  a  running  thing,'  and  'The  snow  is  a 
falling  object.'  This  explanation  may  do  no  harm  in 
logic,  but  it  is  psychologically  false.  One  may  have  a 
judgment  feeling  with  one  term  as  well  as  with  two,  on 
the  basis  of  a  percept  as  well  as  of  a  comparison.  The 
thought,  'The  snow  falls,'  is  a  judgment,  not  that  the 
snow  is  in  the  class  a  falling  object,  but  that  a  certain 
state  of  affairs,  'snow  falling,'  is  the  case. 

Judgments  and  Thought. — It  is  as  combined  in 
judgments  that  our  feelings  of  things,  conditions,  quali- 
ties and  relations  are  most  influential  in  the  intellectual 
life.  Conversation  is  largely  the  expression  of  judg- 
ments.    Still  more  so  is  the  reading-matter  of  newspapers, 

^  Interrogative  sentences  also  may  express  judgments  plus  an 
attitude  of  inquiry  concerning  their  correspondence  with  reality. 
Thus  'Is  John  a  tall  man?'  equals  'John  a  tall  man.  Is  it  so?' 
The  interrogative  state  of  mind  in  turn  is  often  expressed  as  an 
outright  judgment  plus  a  query,  as  in  the  German,  'Er  ist  ein 
grosser  Mann.     Nicht  wahrf 


J2  Descriptive  Psychology 

magazines  and  books.  Every  scientific  formula,  every 
mathematical  equation,  every  philosophical  principle — 
each  is  an  expressed  judgment.  In  childhood  intellec- 
tual progress  is  marked  by  the  transformation  of  mere 
percepts  and  images  and  vaguely  felt  relationships  into 
judgments.  Throughout  life  the  thoughtful,  as  opposed 
to  the  sensuous  or  dreamy  or  scatter-brained,  man  or 
woman,  is  one  whose  mental  states  consist  largely  of 
well-defined  judgments. 

Classification. — Judgments  may  be  Individual  or 
General  or  Abstract  according  as  they  afiirm  or  deny 
something  about  a  thing  or  about  a  group  of  things  or 
about  an  abstract  quality.  Judgments  are  called  Analytic 
when  they  affirm  or  deny  something  about  an  object 
which  was  implicit  in  the  thought  of  the  object;  e.g., 
The  fight  is  bright :'  'His  breathing  is  regular ;'  'A  is  A.' 
They  are  called  Synthetic  when  they  affirm  or  deny  some- 
thing about  an  object  which  is  a  new  contribution  to  the 
thought  of  the  object;  e.g.,  The  square  root  of  2  is 
1.41421356;'  'Malaria  is  caused  by  the  bite  of  a  mosquito;' 
The  most  frequent  age  of  graduation  from  American 
colleges  is  about  22  years  and  10  months.'  It  should  be 
noted  that  what  is  an  analytic  judgment  in  one  case  may  be 
synthetic  in  another.  Thus  for  someone  who  had  noticed 
merely  breathing  but  had  not  noticed  varieties  of  breath- 
ing, 'His  breathing  is  regular'  would  be  a  synthetic  judg- 
ment. Such  a  person  could  have  thought  of  the  breath- 
ing without  having  its  regularity  implicit  in  the  thought. 
'A  is  A'  might  be  a  synthetic  judgment  in  the  case  of  a 
very  young  child. 

Further  classifications  may  be  found  in  text  books  on 
logic.  The  student  unacquainted  with  the  elements  of 
logic  will  do  well  to  read  Chapters  I,  III,  VI  and  VIII 


Feelings  of  Facts  73 

of  Aikins'  Principles  of  Logic,  or  equivalent  chapters  in 
some  similar  book. 

No  more  time  need  be  spent  with  the  descriptive 
psychology  of  judgments.  In  Part  III  the  conditions 
of  their  development  and  action  will  concern  us  for  many 
pages. 

Exercises 

1.  Give  illustrations  of: — 

(a)  Individual  judgments. 

(b)  General   judgments. 

(c)  Abstract  judgments. 

2.  State  also,  in  the  case  of  each  illustration  given,  whether 
It  is  an  analytic  or  a  synthetic  judgment. 

3.  What  kind  of  sentence  does  7iot  express  judgments? 

4.  Which  arouses  the  more  judgments,  a  story  read  or  music 
heard? 

5.  With  which  are  judgments  most  associated,  learning  a 
science  like  physics  or  learning  an  art  like  painting? 

References 

A.  James,  Briefer  Course,  XI.   (160-167),  XIV. 
Stout,  Manual,  447-489. 

Titchener,  Outline,  §§  82-83. 
Angell,  Psychology,  X. 

B.  Ebbinghaus,  Grundsiige,  §§  42-43. 
James,  Principles,  IX.  (245-259),  XII. 


CHAPTER  V 
Feelings  of  Personal   Conditions:    Emotions       M 
§  14.  The  Nature   of  the  Emotions 

Emotions  Contrasted  with  Thoughts. — Sensations, 
percepts  and  images,  and  feelings  of  meaning,  relation- 
ship and  judgment  agree  in  being  connected  with  what 
in  common  usage  is  called  the  life  of  thought.  They 
would  all  be  put  by  psychologists  under  the  head  of 
intellection  or  cognition. 

The  emotions  form  in  a  sense  a  radically  different 
group  of  mental  facts.  Love,  hate,  fear,  jealousy,  anger, 
joy,  sorrow  and  the  like,  are  feelings,  not  of  or  about 
things  or  bodily  conditions  recognized  as  such,  but  of  one's 
own  conditions,  unreferred  to  bodily  facts.  They  have, 
that  is,  a  subjective  or  personal  as  opposed  to  an  objective, 
reference.  The  emotional  state  of  mind,  in  which  one's 
own  mental  condition  is  paramount,  is  opposed  to  the 
intellectual  state  of  mind,  in  which  some  object  of  thought 
is  paramount.  Besides  possessing  this  subjective  quality, 
the  emotions  are  less  subject  to  elaboration  and  manip- 
ulation than  are  sensations,  percepts  and  images.  They 
do  not  connect  with  one  another  so  as  to  form  any  system 
or  order  as  do  the  feelings  of  things,  meanings  and  rela- 
tionships. They  are  essentially  isolated  and  incoherent. 
In  the  third  place,  we  do  not  master  them  and  use  them 
at  will  for  intellectual  and  practical  ends  as  we  do  our 
ideas  and  judgments;  rather  they  master  us.  For  the 
time  being  one  is  the  emotion. 

74 


Feelings  of  Personal  Condition  75 

Emotions  and  Sensations, — It  is  however  true  that 
between  certain  emotions  and  certain  sensations  no  clear 
line  of  distinction  can  be  drawn.  The  distinctions  just 
made  approach  a  vanishing  point  in  the  case  of  such 
sensations  as  dizziness,  faiigi.e  Ux*  xiausea,  and  such  emo- 
tions as  ennui,  interest,  zeal,  stage-fright,  and  the  animal 
types  of  jealousy  and  love.  Stage-fright  is  a  feeling  of 
as  definite  a  thing  as  nausea.  One  can  master  zeal  and 
use  it  to  intellectual  advantage  rather  better  than  nausea. 

The  emotions  are  in  fact  closely  allied  to,  and  perhaps 
are  one  division  of,  the  internal  sensations.  Whether  we 
shall  say  that  the  feeling  of  well-being  is  a  sensation  or  an 
emotion  depends  upon  whether  we  do  or  do  not  recognize 
it  as  a  feeling  of  bodily  condition,  refer  it  to  the  body  as 
we  do  hunger  or  leave  it  as  an  unref erred  subjective  feel- 
ing as  we  do  ambition.  One  person  will  feel  it  in  the  one 
way,  another  in  another;  one  person  will  feel  it  at  one 
time  as  an  unreferred  feeling,  but  at  another  time,  say 
after  taking  a  medical  course,  will  refer  it  definitely  to 
his  body.  Indeed  one  theory  of  the  nature  of  the  emo- 
tions is  that  they  are  made  up  of  the  same  stuff  as  sensa- 
tions plus  greater  or  less  amounts  of  the  feelings  of 
pleasantness  or  unpleasantness. 

§  15.  The    Classification    of   the   Emotions 

Classifications  are  Arbitrary. — In  our  present  igno- 
rance of  the  differences  in  physiological  basis  of  the 
different  emotions,  any  method  of  classifying  them 
must  be  largely  arbitrary.  Different  students  of  the 
subjects  consequently  have  widely  different  opinions,  and 
in  no  classification  can  the  groups  be  sharply  separated 
from  one  another. 

A  classification  does  however  serve  the  useful  purpose 
of  displaying  the  variety  of  the  emotional  life.     If  the 


"j^i  Descriptive  Psychology 

physiological  basis  for  each  kind  of  emotional  feeling 
were  known  we  might  have  a  more  satisfactory  classifica- 
tion, comparable  in  definiteness  to  the  classification  of 
sensations.  I  shall  not  try  to  present  the  best  possible 
classification,  but  will  present  the  essentials  of  four  differ- 
ent classifications,  each  arranged  by  an  eminent  psycholo- 
gist. The  first  to  be  given  is  that  of  Professor  Baldwin. 
A  description  of  the  different  classes  may  be  found  in  his 
Elements  of  Psychology,  pp.  241-298. 

Baldwin's  Classification. — 

The  Common  Emotions 

A.  Interest. 

B.  Reality  Feeling  and  Unreality  Feeling. 

C.  Belief. 

D.  Doubt. 

The  Special  Emotions 

A.  Of  Activity. 

I.  Of  Adjustment.     Distraction   or   confusion,   ab- 
straction   or    clearness,    contraction    or    effort, 
expansion   or  ease. 
II.  Of  Function. 

1.  Of   Exaltation.     Freshness,    triumph,    eager- 

ness,   alertness,    hope,    courage,    aspiration, 
elation. 

2.  Of  Depression.     Hesitation,  indecision,  anx- 

iety, timidity,  melancholy,  irritation,  fear. 

B.  Of  Content. 

I.  Presentative. 

1.  Self- Emotions. 

a.  Emotions  of  Pride. 

b.  Emotions  of  Humility. 

2.  Objective  Emotions. 
a.  Expressive. 


Feelings  of  Personal  Condition  77 

A.  Of   Attraction.^ 

Admiration,     veneration,     awe,     attachment, 
affection,  confidence,  patience,  security,  etc. 

B.  Of   Repulsion.^ 

Unattractiveness,    objectionableness,    disdain, 

distrust,    distaste,    scorn,   rebellion,   hatred, 

abhorrence,  contempt,   disgust,  etc. 

b.  Sympathetic.     Congratulation,   fellow-suffering, 

pity,  jealousy,  sensitiveness,  and  many  others. 

II.  Relational. 

1.  Logical.     Feelings   of   reasonableness   and   un- 

reasonableness, anticipation,  distance,  co-ex- 
istence, quality,  identity,  fitness,  objective 
power,  etc. 

2.  Conceptional. 

a.  For  System  in  Mental  Construction. 

b.  Ethical    Feelings.     Moral    sympathy,    moral 
obligation,  remorse,  etc. 

c.  Aesthetic   Feelings. 

(a)  Lower  or  sensuous. 

(b)  Higher  or  representative. 
Wundt*s  Classification. — It  is  possible  also  to  clas- 
sify emotions  according  to  the  prominence  in  them  of 
pleasantness  or  unpleasantness,  of  excitement  or  depres- 
sion (sthenic  and  asthenic  emotions),  and  of  tension  or 
relief.  We  can,  that  is,  rate  an  emotion  according  to 
these  three  scales  and  group  together  those  which  have 
similar  ratings.  By  excitement  and  depression  are  meant 
the  qualities  that  stimulate  or  lower  general  bodily  activi- 
ties. By  tension  is  meant  the  quality  that  stimulates  the 
voluntary  muscles  to  over-action  and  constrained  action, 
by  relief  the  quality  that  predisposes  to  free  and  relaxed 

^  With  reference  to  future  and  past  we  have  under  B2  a  A,  hope 
and  joy,  and  under  B2  a  B,  dread  and  sorrow. 


78  Descriptive  Psychology 

action.  Glee  would  be  distinguished  from  joy  as  being 
more  exciting  though  not  necessarily  more  pleasant. 
Both  joy  and  glee  would  be  mediocre  with  respect  to  the 
tension-relief  quality.  Horror  would  imply  much  un- 
pleasantness and  tension  and  some  depression.  Grief 
would  imply  more  depression  but  less  tension. 

The  quality  of  relief  is  per  se  pleasant  and  is  ordi- 
narily associated  with  still  more  pleasantness.  The 
reverse  holds  of  tension.  Both  excitement  and  depres- 
sion may  be  accompanied  by  pleasantness  or  by  un- 
pleasantness. Joy  is  exciting  and  pleasant.  Anger  is 
exciting,  but  often  unpleasant.  Melancholy  (in  the 
poet's  sense)  is  depressing  but  pleasant.  Of  depressing 
and  painful  mental  states  the  number  is  of  course  legion. 

Royce's  Classification. — Another  grouping  (that  of 
Professor  Royce)  is  according  to  the  pleasantness  or  un- 
pleasantness and  the  restlessness  or  quiescence  of  the 
feeling.  This  latter  scale  is  perhaps  a  composite  of  the 
excitement-depression    and   tension-relief   scales. 

Titchener's  Classification. — Finally,  a  still  different 
view  is  given  in  the  following  quotation  (for  a  fuller 
account  see,  An  Outline  of  Psychology,  by  E.  B. 
Titchener,   pp.  224-234)  : 

"The  Forms  of  Emotion. — Just  as  there  are  two  kinds 
or  classes  of  feelings,  so  there  are  two  of  emotion ;  the 
pleasurable  and  the  unpleasurable.  Within  each  kind  or 
class  there  are  a  large  number  of  special  emotive  forms, 
as  there  are  a  large  number  of  special  'feelings.'  Can  we 
name  these  forms,  and  so  classify  emotions,  as  we  classi- 
fied sensations  and  ideas?  Or  must  we  be  content  with 
the  general  distinction  of  the  two  classes,  as  we  were 

compelled  to  be  in  the  case  of  feeling? All  emotions 

are  coloured  by  the  organic  sensations  set  up  during  the 
adjustment  of  the  physical  organism  to  the  situation.    If, 


Feelings  of  Personal  Condition  79 

then,  we  could  find  typical  groups  of  organic  sensations — 
lung,  heart,  bladder  sensations — appearing  in  the  various 
emotions,  we  could,  again,  determine  the  fundamental 
emotive  forms.  Our  'physical'  would  be  supplemented 
by  a  truly  psychological  classification. 

Although  there  is  no  reason  to  suppose  that  the 
problem  is  insoluble,  it  has  not  yet  been  solved." 

Emotions  Concerned  with  the  Manner  of  Think- 
ing.— The  feelings  which  Professor  Baldwin  describes 
under  the  heading.  Relational,  are  worthy  of  special  at- 
tention. It  may  be  a  question  whether  such  feelings  of 
the  tendency,  direction  and  attitude  of  thought  should 
be  called  emotions,  but  at  all  events  they  exist.  We 
feel  in  our  thinking,  not  only  objects  and  their  relation- 
ships and  meanings,  but  also  feelings  of  their  comings 
and  goings,  of  their  fitness  to  our  purposes,  and  of  our 
attitudes  toward  them.  Like  the  feelings  of  relation- 
ships described  in  §  11,  these  feelings  of  tendency  and 
intellectual  attitude  are  commonly  transitive,  evanes- 
cent, intangible  feelings  that  color  rather  than  compose 
our  mental  life.  Examine,  for  instance,  the  feelings  of 
expectancy,  of  a  mental  gap  to  be  filled,  and  of 
familiarity. 

'•'Suppose  three  successive  persons  say  to  us:  'Wait!' 
'Hark !'  'Look !'  Our  consciousness  is  thrown  into  three 
quite  different  attitudes  of  expectancy,  although  no  defi- 
nite object  is  before  it  in  any  one  of  the  three  cases. 

Suppose  we  try  to  recall  a  forgotten  name.  The  state 
of  our  consciousness  is  peculiar.  There  is  a  gap  there- 
in ;  but  no  mere  gap.  It  is  a  gap  that  is  intensely  active, 
A  sort  of  wraith  of  the  name  is  in  it,  beckoning  us  in  a 
given  direction,  making  us  at  moments  tingle  with  the 
sense  of  our  closeness,  and  then  letting  us  sink  back 
without  the  longed-for  term.     If  wrong  names  are  pro- 


8o  Descriptive  Psychology 

posed  to  us,  this  singularly  definite  gap  acts  immediately 
so  as  to  negate  them.     They  do  not  fit  into  its  mould. 

Again,  what  is  the  strange  difference  between  an  ex- 
perience tasted  for  the  first  time  and  the  same  experi- 
ence recognized  as  familiar,  as  having  been  enjoyed 
before,  though  we  cannot  name  it  or  say  where  or  when  ? 
A  tune,  an  odor,  a  flavor,  sometimes  carry  this  inarticu- 
late feeling  of  their  familiarity  so  deep  into  our  con- 
sciousness that  we  are  fairly  shaken  by  its  mysterious 
emotional  power."^ 

The  Aesthetic  Emotions. — The  so-called  aesthetic 
emotions  also  deserve  additional  comment.  The  common 
classification  of  them  is  merely  into  feelings  of  the  beau- 
tiful, of  the  sublime  and  of  the  comic.  It  is  obvious 
that  without  great  straining  these  three  types  of  feeling 
fail  to  include  the  feelings  one  has  say  in  seeing  an 
ordinary  play  or  reading  an  ordinary  story.  The  plays, 
Sherlock  Holmes  and  Uncle  Tom's  Cabin,  are  hardly 
beautiful,  are  certainly  not  sublime  and  are  comic  only 
in  spots  if  at  all.  Robinson  Crusoe  is  certainly  neither 
beautiful  nor  sublime  nor  comic.  A  more  exact  divi- 
sion of  the  aesthetic  emotions  is   evidently  needed. 

The  two  main  classes  of  feelings  which  are  meant 
by  the  term  aesthetic  emotions,  as  it  is  used  in  critical 
studies  of  art  and  literature  and  music,  are  Sen- 
sory Pleasures  and  certain  P send o-E motions.  These 
sensory  pleasures  are  distinguished  from  the  non- 
aesthetic,  first  in  that  they  are  unselfish,  not  proprietary, 
do  not  imply  the  possession  of,  or  exclusion  of  others 
from,  the  object  causing  the  pleasure  but  only  its 
presence;  and  second,  in  that  they  arise  from  intrinsic 
qualities  of  the  object,  not  from  its  derived  values.  The 
pleasures  of  taste  are  thus  not  called  aesthetic  because 
one  cannot  eat  his  cake  and  leave  it  for  others  to  eat  too. 

^W.  James,  Principles  of  Psychology,  vol.  I,  pp.  250-252. 


F 


Feelings  of  Personal  Condition  8l 

The  pleasure  one  has  in  seeing  a  coin  because  of  its  form 
and  chasing  is  called  aesthetic,  while  the  pleasure  in  its 
money   value   is  not. 

The  pseudo-emotions^  are  distinguished  from  their 
real  correspondents  in  that  they  do  not  arouse  the  same 
bodily  reactions  and  impulses  and  are  free  from  excessive 
pain  or  pleasure.  Thus  the  sorrow  felt  for  the  suffering 
hero  in  the  story  is  unlike  real  sorrow  (i)  in  that  one 
does  not  rush  around  wringing  his  hands  and  seeking  to 
offer  help  nor  feel  like  doing  so,  and  (2)  in  that,  whereas 
real  sorrow  is  very  uncomfortable,  the  pseudo-sorrow  of 
the  reader  of  the  story  is  more  or  less  enjoyable.  In 
place  of  both  the  violent  pangs  and  delights  of  real 
jealousy  and  affection,  the  reader  of  a  novel  has  only  a 
rather  mild  excitement,  which  is  commonly  pleasant 
regardless  of  the  quality  of  the  corresponding  real 
emotion. 

§  16.  The  Attributes   of  Emotions 

Their  Bodily  Expression. — Omitting  from  con- 
sideration the  feelings  of  tendency  and  the  aesthetic  feel- 
ings, one  finds  that  emotions  as  a  class  are  characterized 
by  emphatic  bodily  expression ;  e.g.,  fear  expresses  itself 
far  more  than  does  a  feeling  of  seventeen.  It  is  usually 
not  difficult  to  tell  whether  a  person  is  frightened,  happy, 
angry  or  eager  by  his  facial  expression  and  bodily  move- 
ments, whereas  it  is  impossible  to  tell  whether  he  is 
thinking  of  seventeen  or  of  seventy,  of  a  cat  or  of  a  mat. 
Other  mental  states  do,  of  course,  influence  the  bodily 
organs,  the  facial  muscles  especially,  but  not  to  such  an 
extent  as  do  the  emotions.     Doing  arithmetic  does  raise 

^  It  is  conceivable,  and  has,  I  believe,  been  by  some  literary 
critics  suggested,  that  these  pseudo-emotions  occupy  the  same  po- 
sition with  respect  t9  real  emotions  hat  mental  images  do  with 
respect  to  percepts.     They  are  on  the  whole   .  ather  a  mystery. 

6 


/Z-1/lS 


82  Descriptive  Psychology 

the  pulse,  but  it  cannot  make  the  heart  go  pit-a-pat  as 
fear  does.  Attention  leads  to  a  frown,  but  not  to  the 
tremendous  wrinkles  of  the  man  in  a  rage. 

Their  Impulsive  Power. — Emotions,  especially  the 
coarser  ones,  cause  not  only  these  expressive  movements, 
but  also  further  movements  of  effect.  They  tend  to 
arouse  some  emphatic  acts,  running,  jumping,  seizing, 
biting  or  the  like.  Our  ideas  and  judgments  more  often 
guide  and  restrain,  while  the  emotions  more  often  arouse, 
action.  The  more  intellectual  feelings  also,  in  so  far  as 
they  do  arouse  action,  lead  to  the  more  orderly  and  re- 
strained movements  of  face,  eyes  and  throat;  while 
the  emotional  states  impel  to  more  gross  and  violent 
movements. 

Their  Early  Development. — The  emotions  are  older 
in  the  individual  and  in  the  race  than  images,  feelings  of 
meaning  and  relationships,  or  judgments.  They  come 
along  with  vague  sensations,  as  early  steps  in  the  growth 
of  the  infant's  mind.  During  the  first  year  anger,  joy, 
impatience  and  other  emotions  are  evident.  They  appear 
in  animals  below  man  in  the  scale  of  development.  Birds 
and  mammals  that  give  few  signs  of  the  possession  of 
images  and  almost  certainly  lack  feelings  of  meaning, 
relationships  or  judgments,  manifest  many  of  the  coarser 
emotions  of  the  human  mind.  It  is  when  we  are  absorbed 
in  emotional  feelings  that  we  act  more  or  less  as  the  lower 
.  animals  do.  In  general  the  progress  of  development 
involves  a  weakening  of  the  coarser  animal-like  emotions 
and  their  transformation  into  sentiments  by  the  mixture 
of  ideas  with  them. 

The  Infrequency  of  Reproduced  Emotions. — Emo- 
tions are  less  often  and  less  easily  imaged  than  are 
percepts.  One  can  easily  remember  that  he  did  feel 
angry;  but  he  then  has  not  a  real  image  of  the  anger 


Feelings  of  Personal  Condition  83 

feeling,  but  only  a  judgment  that  at  such  and  such  a  time 
he  was  angry.  Occasionally  individuals  do  have,  or  at 
least  report  that  they  have,  a  feeling  of  anger  as  not 
present  comparable  to  the  image  of  a  sight  or  a  sound. 
But  such  cases  are  surely  rare  and  may  really  be  cases 
v^here  the  individual  by  recalling  certain  circumstances 
gets  a  real  but  lesser  emotion  of  anger,  not  a  true  image 
of  it.  It  may  be,  as  was  hinted  in  the  note  on  page  81, 
that  the  revival  of  an  emotion  in  imagination  takes  the 
form  of  the  pseudo  or  aesthetic  emotions. 

Exercises 

1.  Name  one  or  two  emotions  characterized  by  much  ex- 
citement. 

2.  Name  one  or  two  emotions  characterized  by  much  de- 
pression. 

3.  Name  one  or  two  emotions  characterized  by  much  tension, 

4.  Name  one  or  two  emotions  characterized  by  much  relief. 

5.  Name  one  or  two  emotions  characterized  by  much  rest- 
lessness. 

6.  Name  one  or  two  emotions  characterized  by  much  definite 
bodily  feeling. 

7.  Name  one  or  two  emotions  characterized  by  little  definite 
bodily  feeling. 

8.  Name  one  or  two  emotions  characterized  by  much  out- 
ward expression. 

9.  Name   one  or  two  emotions  characterized  by  little  out- 
ward expression. 

10.  Name  one  or  two  emotions  which  are  common  to  man 
and  the  lower  animals. 

11.  Name  one  or  two  emotions  which  are  primarily  individ- 
ual, that  is  concern  chiefly  oneself. 

12.  Name  one  or  two  emotions  which  are  primarily  social, 
that  is  concern  chiefly  others. 

13.  What   is  the  bodily  expression   of  rage? 

14.  **       "     «         "  *'  "  fear? 

15.  "       "     "         «  "  "  grief? 

16.  "       "     *'         "  "  "  joy? 


84  Descriptive  Psychology 

17.  (a)  What  part  of  speech  almost  invariably  expresses  an 

emotional   state? 
(b)  What  parts  of  speech  almost  never  do? 

18.  What  kind  of  sentence  almost  always  expresses  an  emo- 
tion? 

19.  Which  can   animals   express   to   us  most  clearly,  their 
sensations   or  their  emotions?    Why? 

References 

A.  James,   Briefer   Course,   XXIV. 
Stout  Manual,  276-311,  562-580. 
Titchener,  Outline,  §§  31-34,  56-60,  86-91. 
Angell,  Psychology,  XVIII. 

B.  Ebbinghaus,  Grundsiige,  §§  51-54. 
James,  Principles,  XXV. 

Wundt,  Physiologische  Psycholcgie,  XVI. 


■^. 


CHAPTER  VI 

Mental  States  Concerned  in  the  Direction  of  Con- 
duct:    Feelings   of  Willing 

§  17.  Definitions  and  Descriptions 

In  General. — Books  on  psychology  commonly  an- 
nounce three  divisions  of  mental  life,  cognition,  emotion 
and  volition,  or,  in  the  older  phraseology,  the  intellect, 
the  feelings  and  the  will,  but  give  nine-tenths  or  more  of 
their  space  to  cognition  and  the  emotions.  In  so  far  as 
psychology  attempts  merely  to  describe  states  of  con- 
sciousness, this  subordination  is  not  unfair.  For,  al- 
though the  will  in  a  broad  sense  deserves  as  much  study 
as  the  intellect,  states  of  volitional  consciousness,  that 
is  to  say,  feelings  of  willing,  do  not  require  lengthy 
explanation.  For  their  description  this  one  section  will 
suffice.  The  will,  in  the  broad  sense  of  the  entire  basis 
of  human  action,  will  receive  due  attention  in  Part  III. 

The  important  mental  states  concerned  primarily  in 
the  direction  of  conduct  are  usually  stated  to  be  feelings 
of  impulse,  wishing  or  desire,  deliberation,  motiv.es,  de- 
cision and  choice,  will,  effort,  consent,  and  of  the  so- 
called  'Hat/  It  is,  of  course,  true  that  mental  states 
of  all  sorts  may  appear  in  intimate  connection  with  the 
life  of  action.  But  it  will  be  best  to  follow  the  custom 
that  singles  out  for  treatment  under  one  head  the  men- 
tal  states  named. 

Impulses. — One  is  tempted  to  desire  a  special  name 
85 


86  Descriptive  Psychology 

for  the  class  of  feelings  which  in  the  round-about  phrases 
of  common  thought  and  speech  are  called  'an  impulse  to 
sneeze/  'an  impulse  to  laugh/  'an  impulse  to  run/  and  the 
like.  Many  mental  states  are  so  intimately  connected 
with  acts  that  the  only  names  for  them  are  names  of  the 
acts  to  which  they  lead.  E.g.,  the  feelings  that  lead  us 
to  yawn  and  to  cough  appear  almost  never  save  as  im- 
pulses to  these  acts ;  are  not  felt  by  themselves ;  do  not 
reappear  as  images ;  and  play  but  a  slight  part  in  the 
development  of  the  fabric  of  ideas  and  judgments  as  a 
whole.  Yet  strictly  speaking  these  two  feelings  are  sen- 
sations, are  feelings  of  bodily  condition  comparable  to 
the  sensations  of  tickling,  heat,  cold,  pain,  and  the  like. 
And  in  a  strict  classification  there  need  be  no  separate 
heading  for  impulses.  The  feelings  that  are  commonly 
called  impulses  are  those  sensations  and  emotions  which 
are  vague,  obscure  and  little  emphasized  in  the  mind  in 
comparison  with  the  acts  to  which  they  lead. 

It  is  further  true  that  any  mental  state  whatever  may 
be  an  impulse, — ^may  take  on  the  aspect  of  impeller  to  an 
act.  Feelings  of  relationships  and  feelings  of  meaning 
do  so  but  infrequently  and  slightly ;  images  and  memories 
do  so  somewhat  more;  percepts,  sensations  and  emotions 
do  so  most  of  all.  Those  among  the  last  that  do  so  pre- 
eminently are  commonly  called  impulses. 

Although  we  must  abandon  the  notion  of  impulses  as 
a  group  of  feelings  distinct  from  all  others,  we  might 
have  a  right  to  speak  of  an  impulse-quality  which  could 
add  itself  to  any  feeling,  but  was  itself  a  new  kind  of 
mental  stufif.  But  the  psychologists  of  to-day  deny  that 
one  has  that  right.  By  the  impulsive  quality  of  a  mental 
state  is  meant,  they  say,  not  any  peculiar  aspect  of  it  as 
felt,  but  only  its  quality  of  being  connected  directly  with 
an  act.     The  description  of  this  impulse  quality  comes 


1 


Feelings  of  Willing  87 

then  under  the  description  of  the  connections  between 
mental  states  and  bodily  acts. 

Desires  and  Wishes. — Desire  and  wishing  are  emo- 
tions, and  have  been  so  classified  in  the  previous  chapter. 
When  we  feel,  'I  wish  I  had  that  picture/  the  feeling 
includes  the  thought  of  the  object  and  an  emotional  atti- 
tude toward  it.  The  particular  sort  of  emotion  is,  it  is 
true,  somewhat  more  frequently  and  emphatically  con- 
nected with  conduct  than  are  emotions  of  other  sorts,  but 
the  difference  is  only  one  of  degree.  The  T  wish'  repre- 
sents a  state  of  mind  not  in  general  character  different 
from  T  hate'  or  T  pity'  or  T  fear.'  It  represents  a  special 
activity  of  the  mind  no  more  and  no  less  than  do  they. 

Deliberation. — The  word  deliberation  is  used  in 
ordinary  speech  to  mean  any  state  of  mind  in  which  some 
topic  is  considered  attentively.  It  then  means  little  more 
than  a  state  of  attention.  In  the  more  restricted  use  of 
the  word  to  describe  a  state  of  will,  psychologists  mean 
by  it  the  consideration  of  a  topic  calling  for  mental  choice 
or  bodily  action.  In  such  cases  the  state  of  mind  is  likely 
to  include  different  and  more  or  less  opposed  motives. 
We  think  over  the  alternatives,  have  ideas  favoring  this, 
that  or  the  other,  and  swing  suspended  between  them. 
The  presence  of  percepts,  images  and  feelings  of  meaning 
plus  an  emotion  of  doubt  or  uncertainty  describes  delib- 
eration from  the  inside.  From  the  outside,  it  is  a  state 
of  hesitation  before  action. 

Decision  and  Choice. — The  termination  of  this  hesi- 
tation, suspension  or  conflict  of  ideas  is  sometimes  marked 
by  a  feeling  of  decision  or  choice.  We  must  not  confuse 
here  the  fact  of  decision  with  the  feeling  of  decision. 
The  fact  of  decision  or  choice,  which  means  simply  that 
one  motive  has  conquered, — that  one  idea  or  act  has  pre- 
vailed in  the  mind, — may  have  much  or  little  or  no  feeling 


88  Descriptive  Psychology 

of  choice  accompanying  it.  Thus,  in  writing  the  last 
sentence,  I  thought  first  of  writing  'Uttle  or  nothing'  and 
then  of  writing  *Httle  or  no.'  The  latter  was  chosen,  but 
there  was  no  feeling  of  choice  or  decision, — no  conscious- 
ness of  anything  but  the  two  phrases  and  the  grammati- 
cal superiority  of  the  second.  On  the  other  hand  we 
often  have  an  intense  feeling  of  acceptance  of  the  one 
course  and  of  rejection  of  the  other,  a  feeling  of  V^s  to 
this,  and  no  to  that.'  Such  feelings  are  akin  to,  if  not 
identical  with,  the  feelings  of  belief  and  disbelief  and  of 
attraction  and  repulsion  and  belong  properly  among 
the  emotions. 

The  Fiat. — The  term,  the  Hat  of  will,  is  applied  to 
a  feeling  which  may  perhaps  be  analyzed  ont  in  some 
cases  from  the  feeling  of  acceptance,  a  feeling  of  *Go 
ahead,'  'Let  the  act  occur,'  'Let  the  consequences  of  my 
decision  become  real.' 

Willing. — The  verb  to  zvill  is  used  as  a  general  term 
to  express  the  fact  of  decision  in  favor  of  or  consent 
to  any  course  of  action  which  has  been  the  topic  of 
thought.  The  word  is  used  especially  of  cases  where  the 
decision  is  accompanied  by  a  feeling  of  effort,  where  we 
decide  against  natural  tendencies.  We  do  not  say  that 
we  willed  to  breathe  because  no  decision  was  involved. 
We  do  not  say  that  we  willed  to  eat  our  breakfast  this 
morning  because  the  action  was  not  the  topic  of  thought. 
We  do  not  often  say  that  we  willed  to  stay  in  bed  this 
morning  because,  though  the  issue  may  have  been  the 
topic  of  thought  and  a  decision  may  have  been  involved, 
the  action  accepted  was  easy  and  natural.  We  do  say, 
'I  got  up  this  morning  by  sheer  will,'  because  thought, 
decision  and  effort  were  markedly  present.  In  all  this 
there  is  no  description  of  any  special  feeling  of  willing  or 
volition,  but  only  of  a  general  experience  involving  cer- 


Feelings  of  Willing  89 

tain  feelings  and  tendencies  to  action.  The  feelings 
present  when  one  wills  to  do  or  think  something  are  in 
fact  those  already  described. 

The  Will. — The  phrase  the  will  is  used  most  often 
to  mean  the  source  of  all  purposive  action.  In  this  sense 
it  equals  the  general  fact  of  connections  between  mental 
states  and  acts.  Thus  we  say,  'To  educate  the  will  is 
more  important  than  to  educate  the  intellect.'  It  is  used 
at  times  to  mean  the  power  to  inhibit  attractive  in  favor 
of  less  attractive  ideas  and  acts.  Thus  we  say,  Tt  re- 
quired will  to  do  that.'  It  is  used  at  times  by  psycholo- 
gists as  a  class  name  for  all  those  feelings  which  are 
closely  associated  with  acts.  Thus  we  say  that  mental 
states  comprise  states  of  thought,  states  of  feeling  and 
states  of  will,  or  are  divided  among  cognition,  emotion 
and  volition  or  will. 

The  terms  effort  and  motive  have  been  used  without 
description.  The  feeling  of  effort  needs  no  description, 
for  anyone  who  has  ever  attended  to  an  uninteresting 
piece  of  mental  or  bodily  work,  or  chosen  the  disagreeable, 
repulsive  duty,  or  willed  to  do  and  done  the  painful  task, 
has  had  direct  experience  of  the  feeling.  The  term  mo- 
tive is  used  for  any  sensation,  percept,  image,  feeling  of 
meaning,  judgment  or  emotion  which  shares  in  swaying 
one's  decisions.  In  so  far  as  it  influences  our  willing, 
any  idea  is  called  a  motive. 

On  the  whole  the  feelings  concerned  in  the  life  of 
conduct  are  in  the  main,  perhaps  entirely,  made  up  of  in- 
tellectual and  emotional  stuff.  Action  itself  is  not 
thought  nor  emotion,  but  it  is  felt  in  and  guided  hy 
thought  and  emotion.  The  special  psychology  of  the 
will  is  chiefly  not  a  descriptive  account  of  the  feelings 
connected  with  conduct,  but  an  account  of  capacities  for 
and  habits  of  action  and  of  the  connections  between 
thoughts  and  acts.     This  will  be  found  in  Part  III. 


9©  Dtscnptive  Psychology 

Exercises 

Notice  your  feelings  as  you  follow  the  directions  given  in 
this  paragraph.  Follow  them  without  question,  a.  Choose  a 
certain  number  between  loo  and  200.  b.  Will  to  turn  to  that 
page  {i.  e.,  the  page  of  the  chosen  number)  or  not  to  do  so.  c. 
It  is  left  to  you  whether  you  will  take  the  trouble  to  write  to  the 
author^  of  this  book  a  description  of  how  you  feel  (a)  when  you 
decide  to  go  to  church  rather  than  to  stay  at  home,  and  (b) 
when  you  will  to  continue  studying,  though  bored  and  sleepy. 
The  information  is  seriously  and  earnestly  requested  by  him. 
Decide  whether  you  promise  to  do  so  or  not. 

1.  Did  you  or  did  you  not  in  choosing  the  number  have  any 
feeling  of  decision  or  of  indecision? 

2.  In  case  you  willed  to  turn  to  that  page,  what  was  your 
feeling  of  willing  to  do  so?  {i.  e.,  describe  the  feeling). 

3.  In  case  you  willed  not  to  turn  to  the  page,  what  was  your 
feeling  of  willing  not  to  do  so?  {i.  e.,  describe  the  feeling). 

4.  In  case  you  decided  to  promise  to  write  to  the  author, 
describe  your  feeling  of  deciding  to. 

5.  In  case  you  decided  not  to  do  so,  describe  your  feeling  of 
deciding  not  to. 

As  before,  follow  the  directions,  noticing  your  feelings. 

d.  Take  a  pencil   and  write  your  name. 

e.  Make  up  your  mind  to  buy  ten  cents  worth  of  stamps 
to-morrow. 

6.  Did  you,  before  taking  the  pencil  and  writing  your  name, 
(I)  feel  nothing  but  the  words  read;  or  did  you  (II)  have  an 
image  of  the  movements  to  be  made;  or  did  you  (III)  have  a 
visual  image   of  the  name   as  written? 

If  you  had  any  other  feelings  as  components  of  the  'willing,' 
what  were  they? 

7.  Did  you,  in  resolving  to  buy  the  stamps,  (I)  feel  nothing 
but  acquiescence  to  the  words  read;  or  did  you  (II)  feel  'All 
right,'  or  'Yes,'  or  T  will';  or  did  you  (III)  feel  also  an  image  of 
yourself  handling  out  money;  or  did  you  (IV)  feel  also  yourself 
going  to  the  purchasing  place,  taking  out  money  and  handing  it 
over  to  the  clerk;  or  did  you  (V)  feel,  in  place  of  III  and  IV  or 

*The  author  will  indeed  be  very  glad  if  some  of  the  students 
of  this  book  are  willing  to  send  him  descriptions  of  their  feelings 
of  willing.     He  has  already  many  such  records. 


Feelings  of  Willing  91 

in  addition  to  III  and  IV,  an  image  of  the  stamps  as  in  3rour 
possession  ? 

8.  In  view  of  your  answers  to  questions  1-7,  would  you 
agree  with  the  theory  that  an  anticipatory  image  of  the  move- 
ment to  be  made  or  of  the  result  of  the  movement  was  a  neces- 
sary^ feature  of  willing?  Would  you,  for  instance,  say  that  the 
following  account  was  true  of  all  people? 

"My  volition  to  sign  a  letter  is  either  an  image  of  my  hand 
moving  the  pen  or  an  image  of  my  signature  already  written,  and 
my  volition  to  purchase  something  is  an  image  of  myself  in  the 
act  of  handing  out  money  or  an  image  of  my  completed  purchase 
— golf  stick  or  Barbedienne  bronze."  M.  W.  Calkins,  Introduc- 
tion to  Psychology,  p.  299. 

References 

A.  Titchener,  Outline,  §§  36-37. 
Angell,  Psychology,  XVII. 

B.  Ebbinghaus,  GrundzUge,  §  55. 

Wundt,  Physiologische  Psychologie,  XVII. 


CHAPTER  VII 
General  Characteristics  of  Mental  States 
§  1 8.  Qualities   Common   to   all  Mental  States 

Complexity. — The  fact  that  one's  mental  state  at 
any  moment  is  usually  a  complex  mixture  has  already 
been  emphasized.  As  the  reader  sees  this  page,  he  feels 
the  temperature  of  the  room  and  the  well  or  ill-being  of 
his  body,  thinks  of  the  meanings  of  the  words  in  this 
paragraph,  has  flitting  images  of  this  or  that  called  up  by 
them  and  is  mildly  interested  or  bored  or  satisfied  or 
disgusted  with  it  all.  Even  if  we  take  but  a  momentary 
bit  of  his  mental  state  it  may  contain  many  of  these  dif- 
ferent elements.  Although,  to  study  the  body  of  thought 
and  feeling  of  a  human  life,  we  dissect  it  out  into  this, 
that  and  the  other  specially  named  kinds  of  mental  facts, 
we  must  not  forget  that  in  reality  a  mental  Hfe  is  a  series 
of  confused  mixtures  of  thought-stuff,  a  rich  blending 
of  various  elements,  and  that  often  all  the  names  so  far 
given  to  denote  different  sorts  of  mental  facts  would  be 
needed  to  describe  the  mental  state  of  ^,  man  for  a  single 
minute.  Mental  life  is  not  like  a  series  of  solos,  now  sen- 
sations, now  memories,  now  decisions ;  but  is  like  the 
performance  of  an  orchestra  in  which  many  sounds  fuse 
into  a  total.  One  instrument  may  predominate  for  a 
while,  but  only  very  rarely  is  it  active  alone. 

Personal  Feeling. — Again,  although  for  convenience 
we  study  images,  concepts  and  all  mental  facts  as  if  one 

92 


General  Characteristics  of  Mental  States  93 

image  of  a  tiger  was  like  another  of  the  same  tiger,  one 
feehng  of  eight  Hke  another  feeHng  of  eight,  it  must  be 
borne  in  mind  that  what  we  call  the  same  thought  or  feel- 
ing in  two  men  is,  after  all,  never  the  same,  John  in 
imagining  a  tiger  feels  it  as  a  tiger  not  present  and  so  does 
James,  but  John  feels  the  feeling  as  his,  as  belonging  with 
the  rest  of  his  inner  life,  as  a  part  of  his  strte.m  of 
thought.  James  could  feel  the  feeling  just  as  John  does 
only  by  being  John.  If  a  hundred  scholars  are  asked 
to  add  four  and  four,  the  hundred  thoughts  of  eight  are 
never  absolutely  alike.  Each  eight  is  felt  with  a  fringe 
or  halo  of  personal  possession, — as  someone's  own  ob- 
ject of  thought, — with  a  tag  which  says,  'This  is  my 
thought  or  my  emotion.'     To  quote  Professor  James : 

"In  this  room.  . .  .there  are  a  multitude  of  thoughts, 
yours  and  mine,  some  of  which  cohere  mutually,  and 
some  not 

"They  are  as  little  each-for-itself  and  reciprocally 
independent  as  they  are  all-belonging-together.  They 
are  neither:  no  one  of  them  is  separate,  but  each  belongs 
with  certain  others  and  with  none  beside.  My  thought 
belongs  with  my  other  thoughts,  and  your  thought  with 
your  other  thoughts.  Whether  anywhere  in  the  room 
there  be  a  mere  thought,  which  is  nobody's  thought,  we 
have  no  means  of  ascertaining,  for  we  have  no  experience 
of  its  like.  The  only  states  of  consciousness  that  we 
naturally  deal  with  are  found  in  personal  consciousnesses, 
minds,  selves,  concrete  particular  I's  and  you's."^ 

This  personal  element  varies  in  amount  in  the  same 
individual  at  different  times  and  amongst  individuals. 
When  one  is  playing  with  interest  a  game  of  skill  or 
absorbed  in  the  effort  of  landing  a  fish  or  stalking  a 
deer  the  personal  element  is  almost  absent.  It  is  far  less 
in  young  children  than   in  developed   minds.     There   is 

^  W.  James,  Principles  of  Psychology,  vol.  I,  p.  225  f. 


94  Descriptive  Psychology 

less  and  less  evidence  of  it.  as  we  progress  down  through 
the  animal  kingdom  to  the  lower  forms. 

Social  Implications. — That  in  human  beings  gen- 
erally thoughts  and  feelings  are  always  some  one's  own 
should  not  be  taken  to  mean  that  one  man's  thought  is 
incomparable  with  and  uninfluenced  by  those  of  other 
men.  The  likeness  of  the  hundred  feelings  of  eight  is 
far  greater  than  the  difference.  The  isolation  of  my 
stream  of  thought  from  others  is  only  such  that  I  can- 
not be  them,  not  such  that  I  cannot  be  incessantly  and  to 
the  utmost  extent  influenced  by  them.  'Individual' 
would  be  a  very  unfit  adjective  to  apply  to  human 
thoughts  and  feelings  if  it  were  to  mean  more  than  'felt 
always  by  someone  as  his  own.'  So  far  they  are  indi- 
vidual, but  they  are  also  in  an  important  sense  social. 

If  we  leave  out  any  solitary  from  birth  whom  chance 
or  miracle  may  have  preserved,  the  thoughts  and  feel- 
ings of  any  man  at  any  time  are  in  part  the  result  of  the 
thoughts  and  feelings  of  others.  What  we  feel,  how  we 
think,  what  we  enjoy,  depend  on  the  existence  and  action 
vipon  us  of  the  thoughts  and  feelings  of  other  people. 
When  the  attempt  is  made  to  explain  the  actual  mental 
life  of  men  so  as  to  show  how  they  come  to  be  what 
they  are,  the  social  aspect  of  mental  facts, — the  impor- 
tance of  the  fact  that  anyone's  thoughts  and  feelings  are 
members  of  a  great  community  of  mental  states, — is 
abundantly    evident. 

Mental  States  are  Parts  of  a  Continuum. — Any 
mental  state  is  felt  as  a  part  of  a  total  stream  of  feeling, 
as  in  a  context,  as  with  what  has  been  and  is  to  be.  The 
first  thought  of  the  morning  is  thus  bound  to  the  life  of 
yesterday,  feels  at  home  with  the  memories  of  the  past 
and  already  half-acquainted  with  the  life  of  the  future. 

Are,  More  or  Less,  Focal. — Thoughts  and  feelings 


General  Characteristics  of  Mental  States  95 

may  be  ranked  in  a  scale  according  to  the  degree  to  which 
they  are  absorbing,  exclusive  of  others,  impressive  charac- 
ters in  one's  mental  history.  A  thought  may  be  so  promi- 
nent, so  in  the  focus  that  for  the  time  being  it  practically 
is  the  mental  life,  or  it  may  be  just  a  shadowy,  almost 
unnoticed  hoverer  in  the  background  of  the  mind. 

Within  any  mental  state  also  some  parts  are  more 
emphatic,  more  in  relief,  gain  greater  possession  of  us, 
count  more,  are  attended  to  more  than  others.  Psycholo- 
gists make  use  of  the  fitting  epithets  focal  and  marginal 
to  express  this  unevenness  in  the  emphasis  of  different 
parts  of  a  mental  state.  In  the  reader's  mind  the  thought, 
'more  emphatic,  more  in  relief,  gain  greater  possession  of 
us,  count  more,'  should  just  now  have  been  the  chief,  focal, 
absorbing  part  of  his  total  state  of  mind ;  the  sight  of  the 
rest  of  the  page  and  the  feeling  of  the  book  in  his  fingers 
less  so ;  while  the  feelings  or  noises  about  him,  of  the  time 
of  day  or  of  the  floor  beneath  his  feet  should  be  out  in 
the  margin  of  thought,  a  shadowy  background,  half  lost 
in  the  darkness  of  the  border-land  between  consciousness 
and  unconsciousness. 

If  a  mental  state  is  pictured  as  an  elevation  above  the 
level  of  unconsciousness,  it  must  be  pictured  not  as  a  cube 
or  cylinder  but  as  a  mountain,  the  peak  representing  the 
focal  or  attended  to  part  of  the  thought,  the  slopes  the 
marginal  part  merging  gradually  into  the  flat  plain  of 
unconsciousness.  If  we  picture  it  as  an  illuminated  area 
in  darkness,  the  light  should  be  unequally  diffused,  strong 
at  one  point  but  melting  off  gradually  into  darkness. 

This  general  characteristic  of  thinking  by  which  one 
thought  prevails  over  others  or  some  one  element  of  a 
total  thought  outweighs  all  the  rest  is  of  tremendous 
practical  importance.  Not  what  we  think  but  what  is 
focal  in  our  thoughts,  becomes  thus  the  matter  of  conse- 


96  Descriptive  Psychology 

quence  in  mental  life.  This  focalizing  of  thought,  com- 
monly referred  to  by  the  word  attention,  will  be  the 
subject  of  a  special  section. 

Other  Qualities. —  (i)  Thoughts  and  feelings  may 
also  usually  be  ranked  in  a  scale  of  intensity.  Some 
have  an  extreme  amount  of  a  striking,  incisive,  piercing 
quality;  others  are  mild,  flat,  weak,  lukewarm.  (2)  It 
may  perhaps  be  possible  to  rank  all  thoughts  and  feelings 
on  a  scale  of  desirability  and  intolerability  ranging  from 
the  feeling  one  most  shrinks  from  to  the  feeling  one  most 
welcomes.  This  scale,  desirability  to  intolerability,  is  not 
identical  with  pleasure  to  pain.  Certain  pleasures  may 
be  intolerable  and  certain  pains  welcomed.  (3)  No  one 
could  build  a  pile  of  feelings  over  which  one  could  not 
jump,  or  fill  a  bucket  with  ideas ;  they  do  not  occupy 
space.  (4)  They  do  take  time ;  as  quick  as  thought  is  no 
truer  than  as  slow  as  thought. 

So  much  for  the  general  inner  qualities  of  mental 
facts.  They  have  also  two  general  outside  relationships. 
They  are  intimately  connected  with  conditions  of  the 
brain  which  precede,  accompany  and,  in  the  common 
sense  use  of  the  word,  cause  them.  They  are  also  inti- 
mately connected  with  acts  of  the  body  which,  in  the 
common  sense  use  of  the  word,  are  caused  by  them. 

These  two  general  facts  that  all  mental  life  is  con- 
nected with  the  activity  of  the  brain  and  always  expresses 
itself  in  bodily  action  will  be  discussed  in  Parts  II.  and  III. 

Exercises 

Experiment  8.  The  Duration  of  Mental  Processes. — With 
the  proper  apparatys  for  making  delicate  measurements  of  time 
and  for  eliminating  the  influence  of  other  processes  than  those 
which  we  wish  to  measure,  the  time  required  to  notice  a  difference, 
or  to  call  up  an  image,  the  time  that  an  idea  or  an  emotion  lasts, 
and  the  like-  may  be  measured. 


General  Characteristics  of  Mental  States  97 

Even  with  the  crudest  means  the  differences  in  duration  of 
the  following  processes  may  be  at  least  roughly  measured: — 
To  feel  a  stimulus  and  make  a  movement  in  response  to  it. 
To  feel  a  stimulus,  distinguish  it  from  other  possible  ones, 

and  make  a  movement  in  response  to  it. 
To  feel  a  stimulus,  feel  its  meaning,  call  up  an  idea  in 
response  to  it  and  make  a  movement  in  response 
to  this  idea. 
Arrange  for  ten  or  more  individuals  to  act  as  subjects:  have 
ready  a  stop  watch  measuring  fifths  of  a  second.     Let  the  subjects 
be  seated  in  a  circle,  the  observer  among  them. 

A.  Say,  "We  are  to  measure  roughly  the  time  it  takes  to 
hear  a  sound  and  make  a  sound  in  response.  I  shall  say,  'Be'  and 
as  soon  as  I  say  it,  the  person  at  my  right  will  reply  by  making 
the  same  sound  'Be' ;  as  soon  as  he  says  it,  the  person  on  his 
right  will  make  the  same  sound,  and  so  on  around  the  circle  as 
fast  as  we  can  until  I  say  'Stop'.  Be  careful  not  to  say  'Be'  un- 
til you  hear  the  person  just  at  your  left  say  it."  Give  one  round 
of  practice.  Then  say  'Attention',  and  then  say  'Be',  starting  the 
watch  simultaneously.  After  the  word  has  been  passed  around 
the  circle  three  times,  that  is,  when  you  hear  'Be'  the  fourth  time, 
stop  the  watch  instead  of  saying  'Be'  a  fourth  time,  and  then  say 
'Stop'.  If  there  are  ten  people  the  total  time  taken  divided  by  30 
will  be  the  average  time  taken  to  hear  the  sound  and  to  make  the 
sound  and  for  the  sound  wave  to  pass  from  one  person's  mouth 
to  the  next  person's  ear. 

B.  Say,  "We  will  now  measure  the  time  it  takes  to  hear  a 
sound,  distinguish  it  from  others  and  make  a  sound  in  response 
to  it.  I  shall  start  counting,  say,  with  two ;  as  soon  as  I  say  two, 
the  person  on  my  right  will  say  three;  as  soon  as  he  says  three, 
the  person  on  his  right  will  say  four;  as  soon  as  he  says  four, 
the  person  on  his  right  will  say  one,  and  so  on,  one  calling  for 
two  as  its  reply,  two  for  three,  three  for  four,  and  four  for  one. 
Continue  until  I  say  stop."  Give  one  round  of  practice.  Then 
say  'Attention',  and  say  'Two'  or  'Three',  starting  the  watch  sim- 
ultaneously. Stop  after  three  rounds  of  the  circle  as  before. 
Compute  the  average  time  as  before.  It  will  be  well  to  have 
some  one  outside  the  circle  watch  for  erroneous  responses. 

C.  Say,  "We  will  now  measure  the  time  it  takes  to  hear  a 
word,  distinguish  it,  think  what  thing  it  means,  think  of  some 
thing  connected  with  this  and  respond.     I,  the  first  person,  will 

7 


98  Descriptive  Psychology 

say  the  name  of  something;  the  person  at  my  right  will  reply  by 
saying  the  first  word  called  to  his  mind  by  the  word  I  say,  the 
person  at  his  right  will  reply  by  saying  the  first  word  called  to 
his  mind  by  the  word  the  second  person  said,  and  so  on.  Be 
careful  to  listen  only  for  the  word  spoken  by  the  person  at  your 
left  and  to  reply  with  the  word  it  calls  up."  Give  one  or  two 
rounds  of  practice  and  then  after  the  'Attention'  say  'House'  and 
start  the  watch  simultaneously.  Stop  after  three  rounds  of  the 
circle  as  before.     Compute  the  average  time  as  before. 

Experiments  A,  B,  and  C  may  be  repeated  as  many  times  as 
is  convenient. 

References 

A.  James,  Briefer  Course,  XI. 
Stout,   Manual,  7^-7^- 
Titchener,   Outline,  §§  92-98. 

B.  James,  Principles,  IX. 


§  19.  Attention 

The  Fact  of  Attention  and  the  Feelings  of  Atten- 
tion.— The  words  and  phrases  'attend,'  'attentive,'  'ab 
sorbed  in,'  'give  one's  mind  to,'  and  their  synonyms,  like 
most  common  words,  have  many  shades  of  meaning. 
They  refer  at  times  to  what  I  shall  call  the  fact  of  atten- 
tion and  at  other  times  to  what  I  shall  call  the  feelings  of 
attention.  In  the  first  case  they  mean  (i)  the  fact  that 
some  part  of  one's  state  of  mind  is  focal,  prominent,  pre- 
potent over  the  rest  or  (2)  that  some  one  possible  idea  is 
noticed  and  felt  to  the  exclusion  of  others.  Thus  (i) 
*He  attended  chiefly  to  the  color  of  the  rose  he  was 
observing,'  and  (2)  'He  attended  to  the  rose,  not  noticing 
what  was  said  or  how  awkward  he  appeared.'  In  the 
second  case  they  mean  (3)  the  feeling  of  effort  which  so 
often  accompanies  the  prevalence  of  one  part  over  other 
parts  of  a  feeHng  or  of  one  feeling  over  others  if  the 


General  Characteristics  of  Mental  States  99 

natural  impulse  is  to  attend  otherwise,  or  (4)  the  feeling 
of  interest  which  so  often  accompanies  such  prevalence 
if  it  is  in  accord  with  natural  impulse  or  (5)  the  feeling 
of  activity, — of  oneself  being  a  helper  in  making  the  part 
or  idea  prevail.  Thus  (3)  'He  resolutely  attended,'  'The 
power  of  attention ;'  (4)  'He  was  absorbed  in  play,'  Tt 
attracted  my  attention,'  T  could  not  help  feeling  atten- 
tive;' (5)  T  was  thinking  hard.  Every  sense  in  me  was 
on  the  qui  vive/ 

Separate  words  should  be  used  for  each  of  these  five 
meanings  if  we  are  to  be  clear,  at  least  in  all  cases  where 
the  context  does  not  show  in  which  sense  the  word  atten- 
tion is  used.  Let  us  use  Focalness  of  Mental  States  for 
the  fact  that  each  mental  state  is  not  throughout  equally 
prominent,  but  that  parts  are  in  greater  relief  than  others, 
and  Selectedness  of  Mental  States  for  the  fact  that  out  of 
many  feelings  felt  by  no  means  all  are  noticed,  dwelt 
upon,  allowed  to  play  leading  parts.  For  the  three  chief 
feelings  that  accompany  such  focal  and  selective  thinking, 
let  us  use  the  terms :  The  Feeling  of  Effort  or  Strain, 
the  Feeling  of  Interest  or  Attraction,  and  the  Feeling  of 
Activity  or  of  Mental  Life. 

(i)  and  (2)  are  the  most  alike.  They  represent  the 
results  of  the  same  mental  law  acting  (A)  within  one 
mental  state  and  (B)  among  a  number  of  mental  states. 
Together  they  represent  the  fact  of  attention  as  opposed 
to  the  feelings  going  zvith  it.  When  in  this  or  later  chap- 
ters the  word  attention  is  used  alone  it  will  mean  this  fact 
of  attention. 

Cases  of  attention  may  be  classified : — 

(A)  According  to  the  kind  of  feeling  accompanying 
them,  into  voluntary  and  involuntary. 

(B)  According  to  the  reason  why  the  chief  thought 


lOO  Descriptive  Psychology 

or  feeling  is  chief,  into  native  and  acquired,  and  also 
into  immediate  and  derived. 

(C)  According  to  the  nature  of  the  chief  or  pre- 
potent or  'attended  to'  object,  into  intellectual  and  sen- 
sorial. 

Voluntary  and  Involuntary  Attention. — In  certain 
cases  the  special  emphasis  on  some  part  of  our  total 
thought  or  possible  thought  is  accompanied  by  a  feeling 
of  effort  or  strain,  a  feeling  of  holding  ourselves  down  to 
that  part  and  resisting  other  temptations.  If  in  the  mind 
of  a  schoolboy,  in  spite  of  tired  eyes  and  a  strong  desire 
to  be  outdoors,  the  xs  and  ys  of  the  algebra  book  before 
him  hold  the  field  against  the  shouts  and  laughter  of  play- 
mates outside  and  impulses  to  look  at  the  clock,  to  leave 
the  examples  till  next  day  and  the  like,  the  case  is  pre- 
sumably one  of  voluntary  attention.  The  boy  probably 
has  a  feeling  of  effort.  Such  cases  of  attention  with  a 
feeling  of  effort  are  called  Voluntary  Attention,  The 
name  is  perhaps  ill  chosen ;  for  in  a  sense  these  are  just 
the  cases  where  w^e  do  not  attend  willingly.  The  word 
voluntary  is  used  by  psychologists  to  show  that  in  these 
cases  of  attention  with  a  feeling  of  effort  there  is  a  willful 
ruling  out  of  other  tempting  ideas  and  an  adherence  to 
the  point  attended  to. 

In  other  cases  an  idea  is  in  the  focus, — is  selected, — ■ 
without  being  accompanied  by  any  feeling  of  effort.  On 
the  contrary  the  object  seems  to  attract  us,  is  more  tempt- 
ing than  any  others,  and  is  usually  accompanied  by  a 
feeling  of  attraction.  Such  cases  are  called  cases  of 
Involuntary  Attention.  To  say  that  a  thing  attracts  us 
is  simply  another  way  of  saying  that  it  wins  a  place  over 
other  thoughts  without  any  feeling  of  effort  on  our  part. 
When  the  percepts  of  an  exciting  game  hold  the  field  in 
the  school-boy's  mind  and  keep  down  and  out  the  thoughts 


General  Characteristics  of  Mental  States         loi 

of  xs  and  ys,  nouns  and  verbs,  sitting  still  and  looking  at 
books,  it  is  presumably  a  case  of  involuntary  attention. 
He  probably  feels  little  effort  in  the  process. 

The  feeling  of  effort  of  voluntary  attention  is  a  feeling 
arising  not  so  much  from  thinking  of  the  one  thing  to 
which  we  feel  we  must  attend  as  from  checking  or,  in 
technical  terms,  inhibiting  the  tendencies  to  think  of  other 
things.  The  real  task  of  the  boy  in  school  who  with 
effort  keeps  the  example  uppermost  in  his  mind  is  to  keep 
down  and  out  ideas  of  how  long  it  is  before  school  ends, 
of  the  base  ball  match  in  the  afternoon,  of  how  thirsty  he 
is,  and  the  like.  Thinking  and  action  are  of  themselves 
desirable,  natural  and  involuntary;  the  effort  is  not  to 
think  the  more  attractive  thought,  not  to  do  the  more 
enjoyable  acts.  It  is  what  we  do  not  do  that  is  hard. 
The  fatigue  which  is  in  school  the  so  common  result  of 
work  demanding  attention  is  due  largely  to  the  strain  of 
suppressing  attractive  tendencies.  In  proportion  as  the 
work  itself  is  attractive  and  absorbing,  fatigue  diminishes. 

Although  voluntary  and  involuntary  attention  are 
diametrically  opposite,  the  same  object  may  at  one  time 
arouse  voluntary  attention  and  at  another  involuntary. 
The  boy  who  in  the  primary  school  attended  to  the  letters 
in  a  book  only  with  effort  comes  later  to  read  without 
effort.  The  song  which  a  few  months  ago  won  our  invol- 
untary attention  has  by  repetition  lost  its  attractiveness 
and  we  listen  to  it  only  with  a  decided  feeling  of  strain. 
What  interests  one  ceases  to  do  so  if  no  profit  or  pleasure 
to  him  results.  What  originally  implied  a  feeling  of 
effort  becomes  freed  from  it  in  porportion  as  profit  or 
pleasure  to  the  mind  concerned  results. 

Other  names  for  Voluntary  and  Involuntary  Attention 
are  Forced  and  Free, 

Native  and  Acquired  Attention. — Certain  thoughts 


I02  Descriptive  Psychology 

and  feelings  take  a  prominent  place  in  the  stream  of 
thought  apart  from  any  experience  on  our  part  of  their 
pleasurableness  or  utility.  The  inborn  constitution  of 
human  beings  is  such  that  in  young  children  a  clear, 
bright  light  wins  a  place  in  the  focus  of  the  mind  over 
filmy  shadows, — that  the  sight  of  a  puppy  running  about 
excludes  the  feehngs  of  the  clouds  or  trees.  The  fact 
of  attention  in  such  cases  is  called  Native  or  Inborn 
Attention  because  it  is  caused  by  inborn  qualities. 

In  the  majority  of  cases  of  attention  in  adult  life, 
however,  the  tendency  for  the  uppermost  idea  to  be  upper- 
most has  been  caused  by  our  experiences  of  the  different 
ideas  concerned  and  of  their  consequences.  The  black 
and  white  of  printed  pages  gains  attention  because  of  the 
pleasures  that  have  come  from  reading,  the  utility  of  the 
information  gained  and  the  like.  The  dollars  and  cents, 
clothes  and  furniture,  concerts  and  plays,  the  spoken  and 
written  words,  which  figure  so  largely  among  the  promi- 
nent, focal,  attended  to  ideas  of  civilized  human  beings 
do  not  owe  their  prominence  to  the  inborn  constitution  of 
man,  but  to  the  circumstances  of  his  life  and  training. 

Cases  of  native  attention  are  always  involuntary. 
There  is  no  feeling  of  effort  in  doing  what  one's  inborn 
make-up  leads  him  to  do.  Cases  of  acquired  attention 
may  be  voluntary  or  involuntary. 

Immediate  and  Derived  Attention. — A  less  useful 
division  is  into  Immediate  and  Derived  Attention,  imme- 
diate attention  meaning  those  cases  where  the  prominence 
of  the  object  is  due  to  some  intrinsic  quality  of  its  own, 
and  derived  attention  meaning  those  cases  where  it  is  due 
to  some  thing  not  in  the  object  but  indirectly  associated 
Avith  it.  The  attitudes  of  a  baby  and  of  an  adult  toward 
a  twenty  dollar  gold-piece  are  cases  in  point.  The  first 
is  immediate  attention  due  to  the  glitter  of  the  form  itself ; 


General  Characteristics  of  Mental  States         103 

the  second  is  largely  derived  attention,  due  to  the  ideas 
connected  with  twenty  dollars.  The  reason  why  this 
division  into  immediate  or  intrinsic  and  derived  or  ex- 
trinsic is  less  useful  is  that  it  is  in  many  cases  extremely 
hard  to  decide  which  occurs.  For  example,  does  the 
miser  attend  to  the  gold  for  itself  or  for  its  indirect 
properties?  Certainly  the  attention  was  originally  de- 
rived, but  certainly  it  feels  to  him  now  immediate. 

Sensorial  and  Intellectual  Attention. — Cases  where 
the  object  that  is  prominent  is  a  thing  of  sense  are  called 
cases  of  Sensorial  Attention.  Cases  where  it  is  an  image, 
meaning,  concept,  or  the  like,  are  called  cases  of  Intel- 
lectual Attention.  Thus  'His  mind  was  absorbed  by  the 
face  before  him,'  gives  an  instance  of  the  former,  and 
'His  thoughts  were  firmly  fixed  on  the  idea  of  self  sacri- 
fice,' gives  an  instance  of  the  latter.  Many  other  divisions 
could  be  made,  according  to  the  nature  of  the  object  of 
attention,  into  attention  to  thoughts  and  attention  to  acts, 
attention  to  feelings  of  external  things  and  attention  to 
feelings  of  the  body,  etc. 

In  common  use  the  word  attention  refers  to  physical 
facts  as  well  as  to  mental  facts.  T  attended  to  the  lec- 
tures' means  in  common  speech  not  only  'Percepts  of  the 
words  spoken  were  predominant  among  my  feelings  and 
excluded  other  feelings,'  but  also,  'My  eyes  were  directed 
toward  the  lecturer  and  followed  his  movements.  They 
focussed  upon  him,  not  upon  something  in  front  of  or 
behind  him.  My  ears  were  held  tense  as  in  listening.' 
The  connection  between  the  mental  fact  attention,  which 
this  chapter  has  dealt  with,  and  its  physical  or  bodily 
expression,  to  which  the  word  attention  so  often  refers, 
will  be  discussed  later  in  its  proper  place. 

Attributes  of  Attention. — Much  has  been  written 
about  the  extent  to  which  one  idea  in  the  focus  of  thought 


I04  Descriptive  Psychology 

may  shut  out  others.  Even  the  most  intense  stimuli  may 
fail  to  intiuence  one  who  is  thus  absorbed.  Stock  illus- 
trations are  the  soldier  who,  absorbed  in  the  excitement  of 
the  battle,  fights  on  unconscious  of  severe  wounds,  the 
child  absorbed  in  his  story  book  who  fails  to  reply  to  the 
loudest  call,  and  the  preacher  who,  although  so  afflicted 
with  weakness  as  to  have  to  be  carried  to  his  pulpit,  yet 
in  the  course  of  his  discourse  rose  from  the  chair  in  which 
he  had  been  seated  and  soon  was  speaking  with  full  voice 
and  vigorous  gestures.  Though  such  extreme  cases  of 
the  victory  of  a  possessing  idea  are  rare,  the  same  thing 
occurs  to  a  less  degree  with  everyone  in  every  day's  work. 
We  can  and  do  'put  things  out  of  our  mind'  by  attending 
to  something  else. 

Whether  it  ever  happens  that  all  parts  of  a  state  of 
mind  are  equally  focal,  equally  attended  to,  is  a  doubtful 
question.  At  times,  for  instance  when  he  lies  idly  dozing 
in  a  hammock,  a  person  seems  to  feel  one  thing  as  much 
and  no  more  than  another,  to  be  equally  open  to  all  parts 
of  an  impression,  to  care  no  more  for  one  element  of  a 
thought  than  for  another.  But  in  such  cases  attention 
may  not  be  really  dispersed  equally  over  the  field,  but  may 
have  run  from  one  thing  to  another  very  rapidly.  Each 
element  may  have  been  attended  to  in  its  turn  somewhat 
exclusively.  The  question  is  not  of  much  importance, 
since  such  cases  are  certainly  rare  in  mental  life.  As  an 
almost,  if  not  quite,  universal  rule  mental  life  is  focalized. 
What  common  usage  calls  inattention  is  then  very, 
very  rarely  real  inattention,  attention  to  nothing,  but  only 
attention  to  something  else.  We  call  him  inattentive  who 
does  not  attend  to  what  we  wish  or  expect  him  to.  The 
reason  is  to  be  sought  not  in  the  non-focal  quality  of  his 
mental  life,  but  in  the  fact  that  it  is  focussed  on  some- 
thing else.   The  inattentive  boy  of  the  school  is  commonly 


General  Characteristics  of  Mental  States         105 

extremely  attentive  to  the  bent  pin  he  is  preparing  for  his 
neighbor's  sleep  or  to  the  dreams  of  out-of-school  life 
which  fill  his  mind. 

Analysis. — Closely  allied  to  the  fact  of  focalness  of 
thinking  is  the  fact  of  analysis,^  the  fact  of  breaking  up  a 
total  fact  into  its  elements,  parts  or  aspects.  It  is  only  as 
a  result  of  such  a  process  of  breaking  up  total  facts  into 
their  qualities  that  the  elements  of  color,  size,  shape, 
weight,  pressure  and  the  like  are  felt  in  place  of  a  'big, 
blooming,  buzzing,  confusion.'  It  is  only  as  a  result  of 
such  a  process  that  many  feelings  of  meanings  and  of  in- 
tellectual relationships  arise  at  all.  In  the  fact  of  focal- 
ness of  thinking  lies  the  possibility  of  feeling  one  part  or 
element  of  a  fact  and  neglecting  the  rest.  As  now  the 
color,  now  the  size  and  now  the  shape,  of,  say,  a  plate  is 
made  focal  in  the  infant's  mind,  he  is  able  with  aid  from  a 
law  to  be  described  in  Chapter  XIV  to  think  of  the  color 
of  the  plate,  the  size  of  the  plate  and  the  shape  of  the  plate 
each  by  itself,  and  to  think  of  the  total  fact,  the  plate,  as 
possessing  or  constituted  by  these  elements. 


Exercises 

I.  Classify  each  of  the  following  cases  of  attention  as  vol- 
untary or  involuntary,  as  native  or  acquired  and  as  intellectual 
or  sensorial: — 

a.  The  baby's  fixed  glance  at  the  bright  light. 

b.  The  miser's  absorption  in  contemplating  his  hoard  of 

gold. 

c.  The  poet's  attention  to  the  composition  of  a  poem. 

d.  The   school    boy's    attention   to    it   in   learning   it  by 

heart   for  to-morrow's   lesson. 

^  The  word  discrimination  is  used  sometimes  with  this  same 
meaning  of  coming  to  feel  parts  of  facts,  but  as  it  is  more  often 
used  to  mean  feeling  differences  between  facts,  the  word  analysis 
is  preferable. 


io6  Descriptive  Psychology 

e.  The  compositor's  attention  to  the  copy  of  it  in  setting 

it  up  in  type. 

f.  The  child's  attention  to  the  piece  of  candy  held  be- 

fore him. 

g.  His  attention  to  the  organ-grinder's  monkey. 

h.  His  attention  to  the  letters  in  the  primer  from  which 
he  puzzles  out  the  words. 

i.  The  sailor's  attention  to  the  sail  he  can  barely  dis- 
cern in  the  distance. 

j.  The  young  girl's  attention  to  the  memories  of  last 
night's   party. 

2.  Illustrate  from  your  own  experience  the  power  of  inat- 
tention   to   temporarily   banish   pain   and   fatigue. 

3.  What  are  some  of  the  things  and  qualities  to  which  at- 
tention is  naturally  given  as  a  result  of  inborn  constitution  re- 
gardless of  our  experience  of  their  effects? 

Experiment  p.  The  Fluctuations  of  Attention. — Paint  a  very 
light  gray  circle  about  a  naif  inch  in  diameter  on  a  square  of 
white  cardboard  or  heavy  paper,  the  color  of  the  circle  to  be 
barely  distinguishable  from  white  (about  2  drops  of  black  writ- 
ing ink  to  a  teaspoonful  of  water  will  do  if  painted  in  a  thin  coat). 
Place  the  square  of  cardboard  far  enough  away  so  that  the  gray 
circle  can  just  be  made  out.  Look  steadily  and  attentively  at  it 
for  six  or  eight  minutes.     What  happens  to  the  gray  circle? 

Experiment  10.  The  Relative  Time  of  Focal  and  Marginal 
Thinking. — Read  passage  A  not  thinking  of  the  words  at  all  at- 
tentively: read  it,  that  is,  as  one  skims  over  an  unimportant  pas- 
sage or  a  perfunctory  letter.  Keep  a  record  of  the  number  of 
seconds  which  elapse.  It  will  be  convenient  to  start  when 
the  second  hand  is  at  60.  Read  passage  B  attentively,  as  one 
would  read  an  interesting  book  or  a  notice  of  importance.  Score 
the  time  as  before.     Compare  the  times. 

A. 

Passing  down  the  street  you  come  first  to  a  tall,  brick  build- 
ing, then  to  the  Presbyterian  church,  and  next  to  the  store  of 
William  Gunnison.  Above  the  door  hangs  the  sign,  "Antiques 
Bought  and  Sold."  If  you  go  in  you  will  see  tables,  chairs,  bed- 
steads, and  desks  of  mahogany,  mirrors  in  gilded  frames  which 
Mr,  Gunnison  will  assure  you  are  genuine  Chippendale,  and  an 
almost  endless  row  of  grandfather's  clocks.  The  walls  are 
covered  with  shelves  and  racks  and  hooks  on  which  rest  or  to 


General  Characteristics  of  Mental  States         107 

which  are  hung  thousands  of  pieces  of  crockery  of  all  sizes  and 
shapes  imagined  and  unimagined.  Blue,  brown  and  lavender 
figured  plates  jostle  pewter,  china  and  earthen  tea-pots. 

B. 

Just  across  the  river  is  situated  a  prosperous-looking  farm- 
house .with  a  red  barn  and  a  little  beyond  it  a  grove  of  pine  trees. 
Near  the  gate  stands  a  man  with  sword  and  pistol.  In  the  house 
he  has  stored  knives,  guns,  cutlasses  and  Indian  tomahawks,  and 
ninety  Italian  stilettos,  each  of  which,  he  informs  visitors,  has 
killed  a  man.  In  spite  of  the  murderous  nature  of  Mr.  Talbot's 
mania,  he  is  kind  to  his  horses,  cattle  and  dogs.  He  simply  en- 
joys collecting  weapons  as  other  people  enjoy  collecting  more 
peaceful  objects.  He  gathers  straight,  curved  and  pointed  swords 
and  daggers  as  you  might  gather  pictures,  books  or  oriental  rugs. 

Experiment  it.  The  Influence  of  Attention  on  Memory. — 
Write  what  you  remember  of  both  passages,  A  and  B.  Compare 
the   results. 

Experiment  12.  The  Aid  of  Attention  in  Analysis. —  (a) 
Sound  or,  better  still,  have  some  one  sound  for  you  on  a  piano,  a 
chord  made  up  of  the  middle  C  and  the  note  C,  an  octave  above 
it.  Do  you  hear  the  two  components  or  is  the  sound  apparently 
only  one  note?  If  the  latter  is  the  case,  sound  several  times  the 
C  until  you  have  it  clearly  in  mind.  Have  the  chord  played 
again.  Do  you  now  hear  the  C  as  a  component?  If  the  chord 
was  felt  as  a  result  of  two  component  tones  notes  from  the  start, 
experiment  as  follows  : 

(b)  Strike  the  middle  C  alone.  Do  you  hear  any  com- 
ponent notes?  Strike  softly  the  C  until  you  have  it  clearly  in 
mind  and  then  listen  for  it  as  you  again  strike  the  middle  C.  Do 
you  hear  the  C  now?  The  middle  C  does  contain  the  C  as  one 
of  its  overtones  and  with  enough  practice  and  close  attention  it 
can  be  detected. 

References 

A.  James,  Briefer  Course,  XIII. 
Stout,  Manual,  611-614. 
Titchener,   Outline,  §§  38-42. 
Angell,  Psychology,  IV.,  64-82. 

B.  Ebbinghaus,  Grundsiige,  §§  56-59- 
James.    Principles,   XI. 

Wundt,  Physiologisclie  Psychologie,  XVIII.  §  i. 


io8  Descriptive  Psychology 

§  20.  A  New  Classification  of  Mental  States 

The  thoughtful  and  ingenious  student  may  have 
observed  already  that  human  thoughts  and  feelings  may 
be  ranged  in  a  scale  according  to  the  directness  of  their 
relationships  to  their  'objects/  that  is  the  things  which 
they  stand   for. 

Feelings  Which  are  What  They  Stand  For. — There 
are  firstly  feelings,  such  as  of  blue,  length,  suffocation, 
sleepiness,  terror  and  rage,  which  simply  are  what  they 
stand  for.  These  may  be  called  feelings  of  the  first 
intention.  They  give  us  the  stuff,  the  content,  the  ma- 
terial out  of  which  the  mind's  world  is  shaped.  They 
mean  or  refer  to  or  know  nothing  unlike  or  beyond  them- 
selves. The  suffocation,  as  a  feeling  of  the  first  inten- 
tion, stands  for  just  the  suffocation:  the  blue  means  just 
the  blue.  In  adult  life  one  rarely  has  feelings  of  the  first 
intention  pure  and  simple.  Even  the  suffocation  is  felt 
as,  T  am  strangling,'  or  'What  an  intolerable  atmosphere,* 
more  frequently  than  in  its  bare,  intrinsic  self.  To  get 
adequate  illustrations  of  them  one  must  turn  to  such  feel- 
ings as  one  has  when,  in  close  touch  with  nature,  without 
thought  of  'things'  or  'self,'  he  feels  impressions  directly. 
Think  for  instance,  of  how  one  feels  when  half  dozing  in 
the  summer  sunshine  or  when  swimming  lazily,  or  when 
in  the  agony  of  whooping-cough  or  asthma,  or  when 
beside  oneself  with  rage,  or  when  absorbed  in  the  smell  of 
the  woods.  One  is  then  swallowed  up  in  the  sensation, 
is  lost  in  the  feeling,  for  the  time  being  is  it.  One  does 
not  'think'  or  have  'ideas'  or  notice  'things.'  One  simply 
feels  the  warmth,  the  water  and  the  sky  and  one's  bodily 
movements,  the  pain,  the  rage,  the  odorous  air. 

Feelings  Which  are  Like  What  They  Stand  For. — 
There  are,  secondly,  feelings  such  as  percepts  and  images 


General  Characteristics  of  Mental  States         109 

(and  the  pseudo-emotions),  which  have  objects,  more  or 
less,  but  always  somewhat,  like  themselves.  The  feeling 
of  the  blue  which  we  call  a  feeling  of  'the  sky,'  the  feeling 
of  a  white  rectangle  which  we  call  a  percept  of  a  sheet  of 
paper,  the  image  of  the  line  an  inch  long — each  of  these 
refers  to  something  which  it  is  not  exactly  but  only  in 
part.  They  may  be  called  feelings  of  the  second  intention. 
Feelings  Which  are  Unlike  What  They  Stand  For. 
— There  are  in  the  third  place  feelings  which  may  be 
utterly  unlike  the  facts  to  which  they  refer.  These  feel- 
ings of  the  third  intention  or  symbolic  feelings  include 
the  feelings  of  intellectual  relationships,  of  meanings,  of 
judgments  and  the  like.  A  single  illustration  will  suffice. 
(a- — b-)  —  (a-\-b)  (a — b)  is,  in  so  far  as  it  is  a  feeling 
merely  of  the  straight  and  curved  lines  seen,  a  feeling  of 
the  first  intention ;  in  so  far  as  it  is  a  feeling  of  letters  and 
signs,  that  is,  of  certain  things  or  images  which  the 
straight  and  curved  lines  call  to  mind,  it  is  a  feeling  of  the 
second  intention :  while,  in  so  far  as  it  is  a  feeling  that  one 
means,  'Any  a  squared  minus  any  b  squared  equals  the 
sum  of  these  quantities  times  their  difference,'  it  is  a  feel- 
ing of  the  third  intention.  It  is  in  the  third  intention  that 
feelings  become  the  rational  or  strictly  human  kind  of 
thinking.  They  can  have  as  objects,  things  that  are  not, 
have  not  been  and  cannot  be  felt  in  the  first  or  second 
intention.  Millions  of  lengths  that  could  be  so  felt  only 
in  the  course  of  a  lifetime  can  be  felt  in  the  third  inten- 
tion as  easily  as  can  a  single  inch.  Differences  that  are 
indistinguishable  and  elements  that  are  indissoluble  by 
direct  feeling  can  be  thought.  What  the  eye  has  not  seen 
nor  the  ear  heard  can  thus  enter  the  mind  of  man.  Far 
and  near,  past  and  future  can  be  joined  in  thought.  Feel- 
ings of  the  third  intention  do  thus  in  a  sense  transcend 
the  limits  of  space  and  time  and  place  thought  sub  specie 


no  Descriptive  Psychology 

aeternitatis.  The  universe  can  be  and  is  destroyed  and 
recreated  in  the  mind. 

The  Attributes  of  Each  of  These  Classes. — Feelings 
of  the  first  intention  are  common  to  many,  if  not  all,  of 
the  members  of  tht3  animal  kingdom.  Feelings  of  the 
second  intention  may  appear  here  and  there  in  a  few  of 
the  higher  vertebrates,  but  in  general  are  lacking  in  the 
lower  animals.  Feelings  of  the  third  intention  are  the 
exclusive  property  of  man,  and  fail  to  appear  in  the  less 
developed  minds  of  idiots.  In  the  growth  of  any  in- 
dividual's mind  the  second  class  appears  only  after  some 
months  of  life,  and  the  third  only  in  proportion  as  the 
second  becomes  established. 

Feelings  of  the  first  intention  are  strongly  impulsive 
to  bodily  acts.  xA.s  a  bone  is  to  a  dog's  mind  literally  a 
'to  seize  and  gnaw ;'  as  a  sunny  dust  pile  is  to  the  chick's 
intellect  literally  a  'to  scuffle  and  squat  in ;'  so,  to  man  as 
well,  a  feeling  of  cold  is  in  its  first  intention  a  'to  shiver, 
crouch  or  get  away  from.'  Whereas  feelings  of  the  first 
intention  thus  impel  to  immediate  bodily  action,  those  of 
the  second  are  especially  provocative  of  delayed  action, 
of  action  only  indirectly  and  after  a  time.  Their  direct 
consequence  is  more  often  another  idea.  The  printed  a, 
which  in  the  chick  arouses  only  an  act,  viz.,  'to  peck,' 
because  the  chick  feels  only  the  first  intention,  will  in  a 
man  arouse  the  image  of  the  sound  of  a  or  the  ideas  of  h, 
c  and  d.  Feelings  of  the  third  intention  impel  to  imme- 
diate action  still  more  rarely  and  arouse  judgments  rather 
than  images.  In  the  long  run,  however,  they  influence 
action  more  than  do  the  others,  for  through  them  we  can 
react  once  for  all  to  a  whole  group  of  objects  or  to  some 
quality  in  all  the  thousands  of  cases  where  it  is  found. 
In  fact  the  less  our  thoughts  resemble  their  objects  the 
better  they  seem  to  serve  us;  the  less  their  immediate 
exiwession.  the  greater  their  eventual  influence. 


CHAPTER  VIII 

The  Functions  of  Mental  States 
§  21.  The  Function  of  Mental  Life  as  a  Whole 

Thoughts    and    Feelings    Influence    Action. — The 

function  of  thoughts  and  feeHngs, — i.e.,  the  work  they  do, 
the  service  they  perform,  their  share  in  the  business  of 
Hfe, — is  to  influence  actions.  In  some  wider,  freer  world 
than  that  of  this  present  life,  mental  states  may  count  of 
themselves  directly.  But  as  things  are  here,  we  help  or 
harm  our  fellow  men  only  by  what  we  do.  Only  when  a 
man's  ideas  and  emotions  issue  in  effects  on  his  deeds, 
words,  gestures,  facial  expression  or  other  bodily  acts,  do 
they  make  any  difference  to  anyone  else.  And  in  truth, 
though  it  would  be  a  long  task  to  explain  why,  it  is  only 
when  they  influence  such  acts  of  body  or  at  least  of  brain, 
that  they  make  any  permanent  difference  to  him.  Unless 
mental  states  resulted  in  acts  that  altered  the  physical 
world  or  the  bodies  and  minds  of  men  they  would  be  of 
no  service,  and  would  as  well  not  be.  In  §  2y  it  will  be 
shown  that  sooner  or  later,  directly  or  indirectly,  every 
mental  state  is  expressed  or  worked  off  in  causing  or 
inhibiting  bodily  movements  or  brain  changes.  That  we 
now  see  to  be  their  reason  for  being.  We  feel  the  outside 
world  in  order  that  we  may  react  to  it.  We  remember 
and  learn  and  reason  in  order  that  we  may  modify  our 
reactions  to  it.  The  great  majority  or  our  feelings  have 
as  their  function  to  change  our  behavior. 

Ill 


112  Descriptive  Psychology 

The  great  majority  of  our  actions  are  done  in  response 
to  and  under  the  guidance  of  mental  states.  Getting  up, 
dressing,  eating  breakfast,  the  work  of  business  or  study, 
the  play  of  games  and  social  life,  what  we  say,  where  we 
go, — the  entire  course  of  a  day's  doings  minus  the  merely 
physiological  activities  of  digestion,  circulation  and  the 
like, — represent  the  stimulation  to  and  control  of  conduct 
by  thought.  The  history  of  a  man's  life  of  action  as  a 
whole  is  the  history  of  the  changes  in  his  natural  make-up 
which  have  been  wrought  by  his  mental  life.  The  steel 
which  always  reacts  uniformly  to  the  magnet  by  approach, 
— the  acid  and  metal  which  always  react  by  combining 
to  form  hydrogen  and  a  salt, — these  give  no  sign  that  they 
possess  feelings ;  but  in  the  animal  kingdom  in  proportion 
as  we  find  the  power  to  change  the  individual's  responses 
to  conditions,  to  adapt  behavior  to  circumstances,  in  the 
same  proportion  we  find  evidences  of  conscious  life. 

Knowledge  Is  Not  the  Sole  or  Ultimate  Purpose  of 
Thought. — It  is  a  common  mistake  to  speak  of  mental 
states  as  a  means  to  knowledge  as  if  that  were  their  final 
goal.  Mental  states  are  not  in  all  cases  means  to  knowl- 
edge. Many  of  our  emotions  and  impulses  furnish  us 
only  with  tendencies  to  act.  For  instance,  love  and  envy 
do  not  enlighten  our  minds  with  respect  to  their  objects 
but  only  change  our  dispositions  toward  them.  When 
mental  states  are  means  to  knowledge  the  knowledge 
itself  is  really  valuable  chiefly  as  a  means  to  action.  It 
would  be  of  little  advantage  to  have  sensations  of  cold  or 
knowledge  of  the  physiological  effects  of  low  temperature 
if  one  never  was  moved  thereby  to  put  on  a  coat  or  build 
a  fire.  The  reasoning  of  the  mathematician  is  well  nigh 
profitless  until  it  is  expressed  in  words  or  diagrams  or 
some  other  form  of  expression  so  as  to  influence  the 
world's  behavior.     We  learn  so  as  to  do.     Thought  aims 


Functions  of  Mental  States  113 

at  knowledge,  but  with  the  final  aim  of  using  the  knowl- 
edge to  guide  action. 

Adaptation. — Intelligent  behavior, — that  is,  reacting 
to  the  situations  of  life  so  as  to  adapt  oneself  to  them, — 
involves  three  factors:  (i)  being  sensitive,  (2)  acting  or 
making  movements,  and  (3)  connecting  with  each  of  the 
different  situations  certain  particular  movements.  We 
might  give  these  three  factors  names  as  follows : — 

(i)  Sensitiveness  or  Power  of  Impression  or  Re- 
ception. 

(2)  Movement  or  Power  of  Expression  or  Action. 

(3)  Connection  or  Power  of  Association  or  Ela- 
boration. 

We  could  then  say  that  the  function  of  mental  life  was 
to  be  impressed  by  the  environment  and  to  associate  suita- 
ble acts  with  all  impressions.  The  work  of  education  is 
to  make  the  impressions,  acts  and  connections  between 
them  suitable  not  only  in  the  sense  of  suiting  the  actual 
world  but  also  in  the  higher  sense  of  suiting  the  ideal  de- 
mands which  are  to  transform  the  imperfect  world  that  is 
into  some  better  world  of  the  future. 

That  mental  life  in  general  serves  to  adapt  conduct  to 
environment  in  useful  ways  does  not  imply  that  in  each 
and  every  case  it  does  so.  Feet  are  useful  in  general  but 
they  sometimes  trip  us  up ;  the  blood  is  useful  in  general 
but  it  serves  at  times  as  the  medium  for  disease.  So 
thought,  though  useful  in  general,  at  times  leads  men  into 
blunders.  That  we  can  swallow  food  implies  that  we  can 
also  swallow  poison,  and  that  we  can  think  wisely  implies 
also  that  we  can  make  mistakes.  Moreover,  just  as  the 
evolution  of  the  body  does  not  keep  pace  with  the  changes 
in  the  environment  and  manifests  useless  organs  such  as 
the  vermiform  appendix,  so  also  the  mind  shows  useless 

8 


114  Descriptive  Psychology 

sensations  such  as  those  coming  from  tickling,  useless 
emotions  such  as  hysterical  fear  or  joy. 

I  shall  not  waste  the  reader's  time  in  the  following 
account  of  the  special  functions  of  different  classes  of 
feelings  and  connections  between  them  by  rehearsing 
under  each  head  the  cases  of  useless  functioning.  The 
reader  should  once  for  all  understand  that  such  excep- 
tions occur.  In  the  text  only  the  more  general  facts  will 
be  presented. 

§  22.  The  Functions  of  Different  Groups  of  Mental  States 

The   Function   of   Sensations   and   Percepts. — The 

function  of  sensations  and  percepts  is  to  serve  as  signals 
to  warn  us  of  the  presence  of  some  thing  or  quality  or 
condition  and  so  to  arouse  the  appropriate  thought  or  act 
or  emotion.  Sensations  and  percepts  may  be  likened  to 
the  signals  of  an  army  or  the  steam-gauge  of  an  engine. 
They  report  what  occurs  within  and  in  the  neighborhood 
of  our  bodies,  that  is  they  report  more  or  less  of  the 
environment,  and  thus  are  the  first  step  in  our  adapta- 
tions to  it.  This  does  not  mean  that  a  sensation  or 
percept  necessarily  resembles  or  duplicates  or  mirrors 
the  thing  it  stands  for.  The  feeling  of  sweet  no  more 
needs  to  be  like  sugar  than  does  the  position  of  the  indi- 
cator on  a  steam-gauge  to  be  like  an  explosion.  A  tooth- 
ache is  no  more  like  a  decayed  tooth  than  it  is  like  a  green 
light;  a  sound  is  no  more  like  air- vibrations  than  like 
ether-vibrations.  The  function  of  the  sensations  is  not 
to  give  us  a  picture  of  the  outside  world  but  to  lead  us  to 
act  properly  toward  it.  It  is  indeed  literally  true  that  we 
in  any  case  sense  not  so  much  what  is  present,  as  what  it 
is  useful  for  us  to  feel. 

The  different  sensations  give,  of  course,  warnings  of 


Functions  of  Mental  States  115 

the  existence  of  different  qualities  or  features  of  physical 
things  or  bodily  conditions.  Sights  and  sounds  are 
specialized  signals  of  distant  objects ;  pains,  of  conditions 
dangerous  to  life  and  health ;  and  so  on  through  the  list. 
In  general,  sensations  are  warnings  that  emphasize  the 
presence  of  qualities  and  conditions,  while  percepts  are 
warnings  of  the  presence  of  things  themselves. 

The  Functions  of  Images  and  Memory. — The  func- 
tion of  images  is  to  permit  us  to  prepare  for  future  re- 
actions to  things  not  at  the  time  present.  They  allow  us, 
so  to  speak,  to  anticipate  the  future,  to  prepare  for  war 
in  time  of  peace.  By  thinking  of  the  frosty  Caucasus  we 
can  take  measures  in  thought  or  action  against  the  time 
w^hen  we  shall  actually  confront  it.  It  is  by  virtue  of 
images  that  man  thinks  before  and  after  and  so  modifies 
his  behavior  apart  from  the  stress  of  immediate  contact 
with  things.  He  can  thus  spend  days  in  preparation  for 
a  situation  w^hich  in  actual  presence  would  allow  of  hardly 
a  minute's  thought.  Instead  of  having  to  wait  for  the 
convenience  of  nature,  he  can  suit  nature  to  his  thought. 

The  function  of  the  permanence  of  mental  changes  in 
conscious  memory  and  in  unconscious  habits  of  thought 
and  action  is,  of  course,  to  permit  experiences  to  extend 
their  influence  into  the  future.  Man  and  other  animals 
as  well  would  quickly  succumb  to  the  environment  if  the 
lessons  it  taught  them  in  one  hour  were  all  lost  during  the 
next.  It  would  be  useless  and  indeed  meaningless  to 
learn  if  we  learned  only  immediately  to  forget. 

The  Function  of  Feelings  of  Relationships. — To  ex- 
plain in  detail  the  service  rendered  by  feelings  of  relation- 
ships would  require  too  intricate  an  analysis  of  their 
influence  on  human  conduct.  In  general  they  enable  man 
to  adapt  his  reactions  to  the  world  as  a  related  whole. 
Since  things  are  alike  and  different,  are  causes  and  effects, 


Ii6  Descriptive  Psychology 

are  before  and  after,  are  above  and  below,  awareness  of 
these  relations  guides  our  reactions  to  the  things.  And 
since  the  relations  often  equal  or  outweigh  the  things  in 
practical  importance,  awareness  of  relations  will  often  be 
of  as  great  service  as  awareness  of  things. 

The  Function  of  Feelings  of  Meaning. — The  func- 
tion of  an  individual  notion  is  to  provide  a  constant  men- 
tal sign  for  one  particular  thing,  regardless  of  the 
variations  in  its  appearances  in  percepts  and  images. 
Thus  we  can  mean  or  think  'John  Smith'  no  matter 
whether  his  face  or  voice  or  the  sound  of  his  name  is 
perceived  or  imaged.  The  provision  of  a  constant  mental 
sign  to  stand  for  'John  Smith'  anywhere  and  always 
implies  the  provision  for  similar  reaction  to  'Jo^^  Smith' 
anywhere  and  always.  The  individual  notion  then  enables 
anyone  to  economize  by  having  one  reaction  to  one  thing 
instead   of   many    reactions    to   its   varied   appearances. 

The  function  of  a  general  notion  or  concept  is  to  pro- 
vide a  constant  mental  sign  for  any  one  of  the  members  of 
a  group.  As  before,  this  implies  the  power  to  react 
similarly  to  any  member  of  the  group  by  reacting  to  the 
sign  that  stands  for  any  one  of  them.  Since  seven  means 
any  seven  and  five  means  any  five,  any  seven  and  any  five 
make  twelve.  Since  acid  means  any  acid  and  base  means 
any  base  we  can  once  for  all  form  habits  of  knowledge 
and  action  respecting  the  union  of  any  acid  and  any  base. 
General  notions  are  the  short-hand  of  thought. 

The  function  of  an  abstract  notion  or  abstraction  is  to 
provide  a  mental  sign  for  and  hence  means  of  reaction  to 
some  element  or  aspect  or  quality  or  relationship  regard- 
less of  the  particular  thing  or  things  in  which  it  appears. 
Thus  we  react  to  intentions  regardless  of  results ;  to 
lengths  without  either  breadth  or  thickness  ;  to  times  apart 
from  anything  happening  in  them ;  to  shapes  regardless 


Functions  of  Mental  States  iif 

of  what  they  are  shapes  of.  In  a  sense  we  recreate  the 
world  to  suit  us  by  analyzing  it  in  thought  into  elements 
more  manageable  and  by  reacting,  not  to  the  total  situa- 
tion with  which  we  are  confronted,  but  to  some  element 
in  it  which  offers  a  vital  point  of  attack. 

The  Function  of  Emotions. — Emotions  serve  to 
emphasize  certain  things  and  conditions  and  to  lead  to 
action  in  more  specific  and  intense  ways  than  do  sensa- 
tions and  percepts.  They  commonly  go  with  those  things 
and  conditions  which  nature  has  taught  us  to  emphatically 
seek  or  avoid.  The  teachings  of  nature  in  this  respect 
are  however  of  much  less  value  in  the  conditions  of  mod- 
ern civilized  life  than  they  would  be  if  man  were  still  lead- 
ing an  animal  life  in  the  woods.  Jealousy  and  rage,  for 
instance,  could  be  omitted  from  human  life  with  little  loss. 

It  is  often  stated  that  the  emotions  furnish  the  energy 
for  action,  while  the  intellectual  states  only  guide  and 
enlighten;  that  without  the  emotions  man  would  never 
act  vigorously.  This  is  false.  Men  of  vigorous  action 
seem  to  be  moved  by  strong  emotions  because  acting 
vigorously  itself  tends  to  produce  strong  emotions,  but 
really  clear  insight  and  prompt  decision  do  as  much  to 
favor  action  as  do  soul-stirring  fervor  and  intense  pas- 
sion. It  would  be  truer  to  say  that  strong  emotions 
represent  a  partial  waste  of  the  energy  that  should  be 
used  in  action.  The  waste  is  only  partial ;  for  the  emotion 
does,  as  was  said  in  the  previous  paragraph,  emphasize 
the  situation  and  so  intensifies  action  somewhat. 

The  Functions  of  Connecting,  Selecting  and  Ana- 
lyzing Agencies. — It  is  perhaps  needless  to  call  atten- 
tion to  the  function  of  habits,  the  associations  of  ideas, 
and  judgments.  They  are  all  names  for  connections; 
the  first  a  general  name,  the  second  a  name  for  con- 
nections amongst  ideas  only  and  the  third  for  connections 


ii8  Descriptive  Psychology 

commonly  between  concepts,  abstractions  and  individual 
notions,  connections  that  also  usually  involve  a  felt  rela- 
tionship. The  function  of  connections  as  a  class  was 
made  clear  in  the  first  few  paragraphs  of  this  chapter. 
Instincts,  though  also  connections  having  in  general  the 
function  of  all  connections,  have  as  their  special  function 
that  of  providing  for  the  essentials  of  preservation  and  of 
serving  as  the  material  out  of  which  the  edifice  of  habits 
is  reared. 

Analysis,  in  the  sense  of  noting  parts,  does  the  actual 
work  of  breaking  the  direct  concrete  experiences  of  things 
up  into  elements,  and  so  of  producing  the  abstractions 
the  function  of  which  we  found  to  be  so  important.  In 
fact  the  power  to  'see  into  things,'  to  'pick  out  the  essen- 
tial factor  in  a  situation,'  is  as  important  practically  as  the 
power  to  *put  two  and  two  together;'  so  that  analysis  is 
as  useful  as  association. 

The  function  of  attention,  is,  first,  to  economize  time 
and  effort.  The  selective  activity  for  which  attention 
stands  concentrates  mental  life  upon  the  things,  qualities, 
and  conditions  of  moment  to  us  and  allows  the  rest  of 
the  universe  to  slip  by  without  taking  our  time.  It 
allows  us  to  proportion  the  prominence  any  thing  shall 
have  in  the  mind  to  the  importance  it  possesses  for  our 
welfare.  In  the  second  place,  attention  is  one  main  step 
toward  analysis. 

Only  this  brief  statement  of  the  functions  of  the 
means  of  connection,  selection  and  analysis  is  given  here, 
because  the  same  topic  will  be  dealt  with  more  fully  in 
Part  III. 

Exercises 

The  function  or  part  played  by  different  features  of  mental 
life  can  be  concretely  imagined  by  thinking  what  would  be  lost 
from  life  by  the  loss  of  any  one  of  them. 


Functions  of  Mental  States  119 

Thus  suppose  a  man  to  be: — 

1.  Without  any  concepts  or  abstractions. 

2.  Without  any  permanence  to  his  ideas. 

3.  Without  any  images. 

4.  Without  any  established  connections   amongst  his  ideas. 

5.  Without  any  established  connections  between  ideas  and 
acts. 

6.  Without  any  restriction  of  thought  to  special  features  of 
the  situations  encountered. 

7.  Without  any  sensations. 

8.  What  are  some  of  the  difficulties  that  would  be  caused  if 
the  feelings  of  things  in  memory  or  anticipation  were  indistin- 
guishable from  the  feelings  of  things  present  to  perception? 


PART  II 

THE  PHYSIOLOGICAL  BASIS  OF 
MENTAL  LIFE 

CHAPTER  IX 

The  Constitution  of  the  Nervous  System 

§  23.       Gross  Structure 

Human  thought  and  conduct  are  intimately  connected 
with  the  working  of  the  nervous  system,  by  which  is 
meant  the  brain  and  spinal  cord,  the  nerves  from  these  to 
the  organs  of  sense  and  to  the  muscles,  the  nervous  tissue 
in  the  organs  of  sense,  and  the  sympathetic  system  and 
local  ganglia.  Injuries  to  or  diseases  of  the  nervous  sys- 
tem cause  marked  changes  in  thinking  and  action.  Brain 
tumors  may  result  in  disordered  thinking ;  diseases  of  cer- 
tain nerves  cause  inability  to  move  the  corresponding 
muscles ;  disease  of  the  optic  nerve  causes  blindness. 
Drugs  which  aflfect  the  nervous  system,  such  as  chloro- 
form, alcohol  and  hashish,  produce  mental  symptoms. 
The  development  of  the  nervous  system  in  child  life 
parallels  the  growth  of  bodily  control,  intellect  and  char- 
acter. From  a  vast  amount  of  such  evidence  as  this  it  is 
abundantly  shown  that  the  thoughts  and  feelings  and 
behavior  of  men  are  in  direct  relations  with  the  activities 
of  the  nervous  system. 

The  appearance  to  the  naked  eye  of  the  human  nerv- 
ous system,  as  in  Figs.  2,  3  and  4,  offers  little  instruction 

120 


The  Constitution  of  the  Xervoiis  System         I2X 

to  the  student  of  mental  life.  The  surgeon  or  physician 
must  know  its  shape,  the  names  of  its  parts,  and  the  out- 
lining walls  of  its  ventricles,  because  he  has  to  operate 
upon  it.  Its  more  detailed  inner  structure,  as  shown  by 
the  microscope  and  by  modern  histological  methods,  is  of 
chief  concern  to  the  student  of  psychology.  It  is  not  the 
gross  appearance  but  the  composition  of  the  nervous  sys- 
tem that  throws  light  upon  human  learning  and  conduct. 
The  reader  should,  however,  in  order  to  understand 
later  descriptions,  recall  from  his  studies  of  physiology^ 
that  the  nervous  system  as  a  whole  is  divided  into  (i) 
tlie  central  nervous  system,  (2)  the  nerves  passing  from 
it  to  different  parts  of  the  body,  (3)  the  sympathetic 
system  and  its  isolated  ganglia  in  different  parts  of  the 
body  and  (4)  the  nervous  apparatus  of  the  end-organs 
(eyes,  ears,  etc.).  The  central  nervous  system  is  further 
divided  into  the  brain  and  spinal  cord.  The  brain  is 
further  divided  into  the  cerebrum,  cerebellum,  medulla 
oblongata  and  other  parts.  The  cortex  of  the  cerebrum 
is  the  gray  matter  composing  its  outside  layer. 

In  the  descriptions  of  the  figures,  the  name  refers  to  the 
source  from  which  the  figure  was  copied.  Barker  refers  to  L. 
F.  Barker's  'TJic  Nervous  System  and  Its  Constituent  Xeurones;' 
Edinger  to  L.  Edinger's,  'Neri'dse  Centraloygane,'  5  Auflage; 
Kolliker  to  A  Kolliker's,  'HandbucJi  der  Gezi'ebelehre  des  Men- 
schen'  Zweiter  Band,  6  Auflage ;  Lenhossek  to  ^I.  v.  Lenhossek's, 
'Der  Feinere  Bau  des  Nervensystems'  2  Auflage ;  Starr  refers  to 
the  reproductions  of  M.  Allen  Starr's  series  of  photographs  of  the 
brain's  finer  structure  in  his  'Atlas  of  Nerve  Cells':  Van 
Gehuchten  refers  to  A.  Van  Gehuchten's  'Anatomie  du  Systeme 
Nerveux  de  V Homme.'  Roman  numerals  refer  to  the  volume, 
the  first  arabic  numeral  to  the  page,  and  the  second  arable  num- 
eral to  the  number  of  the  figure  in  the  original. 

^  The  student  who  has  never  studied  human  anatomy  and  physi- 
ology should  read  the  chapters  on  the  nervous  system  in  some  stan- 
dard text  book  of  human  physiology. 


122 


Physiological  PsycJioIo<ry 


A.  B. 

Fig.  2.  A.  The  brain  and  spinal  cord,  viewed  from  the  side,  in  their 
relation  to  the  general  structure  of  the  body.  One-seventh  natural 
si?c.  B.  The  brain  and  spinal  cord,  viewed  from  the  front.  Three- 
seventeenths   natural    length       After    \'an   Gehuchten,    I,    2,    i    and  2. 


The  Cojistitution  of  the  Xervous  System 


123 


Fig.  3.  A  (above).  The  cerebrum,  viewed  from  the  top.  Two-fitths 
natural   length.     After  Van   Gehuchten,   I,  80,   60. 

Fig.  3.  B  (below).  The  cerebrum,  viewed  from  the  left  side.  Two-fifths 
natural   length.     After  Van   Gehuchten,   I,   87,  6g. 


124 


Physiological  Psychology 


Fig  4.  A  section  through  the  cerebrum,  showing  the  appearance  to  the 
naked  eye  of  the  white  and  gray  matter  and  the  relation  of  the  cortex 
to  the  inner  substance  of  the  cerebrum.     After  Edinger,  254,    173. 


The  Constitution  of  the  Xervoiis  System 


i-'5 


§  24.     Finer  Structure 

The  Nervous  System  Equals  the  Sum  of  its  Neu- 
rones.— The  nervous  system  proper  (exclusive,  that  is, 
of  the  blood  vessels  and  lymph  which  permeate  it  and  the 
tissues  which  act  as  connective  and  supporting  structures) 
is  composed  of  units  of  structure  called  neurones  or  nerve 
cells.  For  instance,  the  optic  nerve  is  essentially  a  bundle 
of  very  fine  thread-like  bodies  of  protoplasm  placed  side 


^K 

^ 

/^ 

\ 

A 

Vj 

\ 

^. 

-^ 

Fig.  5.     Rough  sketches  of  six  neurones.     Thickness  is  overestimated   rela- 
tively   to   length. 


126  Physiological  Psychology 

by  side  like  the  wires  running  from  pole  to  pole  along  a 
telegraph  line.  Each  of  these  neurones  or  nerve  cells 
of  the  optic  nerve  has  one  end  in  the  retina  of  the  eye  and 
the  other  in  the  brain  (in  the  parts  called  the  geniculate 
bodies).  Again,  if  we  could  see  exactly  the  structure  of 
the  brain  itself,  we  should  find  it  to  consist  of  millions  of 
similar  neurones  each  resembling  a  bit  of  string  frayed 
out  at  both  ends  and  here  and  there  along  its  course.  So 
also  the  nerves  going  out  to  the  muscles  are  simply  bun- 
dles of  such  neurones,  each  of  which  by  itself  is  a  thread- 
like connection  between  the  cells  of  the  spinal  cord  or 
brain  and  some  muscle.  The  nervous  system  is  simply 
the  sum  total  of  all  these  neurones,  which  form  an  almost 
infinitely  complex  system  of  connections  between  the 
sense  organs  and  the  muscles. 

Fig.  5  gives  a  general  idea  of  the  essential  features 
of  a  neurone,  or  nerve  cell,  by  giving  simplified  drawings 
of  several  types  of  neurones.^  Figs.  6-16  may  help  to 
make  real  the  idea  that  the  brain  and  other  components  of 
the  nervous  system  are  essentially  a  vast  assemblage  of 
these  string-like  neurones.  Figs.  6- 11  are  reproductions 
of  drawings  made  with  all  possible  fidelity  to  the  actual 
facts;  Figs.  12-16  reproduce  actual  photographs  of  very 
thin  sections  from  the  central  nervous  system,  so  stained 
as  to  show  its  composition.  In  examining  them  one  must 
bear  in  mind  that  such  sections  will  rarely  if  ever  show 
the  whole  of  any  one  neurone,  but  only  cross  views  of 
parts  of  some,  lengthwise  views  of  parts  of  others,  here  a 
main  string,  there  a  frayed-out  end.     It  is  also  the  case 

^  The  student  will  of  course  bear  in  mind  that  the  fraying  out  is 
not  simply  in  one  plane,  that  the  neurone  is  not  flat.  Moreover,  in 
the  drawings  the  thickness  of  the  string  and  its  branches  is  over- 
estimated relatively  to  their  length.  To  get  a  true  idea  of  these  rel- 
ative proportions  in  the  longest  neurones  one  would  need  to  have  a 
page  many  yards  long  or  on  a  page  of  this  size  to  represent  the  main 
string  of  the  neurone  as  less  than  a  thousandth  of  an  inch  thick. 


The  Constitution  of  the  Nervous  System  127 

that  the  method  of  staining  used  is  such  that  not  all  of  the 
neurones  are  stained.  If  they  were,  the  whole  picture 
would  be  a  dense-black  mass,  so  closely  are  the  string- 
like nerve  units  packed  together.  The  top  of  Fig.  15 
gives  some  idea  of  this  closeness  of  interweaving. 

If  the  reader  will  think  of  a  slice  through  the  brain, 
such  as  appears  to  the  naked  eye  as  in  Fig.  17  or  Fig.  4, 
as  being  really  of  the  appearance  which  a  combination  of 
hundreds  of  such  drawings  and  photographs  as  Figs.  6-16 
would  make,  he  will  have  a  true  though  crude  conception 
of  the  general  characteristics  of  the  brain's  structure.  It 
is  absolutely  essential  that  the  picture  of  it  as  a  custard- 
like mass  of  gray  and  white  stufif  be  replaced  in  the 
reader's  mind  by  a  picture  of  it  as  an  aggregation  of 
millions  of  thread-like  neurones,  each  a  perfectly  definite 
unit  by  itself. 

The  drawings,  I  repeat,  are  in  no  sense  unreal  or 
simply  general  diagrams,  but  are  actual  reproductions  of 
the  things  seen  under  the  microscope.  The  photographs 
are  of  course  absolute  copies  of  actual  cells  as  found  in 
sections  cut  from  the  brain  and  stained.  It  is  unfor- 
tunate that  a  picture  of  an  entire  neurone  cannot  be  gotten 
by  the  camera,  and  that  one  sees  therefore  only  a  scrap 
of  one  neurone  here  and  a  scrap  of  another  there.  Fig- 
ures drawn  as  well  as  photographs  taken  give  a  false  idea 
of  the  length  of  the  neurone.  The  longer  ones  do  not 
appear  for  the  very  good  reason  that  at  the  magnification 
of  say  190  diameters,  a  drawing  of  one  of  the  longer 
neurones  would  have  to  be  a  tenth  of  a  mile  long. 


128 


Physiological  Psychologx 


Fig.  6.  A  sketch  showing  elements  of  the  structure  of  the  brain  cortex  in 
mammals.  These  are  drawn  from  actual  specimens.  Greatly  magnified. 
After    Edinger,    J2i,    152. 


The  Constit^ition  of  the  N'erz'otts  System  129 


Fig.  7.     A    section    through    the    brain    cortex.     Greatly    magnified.     After 
Kolliker,  652,    722. 

9-a 


130 


Physiological  Psychology 


Fig 


Fig.  9. 


Fig.  8.  A  section  through  the  brain  cortex  (a)  (at  the  left)  so  stained  as 
to  show  the  thickened  portions  of  the  neurones  and  short  pieces  of  their 
string-like  processes,  and  (b)  (at  the  right)  so  stained  as  to  show 
only  parts  of  the  string-like  processes.  Imagine  the  left  and  right 
halves  to  fill  the  same  space  and  the  result  will  fairly  represent  the 
real    condition.      Much    magnified.     After   Edinger,    220,    151. 

Fig.  9.  A  section  of  the  part  of  the  brain  in  a  very  early  stage  of  its 
development.      Much    magnified.     After    Kolliker,    802,    814. 


Fig.  10  (above)  and  Fig.  11  (below).  Sections  through  the  medulla  ob- 
longata or  myelencephalon  (the  enlargement  of  the  spinal  cord  where  it 
joins  the  brain).  These  sections  are  from  the  brain  of  a  young 
mouse,  but  the  idea  they  give  of  the  general  structure  of  the  brain  is 
perfectly  applicable  to  the  human  brain.  After  Van  Gehuchten,  II, 
386,  597  and  II,  392,  603.  Both  figures  are  due  originally  to  Ramon  y 
Cajal. 


Figs,    io  and    ii. 


132 


PJiysiological  PsycJwhgy 


Fig.   17.     A  section   through   the   cerebrum,   as   it  appears   to  the   naked   eye. 
Nearly   actual    size.      After    Edinger,   243,    165. 


The  Structure  of  Neurones. — Different  names  are 
given  to  the  different  parts  of  a  neurone  or  nerve  cell. 
The  thickened  part  containing  the  nucleus  is  called  the 
cell-body.  The  process  that  diminishes  in  size  slowly  in 
its  course  and  commonly  goes  a  considerable  distance 
from  the  cell-body  and  gives  off  branches  rather  infre- 
quently until  it  frays  out  at  its  end,  is  called  the  axis- 
cylinder  process  or  neuraxon  or  axone.  The  one  or  more 
processes  that  diminish  rapidly  in   size,  that  commonly 


Fig.  12.  A  photograph  of  a  section  of  the  spinal  cord  in  an  early  stage 
of  the  development  of  the  nervous  system.  After  Starr,  20,  Plate  2. 
y^z-;    Diameters. 


Fig.  13.  A  photograph  of  a  section  through  the  cortex  of  the  cerebrum, 
showing  segments  of  very  many  neurones.  After  Starr,  68,  Plate  4X. 
X150    Diameters, 


r\ 


\      \ 


i 


Fig.  14,  A  photograph  of  a  section  through  the  cortex  of  the  cerebrum  in 
an  early  stage  of  development  of  the  nervous  system,  showing  segments 
of  a  number  of  neurones,  including  the  thickened  part. — the  so-called 
cell-body  of   the   neurone.     After   Starr,  Plate    ^2       X150   Diameters. 


mMm 


Fig.  15.  A  photograph  of  a  sccuuii  thruuyn  a  cunvulutiuii  ul  the  cei\;- 
brum  in  an  early  stage  of  development  of  the  nervous  system.  The 
black  mat  at  the  top  of  the  photograph  represents  a  dense  aggregation 
of  the  frayed-out  ends  of  many  neurones;  in  the  rest  of  the  photograph 
are  seen  clearly  segments  of  many  separate  neurones,  with  the  thickened 
parts  of  about  thirty  in  a  nearly  horizontal  line.  After  Starr,  62,  Plate 
33.      X20    Diameters. 


V 


^ 


l-iG.  16.  A  photograph  of  a  section  through  the  cortex  of  the  cerebrum, 
showing  short  segments  of  a  number  of  neurones,  including  in  many 
cas.'s  the  thickened  part. — the  so-called  cell-body  of  the  neurone^  After 
Starr,     67.     Plate     40.      X123     Diameters. 


The  Constitution  of  the  Xervous  System  133 


go  only  a  slight  distance  from  the  cell-body  and  branch 
again  and  again  like  a  tree  are  called  the  dendritic  pro- 
cesses or  dendrites}     The  fine  branches  given  off  from 


Fig.  18.  A  neurone  from  the  cerebral  cortex.  The  axis-cylinder  process, 
dendrites  and  collaterals  are  marked  A,  D  and  C  respectively.  The 
neuraxon  is  shown  in  the  drawing  only  for  a  short  distance.  If  its 
entire  length  were  pictured  it  would  run  for  yards  below  the  bottom  of 
the   page.     \'ery  greatly  magnified.     After  Van  Gehuchten,   I,  201,   145. 

the  neuraxon  are  called  collaterals.     The  branching  out 
at  the  end  of  a  process  is  often  called  (by  Latin  words 

^  An  absolutely  comprehensive  and  exact  distinction  between 
neuraxon  and  dendrite  cannot  be  made  that  will  agree  with  the  dif- 
ferent usages. 


T34  Physiological  Psychology 

meaning-  the  same  thing)  the  terminal  arborization.  (See 
Fig.  1 8.)  These  different  parts  of  the  neurone  are 
clearly  shown  in  Figs.  19-23  which  represent  neurones  or 
parts  of  neurones.  They  may  also  be  observed  in  the 
actual  photographs  of  neurones  reproduced  in  Figs.  26-29. 

The  part  of  a  neurone  called  the  axis-cylinder  process 
or  neuraxon  or  axone  is  throughout  a  part  of  its  course 
covered  with  a  surrounding  substance  or  sheath,  called 
the  medullary  sheath.  Wlien  a  part  of  a  neurone  is  called 
a  fibre,  the  part  of  it  thus  ensheathed  is  called  a  medullated 
fibre.  Xeuraxons  in  that  part  of  their  course  outside  the 
central  nervous  system  have  a  second  sheath  outside  the 
medullary  sheath,  called  the  sheath  of  Schwann.  Figs.  24 
and  25  (p.  137),  show  the  arrangement  of  these  sheaths. 

It  is  clear  from  the  description  so  far  given  and  from 
the  figures  that  the  word  cell  which  is  used  for  the  unit 
of  structure  in  any  living  thing  does  not  describe  the  unit 
of  structure  of  the  nervous  system  at  all  well.  The  great 
majority  of  structural  units  are  at  least  somewhat  like  a 
cell  or  box  or  bag  or  lump  in  shape,  but  the  'cells'  of  the 
nervous  system  are  especially  unlike  all  other  cells  'of  the 
body  and  utterly  unlike  the  cell  of  common  language. 
These  may  be  thousands  of  times  as  long  as  they  are  wnde 
or  thick,  are  extremely  irregular  in  their  shape,  and  would 
be  far  better  described  by  the  term,  nerve-string  or  fibre 
or  tangle.  The  unfitness  of  the  term  is  one  reason  why 
the  nerve  cell  is  commonly  described  as  a  cell-body  plus 
cell-processes.  It  has  also  been  the  cause  of  a  most  mis- 
leading habit :  namely,  the  use  of  the  word  cell  for  the 
cell-body  alone  and  the  word  fibre  or  process  for  the 
string-like  parts  of  the  cell.  The  student  should  remem- 
ber always  that  the  process  or  fibre  is  always  a  part  of  a 
neurone  or  cell,  and  as  important  a  part  as  the  cell-body. 
It  would  be  a  sad  mistake  to  think  of  the  thickened  part 


The  Constitution  of  the  Xervotis  System         135 


Fig.   19. 


Fig.  21. 


Fig.   19.     A   neurone   from   the   optic  lobe.     Very   greatly   magnified.     After 

Kolliker,    419,    578. 

Fig.  zo..      ^    segment  of  a   neurone    from   the    optic   lobe.      Only    the    frayed 

ind  or  terminal  arborization  is  shown.      Very  greatly  magnified.     After 

Xolliker,    583,   693. 

H'i:G.  21.     A  segment  of  a  neurone  from  the  spinal  cord,  showing  a  collateral. 

Very  greatly  magnified.     After  v.   Lenhossek,  255,  36. 


136 


Physiological  Psychology 


Fig.   22.     Segments  of    three   neurones    from   the    optic    nerve's   termination, 
showing  their   frayed  ends  or  terminal  arborization.      Very  greatly  mag- 
nific  1.       After    Kolliker,    416,    575. 


Fig.   23.      Segments    of    neurones    from    the    spinal    cord,    showing   also   col- 
laterals   (d).     \'ery  greatly  magnified.     After   v.   Lenhossek,   287,   45. 


Fig.  26.  A  photograph  of  a  cell-body  of  a  motor  neurone  in  the  spinal 
cord  with  numerous  dendritic  processes  and  the  beginning  of  the  neu- 
raxon.  The  latter  passes  from  the  cell-body  at  the  left  hand  side 
and  runs  almost  horizontally  to  the  edge  of  the  figure.  After  Starr,  21, 
Plate    3.      X120    Diameters. 

Fig.  2-].  A  photograph  of  segments  of  several  neurones  from  a  spinal 
ganglion  of  an  embryo  chick.  The  cell-body  and  the  extensions  of  the 
neurone  from  it  are  very  clear  in  five  of  the  neurones.  After  Starr,  21, 
Plate    II.      X 120    Diameters. 


'/ 


'        \ 

- 

1 

]  -/ 

^   \ 

• 

1 

/' 

'      S'        .> 

/ 

•* 

-i 

> 

fi 

i 
p. 

1 

t\ 

\ 

i       ' 

# 

•.'^* 

.     i 

'  -^ 

, 

■'^; 

( 

« 

i 

Fig.   28. 


Fig.   29. 


Fig.  28.  A  photograph  showing  at  the  right  a  segment  of  a  neurone  includ- 
ing the  cell-body,  the  neuraxon  running  downward  and  a  long  den- 
dritic process  running  upward  to  form,  by  branching,  a  part  of  the 
black  mat  at  tne  top  of  the  figure.  After  Starr,  Plate  44.  X120  Di- 
ameters. 

Fig.  29.  A  photograph  cf  a  neurone  of  the  third  layer  of  the  cerebral 
corte.x.  showing  the  cell-body,  dendritic  processes  and  the  neuraxon; 
the  latter  runs  upward,  and  divides  into  two  branches  which  later  divide 
again.      After   Starr,   Plate  46.      X330   Diam.eters. 


Tlic  Constitution  of  the  Xcrvous  System 


137 


where  the  nucleus  lies  as  the  essential,  and  of  the  proc- 
esses or  thinner  parts  as  minor  features. 

The  thickened  part  is  not  the  main  thing  even  in  bulk. 
The  process  or  fibre  part  is  almost  always  larger,  in  some 
cases  nearly  if  not  quite  two   hundred  times  as   large. 


1 2. 3. 


Fig.  24.     Schematic     sketch    of    a    longitudinal     section    ol     a    medullated 

neurone. 

1  is   the    neurone    itself    (that    is,    a    segment   of    the    neuraxon). 

2  is    the    medullary    sheath. 

3  is    the    sheath    of    Schwann. 

Fig.  25.  Drawings  of  (A)  a  section  of  a  segment  of  a  medullated  neuraxon, 
and  of  (B,  C,  and  D)  the  appearance  of  a  medullated  neuraxon,  show- 
ing the  structure  and  arrangement  of  the  medullary  sheath.  After 
KoUiker,   pages    10,    13    and    14,    Figs.    331,    334  and   335. 


And  in  the  service  performed  by  a  neurone,  although  the* 
whole  cell  is  needed,  the  frayed-out  ends  and  the  fibres 
play  the  leading  role. 


•38 


Physiological  Psychology 


Varieties  of  Neurones. — The  cells  that  compose  the 
nervous  system  vary  tremendously  in  size  and  shape. 
They  range  from  less  than  a  twentieth  of  an  inch  to  three 
feet  or  more  in  length.     Some  are  very  simple  threads 


Fig.  30.     A  pyramidal  neurone,  showing  only  the  beginning  of  the  neuraxon. 

Greatly   magnified.     After   Kolliker,    46,   367. 

Fig    31.     Segments  of   neurones   with   long   neuraxons.     Greatly    magnified. 

After    \'an    Gehuchten,    II,    497,   676. 


with  a  few  f rayings  and  side  branches ;  others  are  at  their 
two  ends  as  complicated  as  the  branches  and  roots  of  a 
tree.  Some  end  in  simple  fibrils,  others  in  discs  or  plates. 
These  special  forms  are  probably  each  adapted  to  the  work 
the  neurone  has  to  do.     With  all  these  differences  there 


The  Constitution  of  the  Nervous  System         139 

remains  the  general  likeness  to  a  thread-like  body  frayed 
out  at  the  ends,  and  along  its  course.  Figs.  30-40,  with 
those  already  given,  show  some  of  the  chief  types  of 
neurone  structure.  They  will  serve  also  to  emphasize 
the  fact  that  the  nervous  system  is  made  up  of  definite 
units. 


Fig.  32.  A  Purkinje  cell,  a  type  of  neurone  found  in  the  cerebellum, 
characterized  by  very  elaborate  branching  of  the  dendritic  processes. 
Only  a  part  of  the  neuraxon  is  shown.  Greatly  magnified.  After 
Kolliker,   44,   363. 


The  Connections  Between  Neurones. — X"o  neurone 
is  in  complete' isolation.  Every  neurone  stands  in  a  spe- 
cial relation  to  one  or  more  other  neurones ;  namely,  that 
some  part  of  it  is  in  close  proximity  or  contact  with  some 
part  of  the  other  neurone  or  neurones.  Probably  it  is 
between  (i)  the  terminal  arborization  of  the  neuraxon 
or  of  one  of  its  collaterals  of  one  neurone  and  (2)  the 
dendritic  process  or  cell-body  of  the  other  that  this  close 
proximitv  obtains.     I   shall  use  the  word   connection  to 


I40 


PJiysiological  Psychology 


Fig.  33.     A  basket  cell,    a  type  of  neurone   found  in   the  cerebellum.     The 
neuraxon   gives    off   a   number   of   branches,    each    ending   in    a    basket- 
shaped    arborization.      Greatly    magnified.     After    KoUiker,    352,    535. 
Fig.   34.     A    commissural    cell,    a   type    of    neurone    with    a    short    neuraxon. 

Greatly   magnified.      After  v.    Lenhossek,   3^3,   50. 
Fig.   35.     A   Golgi  cell,  a  type   of   neurone    with   a    short   and   much   branch- 
ing neuraxon.      Greatly  magnified.      After  v.    Lenhossek,   371,   57. 
Fig     36.     A  Cajal  cell,  a  type  of  neurone  with  several   neuraxons.     Greatly 
magnified.     After    v.     Lenhossek,     53,     8. 


^  -Am. 


i 


M 


Fig.  38.     A    photograph    of    a    Purkinje    cell.     After    Starr.    35.    Plate    15- 

X125    Diameters. 
Fig.  39.     A  photograph  of  a  Cajal  cell.     After    Starr,   65,   Plate   37-      X125 

Diameters. 

Fig.  40.     A  photograph  of  a  large  polygonal   neurone  from  the  spinal  cord. 

After    Starr,   26,   Plate   8.      X125    Diameters. 


The  Constitution  of  the  Nervous  System 


141 


denote  this  relationship  of  close  proximity  or  contact, 
though  it  should  be  understood  that  there  ma\-  be.  and 
commonly  is,  no  connection  in  the  sense  of  one  neurone 
growing  into  the  other,  fusing  with  it,  making  a  struc- 
tural connection.     Every  neurone,  then,  is  in  connection^ 


Fig.  :i7.     Association    cells    (a,    b    and    c). 
insrer.    28.    o 


Greatlv    masmified.     After    Ed- 


with  some  other  or  others.  Fig.  41  shows  the  general 
plan  of  such  connections.  Figs.  42  and  43  are  drawings 
of  the  actual  connections  in  two  cases  where  they  can  be 
clearly  inferred  from  what  the  microscope  reveals. 

^  The  word  synapsis,  meaning  a  clasping  together,  has  been  sug- 
gested as  a  useful  descriptive  term  for  the  peculiar  connections  that 
exist  between  neurone  and  neurone. 


142 


Physiological  Psychology 


^ 


r^ 


^ 

■^ 
^ 


i 


Fig-  41.     A   schematic  sketch   showing  methods  of  connection  between  neu- 
rones. 


The  Constitution  of  the  Xerz'ous  System 


143 


Fig.  42. 


Fig.  42.  A  sketch  showing  the  connection  between  the  terminal  arboriza- 
tions between  the  axis-cylinder  processes  of  the  neurones  of  the  optic 
nerve  and  the  dendritic  processes  of  neurones  in  the  optic  lobes,  f 
obt.  =:the  axis-cylinder  processes  of  the  neurones  of  the  optic  nerve; 
ram.  t.  =  their  terminal  arborizations  in  contact  with  the  dendritic  pro- 
cesses of  the  neurones  below.     After  Van  Gehuchten,    I,    245,   159. 

Fig.  43.  A  sketch  showing  the  connection  between  the  terminal  arboriza- 
tions of  the  bipolar  neurones  of  the  sense  organ  of  smell  and  the 
dendritic  processes  of  the  so-called  mitral  cells.  The  two  terminal 
arborizations  intertwine  in  a  globular  mass  called  the  glomerulus  (gl). 
After    Van    Gehuchten,    II,    369,    581. 


CHAPTER  X 

The  Action  of  the  Nervous  System 

§  25.     The  Functions  of  the  Neurones 

The  neurone  or  nerve  cell,  besides  possessuig  the 
powers  of  absorption,  growth,  etc.,  common  to  all  the 
cells  of  the  body,  has  three  special  duties  or  functions : — 

( 1 )  It  is  especially  sensitive  to  or  influenced  by  what 
happens  to  it  or  to  parts  of  it. 

(2)  It  conducts  or  transmits;  i.e.,  it  so  acts  that  a 
stimulation  or  disturbance  or  activity  at  one  end  of  it 
results  in  a  stimulation  or  disturbance  or  activity  at  the 
other. 

(3)  It  is  especially  modifiable;  i.e.,  its  action  at  any 
time  depends  upon  its  previous  actions.  In  the  human 
nervous  system  this  third  function  is  probably  restricted 
in  the  main  to  the  cells  in  certain  parts  of  the  central 
nervous  system. 

Sensitivity. — The  first  function,  sensitivity  or  im- 
pressibility, needs  no  explanation.  All  matter  is  influenced 
by  what  happens  to  it ;  all  living  matter  is  especially  so ; 
and  the  nerve  cells  are  the  parts  of  living  animals  which 
carry  this  trait  to  the  extreme.  If  we  compare  a  man's 
body  to  a  building,  calling  the  steel  frame-work  his  skele- 
ton and  the  furnaces  and  power-station  his  digestive 
organs  and  lungs,  the  nervous  system  would  include  with 
other  things  the  thermometers,  heat  regulators,  electric 
buttons,  door  bells,  valve  openers, — the  parts  of  the  build- 

144 


The  Action  of  the  Xerz'oiis  System  145 

ing  in  short  which  are  specially  designed  to  respond  to 
influences  of  the  environment. 

Conductivity. — Jnst  how  the  nerve  cell  conducts  or 
transmits  is  not  known.  But  the  fact  itself  is  sure.  As 
a  copper  wire  at  one  end  of  which  an  electric  current  is 
excited  is  so  influenced  that  the  current  appears  at  the 
other  end ;  as  the  air  so  acts  that  a  vibration  in  any  part 
spreads  to  other  parts, — so  the  neurone  when  stimulated 
at  one  end  acts  so  as  to  produce  a  corresponding  activity 
at  the  other  end ;  and  so  as  to  produce,  under  certain  con- 
ditions, activity  in  the  neurones  in  connection  or  synapsis 
with  it. 

The  activity  or  disturbance  which  is  transmitted  is 
called  the  nervous  impulse.  When  such  an  impulse  is 
started  in  a  nerve  cell  we  say  that  the  nerve  cell  is  stim- 
ulated and  call  the  agency  by  which  the  impulse  is  begot- 
ten the  stimulus.  Also  when  the  nerve  cell  transmits  the 
impulse  to  some  body  cells  or  other  nerve  cells  we  say 
that  it  stimulates  them.  Just  as  an  electric  current  might 
pass  along  one  wire,  thence  to  another  and  along  it  to  a 
third,  so  the  nervous  impulse  passes  from  neurone  to 
neurone  when  these  are  in  functional  connection. 

The  conduction  or  transmission  is  commonly  over  a 
series  of  nerve  cells.  For  instance  when  the  stnnulus  of 
pain  at  the  finger's  end  makes  us  rub  the  injured  spot,  the 
impulse  does  not  go  from  the  skin  to  the  muscles  via  a 
single  cell  (or  set  of  cells),  but  traverses  at  least  three, 
one  set  running  from  the  skin  to  the  spinal  cord,  one  from 
the  spinal  cord  to  the  muscles  and  one  or  more  sets  in  the 
spinal  cord  connecting  these.  The  transmission  is,  in 
any  given  neurone,  usually,  if  not  always,  in  the  same 
direction  ;  namely,  toward  the  extremities  of  the  neuraxon. 
A  cell  carrying  impulses  from  the  brain  to  a  muscle  does 
not,  so  to  speak,  carry  return  messages.     For  that  another 


146  Physiological  Psychology 

wire  is  used.  A  nerve  cell  may  receive  impulses  from 
several  nerve  cells.  It  may  and  commonly  does  transmit 
its  impulses  to  many  nerve  cells. 

As  might  be  expected,  the  two  functions  of  sensitivity 
and  conductivity  are  aided  by  such  an  arrangement  of  the 
nerve  cells  that  stimuli  are  received  at  important  points 
in  the  body  and  conducted  to  appropriate  muscles.  The 
constituents  of  the  nervous  system  are  not  arranged  at 
random.  They  are  not  like  the  chance  tangle  of  a  billion 
little  threads  which  would  receive  stimuli  hit  or  miss  and 
conduct  them  nowhere  in  particular,  but  are,  like  the 
wires  of  the  telephone  system  of  a  city  or  the  railroads  of 
a  country,  definitely  placed  lines  of  transmission  between 
important  points,  and  are  so  arranged  at  central  offices 
as  to  permit  a  great  number  of  useful  connections.  For 
instance,  the  neurones  receiving  the  stimuli  of  light  in  the 
retina  have  definite  connections  with  the  neurones  that 
carry  impulses  to  the  muscles  that  open  and  close  the  eyes, 
also  to  the  muscles  that  move  the  eyes  in  turning  to  and 
converging  upon  and  focussing  for  objects,  also  to  the 
muscles  that  move  the  head. 

Modifiability. — The  analogy  with  a  telephone  sys- 
tem fails  when  we  come  to  the  third  function,  characteris- 
tic of  many  of  the  nerve  cells^  of  the  human  brain,  their 
power  of  modification  by  use.  Unlike  any  system  of 
wires  or  machines,  the  human  nervous  system  possesses 
the  power,  at  least  in  many  of  its  parts,  to  be  so  altered 
by  whatever  happens  to  it  as  to  enable  the  body  on  the 
next  occasion  to  meet  the  situation  more  successfully. 
The  nervous  system  which  causes  at  a  child's  early  sight 
of  the   fire   the   reaction   of   reaching   for   it,   becomes   a 

^This  paragraph  refers  only  to  the  cells  of  the  so-called  'higher' 
parts  of  the  nervous  system.  Of  the  cells  in  the  spinal  cord  and 
peripheral  system  it  is  almost  surely  not  true.  Of  j"«*  what 
groups  of  cells  it  is  true  is  not  known. 


The  Action  of  the  Xcri'ous  System  147 

nervous  system  that  causes  in  later  trials  the  reaction  of 
avoidance.  The  connection  between  the  impression  and 
the  one  motor  discharge  has  been  weakened  and  an 
opposite  one  formed.  The  neurones  learn,  so  to  speak, 
to  form,  break  and  modify  their  inter-connections.  If  a 
telephone  system  possessed  within  itself  the  power  by 
which  the  connections  between  the  wires  to  certain 
houses  would,  with  successful  use,  become  more  and  more 
easily  made  while  other  connections  would  become  in- 
creasingly more  difficult,  the  analogy  would  be  complete. 
But  of  course  no  mere  machine  has  such  a  power  to 
modify  its  workings,  to  make  or  break  connections  in  ac- 
cordance with  the  frequency  of  their  use  and  the  desira- 
bility or  discomfort  of  the  results  to  which  they  lead. 
This  function  of  the  neurones  will  be  more  fully  described 
after  the  facts  concerning  the  arrangement  of  the 
neurones  in  a  system  have  been  presented. 

§  26.     The  Arvangejiicnt  of  the  Xeurones 

The  Three  Chief  Groups. — The  cells  of  the  nervous 
system  as  a  whole  ma\  best  be  divided  into  three  classes. 
There  are  first,  neurones  which  are  stimulated  by  heat, 
light  and  other  physical  or  chemical  forces  and  discharge 
into  other  neurones ;  second,  neurones  which  are  stimu- 
lated by  other  neurones  and  themselves  stimulate  muscles ; 
third,  neurones  which  are  stimulated  by  and  themselves 
stimulate  other  neurones.  In  other  words,  there  are  cells 
directly  sensitive  to  the  environment,  cells  directly  active 
in  causing  muscular  contraction  and  cells  acting  as  inter- 
mediaries between  the  former  and  the  latter.  The  first 
are  called  Afferent  or  Centripetal  neurones  because  they 
bring  stimuli  toward  the  brain  and  spinal  cord  (ad-fero^ 
bring  to)  ;  the  second  are  called  Efferent  or  Centrifugal 


148  Physiological  Psychology 

neurones  because  they  carry  stimuli  away  from  the  brain 
and  spinal  cord  toward  the  muscles.  The  third  are  called 
Associative  or  Connecting  neurones. 

Cells  of  class  i  are  also  called  Sensory  neurones  or 
cells ;  cells  of  class  2,  Motor  neurones  or  cells.  The  term 
motor  cell  is  also  used  to  include  cells  which,  though 
themselves  not  directly  connected  with  muscles,  lead  out 
from  the  brain  and  connect  in  the  spinal  cord  with  cells 
which  are  so  connected.  Afferent,  centripetal  and  sen- 
sory are  used  of  nerves  when  the  cells  composing  the 
nerve  bring  stimuli  from  the  different  parts  of  the  body 
to  the  brain  and  spinal  cord ;  efferent,  centrifugal  or 
motor  nerves  meaning  of  course  nerves  of  an  opposite 
f  miction. 

Sensory  Neurones. — From  almost  every  part  of  the 
body  there  originate  afferent  neurones  to  transmit  stimuli 
arising  there  to  the  brain  and  spinal  cord.  Xot  only  in 
the  eyes,  ears,  nose,  mouth  and  skin,  but  also  in  the 
muscles,  articular  surfaces,  connective  tissues,  along  the 
digestive  tract,  and  throughout  the  sensitive  areas  of  the 
body,  there  are  neurone-endings  capable  of  being  set  in 
action  by  the  proper  stimuli  at  the  point  where  they  are 
located. 

Motor  Neurones. — To  all  the  muscles, — to  the 
muscles  which  control  the  peristalsis  of  the  intestine  and 
the  contraction  of  the  blood  vessels,  as  well  as  to  those 
that  more  obviously  move  our  limbs, — run  efferent  neu- 
rones, stimuli  from  which  influence  the  amount  and  dura- 
tion of  muscular  action. 

The  nervous  system  thus  furnishes  a  most  elaborate 
mechanism  for  receiving  stimuli  at  almost  all  points  in 
the  body, — and,  in  the  case  of  light,  heat  and  smell,  of 
stimuli  from  distant  objects, — and  for  controlling  the 
action  of  the  body  in  the  most  minute  details.     If  we 


The  Action  of  flic  Xcrrous  System  149 

liken  the  body  to  an  army  and  the  neurones  to  its  signal- 
ling corps,  we  may  say  that  signals  may  be  sent  from 
every  point  in  the  army  to  headquarters  and  from  head- 
quarters to  every  company  or  battery  that  can  act. 

Associative  Neurones. — Still  more  elaborate  is  the 
mechanism  for  securing  the  proper  connections  between 
stimulus  to  and  action  of  the  body,  for  enabling  the  body 
to  react  advantageously  w^ith  the  movement  fitted  to  the 
particular  stimuli  felt,  for  causing  what  happens  to  it  to 
result  in  its  doing  what  is  necessary.  This  mechanism  is 
of  course  the  system  of  neurones  connecting  sensory  with 
motor  cells.  It  is  almost  literally  true  that  any  set  of 
afferent  cells  may  indirectly  make  connection  with  any 
set  of  motor  cells  and  so  influence  any  bodily  act.  The 
cell  connections  provide  for  a  range  of  performances, 
extending  from  simple  cases,  such  as  that  of  the  trans- 
mission of  the  stimulus  of  cells  in  the  eye  due  to  a  bright 
light  to  the  cells  influencing  the  muscles  of  the  eyes  so  as 
to  result  in  the  act  of  winking,  to  such  a  complex  linkage 
as  occurs  when  the  sight  of  the  word  'dollar'  leads  a  man 
to  put  his  hand  in  his  pocket,  grasp  a  coin  and  pull  it  out 
wath  a  sigh. 

The  greater  part  of  the  bulk  of  the  human  brain  is 
given  up  to  such  connecting  cells.  And  the  more  im- 
portant part  of  the  w^ork  of  the  nervous  system  is  the 
w^ork,  not  of  receiving  stimuli  from  sensitive  parts  of  the 
body,  nor  of  discharging  stimuli  to  the  muscles,  but  of 
turning  stimulus  into  discharge,  connecting  outgo  prop- 
erly with  income,  suiting  expression  to  impression,  action 
to  circumstances. 

The  Grouping  and  Chaining  Together  of  the  Neu- 
rones.— It  would  be  hopeless  to  try  to  portray  in  a 
diagram  the  arrangement  of  this  practical  infinitude  of 
neurones  to  be  affected  by  happenings  inside  and  outside 


150 


Physiological  PsycJwlogy 

i> -< 


Fig.   44A.      A   possible   scheme   of  arrangement  of   neurones  to    form   an  ex- 
ceedingly   simple    nervous    system. 


t  I 


f  1 


Fig.   44B.     A   scheme   of   arrangements   of   neurones   of    varying    dcgixes    ot 
complexity.     Each    line    represents    one    neurone    or    neurone    group. 


The  Action  of  the  Nervous  System  151 

of  the  body  and  to  transmit  the  stimuH  here  and  there  so 
as  to  make  final  connections  with  neurones  going  out  to 
the  muscles.  Even  if  we  knew  the  exact  arrangement 
of  each  neurone  in  a  man's  brain  it  would  take  a  model  as 
large  as  St.  Paul's  Cathedral  to  make  them  visible  to  the 
naked  eye,  a  model  with  whose  details  only  years  of  study 
would  familiarize  us.  Consider  that  counting  at  the  rate 
of  50  a  minute  it  would  take  a  man  working  12  hours  a 
day  over  200  years,  probably  over  700  years,  to  merely 
count  the  nerve-cells  of  one  man. 

It  is  possible,  however,  to  picture  the  general  features 
of  the  arrangement.  W^e  can  imagine  an  animal  with  a 
nervous  system  with  only  two  neurones  to  receive  stimuli, 
only  three  neurones  to  discharge  into  muscles  and  only 
two  connecting  neurones.  Fig.  44A  may  serve  as  its 
picture.  Xervous  action  in  general  may  be  diagrammed  as 
in  Fig.  44B,  which  shows  various  degrees  of  complexity 
of  connections.  Even  the  most  complicated  nervous  sys- 
tems are  variations  of  this  general  arrangement  of  a 
shorter  or  longer  series  of  neurones  making  a  circuit 
from  sensitive  surfaces  to  organs  of  response.  Such  a 
simple  circuit  is  called  a  Reflex  arc  or  Reflex  arch.  What 
would  be  seen  if  a  perfect  model  of  all  the  nerve  cells 
were  available  would  be  simply  a  multitude  of  such  arches 
or  circuits  of  conduction  from  sensitive  parts  of  the  body 
to  muscles  and  a  multitude  of  circuits  cross-connecting 
these. 

It  is  possible  also  to  get  a  more  definite  conception  of 
these  circuits  of  conduction  by  studying  one  or  two  sam- 
ples or  types  of  them.  Figs.  45,  46  and  47  give  in  this 
way  a  general  view  of  the  grouping  and  chaining  together 
of  the  neurones  which  conduct  certain  stinuili  to  the  brain 
cortex  or  conduct  stimuli  from  the  cortex  to  certain 
groups  of  muscles. 


152 


Physiological  Psychology 


Fig.  45.  Fig.  46. 

Fig.  45.  A  scheme  of  the  arrangement  of  the  neurones  conducting 
stimuli  from  the  olfactory  sense  organ,  i — the  first  neurones  passing 
to  the  glomeruli  (gl).  2 — the  second  neurones  passing  from  the  glom- 
eruli to  the  hippocampus.  3 — the  third  neurones  passing  from  the 
hippocampus  to  the  cornu  ammonis.  4 — the  fourth  neurones  passing 
from  the  cornu  ammonis  to  make  further  connections.  After  Van 
Gehuchten,    II,   294,    539. 

Fig.  46.  A  scheme  of  the  arrangement  of  the  neurones  conducting 
stimuli  from  the  sense  organs  in  the  skin.  After  \an  Gehuchten,  II, 
412,    624. 


The  Action  of  the  Xerroiis  System  153 


Fig.  47       Scheme    of    the    arrangement    of   the    motor    neurones    conducting 
stimuli  toward  the  muscles.     After  Van  Gehuchten,  II,   512,   688. 


II 


154 


Physiological  Psychology 


Sense  Organs. — One  end  (the  peripheral  end)  of  an 
afferent  neurone  is  stimulated  by  physical  or  chemical 
forces.  It  may  be  more  or  less  specialized  to  suit  it  to 
this  work.  It  may  be  connected  with  bodily  structures 
specially  fitted  to  cause  the  physical  or  chemical  force  to 
influence  it.  The  peripheral  end  of  an  afiferent  neurone, 
or  a  group  of  peripheral  ends  of  afferent  neurones  which 


Fig.  48.  A.  Sensory  neurones  ending  around  the  base  of  hairs  (in  the 
mouse).  B.  Cross-section  of  the  same  tissue  as  in  A.  C.  Sensory 
neurones  ending  in  epithelial  cells.  D.  Sensory  neurones  ending 
around  pigment  cells.  A,  B,  C  and  D  are  after  Edinger,  42,  17.  C  is 
taken  by  Edinger  from  Bethe,  D  from  Eberth  and  Bunge.  E.  Sen- 
sory nerve  fibrils  in  the  lining  of  the  oesophagus,  n — the  neurone. 
After  Barker,  362,  211;  after  Retzius.  F.  A  sensory  neurone's  end- 
ing in  a  tactile   corpuscle.     After    Barker,    386,   242;   after   Smirnow. 

act  as  a  unit,  together  with  such  bodily  structures,  is 
called  a  Sense  Organ.  A  sense  organ  may  be  so  simple 
an  afifair  as  the  mere  terminal  arborization  of  a  neurone 
ending  freely  in  the  outer  or  inner  surface  of  the  body. 
Such  are  shown  in  Fig.  48.  It  may  be  so  complex  as  the 
eye,  a  sense  organ  which  includes  not  only  the  endings 
of  thousands  of  neurones  in  the  retina,  but  also  a  lens  to 


The  Action  of  the  Nervous  System  155 


Fig.  49.     Terminal   corpuscle  of  Ruffini   with   the    sensory   neurone's  ending 

therein.     After  Barker,  389,  246;   after   Ruffini. 
Fig.   50.     Tendon    with    nerve-plaque    made    up    of    the    ending    of    sensory 

neurones    seen   entering   from   above;   rfnc,    ultimate   arborization  of   the 

neurones.      After    Barker,    408,    266;    after   Ciaccio. 


Fig.  51.  Terminal  plaque  in  a  muscle  spindle.  The  neurone  entering  at 
the  left  subdivides  to  form  the  elaborate  net  work  shown.  After 
Barker,  416,  273;  after  Ruffini 


156 


Physiological  Psychology 


focus  light  rays  upon  them,  an  arrangement  to  alter  the 
shape  of  the  lens  so  as  to  focus  the  light  from  objects 
at  different  distances,  an  arrangement  to  regulate  the 
amount  of  light  admitted,  an  arrangement  to  shut  out 
light  altogether  and  an  arrangement  to  move  the  eyes  so 
that  light  will  come  from  any  one  of  many  directions. 
The  endings  of  the  neurones  of  a  sense  organ  may  have  a 


54 


55   g 


Fig.  52.  Taste  buds  (from  the  tongue)  and  the  endings  of  sensory  gusta- 
tory neurones:  s — a  supporting  cell;  t — taste  cells;  n — fibrils  of  neu- 
rones passing  upon  and  between  the  taste  buds.  After  Barker,  527, 
348;   after   v.    Lenhossek. 

Fig.  53.     The    ending    of    a    sensory    neurone    in    the    ear    (in    the    macula 
acustica    sacculi).     After    Barker,    502,    333;    after   v.  Lenhossek. 

Fig.   54.     Sensory    neurones    in    the    nose     (in    the    olfactory   mucous    mem- 
brane).    After    Van    Gehuchten,    I,   244,    156. 

Fig.  55.  The  principal  nervous  elements  of  the  retina:  r — rods;  c — cones; 
s — a  supporting  cell;  b — a  bipolar  neive  cell;  g — ganglion  nerve  cell 
After    Van  Gehuchten,    I,   244,    157. 


The  Action  of  the  Kervoiis  System 


157 


structure  not  notably  different 
from  the  general  type  (see  Figs. 
48,  52  and  53)  or  may  be  so 
altered  as  to  be  hardly  recog- 
nizable (see  Figs.  51,  54  and  55). 

An  adequate  idea  of  the  rich 
provision  made  in  the  nervous 
system  for  the  reception  of  stim- 
uli from  without  and  within  the 
body  can  be  obtained  only  by 
study  of  such  a  full  account  of 
the  peripheral  neurones  as  may 
be  found,  say  in  Barker's  'Nerv- 
ous System,'  but  Figs.  48-55  will 
give  some  conception  of  the  fact 
and  may  serve  to  illustrate  the 
statement  previously  made  that 
"not  only  in  the  eyes,  ears,  nose, 
mouth  and  skin,  but  also  in  the 
muscles,  articular  surfaces,  con- 
nective tissues,  along  the  diges- 
tive tract,  and  throughout  the 
sensitive  areas  of  the  body,  there 
are  neurone-endings  capable  of 
being  set  in  action." 

Motor  Organs. — The  ending 
of  an  efferent  neurone  in  a  mus- 
cle is  specialized  to  suit  its  work 
of  transmitting  the  nervous 
stimulus  in  some  w^ay  to  the  tis- 
sue of  the  muscle  so  as  to  make 
the  latter  contract.  As  this  pro- 
cess is  almost,  if  not  exactly,  the 
same    in   all    cases,   there   is   not 


Fig.  56.  The  ending  of  a  motor 
neurone  in  a  muscle.  .AlI  the 
bottom  are  shown  two  mus- 
cle plates  Cp)  on  muscle 
fibres  (m).  After  Van  Ge- 
huchten,     242,     154. 


15^  Physiological  Psychology 

the  variety  or  complexity  in  motor  organs  which  is  found 
in  sense  organs.  Fig.  56  shows  the  ending  of  a  motor 
neurone  forming  the  so-called   niuscle-plates. 

The  Localization  of  Brain  Functions. — It  is  evident 
that  each  particular  cell  has  its  special  work  to  do  and 
that  the  circuits  found  at  any  particular  spot  in  the  brain 
have  each  their  special  work  to  do.  If  a  man's  spinal 
cord  is  injured  in  the  lumbar  region  (the  lower  part  of 
the  back)  it  will  not  directly  influence  his  feelings  from 
or  movements  of  his  arms,  since  the  cells  that  go  to  and 
from  the  arms  and  their  connecting  cells  are  not  directly 
influenced.  An  injury  to  the  frontal  lobe  does  not 
directly  alter  the  power  of  vision,  for  the  circuit  from  the 
eyes  to  the  cortical  cells,  action  of  which  is  accompanied 
by  sensations  of  sight,  is  not  impaired.  But  the  section 
of  the  cord  mentioned  above  would  injure  feelings  from 
and  movements  of  the  legs.  An  injury  at  a  certain  spot 
in  the  occipital  lobe  would  abolish  sensations  of  sight. 
Injuries  to  the  inferior  frontal  convolution  result  in  dis- 
orders of  speech.  Injuries  to  the  parietal  region  result 
in  disordered  sensations  of  bodily  condition  and  second- 
arily in  altered  feelings  of  personality.  Figs.  57  and  58 
show  the  probable  location  in  the  human  cortex  of  the 
neurones  most  intimately  concerned  with  sensations  of 
various  sorts,  and  Figs.  59  and  60  show  the  location  of 
the  neurones  most  intimately  concerned  with  the  control 
of  the  movements  of  various  muscles,  in  the  case  of  the 
monkey. 

This  view  of  localization  is  quite  different  from 
phrenology,  which  regards  the  brain  as  divided  sharply 
into  parts  each  of  which  corresponds  to  some  complex 
mental  trait  such  as  observation,  ingenuity,  kindness, 
intellect,  attentiveness  and  the  like.  Such  a  complex 
trait  as  any  one  of  these  would  involve  very  many  dififer- 


The  Acfioti  of  the  Xcri'ous  System  159 


Fig.  58. 
Figs.  57  and  58.  The  areas  of  the  cerebral  cortex  to  which  sensory  neu- 
rones lead,  and  the  areas  occupied  chiefly  by  associative  neurones. 
Fig.  57  is  a  view  of  the  outer  half  of  the  right  cerebral  hemisphere, 
Fig.  58  of  its  inner  or  mesial  half.  After  Van  Gehuchten,  II,  308, 
548;  after  Flechsig.  I— Tactile  area;  II — Visual  area;  III— Auditory 
area;  IV — Olfactory  area,  i — Anterior  area  for  association;  2 — Pos- 
terior  area   for  association. 


i6o 


Physiological  Psychology 


i 


Fig.  59. 


Fig.  60. 

Figs  59  and  60.  The  areas  of  the  cerebral  cortex  from  which  motor  neu- 
rones stimulating  certain  movements  lead  (in  the  monkey).  After 
Barker,   998   and  999.    634;    after   Horsley  and    Schaefer. 


The  Action  of  the  Nervous  System  i6i 

ent  groups  of  neurones  in  many  different  parts  of  the 
brain.  There  is  a  place  in  the  brain  where  the  cells  are 
specially  connected  with  vision,  but  only  the  action  of 
cells  in  many  places  would  correspond  to  observation. 
Moreover  'place  in  the  brain'  means  the  entire  course  of 
a  conducting-  group  of  neurones,  or  some  important  part 
of  that  course,  not  a  compartment  or  special  creative 
centci". 

The  student  should,  therefore,  not  harbor  any  fanciful 
guesses,  such  as  that  each  neurone  corresponds  to  some 
one  idea,  or  that  one  kind  of  a  neurone  goes  with  thought, 
another  with  emotions,  or  that  the  neurones  hold  thoughts 
and  feelings  in  them  or  tied  to  them.  The  neurone  is  not 
a  feeling,  nor  does  it  hold  it,  nor  does  the  fact  that  the 
action  of  certain  neurones  is  accompanied  by,  say  sensa- 
tions of  smell,  imply  that  the  feeling  of  smell  is  in  them. 

The  proper  way  to  realize  the  nature  of  the  human 
nervous  system,  the  way  its  infinite  multitude  of  nerve 
strings  are  arranged,  the  currents  or  stimuli  which  they 
transmit  and  the  way  these  are  aroused  by  happenings 
in  the  sense  organs  and  in  turn  arouse  movements  of  the 
body, — to  realize  in  short  the  part  played  in  human  life 
by  the  nervous  system — is  to  spend  a  year  or  more  in  the 
study  of  the  histology  and  physiology  of  the  brain.  It  is 
difficult  from  a  few  pages  of  words  and  diagrams  to  get 
even  a  general  idea  of  what  nerve  cells  are  and  what  they 
do.  If,  however,  the  reader  will  practice  himself  in 
thinking  at  every  sense  impression,  ''Now  a  sense  organ 
has  been  excited  to  action  and  has  set  up  a  commotion  in 
some  nerve  cells.  This  commotion  has  been  transmitted 
to  other  cells  in  the  brain ;" — if  he  will  recall,  whenever 
he  makes  a  movement,  that  the  movement  is  due  to  the 
contraction    of   certain    muscles   because    of   a    stimulus 


1 62  Physiological  Psychology 

transmitted  to  them  by  nerve  cells  running  from  the  brain 
and  spinal  cord  and  ending  in  the  muscle  itself; — if  he 
will,  as  he  lives  and  thinks,  keep  before  him  an  image  of 
countless  nerve  cells  running  from  this  place  to  that  in  his 
brain  and  conducting  impulses  hither  and  yon,  and  think 
of  this  activity  as  the  condition  and  parallel  of  his  mental 
life ; — if  in  short  the  reader  will  relate  the  facts  so  far 
given  to  his  life  of  to-day  and  to-morrow,  and  think  of 
human  conduct  in  terms  of  the  conduction  of  stimuli  by 
nerve  cells — he  will  come  to  realize  and  use  the  truth  that 
the  nervous  system  is  the  sum  total  of  nerve  cells,  that 
these  act  by  conducting  impulses,  that  they  link  parts  of 
the  body  that  can  be  influenced  to  parts  of  the  body  that 
can  act  and  link  themselves  to  each  other,  that  in  the 
infinite  number  of  their  possible  ways  of  conduction  there 
is  the  basis  and  parallel  of  the  infinite  variety  of  a  man's 
thoughts  and  deeds. 

He  will  then  no  longer  think  of  the  nervous  system  as 
a  vague  name,  but  as  an  almost  infinitely  complex  mechan- 
ism for  receiving  impressions  from  the  body  and  its 
surroundings,  for  arousing  and  controlling  bodily  acts, 
for  connecting  the  latter  in  appropriate  ways  with  the 
various  situations  represented  by  the  former,  and  for 
modifying  their  connections  to  meet  the  needs  of  life. 
He  will  realize  the  nature  of  the  mechanism  which  enables 
us  to  respond  to  the  events  of  our  lives,  and  by  its  power 
of  modification  affords  the  physiological  basis  for  changes 
of  intellect  and  character,  for  learning,  for  education  in 
the  broadest  sense. 

§  2"/.  The  Lazvs  of  Brain  Action 

The  Law  of  Expression. — In  accordance  with  the 
general  doctrine  of  the  conservation  of  energy  we  must 
believe  that  every  stimulus  that  is  started  in  sensory  nerves 


The  Action  of  the  Xervous  System  163 

by  what  happens  at  their  peripheral  ends  must  have  some 
result.  These  stimuli  cannot  come  to  nothing.  Their 
energy  must  either  be  transmitted  on  to  other  cells  and 
eventually  out  through  the  efferent  cells  to  the  muscles, 
or  else  cause  modifications, — do  work, — in  the  cells  of  the 
central  system.  Just  as  in  a  storage  battery  electric 
charges  coming  in  must  sooner  or  later  be  discharged  out 
or  modify  the  battery  itself,  so  the  stimuli  coming  in  to  the 
brain  must  transform  it  or  be  conducted  out  and  cause 
the  muscles  to  contract.  Every  stimulus  has  its  result 
somehow  and  somewhere.  The  function  of  mental  life 
we  saw  was  to  influence  our  movements, — to  cause  what 
happened  to  us  to  result  in  actions  that  preserved  our 
lives  and  happiness.  The  nervous  system  we  now  see  to 
be  a  transformer  of  stimuli  coming  in,  which  are  due  to 
our  surroundings,  into  stimuli  going  out  which  cause  our 
actions,  or  into  modifications  of  the  nervous  system  itself. 
Inhibitory  Action. — That  action  in  the  nervous  sys- 
tem discharges  eventually  into  the  muscles  does  not  mean 
that  it  necessarily  arouses  movement.  It  may  result  in 
the  cessation  of  a  movement.  Suppose  that  the  forearm 
is  being  lowered  by  the  contraction  of  the  triceps  and  that 
a  stimulus  somewhere  among  the  neurones  works  itself 
out  into  a  stimulus  to  the  biceps  muscle.  This  stimulus 
tends  to  raise  the  forearm  and,  by  counteracting  or  bal- 
ancing the  effect  of  the  contraction  of  the  triceps,  may 
hold  the  arm  still.  Very  many  performances  of  skill  re- 
quire such  a  counteraction.  Two  sets  of  opposite  muscles 
may  both  be  stimulated,  and  but  little  movement  be  made. 
Twice  as  many  neurones  may  be  active  as  if  the  arm  was 
swung  energetically.  Stimulation  may  regulate  or  de- 
crease or  check  movement  as  well  as  initiate  it.  What  we 
do  not  do  as  well  as  what  we  do,  is  often  a  result  of  stim- 
ulation.    Every  nervous  impulse  tends  to  work  itself  out 


164  Physiological  Psychology 

in  action,  but  action  means  restraint,  the  opposition  of  one 
contraction  to'  others,  not  doing,  as  well  as  mere  move- 
ment. 

In  the  mental  world  as  well,  we  may  suppose  that  the 
action  of  the  nervous  system  may  be  to  check  as  well  as  to 
arouse  a  sensation  or  idea.  Nervous  action  may  make 
one  tiot  think  of  a  certain  thing,  not  feel  a  certain  emotion. 

When  the  result  of  nervous  action  is  thus  apparently 
negative, — when  it  checks  or  restrains  or  lessens, — the 
state  of  affairs  is  called  Inhibition  and  the  stimulus  is  said 
to  inhibit  the  checked  process.  Such  inhibitory  action  is  of 
the  utmost  importance.  We  die  when  the  vagus  nerve  to 
the  heart  is  cut,  not  because  the  heart  stops  beating,  but 
because  it  beats  too  fast;  i.e.,  over-acts.  We  are  men  and 
not  brutes  because  the  neurones  concerned  in  the  idea- 
tional and  moral  life  keep  in  subjection  and  counteract  the 
direct  impulses  to  action  of  the  neurones  concerned  in 
the  instincts  of  greed,  lust,  cruelty  and  hatred.  We 
reason,  and  do  not  merely  day-dream,  because  we  can 
check  foolish,  irrelevant  fancies, — can  inhibit  all  ideas 
that  do  not  lead  on  to  the  desired  goal. 

The  Law  of  Least  Resistance. — When  any  neurone 
acts,  i.e.,  when  it  is  stimulated  and  transmits,  it  will  trans- 
mit the  stimulus  along  the  line  of  least  resistance,  or  in 
other  words  along  the  line  of  strongest  connection.  Just 
as  a  copper  wire  through  which  an  electric  current  is 
passing  will,  if  its  end  is  one  millimeter  from  wire  B  and 
20  millimeters  from  wire  C,  transmit  the  current  to  wire 
B,  so  a  neurone  will  transmit  its  stimulus  along  the  easiest 
path. 

The  line  of  least  resistance  or  of  strongest  connection 
for  any  leurone  or  set  of  neurones  will  be,  other  things 
being  equal,  to  the  neurones  which  by  the  inborn  arrange- 
ment of  the  nervous  system  are  in  closest  connection  with 


The  Action  of  the  Xcrrous  Sysfem  165 

it.  When  the  neurone  endings  of  the  retina  are  stimu- 
lated by  bright  Hght,  nothing  need  happen  in  the  leg 
musch^s,  because  there  is  no  ready  made  connection  in  the 
brain  between  the  optic  neurones  and  the  neurones  pass- 
ing from  the  spinal  cord  to  the  leg  muscles.  But  there 
will  be  a  contraction  of  the  muscles  that  lessen  the 
pupillary  opening,  for  there  is  a  definite  connection  be- 
tween the  optic  neurones  and  those  to  the  iris  muscle. 

The  Law  of  Inborn  Connections. — The  first  law 
that  decides  what  neurones  any  given  neurone  will  arouse 
to  action, — what  the  line  of  least  resistance  or  strongest 
connection  will  be, — is  then  that,  other  things  being  equal, 
any  neurone  group  will  discharge  into  the  neurone  group 
zvifh  zvhich  it  is  by  the  inner  grozvth  of  the  nervous  sys- 
tem co\nnected.  This  we  may  call  the  Lazi'  of  Natural  or 
Inborn  Coniiections. 

The  Law  of  Acquired  Connections. — These  natural 
lines  of  connection  are  in  the  course  of  life  added  to  and 
subtracted  from.  The  neurones  are  not  by  nature  so 
arranged  as  to  make  a  ma',  say,  ''How  dazzling,"  when 
the  neurones  of  the  retina  are  stimulated  by  a  bright 
light.  And  the  natural  tendency  of  infants  to  turn  the 
head  toward  a  light  is  in  later  life  largely  overcome.  The 
'other  things'  are  not  always  equal.  We  have  in  fact  as 
a  general  law  of  behavior  of,  at  least,  the  neurone  groups 
of  the  so-called  'higher'  centers  or  parts  of  the  brain,  the 
law  that  zi'hen  any  neurone  or  neurone  group  is  stimidated 
and  transmits  to  or  discharges  into  or  connects  zvith  a 
second  neurone  or  neurane  group,  it  zvill,  zvhen  later 
stimidated  again  in  the  same  zvay,  haz'e  an  increased  ten- 
dency to  transmit  to  the  same  second  neurone  group  as 
before,  provided  the  act  that  resulted  in  the  -first  instance 
brought  a  pleasant  or  at  least  indifferent  mental  state. 
If,  on  the  contrary,  the  result  in  the  first  case  zvas  dis- 


1 66  Physiological  Psychology 

comfort,  the  tendency  to  such  transmission  will  be  les- 
sened. 

In  other  words,  any  conduction  of  a  stimulus  from 
nerve  cell  to  nerve  cell  tends  increasingly  to  take  the 
direction  it  has  taken  unless  the  residt  is  discomfort.  In 
that  case  the  original  tendency  decreases. 

Stating  the  law  in  terms  of  connections  made  between 
cells,  we  would  say:  Connections  hetzveen  neurones  are 
strengthened  every  time  they  are  used  with  indifferent  or 
pleasurable  results  and  weakened  every  time  they  are 
used  with  residting  discomfort. 

This  law  includes  the  action  of  two  factors,  frequency 
and  pleasurable  result.  It  might  be  stated  in  a  com- 
pound form  as  follows,  (i)  The  line  of  least  resistance 
is,  other  things  being  equal,  that  resulting  in  the  greatest 
satisfaction  to  the  animal;  and  (2)  the  line  of  least  resist- 
ance is,  other  things  being  equal,  that  oftenest  traversed 
by  the  nervous  imptdse.  We  may  call  (i)  the  Lazv  of 
Effect,  and  (2)  the  Law  of  Habit. 

The  line  of  least  resistance  will  also,  other  things 
being  equal,  be  that  most  recently  traversed.  Suppose 
a  neurone  group.  A,  to  have  made  connection  ten  times 
with  neurone  group  B  and  ten  times  with  neurone  group 
C  with  equally  pleasurable  results ;  suppose  the  stimulus 
to  have  been  transmitted  from  A  to  B  ten  years  ago  and 
from  A  to  C  during  the  past  week.  All  that  we  know  of 
living  matter  teaches  us  to  expect  that  time  will  weaken 
the  effect  of  any  influence  upon  it.  The  strongest  con- 
nection will  then  be  from  neurone  group  A  to  neurone 
group  C.     We  may  call  this  law  the  Lazv  of  Recency. 

The  line  of  least  resistance  will  also  be  that  which  has 
been  traversed  by  strong  stimuli  rather  than  weak,  or  by 
stimuli  acting  for  a  long  time  rather  than  by  stimuli  acting 
for  a  short  time.     Just  as  a  large  flow  of  water  will  cut 


The  Action  of  the  Kervoiis  System  167 

a  deeper  channel  than  a  small  flow,  or  a  flow  lasting  an 
hour  a  deeper  channel  than  a  flow  lasting  but  a  minute ; 
so  energetic  or  continued  nervous  transmission  in  a  cer- 
tain direction  will  make  future  transmission  in  that  direc- 
tion the  more  likely.  We  may  call  these  the  laws  of 
Intensity  and  Duration.^ 

The  line  of  least  resistance  will  also  be  toward  the 
most  easily  arousable,  most  sensitive  neurone  group,  the 
group  most  ready  to  act. 

All  these  different  laws  may  be  combined  in  the  fol- 
lowing general  Lazi:  of  Acquired  Brain  Connections  or 
Lazi'  of  Association:  When  any  neurone  group.  A,  is 
stimulated,  the  nervous  impidse  will  be  transmitted  to  the 
neurone  group  which  is  most  closely  connected  zvith 
group  A,  which  has  been  aroused  by  A  most  frequently, 
zvith  most  satisfaction  to  the  individual,  most  recently, 
most  energetically  and  for  the  longest  time,  and  which  is 
the  most  sensitive  at  the  time. 

Finally  a  neurone  group  may  be,  and  commonly  is, 
tremendously  complex,  and  the  connection  formed  may 
be,  and  often  is,  not  with  a  few  neurones,  but  with  a  few 
neurones  chiefly  plus  a  host  of  others  acting  less  vigor- 
ously. The  condition  of  a  whole  system  of  neurones  at 
any  one  time  determines  their  condition  later.  The  action 
of  any  neurone  group  depends  upon  the  'set'  or  condition 
of  the  total  system  of  which  the  group  is  a  part. 

The  way  in  which  a  brain  acts  at  any  time  is.  then, 
the  result  of  what  connections  it  possesses  as  features  of 
its  inborn  organization,  plus  what  has  happened  to  it  in 
the  past  and  what  actions  it  has  previously  manifested. 

^There  is  an  important  exception  to  the  laws  of  frequency,  re- 
cency, intensity  and  duration.  If  a  connection  is  made  too  often, 
too  energetically  and  too  long  tvithout  rest,  the  neurones  may  be- 
come fatigued  and  lose  the  power  to  transmit.  Neurones,  however, 
apparently  fatigue  very  slowly. 


l68  Physiological  Psychology 

From  hour  to  hour  and  day  to  day  it  is  becoming  a  new 
thing.  From  month  to  month  it  takes  on  new  habits. 
Everything  that  is  manifested  as  knowledge,  power,  self- 
control,  habits  of  thought  and  action,  attitudes  and  capaci- 
ties of  mind,  skill  and  training  may  be  paralleled  within 
by  alterations  which  the  neurones  have  undergone.  If 
we  had  perfect  knowledge  of  the  entire  history  of  a  man's 
brain,  if  we  could  from  second  to  second  see  just  what 
was  going  on  in  it,  we  should  find  in  its  actions  and  con- 
sequent changes  the  parallel  of  his  life  of  thought  and 
action. 

Let  no  one  object  that  it  is  incredible  that  the  mental 
history  of  a  man  involving  millions  of  ideas  and  acts 
should  be  paralleled  by  any  bodily  organ.  A  human 
nervous  system  is  estimated  to  comprise  over  ten  thou- 
sand millions  of  neurones.  Each  of  these  is  itself  a  com- 
plex organ,  and  is  often  capable  of  many  connections. 
Since  it  would  take  ten  lifetimes  to  merely  count  the 
neurones  and  probably  the  lifetimes  of  ten  Methuselahs 
to  count  their  connections,  it  is  evident  that  the  brain 
is  complicated  enough  to  register  the  richest  and  most 
active  human  experience. 

References 

A.  James,  Briefer  Course,  VIIL,  IX. 
Stout,  Manual,  34-46. 

Angell,  Psychology,  II. 

B.  Ebbinghatis,  Grundziige,  §§  7-1 1. 
James,  Principles,  II.,  III. 

Wundt,  Physiologische   Psychologic,   II.-VL,   or  Princi' 

pies  of  Physiological  Psychology,  II. -VI. 
Barker,  L.   F.,   The  Nervous  System. 


CHAPTER  XI 
The  Nervous  System  and  Mental  States 

§  28.  In    General 

Brain  Action  Without  Consciousness. — Not  all  the 

happenings  in  all  the  neurones  are  accompanied  by  men- 
tal states.  Stimuli  are  incessantly  coming  in  from  the 
body  which  need  not  be  felt ;  e.g.,  many  stimuli  from  the 
lungs  or  digestive  tract  in  waking  hours  ;  many  stimuli 
from  all  quarters  during  sleep ;  many  stimuli  of  slight 
amount.  Stimuli  are  incessantly  going  out  to  the  muscles 
which  some  psychologists  think  are  never  felt  and  which 
certainly  in  many  cases  and  at  many  times  are  not ;  e.g., 
the  stimuli  which  regulate  the  nourishment  of  parts  of  the 
body  and  control  the  reflexes  such  as  winking  or  the  con- 
traction of  the  pupil  of  the  eye. 

Brain  x^ction  With  Consciousness. — What  sort  of 
action  in  the  neurones  is  accompanied  by  consciousness 
and  even  whether  there  is  any  special  sort  that  is,  science 
has  not  yet  discovered.  Which  neurones  are  concerned 
in  the  conscious  life  is  known  only  imperfectly.  Appar- 
ently in  man  those  in  certain  parts  of  the  cortex  are  and 
those  in  the  sensory  and  motor  nerves,  spinal  cord, 
medulla,  cerebellum  and  base  of  the  brain  are  not.  It  is 
thought  by  many  that  consciousness  appears  only  when 
:he  nervous  system  is  undergoing  modification, — becom- 
ing adjusted  to  some  new  condition. 

The  action  in  the  nervous  system  which  is  connected 

12  169 


170  Physiological  Psychology 

with  any  mental  state  is  called  the  physiological  or  neural 
or  nervous  basis  or  correlate  of  that  mental  state. 

Although  it  is  easy  to  prove  that  mental  life  in  general 
is  connected  with  the  activity  of  nerve-cells  it  is  hard  to 
ascertain  what  is  the  particular  physiological  basis  of 
each  special  variety  of  mental  state.  For  instance,  just 
what  happens  in  the  nervous  system  when  one  feels  bored 
or  thinks  'nevertheless,'  no  one  could  say.  So  also  what 
difference  there  is  between  the  neural  correlate  of  the 
mental  image  of  a  dog  and  the  neural  correlate  of  a  gen- 
eral notion  of  a  dog  is  a  matter  for  hypothesis,  not  for 
proof. 

There  are  undoubtedly  differences  in  the  activities  of 
the  nervous  system  corresponding  to  the  differences 
between  feelings.  For  sensations  there  is  brain  action  A, 
for  percepts,  brain  action  B,  for  images,  brain  action  C, 
for  emotions,  brain  action  D,  and  so  on  through  the  list. 
With  the  advance  of  knowledge  these  correspondences 
will  become  better  and  better  known.  In  some  cases 
there  is  already  enough  evidence  to  warrant  a  working 
belief.  In  others  there  are  more  or  less  interesting 
hypotheses.  These  beliefs  and  hypotheses  are  stated 
briefly  in  §  29. 

§  29.  The  Physiological  Correlates  of  Particular  Groups 
of   Mental  States 

Of  Sensations. — The  physiological  basis  of  a  sen- 
sation is  action  of  certain  neurones  stimulated  at  the 
time  by  sensory  neurones.  The  locality  in  the  brain  of 
the  neurones  concerned  in  many  special  kinds  of  sensa- 
tions, e.g.,  sounds,  is  known.  In  Figs.  57  and  58  were 
shown  the  localities  in  the  brain  where  the  neurones  con- 
cerned   with    certain    sensations    are    found.     It    is   not 


The  Nervous  System  and  Mental  States 


171 


action  of  sensory  neurones  themselves,  of  the  cells  mak- 
ing up  the  afferent  nerves,  that  parallels  sensations.  It 
is  apparently  only  when  the  afferent  cells  have  stimulated 
other  cells  than  themselves,  cells  in  the  cortex  of  the 
brain,  that  any  sensation  is  felt. 

Of  Percepts. — The  physiological  basis  of  a  percept 
is  the  same  except  that  modifications  of  the  action  of  the 
neurone  group  due  to  previous  experiences  play  a  larger 
part.  It  is  apparently  when  the  actions  of  neurones 
stimulated  by  sensory  neurones  result  together  in  some 
unitary  muscular  response  that  we  feel,  not  a  confusion 
of  sensations,  but  a  definite  'thing,' 

Of  Illusions  and  Hallucinations. — The  physiological 
basis  of  an  illusion  is  the  same  as  for  the  corresponding 
percept  except  that  the  sensory  neurones  that  give  the 
stimulus  are  not  those  which  commonly  do.  The  physio- 
logical basis  of  an  hallucination  is  the  same  as  for  the 


N     P     F     B 


Fig.  61.  Let  N  P  F  B  be  the  neural  process  corresponding  to  the  feel- 
ing of  the  sound  of  a  bell.  Let  S  B  be  the  action  in  sensory  neurones 
which  usually  arouses  the  neural  process  corresponding  to  the  feeling 
of  the  sound  of  a  bell.  Let  S  H  be  the  action  in  sensory  neurones 
which  usually  arouses  the  neural  process  corresponding  to  the  feeling  of 
the  sound  of  a  hammer  on  an  anvil.  Let  I  I  be  the  neurvil  process  cor- 
responding to  the  feeling  of  certain  ideas  and  images.  When  S  B 
arouses  X  P  F  B.  the  mental  state  corresponding  is  called  perception. 
When  S  H  arouses.  N  P  F  B,  the  mental  state  corresponding  is 
called  illusion.  When  I  I  arouses  N  P  F  B,  the  mental  state  corres- 
ponding   is    called    hallucination. 


172  Physiological  Psychology 

corresponding  percept  except  that  the  cells  are  aroused 
to  action  without  any  stimulus  from  sensory  cells.  Fig. 
61  illustrates  the  different  neural  processes  which  parallel 
respectively  the  percept,  illusion  and  hallucination  of  an 
object. 

Of  the  Emotions. — With  respect  to  the  coarser  or 
bodily  emotions  such  as  jealousy,  rage  or  fear,  the  best 
working  hypothesis  is  the  theory^  that  their  physiological 
basis  is,  like  that  of  sensations,  the  action  of  neurones 
stimulated  at  the  time  by  afferent  neurones.  In  the  case 
of  the  emotions,  however,  these  afferent  neurones  come, 
not  from  eyes  or  nose  or  ears,  but  from  the  lungs,  heart, 
blood  vessels  and  other  internal  organs. 

That  is,  just  as  when,  light  rays  having  excited  the 
peripheral  ends  of  the  visual  sensory  neurones,  the  excita- 
tion is  transmitted  to  the  sensory  neurones  concerned  in 
vision,  sensations  of  color  and  brightness  are  felt ;  so 
when  the  excitation  caused  in  the  peripheral  ends  of  the 
sensory  neurones  in  the  internal  organs  of  the  body  by 
palpitating  heart,  tense  muscles,  the  contraction  of  the 
small  arteries  of  the  skin,  etc.,  is  transmitted  to  the  neu- 
rones in  the  cortex,  fear  is  felt.  The  bodily  disturbances 
which  are  commonly  called  the  expression  of  the  emo- 
tional feeling  would  then  be  really  its  cause.  The  tre- 
mendous equipment  of  sensory  neurone  endings  in  the 
inner  parts  of  the  body  appears  to  be  not  so  much  for  the 
sake  of  the  few  sensations  such  as  hunger,  thirst,  nausea, 
pains  and  the  like  which  are  recognized  as  dependent  upon 
afferent  neurones  from  inside  the  body,  as  for  the  sake  of 
the  rich  life  of  passion,  jealousy,  fear,  anger,  grief,  joy 
and  the   like. 

^  The  James-Lange  theory  of  the  emotions,  named  after  the  two 
psychologists,  William  James  and  C.  Lange,  who  announced  the 
theory  independently  at  about  the  same  time. 


The  Xcrz'oits  System  and  Mental  States 


173 


According-  to  the  other  theory  of  the  emotions,  the 
physiological  basis  of  the  emotions  would  be  the  action 
of  associative  neurones  aroused  by  the  neurones  the  action 
of  which  parallels  percepts  and  ideas.  By  this  theory 
the  order  of  events  is  ( i )  some  sensation,  percept  or  idea, 
(2)  some  emotion  resulting  from  it,  (3)  disturbances  of 
bodilv  organs  resulting  from  the  emotion.  The  behavior 
of  a  child  frightened  by,  say,  a  horse  would  be  described 
bv  the  two  theories  as  follows : — 


Older  Theory 
Percept    of    horse    running. 
Feeling  of   fear. 

Acts   of   altered   heart  beat, 
pallor,    trembling,    etc. 


James-Lange    Theory 
Percept  of  horse  running. 
Acts  of  altered  heart  beat, 

pallor,    trembling,   etc. 

Feeling  of  fear. 


The    two    theories     might    be     stated     in     terms     of 
neurone  action   as   follows : — 


Older  Theory 
Sense   organs    stimulated. 
Afferent   neurones. 
Central   neurones    concerned 

with  percepts. 
Central    neurones   connected 

therewith       (giving       the 

emotion). 
]\Iotor   neurones. 

Bodily  disturbances  in  heart, 
lungs,  etc. 


James-Lange    Theory 
Same 
Same. 
Same. 

]\Iotor  neurones. 

Bodily  disturbances  in 
heart,  lungs,  etc. 

Afferent  neurones  coming 
from   heart,   lungs,    etc. 

Central  neurones  con- 
nected with  these  (giv- 
ing the   emotion). 


It  is  a  matter  of  dispute  how  far  other  than  the  coarser 
of  emotions  follow  the  James-Lange  theory.     It  appears 


174  Physiological  Psychology 

probable  that  the  bulk  of  our  emotional  life  is  thus  due 
to  stimuli  from  the  heart,  lungs,  vaso-motor  system, 
digestive  tract  and  other  internal  organs ;  that  in  large 
measure  the  emotions  are  caused  in  the  same  way  as 
sensations  and  percepts, — are  'peripherally  initiated' 
mental  states.  There  still  might  be  and  probably  are 
not  only  such  sensory  emotions  but  also  imaged  emo- 
tions, 'centrally  initiated.'  Their  neural  correlates  would 
correspond  to  those  for  images  of  things,  to  be  described 
on  the  next  page. 

Of  Effort. — The  physiological  basis  for  the  feeling 
of  strain  or  effort,  as  in  voluntary  attention,  also  cor- 
responds probably  to  that  for  sensations,  being  action 
of  certain  neurones  stimulated  at  the  time  by  sensory 
neurones  with  peripheral  ends  in  or  on  the  muscles,  joints 
and  tendons. 

Of  External  Relationships. — Feelings  of  external 
relationships,  such  as  of  above,  below,  beyond  and  the  like, 
may  be  really  sensational ;  e.g.,  the  feeling  of  the  above- 
ness  of  this  line  to  the  next  may  be  simply  the  feeling  of 
the  eye's  movement  in  looking  from  one  to  the  other. 
The  neural  correlate  of  feelings  of  relationship  of  this 
sort  would  be  the  same  as  of  sensations. 

It  may  perhaps  be  assumed  that  all  the  feelings  which 
were  grouped  under  the  heading,  feelings  of  the  first 
intention,  have  as  their  neural  correlate  action  in  neurones 
stimulated  at  the  time  by  afferent  neurones. 

Leaving  now  the  field  of  sensations  and  their  like,  all 
statements  about  neural  correlates  of  mental  states  must 
be  regarded  as  hypotheses  and  should  properly  be  pre- 
faced by  a  perhaps. 

Of  Images. — The  neural  basis  of  feelings  of  the  sec- 
ond intention  is  evidently  action  of  cells  not  stimulated 


The  Nervous  System  and  Mental  States  175 

at  the  time  by  sensory  cells.  Much  more  cannot  be  said 
except  as  guess  work.  The  physiological  basis  of  an 
image  is  perhaps  action  similar  to  that  in  the  correspond- 
ing percept  but  weaker,  or  (and  to  the  author's  mind  far 
more  probably)  the  action  of  only  a  portion  of  the  cells 
involved  in  the  corresponding  percept,  the  cells  asso- 
ciated in  the  action  being  different  in  the  two  cases.  In 
actual  perception  the  brain  action  giving,  say,  the  mere 
sight  of  the  thing  would  be  accompanied  by  brain  action 
corresponding  to  the  thing  being  in  a  certain  place,  being 
touched  as  well  as  seen,  being  felt  as  possessed  of  ten- 
dencies to  be  or  do  this  or  that.  The  neural  correlate 
of  a  percept,  say  of  a  dog,  would  thus  be  a  complex  total. 
The  mental  image  of  the  dog  might  well  have  as  its  neural 
correlate  a  weakened  revival  and  of  only  a  part  of  this 
total. 

Still  more  hypothetical  are  all  notions  about  the  neural 
correlates  of  feelings  of  the  third  intention. 

Of  General  Notions. — The  physiological  basis  of  a 
general  notion  is  perhaps  the  neural  correlate  of  some 
percept  or  image  or  sensation,  commonly  of  a  word,  plus 
the  half-aroused  activities  of  the  numerous  associated  sets 
of  cells,  each  set  of  which  would,  if  fully  active,  give  the 
feeling  of  one  of  the  particular  things  included  in  the 
class  meant  by  the  word.  For  instance,  the  concept  'a 
dog'  would  have  as  its  physiological  basis  the  cell  action 
going  with  the  image  of  the  word  'dog'  plus  the  half- 
aroused  action  of  the  cells  which  if  fully  active  would 
give  images  of  different  particular  dogs. 

Of  Individual  Notions. — The  physiological  basis  of 
an  individual  notion  is  probably  the  neural  correlate  of 
some  percept  or  image  or  sensation,  commonly  of  a  word, 
plus  action  in  other  cells  which  would,  if  allowed  to  dis- 


176  Physiological  Psychology 

charge  on  into  their  associated  cells,  lead  to  the  image  or 
percept  of  the  thing  or  person  referred  to  by  the  individual 
notion.  Thus  the  thought  of  'Napoleon'  may  have  as  its 
physiological  basis  the  cell  action  going  with  the  word 
'Napoleon'  plus  the  half-aroused  action  of  the  cells  w^hich 
if  fully  active  would  give  images  of  Napoleon  or  of  his 
various  acts  and  characteristics. 

Of  Feelings  of  Relationships. — Feelings  of  logical 
relationships  may  have  as  their  basis  the  states  of  transi- 
tion in  the  brain  from  the  activity  of  one  set  of  neurones 
to  that  of  others.  For  instance,  the  feeling  of  unlikeness 
may  have  as  its  parallel  the  simultaneous  waning  of  one 
brain  process  and  the  waxing  of  one  different.  Some 
feelings  of  relationship  may  be  semi-emotional  feelings, 
and  due  to  the  same  type  of  neural  action  as  parallels  emo- 
tions. Thus  the  feeling  of  the  relation  of  cause  and 
effect  may  be  a  feeling  of  justified  expectancy. 

Other  hypotheses  about  the  neural  basis  of  mental 
states  are  that  the  greater  or  less  intensity  of  a  mental 
state  is  due  to  a  greater  or  less  violence  of  the  conducted 
stimulus  ;  that  the  personal  feeling  w^hich  characterizes 
mental  states  is  related  to  the  constantly  acting  cells 
stimulated  by  ever  present  bodily  conditions ;  that  the 
broad  qualities  of  mental  life  which  we  call  temperament 
or  disposition  are  related  to  cell  action  due  to  the  con- 
dition of  the  blood.  About  the  physiological  activities 
which  go  with  feelings  of  time,  belief,  desire,  choice  and 
many  other  types  of  feelings,  so  little  is  known  or  even 
guessed  that  it  is  unwise  to  note  the  speculations  about 
them. 

Of  Mental  Connections. — The  physiological  basis  of 
the  connections  between  ideas,  acts,  and  ideas  and  acts  is 
much  clearer  than  the  physiological  basis  of  the  varieties 


The  Nervous  System  and  Mental  States  177 

of  ideas.  These  connections  are  throughout  based  on  the 
connections  between  neurone  and  neurone  in  the  nervous 
system,  the  existence  of  paths  of  easy  conduction  for  the 
nervous  stimukis. 

Reflexes  and  instincts  are  the  manifestations  in  con- 
duct of  connections  between  neurones  due  to  the  natural 
organization  of  the  human  body.  Acquired  habits  of 
thought  and  conduct  represent  the  connections  between 
neurones  by  which  the  nervous  system  has  adapted  itself 
to  the  individual's  needs.  Wlien  in  Part  III  the  growth 
of  mental  life  and  the  laws  of  its  action  are  described, 
the  dependence  of  the  connections  between  the  parts  of 
a  human  life  of  thought  and  action  upon  the  connections 
between  parts  of  the  nervous  system  will  be  seen  every- 
where to  be  a  natural,  almost  the  inevitable,  conclusion. 

Exercises 

Experience  13.  The  Iiittiieiice  of  the  Absence  of  Neurone 
Endings  in  a  Portion  of  a  Sensitive  Surface.  The  neurones  com- 
posing the  optic  nerve  form  a  compact  bundle  of  fibres  where  they 
enter  the  retina.  Where  this  bundle  enters  there  are  no  rods  or 
cones  or  bi-polar  neurones,  nothing  in  fact  to  be  stimulated  by 
light. 

Close  or  cover  the  left  eye.  Look  with  the  right  eye  steadily 
at  the  cross  in  Fig.  62.   When  the  book  is  about  seven  inches  from 


Fig.  62. 

the  eye  the  circle  will  not  be  seen  at  all.  It  is  essential  that  the 
eye  be  kept  fixed  steadily  on  the  cross.  The  reason  for  the 
non-appearance  of  the  circle  is  that  at  that  distance  the  image  of 
the  circle  on  the  retina  falls  on  the  spot  where  the  optic  nerve 
enters.  Move  the  book  slowly  to  a  greater  distance,  fi.xating  the 
cross  as  before.     Soon  the  circle  will  reappear  and  the  square  dis- 


178 


Physiological  Psychology 


+ 


Rg.W 


+ 


•    •••••••••••• 

•     •     •     •     •     *  .^B^  *     •     •     •    •     «' 


•    ••••» 

•     •     • 


•: 


•  •••  •••• 


FicW 


+ 


After  some  time,  I  came  thither  dressed  in 
my  new  habit,  and  now  I  was  called  governor 
again.  Being  all  met,  and  the  captain  with 
me,  1  caused  the  men  to  be  brought  before 
me,  and  I  told  them  I  had  had  a  full  account 
of  their  villainous  behaviour  to  the  captain, 
and  how  they  had  run  away  with  the  ship, 
and  were  preparing  ♦•  nommit  further  rob- 
beries; but  that  ce  had  ensnared 
them  in  their  ow  d  that  they  were 
fallen  into  the  pi  ey  had  digged  for 
others.  I  let  theii.  ,  that  by  my  direc- 
tion the  ship  had  been  seized,  that  she  lay' 
now  in  the  road,  and  they  might  see  by  and 
bye  that  their  new  captain  had  received  the 
reward  of  his  villainy;  for  that  they  might 
see  him  hanging  at  the  yard-arm.  That  as  to 
them,  I  wanted  to  know  what  they  had  to  , 
say,  why  I  should  not  execute  them  as  pirates 
taken  in  the  fact,  as  by  my  commission  they 
could  not  doubt  I  had  authority  to  do.    On& 


ficfiJ 


The  Xervous  System  and  Mental  States 


179 


appear.     Why?     How  may  the  figure  be  used  to  demonstrate  the 
existence  of  the  similar  'blind  spot'  in  the  left  eye? 

From  this  experiment  it  would  appear  that  every  field  of  view 
seen  by  a  single  eye  should  have  an  unseen  spot  or  patch. 


-f- 


Fig.  66. 

Perform  a  similar  experiment  with  Figs.  63,  64,  65,  66  and  67. 
When  the  circle  falls  on  the  blind  spot,  what  takes  its  place  in  each 
case?  State  the  rule  which  seems  to  hold  concerning  what  hap- 
pens (in  the  case  of  vision)  in  the  absence  of  neurone  endings 
in  a  portion  of  a  sensory  surface. 


+ 


Fig.  67. 

Sensations  from   Bilaterally  Symmetrical  Seiisitiz'c  Surfaces. 

Experiment   14.     If  you   touch  the  desk  simultaneously  with 
the   right   and  left    forefingers,  you    feel   two  touches,  but   if  you 


t8o  Physiological  Psychology 

hear  a  bell  with  both  cars  or  see  a  star  with  both  eyes  you  ordi- 
narily feel  but  one  sound  or  star.  Recall  and  perform  the  experi- 
ment familiar  to  childhood  by  which  the  eyes  are  made  to  see 
double. 

In  bmocular  vision  each  retina  is  separately  stimulated,  but 
the  result  in  sensation  may  be  (i)  two  corresponding  sights,  or 
only  one  sight  due  {2)  to  the  joint  action  of  the  two  stimuli 
or  (3)  to  the  failure  of  one  of  them  to  influence  sensation,  or  (4) 
three  sights,  one  due  to  joint  action  and  two  to  the  separate  ac- 
tions. Experiment  14  shows  a  case  of  (i).  Cases  of  (2)  and 
(3)  occur  of  course  in  ordinary  life  (cases  of  2  occurring  dur- 
ing every  moment's  vision),  but  they  may  be  seen  most  clearly 
by  simple  experiments.  These  experiments  involve  the  power 
to  observe  near  objects  while  holding  the  eyes  as  one  would  to 
look  at  a  distant  object,  and  so  may  require  a  little  practice. 

Experiment  75.  Holding  the  book  upright  before  the  eyes 
at  a  distance  of  about  12  inches,  look  at  the  drawings  of  Fig.  68 
as  you  would  to  look  through  it  at  an  object  in  the  distance. 
That  is,  fixate  for  a  point  in  the  distance,  so  that  the  left  eye 
looks  at  the  left  hand  pair  of  circles  and  the  right  eye  at  the 
right  hand  pair.  If  this  is  done  the  two  figures  will  appear  to 
move  toward  each  other  and  occupy  the  same  space.  If  the  eyes 
are  kept  as  if  fixed  on  a  distant  object,  the  single  figure  result- 
ing from  the  two  drawings  can  be  kept  in  place  for  examination. 
Neglect  the  two  hazy  figures  seen  one  on  each  side  of  it.  What 
does  it  appear  to  be?  What  new  feature  not  present  in  either 
of  the  two  figures  appears?  Do  likewise  with  Fig.  69.  Fill  out 
with  appropriate  words  the  blanks  in  the  following  statement : — 
In  certain  cases   when   one   retina   receives    one    impression   and 

the  other  another  impression,  the  resulting  percept  is  of , 

and  possesses  the  quality  of   

Perform  the  same  experiment  with  Fig.  70.  What  is  the  re- 
sulting single  percept  ?  Do  the  bars  of  the  cage  hide  part  of  the 
bird  or  does  it  hide  part  of  the  cage?  Does  it  seem  inside  or 
outside  or  against  the  front  of  the  cage? 

Experiment  16.  Combine  the  two  halves  of  Fig.  71  by  fix- 
ating for  a  point  in  the  distance  as  in  Experiment  15.  What  is 
the  resulting  picture?  Hold  it  steadily  for  some  moments. 
What  happens? 

Do  likewise  with  the  two  drawings  of  Fig.  72. 

Do  lik'^wise  with  the  two  drawings  of  Fig.  73. 


The  Nervous  System  and  Mental  States  i8i 


iMG.    68. 


Fig.  69. 


Fig.  70. 


l82 


Physiological  Psychology 


Fig.  71. 


z:^ 


Fig.  72, 


Fig    7i' 


The  Nervous  System  and  Mental  States  183 

What  is  the  chief  difference  between  the  resulting  percepts  in 
Experiment  15  and  those  in  Experiment  16?  What  are  some 
other  differences?  What  difference  between  the  pairs  of  objects 
of  Figs.  68-70  and  the  pairs  of  objects  of  Figs.  71-73  seems  to  ac- 
count for  the  difference  in  the  resuhing  percepts?  Fill  out  with 
appropriate  words  the  blanks  in  the  following  statement :  Two 
differing  retinal  impressions  will  result  in  a  single  and  constant 
percept  if  they   are  the   impressions  which   would  ordinarily  be 

caused  by ,  or  are such  impressions.     They  will 

result   in    if  they  are   impressions  which   could  not  be 

caused  by   

References 

A.  James,  Briefer  Course,  II.  (9-12),  III.  (28-40),  IV.  (47- 

53),  V.    (60-67),  XIII.    (228-234),  XIX.    (310-311), 

XX.  (329-330)  XXIV.  (375-384). 

Angell,  Psychology,  III.;  see  also  pp.  93-101,  137,  190-192, 
2i5f.,  272f.,  316-319. 

B.  James,  Principles,  XL  (434-447),  XVI.  (653-658),  XVII. 

(68-75),  XIX.  (103-106),  XX.  (449-474.) 


PART  III 

DYNAMIC  PSYCHOLOGY 

§  30.  Introduction 

The  previous  chapters  have  described  the  different 
varieties  of  mental  states,  the  service  performed  by  each 
in  the  conduct  of  Hfe,  and  the  physiological  facts  with 
which  they  are  connected.  Equally  important — for 
practical  purposes  more  so — is  knowledge  of  the  mind 
in  action,  knowledge,  that  is,  of  the  facts  and  laws  which 
determine  what  any  human  being  will  think  and  feel  and 
do,  how  he  will  learn,  why  he  will  misunderstand,  when 
he  will  be  interested,  what  habits  he  will  form,  to  what 
sort  of  intellect  and  character  he  will  attain.  The  science 
of  the  mind  in  action  is  called  Dynamic  Psychology.^ 

If  we  ask  how  the  baby  comes  to  feel  pleasure  at  puU- 
mg  and  overturning  a  toy,  why  we  shut  our  eyes  when  an 
object  approaches  them,  or  why  we  feel  the  sun  to  be 
brighter  than  the  moon,  common  experience  readily  an- 
swers that  we  are  by  nature  provided  with  these  and 
other  tendencies  to  think,  feel  and  act  in  certain  ways, — 
that  apart  from  any  training  the  mind  of  its  own  accord 
or,  to  use  a  more  technical  word,  instinctively  behaves  in 
certain  ways  under  certain  conditions. 

For  very  many  of  the  mind's  connections  we  need  no 
other  immediate  explanation  than  that-  human  beings  are 
by  nature  so  organized  as  to  manifest  under  certain  cir- 

^  By  some  writers  it   is  called   functional  psychology. 

184 


Introduction  185 

cumstances  certain  thoughts,  feeHngs  and  acts.  Just  as 
human  beings  by  nature  possess  arms  and  hands,  so  they 
possess  nervous  systems  that  lead  them  to  reach  for 
objects  that  He  within  their  view  and  to  grasp  the  objects 
touched.  Just  as  they  are  given  by  nature  Hps  and 
tongues,  so  also  they  are  given  the  feeUngs  of  sweetness 
and  of  pleasure  thereat.  Just  as  infants  are  given  by 
nature  muscles  that  turn  the  head  and  eyes,  so  they  are 
given  by  nature  a  connection  between  seeing  a  light  and 
turning  the  head  and  eyes  toward  it. 

The  capacity  for  becoming  a  great  musician  or  a 
great  orator  or  a  great  mathematician  is  to  a  large  extent 
born  in  a  man  as  a  part  of  his  original  make-up.  For  all 
of  the  powers  of  sense,  intellect  and  character  there  are 
certainly  foundations  in  human  nature  apart  from  the 
training  which  life  gives.  Such  features  of  our  original 
make-up  are  due  to  the  same  causes  as  unlearned  re- 
actions. 

The  basis  of  a  mind's  action, — the  starting  point  of 
the  life  of  intellect,  feeling  and  conduct, — is  thus  its 
equipment  of  instincts  and  capacities,  its  native  or  un- 
learned tendencies. 

These  correspond  to  qualities  inherent  in  the  nervous 
system,  to  characteristics  of  and  connections  between  the 
neurones  which  are  provided  by  nature.  The  brain  is  so 
constructed  at  birth  and  so  grows  by  the  inner  impulse  of 
development  as  to  make  stimulation  of  the  neurones  end- 
ing in  the  retina  of  the  eye  arouse  sensations  of  light  and 
color,  to  make  the  afferent  nerve  cells  stimulated  by  the 
sight  of  a  light  connect  with  the  motor  cells  that  cause 
movements  of  the  head  and  eyes  toward  the  light.  That 
we  have,  apart  from  training,  a  vast  number  of  tendencies 
to  feel  and  to  act  in  certain  ways  in  response  to  certain 
situations,   corresponds   to   the   fact   that   by   the   inner 

13 


1 86  Dynamic  Psychology 

impulse  of  growth  the  brain  is  so  made  as  to  connect 
certain  afferent  neurones  with  certain  associative  and 
efferent  neurones.  That  we  have,  apart  from  training, 
an  equipment  of  capacities  or  possibilities  of  thought  and 
action,  corresponds  to  the  fact  that  the  brain  is  by  nature 
fitted  to  do  certain  work. 

Although  much  of  human  life  finds  its  explanation  in 
unlearned  tendencies, — in  the  mental  constitution  pro- 
vided by  nature, — still  more  must  be  attributed  to  learn- 
ing, experience,  training.  What  is  born  in  us  soon 
becomes  outweighed  by  what  happens  to  us.  The  brain, 
the  basis  of  mental  life,  is  primarily  an  organ  to  be  modi- 
fied; the  connections  between  its  neurones  are  constantly 
being  added  to  and  substracted  from;  it  is  literally  never 
the  same  at  any  two  moments  of  life.  The  mind  similarly 
is  constantly  adding  and  losing  habits,  increasing  this  and 
decreasing  that  capacity,  changing  with  every  influence 
that  plays  upon  it.  If  we  ask  how  the  baby  comes  to  feel 
pleasure  at  the  sight  of  its  mother,  why  we  shut  our  eyes 
when  told  to  do  so  or  why  we  feel  $30.00  to  be  more 
than  30  cents,  the  answer  must  be  sought  in  the  facts  of 
the  modification  of  connections  by  experience, — in  the 
laws  of  mental  acquisition. 

The  two  great  divisions  of  dynamic  psychology  will 
thus  treat  of:  (i)  The  power  of  nature,  manifested  in 
instincts  and  capacities.  (2)  The  power  of  nurture, 
manifested  in  habits  and  acquired  powers. 


CHAPTER  XII 

Original  Tendencies  to  Connections 
§  31.  Instincts 

The  Law  of  Instinct. — Instincts  have  been  defined 
as  all  connections  or  tendencies  to  connections  which  are 
unlearned, — are  in  us  apart  from  training  or  experience. 
The  inborn  constitution  of  a  human  being  provides  con- 
nections between  certain  situations  and  the  responses 
made  to  them.  The  line  of  least  resistance  in  any  case 
will  then,  apart  from  training,  be  toward  that  response 
connected  by  nature  with  the  situation.  This  fact  may 
be  called  the  law  of  instinct  or  the  larju  of  original  con- 
nections. It  may  be  stated  as  follows :  In  any  situation 
that  mental  state  or  act  will,  other  things  being  equal, 
take  place  which  is  by  original  nature  most  closely  con- 
nected with  the  situation;  or,  the  likelihood  that  any 
mental  state  or  act  will  occur  is,  other  things  being  equal, 
proportional  to  the  closeness  of  its  instinctive  connection 
with  the  situation  in  question. 

The  Attributes  of  Instincts. — That  an  instinctive 
tendency  is  born  in  a  human  being  as  a  result  of  the 
structure  of  his  nervous  system  need  not  mean  that  it  is 
present  at  birth.  Creeping,  standing  erect  and  laughing 
are  surely  instinctive,  but  appear  only  after  months  of 
life.  The  new  feelings  and  desires  which  characterize 
the  change  from  childhood  to  adult  life  in  the  years  from 
thirteen  to  sixteen  are  as  truly  instinctive  as  the  infant's 

187 


1 88  Dynamic  PsychoCogy 

fears.  The  date  of  appearance  of  each  instinct  is  a 
separate  problem. 

It  is  also  an  error  to  suppose  that  instinctive  acts  or 
feelings  always  jump  suddenly  into  being,  that  what  we 
do  not  learn  we  get  in  a  flash  as  an  instantaneous  inspira- 
tion from  nature.  On  the  contrary,  the  common  fact  is 
a  gradual  growth.  So,  for  instance,  with  the  fear  of 
strangers  in  young  infants  or  the  tendency  to  personal 
display  with  boys  from  fourteen  to  eighteen.  There  are 
all  degrees  of  gradualness  in  the  maturing  of  instincts. 

Again,  that  a  tendency  is  due  to  inborn  nervous  make- 
up need  not  mean  that  it  will  remain  all  through  life.  On 
the  contrary,  all  instincts  tend  to  die  out  if  not  given 
exercise,  and  may  be  killed  off, — or,  to  use  the  technical 
term,  inhibited, — when  circumstances  are  so  arranged 
that  their  manifestation  leads  to  discomfort.  Thus  chicks 
brought  up  in  isolation  from  the  parent  hen  do  not  show, 
after  ten  or  twelve  days,  the  tendency  to  follow  her ;  and 
children  are  taught  by  punishment  to  abandon  their 
original  tendency  to  grab  every  new  and  attractive 
object  which  they  see.  If  an  instinct  does  not  accord 
with  our  notions  of  desirable  behavior,  we  may  and  do  get 
rid  of  it.  If  it  is  advantageous,  we  must  take  pains  to 
provide  the  conditions  to  call  it  into  use  and  to  allow  its 
action  to  result  in  pleasure.  Instincts  are  a  fund  of  capi- 
tal loaned  to  us  by  nature  for  a  period,  not  given  outright. 
Only  on  the  condition  that  they  are  used  and  bring  satis- 
faction do  they  become  our  permanent  property. 

They  become  our  permanent  property  by  being  hard- 
ened into  habits.  It  is  a  general  law  of  mind  that  any  act 
or  thought  or  feeling  which  in  a  given  set  of  circum- 
stances results  in  satisfaction,  comfort  or  at  least 
indifferently,  is,  if  those  circumstances  recur,  more  likely 
to  appear  than  in  the  first  instance ;  and  so  on  increasingly 


Original  Connections  189 

with  more  repetitions.  The  transitory  instinct  thus  may 
become  a  permanent  habit.  The  child  who  instinctively 
says  baba  or  mama  in  its  mother's  presence  and  is  re- 
warded by  parental  attention  and  petting,  forms  the  habit 
of  calling  her  by  that  name.  The  chick,  in  the  ordinary 
course  of  events,  follows  the  hen  for  a  few  days  because 
of  instinct,  but  from  the  second  time  on  the  force  of  habit 
combines  with  that  of  inner  nature;  so  that  by  the  eighth 
or  tenth  day,  when  the  instinct,  if  left  to  itself,  would 
have  vanished,  the  chick  continues  the  now  habitual  act. 

It  is  common  in  books  of  natural  history  to  give,  as 
illustrations  of  instincts,  extreme  cases, — such  as  the 
building  of  the  honeycomb  by  bees  or  the  spinning  of  the 
web  of  the  spider, — where  the  action  is  definite  and  uni- 
form and  highly  specialized.  But  the  majority  of  in- 
stincts are  vague,  variable  and  rough-hewn.  The  chick 
instinctively  feeds  itself  by  pecking  at,  picking  up  and 
swallowing  small  objects;  but  so  far  as  the  instinct  goes, 
all  sorts  of  small  objects  fit  and  unfit, — tacks,  yarn,  and 
match  heads  as  well  as  seeds  and  bugs, — are  pecked  at. 
Experience,  not  instinct,  decides  the  particular  feeding- 
habits  into  which  the  vague  instinct  shall  eventually  grow. 

This  indefiniteness  and  lack  of  precise  adaptation  to 
any  one  particular  situation  is  important  because  it  allows 
the  instinctive  tendency  to  produce,  not  some  one  single 
habitual  act,  a  replica  of  itself,  but  a  number  of  different 
habits,  each  fitted  to  some  special  set  of  situations. 
Thus  the  vague,  instinctive  tendency  of  kittens  when  con- 
fined in  boxes  to  squeeze,  claw,  bite  and  pull,  gave  rise  to 
the  habits  of  pulling  a  loop  in  one  box,  turning  a  button 
in  another,  pulling  a  lever  in  another,  etc.  Thus  the 
general  instinctive  tendency  of  babies  to  take  and  pull 
and  twist  and  turn  and  drop  and  poke  all  things  grows 


190  Dynamic  Psychology 

into  the  multitude  of  habits  of  using  toys  and  common 
household  objects. 

Akin  to  the  naturalist's  error  of  neglecting  vague  and 
variable  instincts  is  the  psychologist's  error  of  neglecting 
general  tendencies.  The  tendency  of  children  to  do  all 
sorts  of  things  to  objects, — e.  g.,  to  pull,  turn,  drop,  pick 
up,  roll,  put  in  the  mouth,  bite,  pull  out  and  rub  a  new  toy, 
— is  as  truly  due  to  inborn  make-up  as  are  their  tendencies 
to  sneeze,  laugh  or  creep.  The  instincts  of  the  most  im- 
portance to  mental  growth  and  education  are  those 
general  tendencies  to  react  in  certain  ways  to  large  classes 
of  experiences  which  we  call  curiosity,  emulation  and 
physical  play. 

Instincts,  then,  may  be  delayed,  gradual  in  appearing, 
and  transitory;  they  are  modiiiahle,  hardening  into  habits 
or  becoming  abolished  by  disuse  or  inhibition;  they  are 
often  indefinite  and  general. 

Human  Instincts. — Too  little  is  known  about  the 
extent  to  which  human  behavior  is  based  upon  instincts 
to  allow  their  enumeration.  But  even  with  our  present 
lack  of  knowledge  the  list  of  demonstrated  instincts  is  a 
long  one.  It  takes  Professor  James  thirty-seven  pages 
to  list  and  describe  them.  Probably  the  list  will  grow 
with  further  study,  since  many  actions  which  common 
sense  credits  to  acquisition  are  really  the  gift  of  nature. 
E.  g.,  standing  alone,  walking  and  retrieving  (getting  an 
object  and  bringing  it  back)  appear  in  babies  who  are 
given  no  incitement  or  assistance.  The  manifestations 
of  grief, — puckering  the  lips,  drawing  down  the  face  and 
a  prolonged  wail, — appear  in  babies  at  the  stimulus  of 
harsh  speech  or  ugly  looks,  although  such  speech  or  looks 
have  never  been  followed  by  any  unpleasant  consequence. 
The  more  carefully  mental  development  is  investigated. 


Original  Connections  191 

the  more  we  find  human  life  everywhere  rooted  in  in- 
stincts. 

Especially  noteworthy  in  human  instinctive  equipment 
is  the  tendency  which  I  shall  call  miiltipie  reaction  to  a 
single  stimulus.  The  reason  for  this  name  will  appear 
from  the  following  illustrations :  The  baby  confronted 
by  a  small  novel  object,  not  only  reaches  and  takes  it; 
he  also,  as  has  already  been  noted,  puts  it  in  his  mouth, 
takes  it  out,  turns  it  over,  drops  it,  picks  it  up,  rolls  it 
around,  rubs  it  against  his  nose,  looks  at  it  in  one  way, 
then  in  another,  holds  it  up,  holds  it  down,  and  so  on. 
Again  the  baby  makes  not  a  few  distinct  cries  as  does  the 
dog  or  cat,  but  a  rich  variety  of  prattle,  containing  all 
sorts  of  combinations  of  sounds.  By  means  of  these 
multiple  reactions  to  single  stimuli  the  field  of  experimen- 
tation with  things  is  far  greater  in  man  than  in  any  other 
animal.  i\Ian,  who  does  so  many  things  to  so  many 
things,  has  the  opportunity  to  develop  a  far  wider  range 
of  habits.  Out  of  the  fumbling  and  prattle  of  the  baby 
grow  the  play  and  speech  of  the  child,  and  later  the  work 
and  invention  and  thought  of  the  man. 

§  32.  Capacities 

The  Attributes  of  Capacities. — All  the  character- 
istics of  instincts  summarized  in  §  31  belong  to  the 
subtler  possibilities  of  mental  life  which  are  called 
capacities.  For  instance,  the  capacity  for  managmg  men 
is  delayed  in  comparison  with  that  for  acting  or  literary 
production.  Apparently  the  capacity  for  seeing  blue 
develops  later  than  that  for  seeing  other  colors.  Capaci- 
ties of  motor  control  and  of  sense  perception  have  been 
proved  to  mature  gradually.  It  is  a  common  and  likely 
belief  that  the  capacity  for  rote-memorizing  is  transitory, 


192  Dynamic  Psychology 

weakening  somewhat  in  spite  of  the  tremendous  amount 
of  training  which  -it  receives.  The  capacity  to  adopt  new 
points  of  view  seems  to  be  very  often  lost  by  the  age  of 
twenty-five.  When  their  exercise  is  attended  by  pleasant 
results,  capacities  harden  into  actual  powers,  just  as 
instincts  harden  into  habits.  The  child  with  musical 
capacity,  wisely  trained,  thus  becomes  capable  of  actual 
achievement  in  music.  But  disuse  will  as  surely  destroy 
the  capacity,  and  the  fact  of  a  capacity  positively  stamped 
out  by  unpleasant  results  is  one  of  the  commonest  facts 
in  human  life.  Many  men  would  have  been  great  generals 
had  there  been  wars  enough.  Most  men  could  have 
been  first-rate  bullies  and  vagabonds,  most  women  could 
have  been  first-rate  coquettes,  had  not  the  capacities  been 
stifled  from  childhood 

It  is  fortunately  true  that  useful  capacities  are  not 
likely  to  be  inhibited  even  when  home  and  school  offer 
them  little  encouragement.  For  the  capacity  itself  begets 
interest,  and  mere  achievement  is  often  its  sufficient 
reward.  Sooner  or  later  the  boy  or  girl  who  has  a 
capacity  which  the  world  needs  will  probably  transform 
it  into  actual  power  and  achievement.  It  is  risky  to 
console  oneself  for  lack  of  success  by  the  claim  that  one 
had  as  much  capacity  as  anyone  else  but  was  not  en- 
couraged. There  are,  however,  some  sad  cases  of  noble 
capacities  starved  and  beaten  to  death. 

The  Specialization  of  Capacities. — Like  instincts, 
capacities  are  often  indefinite  and  generalized.  Men  are 
not  born  with  the  capacity  to  learn  English  or  German, 
but  to  learn  a  language.  Common  belief,  and  many 
psychologists,  however,  make  here  an  error  just  the 
reverse  of  that  made  concerning  the  same  feature  of 
instincts.  In  the  latter  case  they  overestimate  the  definite- 
ness  and  specialization  of  inborn  nature;  in  the  case  of 


Original  Connections  193 

capacities  they  overestimate  the  indefiniteness  and  gen- 
eralization. These  instincts  of  possibility  are  much  more 
specialized  than  we  commonly  think  or  than  the  older 
books  on  psychology  acknowledge.  One  may  have  the 
capacity  to  appreciate  music  without  the  capacity  to 
appreciate  other  forms  of  art ;  one  may  be  a  most  expert 
calculator  with  numerical  problems  and  nearly  an  idiot 
in  other  fields  of  knowledge ;  a  most  gifted  reasoner  in 
mathematics  was  easily  deceived  by  a  spiritualist's  tricks ; 
the  hardest-headed  men  of  business  are  often  silly  in  their 
superstitions ;  a  most  gifted  and  inventive  scholar  may 
be  hopelessly  stupid  about  the  simplest  bit  of  machinery. 

§  33.  Further  Attributes  of  Original  Tendencies 

Individual  Differences  in  Inborn  Nature. — Nature 
does  not  provide  each  human  being  with  the  same  capital 
of  instincts  and  capacities.  Men  are  no  more  created 
alike  in  their  mental  constitutions  than  they  are  treated 
alike  by  their  surroundings.  Any  instinct  is  possessed 
by  different  individuals  in  different  degrees  of  strength. 
One  is  gentle,  one  harsh,  one  cruel,  one  a  Nero,  One 
strikes  back  only  when  teased  for  an  hour,  another  at  the 
least  offense.  Indeed  there  is  probably  no  instinct  which 
is  not  entirely  lacking  in  some  individuals.  Even  that 
one  which  is  the  first  necessity  for  living,  the  suckling 
instinct,  does  not  always  appear.  So  also  any  capacity 
is  possessed  by  different  individuals  in  different  degrees 
of  strength,  the  variation  here  being  even  greater  than  in 
the  case  of  instincts.  Some  men  are  born  to  be  intel- 
lectual giants,  some  to  be  idiots.  This  is  universally 
recognized  only  in  such  obvious  cases  as  the  capacities 
for  music  and  poetry,  but  it  is  equally  true  of  the  capacity 
to  add  or  to  multiply,  to  read  or  to  spell,  to  succeed  in 
science  or  in  affairs.     Wherever  measurements  have  been 


194  Dynamic  Psychology 

made  of  mental  capacities,  individual  differences  are  the 
rule.  In  the  keenness  of  the  senses,  in  the  quickness  and 
accuracy  of  perception,  in  the  vividness  of  imagery,  in  the 
permanence  of  memories,  in  the  appreciation  of  relations, 
— everywhere  men  are  by  nature  different.  It  is  true  that 
when  thought  of  in  comparison  with  other  animals,  men 
seem  closely  alike, — that  amongst  all  men  there  is  a  gen- 
eral family  resemblance.  The  differences  amongst  men 
seem  small  in  comparison  with  the  much  greater  differ- 
ence between  men  and  animals.  But  they  exist,  and  in 
sufficient  amount  to  explain  a  great  part  of  the  differences 
in  human  achievements. 

The  original  mental  equipment  of  any  human  in- 
dividual is  thus  to  be  regarded  as  the  result  of  two  fac- 
tors ;  ( I )  a  fund  of  instincts  and  capacities  which  he  has 
in  common  with  other  members  of  the  human  species, 
and  which  belongs  to  him  as  one  of  that  species,  and 
(2)  an  additional  fund  which  belongs  to  him  alone  as  an 
individual.  It  is  most  convenient  to  regard  as  the  com- 
mon fund,  that  which  the  ordinary,  average,  common 
man  possesses  and  to  regard  any  individual's  special  share 
as  being  either  plus  or  minus.  The  common  fund  is  then, 
not  that  possessed  by  all,  but  that  possessed  by  the  gen- 
eral type  of  the  species.  From  this  type  an  individual 
may  deviate  in  either  direction. 

The  Source  of  Original  Nature. — So  far  the  inborn 
equipment  of  instincts  and  capacities  has  been  attributed 
to  the  constitution  of  the  nervous  system  as  determined 
by  nature.  We  have  now  to  ask  what  laws  of  nature 
control  its  distribution.  These  are  the  law  of  heredity 
and  its  supplement,  the  law  of  variation. 

The  mental  constitution  given  by  nature  to  any  man  is 
that  of  his  ancestors  plus  many  or  few  of  the  variations 
which   occur   in   all    living   things.    The    special   share 


Original  Connections  195 

characteristic  of  any  individual, — his  deviation  from  the 
general  type  of  the  species, — is  his  inheritance  from  his 
immediate  ancestry ;  the  common  fund  is  his  inheritance 
from  his  remote  ancestry,  the  human  race  as  a  whole. 

Much  of  this  common  fund  dates  its  origin  farther 
back  than  the  human  species.  Just  as  the  human  back- 
bone can  be  traced  back  to  the  notochord  of  Amphioxus, 
or  the  human  kidney  to  the  pronephros  of  the  fishes,  so 
many  instincts  and  capacities  can  be  traced  back  to  our 
animal  forebears.  Scratching  the  head  in  perplexity  is 
as  old  as  the  monkeys ;  creeping  has  a  still  more  remote 
origin ;  the  capacity  to  modify  instincts  into  habits  is  an 
inheritance  fully  as  old  as  the  backbone.  We  are  by 
nature  a  part  of  a  species  thousands  of  years  old, — a  part, 
too,  of  the  animal  kingdom  as  a  whole.  In  mind  as  in 
body,  man  bears  the  marks  of  his  long  ascent. 
r  The  special  characteristics  of  an  individual  are  partly 
^due  to  normal  variation  and  partly  to  the  characteristics 
of  his  immediate  ancestors.  The  second  factor  is  by  far 
the  greater.  Measurements  of  the  resemblance  of  par- 
ents to  offspring  and  of  brother  to  brother  prove  that,  in 
the  same  way  and  for  the  same  reason  that  tall  parents 
have  tall  children  or  dark-haired  parents  dark-haired 
children,  so  also  stupid  parents  have  stupid  children,  hot- 
tempered  parents  have  hot-tempered  children,  and  musical 
parents,  musical  children. 

Original  mental  make-up  is  thus  determined  by 
heredity,  slightly  supplemented  by  chance  variation. 
To  it  prehuman  species  contribute ;  the  thousands  of  gen- 
erations of  savage  and  prehistoric  man  add  their  shares ; 
its  special  features  in  any  individual  are  the  bequests  of 
his  nearer  ancestry.  On  this  foundation  of  original 
make-up,  nurture  builds.  The  bequests  of__heredity_are 
invested  and  made  productive  by  the  environment.     In- 


196  Dynamic  Psychology 

stincts  and  capacities  are  modified  and  transformed  by 
experience.  The  study  of  the  laws  by  which  this  modi- 
fication takes  place  will  occupy  us  in  the  next  six  chapters. 

The  Control  of  Original  Tendencies. — Although 
instincts  and  capacities  are,  in  and  of  themselves,  removed 
from  human  control,  their  later  modifications  are  not. 
They  are  a  fund  of  capital  given  by  nature  which  may  be 
invested  in  all  sorts  of  ways.  We  make  the  most  of 
nature's  gifts  by  (i)  encouraging  the  useful  instincts 
and  capacities,  (2)  inhibiting  the  harmful  ones,  and  (3) 
by  so  arranging  life's  work  as  to  have  natural  tendencies 
assist  rather  than  oppose  it. 

(i)   Useful  instincts  and  capacities  are  encouraged: 

(a)  by  being  given  exercise  as  soon  as  they  appear  and 
frequently  enough  to  result  in  the  formation  of  habits 
before  the  instinct  wanes,  and  (b)  by  making  their  con- 
sequences pleasurable. 

(2)  Harmful  instincts  and  capacities  are  weakened 
or  inhibited:  (a)  by  depriving  them  of  exercise,  by  not 
allowing  the  situations  which  would  evoke  them  to  appear, 

(b)  by  forming,  before  the  tendency  is  fixed,  the  habit 
of  meeting  the  situation  in  some  other  way,  and  (c)  by 
making  their  consequences  intolerable. 

(3)  No  general  answer  can  be  given  to  the  question 
suggested  by  (3),  but  one  or  two  illustrations  will  show 
the  gain  to  be  everywhere  expected  from  recognition  of 
and  allowance  for  natural  tendencies.  A  man  wanted  a 
pile  of  rocks  removed.  He  taught  his  boys  to  play  that 
there  was  a  fire  in  a  hole  some  distance  away  and  that  the 
rocks  were  pails  of  water  and  they  the  firemen.  In  a  few 
days  not  a  rock  was  left.  At  a  city  playground  the  older 
boys  bullied  and  teased  the  younger  ones.  The  sagacious 
director  picked  out  several  leaders  from  among  the  older 
boys  and  appointed  them  policemen  to  enforce  fairness 


Original  Connections  197 

and  to  protect  the  ''little  kids."  The  instincts  of  activity 
and  combativeness  and  emulation  were  now  turned  to 
useful  ends.  Bullying  the  small  boys  gave  way  to  gov- 
erning the  large  ones.  Judge  Lindsey  of  Denver  turns 
youthful  offenders  into  arms  of  the  law  by  directing  the 
instinctive  love  of  excitement  into  the  channel  of  detective 
work  against  men  selling  liquor  to  minors. 

The  individual  differences  in  inborn  original  nature 
may  be  prevented  from  waste  and  made  to  do  service  by 
specialization  in  the  home,  in  school,  in  business — in  fact 
everywhere.  Since  men  are  different,  they  are  adapted 
to  different  careers  in  life.  By  finding  out  their  individual 
constitutions  and  directing  their  energies  in  appropriate 
channels,  we  may  make  them  happier  and  more  useful, 
may  preserve  them  from  unmeaning  instruction  and 
profitless  tasks  and  incite  them  to  service  which  they  can 
do  better  than  anyone  else. 

Exercises 

1.  Pugnacity,  climbing,  walking,  emulation,  jealousy,  biting 
the  finger  nails,  curiosity,  and  manipulation  or  constructiveness  are 
commonly  quoted  cases  of  instinctive  tendencies.  What  are  the 
situations  and  the  responses,  the  connections  of  which  constitute 
these  several  instincts?  E.  g.,  pugnacity  means  the  response, 
'blow,'  to  the  situation,  'being  injured  or  interfered  with,'  and  the 
response,  'enjoyment,'  to  the  situation,  'fighting,' 

2.  Of  the  instincts  named  in  question  i,  name  one  that  is  de- 
layed, one  that  is  transitory,  one  that  is  common  to  man  and  the 
lower  animals,  one  that  is  specially  characteristic  of  the  male 
sex,  one  that  is  most  useful,  one  that  is  often  the  origin  of  crimi- 
nal  acts. 

3.  Give  two  illustrations  from  history  or  from  your  own  ac- 
quaintance of  a  high  degree  of  capacity  coupled  with  only  mod- 
erate attainments  in  other  directions. 

4.  Just  how  would  you  get  rid  of  the  tendency  in  a  child  to 
torment  animals?     After  writing  your  answer  read  again   (2)  of 


198  Dynamic  Psychology 

page  196  and  note  which  methods  of  those  mentioned  there  your 
plan  involves. 

5.  Which   is   rarer,   the  capacity  to    form  percepts   or  the 
capacity  to  form  abstract  ideas? 

6.  Illustrate  individual  differences  (a)  in  the  case  of  sensa- 
tion, and  (b)   in  the  case  of  imagery. 

7.  Illustrate  race  heredity,  i.  e.,  the  inheritance  of  certain 
mental  qualities  by  a  race  as  a  whole. 

Experiment  17.  Instincts  of  the  Reilex  Type. — Have  a  friend 
hold  about  half  or  three  quarters  of  an  inch  in  front  of  his  eyes,  a 
piece  of  glass,  at  least  an  eighth  of  an  inch  thick.  Throw  directly 
at  his  eye  a  bit  of  cork  or  light  wood,  or  a  small  wad  of  paper, 
so  aimed  that,  but  for  the  glass,  it  would  hit  the  eye  and  at  a  fair 
rate  of  speed.     Of  course  he  winks. 

Then  inform  him  that  you  will  repeat  the  process,  and  that 
since  it  is  impossible  that  anything  can  hit  his  eye  he  is  to  keep  it 
wide  open.  Throw  as  before.  Is  the  eye  kept  open?  Repeat 
nine  times  more,  noting  and  recording  each  time  the  action  of  the 
eyelids. 

Experiment  18.  The  ModiHahility  of  Instincts. — With  suffi- 
cient time  the  instinctive  closing  of  the  eye  can  be  modified  and 
even  inhibited.  The  experiment  may  take  many  trials.  If  it  is 
made,  a  tube  like  a  pea-shooter,  but  one  half  inch  in  diameter 
and  not  over  eight  inches  long,  and  a  sufficient  number  of  bits  of 
cork  about  a  quarter  of  an  inch  in  diameter,  should  be  provided. 
Record  the  action  of  the  eyelids  at  each  trial,  and  continue 
the  experiment  until  the  person  can  hold  the  eyelids  unmoved 
during  ten  successive  trials. 

References 

A.  James,  Briefer  Course,  XXV. 
Titchener,  Outline,  §§  35,  66-67. 
Angell,  Psychology,  XV.,  XVI. 

B.  James,  Principles,  XXIV. 


CHAPTER  XIII 

The  Law  of  Association 

§  34.  The  Growth  of  Instincts  into  Habits 

Under  the  influence  of  the  outside  conditions  that 
form  human  nature,  instincts  and  capacities  grow  into  an 
almost  countless  multitude  of  habits  of  thought,  feeling 
and  action.  On  the  basis  of  our  many  unlearned  ten- 
dencies, we  learn  still  more  numerous  acts  and  ideas.  To 
original  equipment  is  added  the  store  of  knowledge  and 
skill  which  we  acquire.  How  this  modification  and  de- 
velopment of  instincts  and  capacities  into  the  fullness  of 
mental  life  is  brought  to  pass  is  the  subject  of  this  chapter. 

Some  Concrete  Cases. — A  simple  case  of  the  develop- 
ment of  habits  from  instincts  will  introduce  us  best  to  the 
laws  that  govern  this  process.  A  child  eight  months  old 
was  kept  an  hour  or  so  each  day  in  a  chair  beside  a  win- 
dow. To  a  cord  hung  from  above  were  attached  some  of 
his  playthings.  His  instinctive  tendency  led  him  to  pull 
at,  poke  and  finger  these.  By  a  specially  vigorous  pull 
to  one  side  the  toy  would  be  swung  against  the  window 
glass.  This  sort  of  a  pull  occurred  occasionally  among  the 
many  acts  which  resulted  from  his  instinctive  play.  It 
noticeably  attracted  the  child's  attention  and  aroused  the 
expression  of  satisfaction.  As  time  went  on  he  did  it 
oftener  and  oftener  until  swinging  the  toy  against  the 
glass  became  a  regular  feature  of  his  play.  The  vague 
instinctive  pulling  had   given   birth  to  a   special   habit. 

199 


200  Dynamic  Psychology 

The  particiilar  act  of  pulling  in  a  certain  way  had  been 
selected  from  the  many  acts  performed  and  had  been 
associated  more  and  more  closely  with  the  situation 
'being  in  that  chair  in  sight  of  that  string  of  toys/  The 
force  which  strengthened  the  connection  between  that 
particular  act  and  the  situation  was  not  only  its  repetition, 
but  also  the  resultant  satisfaction,  for  other  acts  done  as 
frequently  at  the  beginning  faded  out  and  did  not  result 
in  any  new  habits.  This  will  be  still  clearer  from  two 
illustrations  drawn  from  animal  life. 


Fig.  74. 

'Tf  we  make  a  pen,  as  shown  in  Fig.  74,  and  put  but  a 
chick,  say  six  days  old,  in  at  ^,  it  is  confronted  by  a  situa- 
tion which  is,  briefly,  'the  sense-impression  or  feeling  of 
the  confining  surfaces,  an  uncomfortable  feeling  due  to 
the  absence  of  other  chicks  and  of  food,  and  perhaps  the 
sense-impressions  of  the  chirping  of  the  chicks  outside.' 
It  reacts  in  this  situation  by  running  around,  making  loud 
sounds,  and  jumping  at  the  walls.  When  it  jumps  at 
the  walls,  it  has  uncomfortable  feelings  of  effort ;  when 
it  runs  to  B,  or  C,  or  D,  it  has  a  continuation  of  the  feel- 
ings of  the  situation  just  described;  when  it  runs  to  E,  it 


The  Law  of  Association 


20I 


gets  out,  feels  the  pleasure  of  being-  with  the  other  chicks, 
of  the  taste  of  food,  of  being  in  its  usual  habitat.  If  from 
time  to  time  you  put  it  in  again,  you  find  that  it  jumps  and 
runs  to  B,  C,  and  D  less  and  less  often,  until  finally  its 
only  act  is  to  run  to  D,  E,  and  out.  It  has,  to  use  techni- 
cal psychological  terms,  formed  an  association  between 
the  sense-impression  or  situation  due  to  its  presence  at 
A  and  the  act  of  going  to  E.  In  common  language  it  has 
learned  to  go  to  E  when  put  at  A — has  learned  the  way 
out.  The  decrease  in  the  useless  runnings  and  jumping 
and  standing  still  finds  a  representative  in  the  decreasing 
amount  of  time  taken  by  the  chick  to  escape.  The  two 
chicks  that  formed  this  particular  association,  for  exam- 
ple, averaged  one  about  three  and  the  other  about  four 
minutes  for  their  first  five  trials,  but  came  finally  to 
escape  invariably  within  five  or  six  seconds. 

The  following  schemes  represent  the  animal's  behavior 
(i)  during  an  early  trial  and  (2)  after  the  association 
has  been  fully  formed — after  it  has  learned  perfectly  the 
way  out. 


(I) 

Situation 

Impulses 

Acts 

Resulting  Feelings 

As  described 

To   chirp,    etc. 

Corresponding 

Continuation  of  situa- 

above. 

To   jump   at   various     to 

impulses. 

tion. 

places. 

Fatigue. 

To  run  to  B. 

"     "    "   c. 

"         »        -      £,, 

( 

Pleasure   of    company. 

"      "     "    E. 

J 

"    food. 

1 

"            "    surround- 

( 

ings. 

(2) 

Situation 

Impulses 

Acts 

Resulting  Feelings 

Same  as  (i). 

To    run  to    E. 

Corresponding 
to  impulse. 

Pleasurable  as  above. 

If  we  take  a  box  twenty  by  fifteen  by  twelve  inches, 
replace  its  cover  and  front  side  by  bars  an  inch  apart,  and 
14 


202  Dynamic  Psychology 

make  in  this  front  side  a  door  arranged  so  as  to  fall  open 
when  a  wooden  button  inside  is  turned  from  a  vertical 
to  a  horizontal  position,  we  shall  have  means  to  observe 
another  simple  case  of  learning.  A  kitten,  three  to  six 
months  old,  if  put  in  this  box  when  hungry,  a  bit  of  fish 
being  left  outside,  reacts  as  follows:  It  tries  to  squeeze 
through  between  the  bars,  claws  at  the  bars  and  at  loose 
things  in  and  out  of  the  box,  reaches  its  paws  out  between 
the  bars,  and  bites  at  its  confining  walls.  Some  one  of 
all  these  promiscuous  clawings,  squeezings,  and  bitings 
turns  round  the  wooden  button,  and  the  kitten  gains 
freedom  and  food.  By  repeating  the  experience  again 
and  again,  the  animal  gradually  comes  to  omit  all  the 
useless  clawings,  etc.,  and  to  manifest  only  the  particular 
impulse  (e.  g.,  to  claw  hard  at  the  top  of  the  button  with 
the  paw,  or  to  push  against  one  side  of  it  with  the  nose) 
which  has  resulted  successfully.  It  turns  the  button 
round  without  delay  whenever  put  in  the  box.  It  has 
formed  an  association  between  the  situation,  'confinement 
in  a  box  of  a  certain  appearance,'  and  the  impulse  to  the 
act  of  clawing  at  a  certain  part  of  that  box  in  a  certain 
definite  way.  Popularly  speaking,  it  has  learned  to  open 
a  door  by  turning  a  button.  To  the  uninitiated  observer 
the  behavior  of  the  six  kittens  that  thus  freed  themselves 
from  such  a  box  would  seem  wonderful  and  quite  unlike 
their  ordinary  accomplishments  of  finding  their  way  to 
their  food,  beds,  etc.,  but  the  reader  will  realize  that  the 
activity  is  of  just  the  same  sort  as  that  displayed  by  the 
chick  in  the  pen.  A  certain  situation  arouses,  by  virtue 
of  accident,  or,  more  often,  instinctive  equipment  certain 
impulses  and  corresponding  acts.  One  of  these  happens 
to  be  an  act  appropriate  to  secure  freedom.  It  is  stamped  in 
in  connection  with  that  situation.     Here  the  act  is  *claw- 


The  Law  of  Association  203 

ing  at  a  certain  spot'  instead  of  'running  to  £/  and  is 
selected  from  a  far  greater  number  of  useless  acts."^ 

The  Law  of  Habit-Formation. — The  characteristics 
of  these  cases  of  learning  are  that  from  the  instinctive 
tendencies  present  the  one  which  brings  satisfaction  is 
selected  and  is  associated  more  and  more  closely  with  the 
situation  until  it  alone  is  the  reaction  to  that  situation. 
The  tendencies  which  bring  discomfort  are  more  and 
more  dissociated  from  that  situation  until  they  may  be 
totally  eliminated  and  never  appear  in  response  to  it. 
Selection  and  Association  best  describe  the  process.  Sat- 
isfaction best  describes  the  motive  force  in  it.  The  result 
is  that  a  set  of  special  habits  or  connections  between  each 
particular  situation  and  its  fitting  response  takes  the  place 
of  the  original  vague  instinct. 

Instincts  are  thus  modified  into  habits  in  accordance 
with  the  law  that  any  act  which  in  a  given  situation  pro- 
duces satisfaction  becomes  associated  with  that  situation, 
so  that  when  the  situation  recurs  the  act  is  more  likely 
than  before  to  recur  also.  Conversely,  any  act  which  in 
a  given  situation  produces  discomfort  becomes  dissociated 
from  that  situation,  so  that  when  the  situation  recurs  the 
act  is  less  likely  than  before  to  recur. 

The  case  is  the  same  when  the  response  to  the  situation 
is  a  thought  or  feeling  instead  of  an  act.  So  the  law 
may  be  stated,  any  mental  state  or  act  which,  etc. 

§  35.  The  Formation  of  Connections  in  General 

Habits  Formed  From  Previous  Habits. — The  same 
process  of  learning  occurs  when  the  development  is  not 
from  mere  instinctive  tendencies  but  from  these  as  modi- 
fied by  previous  training.     The  baby  who  has  formed  the 

^  E.  L.  Thorndike  in  the  Woods  Holl  Biological  Lectures  for 
1899,  pp.  70-74- 


204  Dynamic  Psychology 

habit  of  swinging  a  toy  against  the  window-pane  may 
later,  as  an  outgrowth  of  that  habit,  form  the  new  habit 
of  swinging  the  toy  rhythmically.  The  process  is  again 
simply  the  selection  of  the  rhythmical  movement  from 
amongst  the  many  sorts  made  because  of  its  relatively 
greater  amount  of  resulting  satisfaction.  We  may  there- 
fore widen  the  statement  of  our  law  and  say : — In  any 
situation  the  thoughts,  feelings  and  acts  manifested  will 
be  those  to  which  instinctive  tendencies  or  capacities  and 
also  previously  formed  habits  impel  one.  Of  all  these 
the  one  which  succeeds  best,  results  in  the  most  satisfac- 
tion, will  be  associated  with  that  situation. 

Some  Additions  to  the  Law  of  Habit  Formation. — 
In  some  cases  the  results  of  original  tendencies  and  pre- 
vious learning  will  be  to  furnish,  not  a  number  of  acts, — 
some  more,  some  less,  some  not  at  all  fitted  to  the  situa- 
tion,— but  to  arouse  directly  the  one  suitable  act.  For 
instance,  the  chicken  a  few  days  old  in  the  presence  of 
a  worm  does  not  pick  at  it  in  many  different  ways,  some 
quite  useless ;  he  at  once  seizes  it.  The  baby  may  suckle 
at  once  when  the  breast  is  offered  to  it.  In  such  cases 
the  selection  is  of  one  act  from  one  only.  The  formation 
of  the  habit  means  as  before  the  strengthening  of  one  con- 
nection, though  not  the  exclusion  of  other  connections. 

Resulting  satisfaction  is  not  always  a  sine  qua  non  in 
the  formation  of  connections.  Mere  repetition  strength- 
ens the  connection  between  situation  and  response,  pro- 
vided no  positive  discomfort  results.  The  child  who  says 
dog  at  the  sight  of  the  letters  dog  often  enough,  will 
learn  to  do  so  even  though  he  has  never  obtained  any 
observable  benefit  from  so  doing.  The  law  then  may  be 
stated,  'which  in  a  given  situation  does  not  produce  dis- 
comfort/ The  greater  the  satisfaction  produced,  how- 
ever, the  more  firmly  will  the  connection  be  made  between 


The  Law  of  Association  205 

the  response  and  its  situation,  and  vice  versa.  Thus 
amended  the  law  becomes: — Any  mental  state  or  act 
which  in  a  given  situation  does  not  produce  discomfort 
becomes  associated  with  that  situation,  so  that  when  the 
situation  recurs  the  mental  state  or  act  is  more  likely  than 
before  to  recur  also ;  the  greater  the  satisfaction  produced 
by  it,  the  stronger  the  association.  Conversely,  any  mental 
state  or  act  which  in  a  given  situation  does  produce  dis- 
comfort becomes  disconnected  from  that  situation,  so 
that  when  the  situation  recurs  the  mental  state  or  act  is 
less  likely  than  before  to  recur  also;  the  greater  the  dis- 
comfort produced  by  it,  the  weaker  the  association 
becomes. 

From  another  point  of  view  the  law  may  be  stated  as : 
In  any  situation  the  mental  state  or  act  mill  take  place 
which  has  resulted  from  that  situation  oftenest  and  with 
the  most  satisfaction. 

The  law  of  habit  formation  and  the  law  of  instinctive 
connection  may  be  combined  into  one  as  follows :  The 
likelihood  that  any  mental  state  or  act  will  occur  in 
response  to  any  situation  is  in  proportion  to  the  closeness 
of  its  inborn  connection  therewith,  to  the  frequency  of  its 
connection  therewith,  and  to  the  amount  of  satisfaction 
resulting.  This  may  be  called  the  Law  of  Least  Resist- 
ance in  Mental  Life. 

The  Real  Situation  May  Be  More  or  Less  Than  the 
Apparent  Situation. — The  word  situation  in  the  law 
of  instinct  and  the  law  of  association  must  be  taken 
broadly.  The  connection  made  is  not  necessarily  with 
one  particular  circumstance  or  thing,  but  often  is  with  the 
total  state  of  affairs  felt.  Thus  the  chicken  in  the  pen 
whose  behavior  was  described  in  §  34,  did  not  make  con- 
nection with  the  situation,  'sight  of  confining  walls,'  but 
rather  with  the  situation,  sight  of  confining  walls  plus 


206 


Dynamic  Psychology 


feelings  of  hunger  plus  absence  of  sight  of  companions 
plus  sound  of  companions  at  a  distance  plus  absence  of 
food.'  The  same  particular  circumstance  may  in  one  set 
of  surrounding  circumstances, — in  one  mental  context, — 
connect  with  one  act  and  in  a  different  mental  context, 
with  another.  Had  the  chick  been  put  into  a  pen  with 
other  chicks  and  food,  it  would  have  played  about  and 
pecked  at  the  food  and  only  occasionally  jumped  at  the 
confining  walls.  The  sight  of  the  figures  below  (Fig.  75) 
would  call  up  in  a  school-boy's  mind  the  thoughts  of  a 
cube  and  a  sphere  if  felt  in  connection  with  the  surround- 


FiG.  75. 

ings  of  his  school  room  and  geometry  class,  while  if  felt 
in  connection  with  the  ordinary  sights  of  street  or  play- 
room they  would  call  up  the  thought  of  a  box  and  a  ball. 

The  situation  may  then  be  the  whole  state  of  mind,  the 
circumstances  or  thing  in  its  context,  the  entire  'attitude' 
or  'set'  of  mental  life,  as  well  as  the  particular  fact  in  its 
focus. 

On  the  other  hand  the  connection  made  may  be  with 
some  very  small  element  of  the  apparent  situation.  In 
learning  to  swim  the  connections  are  not  made  with  the 
color,  temperature,  taste  and  smell  of  the  water,  but  only 
with  the  feelings  of  non-solidity,  of  suspension  and  of 


The  Law  of  Association  207 

sinking.  In  learning  to  play  a  piece  on  the  piano  the 
connections  are  not  made  with  the  color  of  the  instrument, 
the  quality  of  the  room's  atmosphere  and  the  size  of  the 
music  book,  but  with  the  position  of  the  notes  on  the  scale, 
the  form  of  the  notes,  the  feelings  of  one's  arms  and 
fingers  and  the  sounds  produced. 

The  facts  that  the  connection  may  be  made  not  only 
with  the  apparent  situation,  but  also  with  it  plus  the  co- 
operating attitude  of  the  mind  as  a  whole  or  with  it  minus 
many  or  all  but  one  of  its  elements  may  be  stated  as  the 
laws  (1)  of  the  Mind's  Set  and  (2)  of  Partial  Activity. 
These  are : — 

(i)  The  likelihood  that  any  mental  state  or  act  will 
occur  in  response  to  any  apparent  situation  is  in  propor- 
tion to  the  closeness  of  its  connection  with  the  total  set  of 
the  mind  at  the  time  as  well  as  with  the  apparent  situation 
itself, 

(2)  The  likelihood  that  any  mental  state  or  act  will 
occur  in  response  to  any  apparent  situation  is  in  propor- 
tion to  the  closeness  of  its  connection  with  the  apparent 
situation  or  some  element  or  part  thereof. 

Recency  and  Intensity  of  Connections. — Other  fac- 
tors besides  the  results  of  a  connection  and  its  frequency 
determine  the  likelihood  of  its  operation,  namely,  recency 
and  intensity.  For  the  sake  of  simplicity  these  factors 
may  remain  undescribed  until  later  chapters.  An  ade- 
quate statement  of  the  entire  Law  of  Association  would 
be :     The  likelihood  that  any  mental  state  or  act 

WILL  OCCUR  IN  RESPONSE  TO  ANY  SITUATION  IS  IN  PRO- 
PORTION TO  THE  FREQUENCY,  RECENCY,  INTENSITY  AND 
RESULTING  SATISFACTION  OF  ITS  CONNECTION  WITH  THAT 
SITUATION  OR  SOME  PART  OF  IT  AND  WITH  THE  TOTAL 
FRAME  OF  MIND  IN  WHICH  THE  SITUATION  IS  FELT. 

The  Varieties  of  Connections. — The  law  of  associa- 


208  Dynamic  Psychology 

tion  applies  not  only  to  the  growth  of  connections  between 
sensory  situations  and  responses  to  them,  but  also  to  the 
growth  of  all  the  forms  of  connections  described  in 
Chapter  I. 

Connections  between  (i)  physical  stimuli  and  mental 
states,  between  (2)  one  mental  state  and  another,  between 
(3)  ideas  and  acts — all  are  formed  in  accordance  with 
the  law  of  association.  Illustrations  of  (i)  need  some 
preliminary  explanation  and  will  be  reserved  for  another 
chapter  (Chapter  XV).  Illustrations  of  (2)  are  found 
in  almost  every  process  of  memory  or  thought.  We 
think  of  36  when  we  think  of  9X4  because  with  the  situa- 
tion, 'thinking  of  9X4'  the  thought  of  36  has  gone 
oftenest  and  with  most  satisfaction.  Illustrations  of  (3) 
are  found  in  almost  every  hour  of  daily  life.  We  start 
for  the  class-room  when  the  clock  strikes  the  hour  be- 
cause we  have  done  so ;  when  we  feel  a  desire  to  read,  we 
buy  a  magazine  because  we  have  done  so  and  with 
pleasurable  results. 

In  cases  where  the  connection  involves  a  bodily  act, 
it  will  be  found  that  the  satisfaction  or  discomfort  result- 
ing plays  a  large  part  in  the  formation  or  breaking  of  the 
connection.  In  cases  where  the  connection  involves  only 
thoughts  and  feelings,  the  mere  frequency  of  the  response 
will  be  found  to  play  the  leading  role.  This  is  due  to  the 
fact  that  (i)  the  satisfaction  resulting  from  responding 
to  a  situation  by  a  successful  idea  so  often  comes  much 
later.  The  boy  in  school  who  thinks  of  the  correct  answer 
to  a  question  does  not  feel  much  satisfaction  at  the 
time.  Often  he  does  not  know  that  his  idea  is  right  and 
so  feels  none.  It  is  later  when  he  is  asked  to  recite  and 
wins  approval,  or  when  his  examination  paper  is  re- 
turned and  he  finds  it  marked  high,  that  the  satisfaction 
comes.     Moreover  (2)  the  results  of  many  of  our  mental 


The  Law  of  Association  209 

responses  produce  almost  no  satisfaction.  It  makes  little 
difference  whether  the  sight  of  a  watch  arouses  the 
thought  of  a  clock  or  the  thought  of  time  or  the  thought 
of  wheels;  whether  the  thought  of  John  arouses  the 
thought  of  Smith  or  of  Jones  or  of  Anderson. 

§  36.  The  Control  of  the  Formation  of  Connections 

Three  Essentials  in  Efficient  Learning. — The  appli- 
cations of  the  law  of  association  to  the  control  of  mental 
life  by  school  education  and  general  training  are  clear. 
In  briefest  terms  they  are  as  follows: — 

The  first  necessity  of  mental  progress  is  fertility  in 
response.  Unless  the  baby  does  something,  it  can  learn 
nothing ;  there  is  nothing  for  selection  to  work  upon.  In- 
tellect and  character  cannot  be  created  from  a  void. 
Other  things  being  equal,  the  capacity  for  varied  re- 
sponses, great  activity,  curiosity,  and  mental  energy 
increase  the  probability  of  mental  improvement. 

The  second  means  of  training  is  the  arrangement  of 
instructive  situations, — of  conditions  the  responses  to 
which  may  form  valuable  associations.  As  civilization 
progresses,  men  try  increasingly  to  provide  in  the  home, 
in  schools  and  in  the  world's  affairs,  situations  fitted  to 
induce  profitable  responses.  The  behavior  and  conver- 
sation of  the  people  about  us,  the  books,  laboratories, 
museums  and  other  school  paraphernalia,  sermons,  news- 
papers, music,  laws  and  the  like — all  aim  to  control  the 
mind's  acts  by  controlling  the  situations  to  which  it 
responds.  In  the  words  of  a  sagacious  trainer  of  ani- 
mals, we  "Arrange  all  the  circumstances  of  the  experi- 
ment so  that  the  animal  is  compelled  by  the  laws  of  its 
own  nature  to  do  the  trick." 

The  third  means  is  the  arrangement  of  the  results  of 


2IO  Dynamic  Psychology 

the  different  possible  responses  so  that  desirable  ones  give 
satisfaction  and  undesirable  ones,  discomfort.  By  re- 
wards and  punishments,  natural  or  designed,  parents, 
teachers,  employers  and  rulers  preserve  the  responses 
which  they  approve  and  stamp  out  those  which  they 
disapprove.  The  history  of  a  mind's  training  is  in  great 
measure  the  history  of  the  elimination  of  its  mistakes. 

These  Three  Factors  Illustrated. — These  three  fac- 
tors may  be  illustrated  by  almost  any  mental  achievement, 
for  instance,  by  learning  to  read.  The  teacher  arranges 
a  chart  with  a  picture  of  a  cat,  the  word  cat  and  the  like. 
The  more  skillfully  she  can  arrange  to  get  the  situation 
^attention  to  the  picture,  the  cat  and  the  sound  as  she  or 
some  pupil  pronounces  it,'  the  better  the  prospect  that  the 
associations  between  the  cat  and  the  picture  and  sound 
will  be  formed.  If  now  there  is  an  utterly  stolid,  idiotic 
boy  who  is  aroused  to  no  action  by  the  situation,  who  does 
not  look  at  the  chart  or  listen  to  the  teacher,  or  repeat 
the  sound  after  her,  or  think  of  cats  or  dogs  or  anything 
else,  the  process  of  teaching  him  to  read  is  blocked  at  the 
outset  and  cannot  progress  till  he  is  somehow  stimulated 
to  respond. 

Usually,  of  course,  responses  will  be  made;  the  chil- 
dren will  say  cat  when  the  picture  is  pointed  out,  will 
repeat  cat  after  the  teacher  when  she  points  at  the  word 
and  says  cat;  and  will  say  cat  when  she  points  at  the  word 
but  says  nothing;  some  may  however  say  'kitten,'  or 
'What  is  that?'  or  the  last  word  the  teacher  has  herself 
said.  If  the  teacher  looked  as  pleased,  and  said  yes  as 
often,  and  in  general  rewarded  these  incorrect  replies  as 
she  does  the  correct  ones,  the  process  would  again  be 
blocked.  It  is  the  satisfaction  or  discomfort  which  she 
causes  that  selects  the  sound  cat  to  be  the  permanent  fixed 
associate  of  the  sight  cat. 


The  Law  of  Association  211 

§  37.  Response  by  Analogy 

Responses  to  Novel  Situations. — The  law  of  Instinct 
and  the  law  of  association  fail  apparently  to  prophesy 
what  will  happen  when  a  situation  appears  for  which  no 
instinctive  connection  exists  and  which  has  never  before 
been  experienced.  What,  for  example,  will  a  chicken  do 
when  it  for  the  first  time  sees  a  piece  of  yarn?  What 
will  a  student  unlearned  in  zoology  do  who  is  asked  to 
name  the  picture  of  an  Amphioxus? 

There  being  no  response  provided  for  that  particular 
situation  by  inborn  constitution^  or  previous  experience, 
the  individual  will  respond  as  he  would  to  some  situation 
like  it,  to  which  instinct  or  training  has  provided  a  re- 
sponse. The  chicken  will  respond  to  the  yarn  as  he 
would  instinctively  to  a  worm,  will  seize  it,  run  away  and 
begin  to  swallow  it.  The  student  will  call  the  picture  of 
Amphioxus  a  worm,  though  it  is  not,  because  experience 
has  connected  the  word  worm  with  long,  legless,  finless 
things. 

Every  stimulus  tends  to  discharge  in  some  response; 
and  in  default  of  any  response  specially  connected  with 
it  by  nature  or  nurture,  a  stimulus  will  discharge  into  that 
response  which  has  gone  with  something  like  it.  This 
fact,  that  any  unprepared-for  situation  will  be  treated  as 
some  familiar  one  like  it  would  be,  may  be  called  Assimi- 
lation or  Response  by  Analogy.  The  fact  may  be  stated 
more  exactly  as  follows: — 

To  any  situation  for  which  neither  nature  nor  nurture 
provides  a  response  the  response  will  be  that  which  they 
provide  for  the  situation  most  like  it;  or,  Any  situation 

^  It  must  be  remembered  that  for  many  new  situations  there  Is 
provided  an  instinctive  response  just  because  of  their  novelty.  'To 
handle  and  look  at'  is  the  baby's  instinctive  reaction  to  small  novel 
objects  as  a  class. 


212  Dynamic  Psychology 

which  has  by  nature  and  nurture  no  connections  will  con- 
nect with  that  response  which  the  situation  most  like  it 
would  connect  with. 

Response  by  Analogy. — Learning  to  deal  with  new 
situations  is  a  constant  repetition  of  the  following  process : 
the  new  is  treated  as  some  situation  like  it  would  be 
treated;  by  the  results  of  the  responses  the  responses 
themselves  are  modified  until  in  due  time  a  response  is 
selected  that  is  well  adapted  to  the  situation. 

The  probable  physiological  basis  for  assimilation  is 
easy  to  conceive,  though  proof  is  absent.  Let  us  call  the 
stimulation  set  up  in  the  neurones  by  the  new  situation 
A  B  C  D  E  F  G.  For  just  this  particular  situation  there 
is  no  response  provided;  with  just  this  neurone-group 
action  there  is  no  connection  formed.  But  suppose  that 
for  the  brain  action  A  K  C  D  E  F  G,  there  is  a  connection 
formed,  M  N  O.  The  line  of  least  resistance,  of  strongest 
connection  for  A  B  C  D  E  F  G  would  be  toward  M  N  O 
rather  than  toward  some  other ;  for  the  elements  A  C  D 
E  F  and  G  would  tend  each  to  call  up  its  own  connection. 
The  fact  that  the  new  situation  resembles  some  other 
means  that  it  has  elements  in  common  with  some  other. 
It  can  call  up  a  response  because  these  elements  do  have 
some  formed  connection  though  it  as  a  whole  has  not. 
It  calls  up  the  response  which  would  be  made  to  the 
situation  most  like  it,  because  being  most  like  it  means 
containing  many  of  the  elements  which  it  contains.  The 
elements  in  it  call  up  the  response  which  they  are  con- 
nected with,  namely,  the  response  made  to  the  situation 
most  like  it.  Assimilation,  then,  is  one  instance  of  the 
law  of  partial  activity.  The  case  may  be  likened  roughly 
to  that  of  the  direction  taken  by  a  four  horse  team  at  a 
fork  in  the  roads,  when  the  team  has  never  traveled  either 
road  as  a  team  but  some  one  horse  or  a  pair  has.     Their 


The  Law  of  Association  213 

previous  habit  of  taking,  say,  the  left  turn,  will  cause  the 
whole  team  to  go  that  way. 

The  law  of  response  by  analogy  is  of  importance 
apart  from  its  service  as  an  account  of  the  means  of 
responses  to  new  situations ;  for  even  when  instinct  or 
habit  does  furnish  a  response,  that  response  may  be 
neglected  in  favor  of  the  response  which  would  be  made 
to  some  situation  resembling  the  one  present.  The  baby 
who  on  seeing  a  bottle  of  small  white  medicine-tablets 
sang  out  'shirt  buttons'  could  have  followed  instinct  and 
responded  merely  by  fumbling  and  biting  the  new  things. 
The  school  boy  who,  when  asked  to  give  the  opposite  of 
frequently,  wrote  'a  bad  smell,'  could  have  followed  pre- 
vious habits  and  said,  T  don't  know.' 

Exercises 

1.  What  addition  should  be  made  to  the  maxim,  "Practice 
makes  perfect?" 

2.  Why  is  repetition  more  useful  in  acquiring  knowledge 
than   in  acquiring  skill? 

3.  Show  how  the  law  of  association  applies  (a)  to  learning 
to  ride  a  bicycle,  (b)  to  learning  to  be  tactful  in  dealing  with 
people,  (c)  to  learning  to  read,  (d)  to  learning  to  shoot  straight. 

4.  (a)  Give  two  cases  of  learning  in  which  resultant  satis- 
faction is  the  main  factor,  (b)  Give  two  cases  in  which  result- 
ing discomfort  is  the  main  factor,  (c)  Give  two  cases  in  which 
frequency    is    the   main    factor. 

5.  Give  two  illustrations  of  the  law  of  the  mind's  set.  Give 
two  illustrations  of  the  law  of  partial  activity. 

6.  Explain  by  the  laws  described  in  this  chapter  or  the  pre- 
ceding one  the  following  facts : 

a.  The  existence  of  the  so-called  'happy  families';  e.  g.,  of 
dogs,  cats,  mice,  chickens,  living  together  in  peace. 

b.  That  a  religion  based  on  fear  commonly  produces  only 
negative  morality;  /.  e.,  only  the  absence  of  evil,  not  the  presence 
of  good  acts. 

c.  Young  children   (five  to  eight  years  old)  will  commonly 


214  Dynamic  Psychology 

define  an  object  by  its  use.    Thus  a  knife  *is  a  thing  to  cut  with*, 
a  chair  *is  what  you  sit  on'. 

d.  A  child  in  the  primary  class  of  a  school  committed  some 
misdemeanor  and  was  called  to  the  teacher's  desk  and  punished. 
A  day  or  so  later  when  occasion  offered  he  committed  the  same 
fault  but  when  told  to  come  to  the  teacher's  desk  sat  stubbornly 
still. 

e.  A  child  from  the  country  who  was  being  shown  the  ani- 
mals in  the  zoological  gardens  called  the  antelopes  calves. 

7.  In  what  way  does  attention  play  a  part  in  acquisitions 
by  the  law  of  association? 

8.  Criticise    the    following    statement: 

"Our  nervous  system  grows  to  the  modes  in  which  it  has 
been   exercised." 

9.  The  probable  physical  parallel  in  the  nervous  system  for 
the  law  of  association  is  the  law  of  the  formation  of  connections 
stated  and  described  in  Chapter  X.  Read  again  §  27  and  for 
each  feature  of  the  law  of  association  find  the  probable  physiolog- 
ical parallel. 

References 

A.  James,  Briefer   Course,  X. 
Stout,  Manual,  76-96. 

B.  James,    Principles,    IV. 


CHAPTER  XIV 

The  Law  of  Dissociation  or  Analysis 
§  38.  The  Process  of  Analysis 

Important  as  is  the  action  of  the  mind  in  connecting 
impressions  with  ideas  and  acts,  ideas  with  ideas  and  acts 
and  acts  among  themselves,  it  would  be  a  gross  mistake 
to  restrict  mental  action  to  the  single  field  of  connections, 
habit  formation,  association.  The  mind  works  not  only 
by  association,  by  connecting  this  situation  with  that 
response,  but  also  by  consociation  or  analysis,  by  breaking 
up  a  total  situation  into  its  elements.  The  abstract  and 
general  notions  which  we  found  in  Part  I  to  be  essential 
features  in  the  higher  types  of  human  thinking  and  the 
operations  of  parts  of  impressions  or  ideas  which  will 
later  be  found  to  be  essential  features  of  reasoning,  are 
mental  products  which  come,  not  by  putting  things  to- 
gether, but  by  separating  them  into  parts.  The  bare 
facts  of  experience  give  only  white  paper,  white  balls, 
white  liquids,  never  the  thought  of  mere  whiteness  by 
itself ;  the  law  of  association,  so  far  as  hitherto  described, 
would  lead  to  an  interminable  repetition  of  selections 
from  our  experience  and  responses,  never  to  the  original 
insights  of  the  mathematical  or  scientific  thinker;  the 
same  law  in  conduct  would  provide  only  a  better  and 
better  selection  from  amongst  acts,  a  greater  skill  due  to 
the  elimination  of  failures,  never  with  totally  new  moral 
insights  or  new  combinations  of  bodily  movements.     But 

315 


2i6  Dynamic  Psychology 

in  fact  we  do  separate  out  elements  in  thought  which 
have  never  appeared  before  by  themselves,  but  only  as 
parts  or  elements  of  total  experiences.  We  do  come  to 
make  isolated  movements  which  have  previously  been 
only  parts  of  instinctive  and  habitual  reactions.  And 
this  work  of  analysis  of  total  impressions  into  ideas  of 
parts  and  elements  and  qualities  and  of  complex  acts 
into  minute  separate  movements  is  of  the  utmost  use  in 
giving  command  over  the  problems  of  thought  and  the 
activities  of  the  body.  By  dividing  we  conquer.  How 
this  process  of  analysis  occurs  will  be  clear  from  a  few 
simiple  cases. 

The  child  at  school  whom  we  wish  to  feel  the  abstract 
quality  of  sphericity  is  given  marbles  and  balls  to  observe. 
His  attention  is  called  to  the  orange,  the  gas  globe,  and 
the  like.  The  word  round  or  sphere  is  associated  with 
all  these  and  other  objects,  alike  in  being  spheres  but 
different  in  size,  color,  use,  etc.  As  a  result  he  comes  to 
feel  in  connection  with  the  word  the  special  quality  of 
similarity  of  surface  at  all  points  which  to  him  means 
sphericity.  Again  the  child  to  whom  we  wish  to  teach 
the  abstract  thing,  number, — for  instance  the  abstract 
quality  of  fiveness, — is  given  five  peas,  five  sticks,  five 
leaves,  is  made  to  draw"  five  lines,  to  move  his  arm  five 
times,  to  hold  up  five  fingers,  each  time  in  association 
with  the  word  five.  He  comes,  by  having  the  five  quality 
constantly  present  but  in  connection  with  all  sorts  of 
other  accessory  qualities,  to  feel  the  numerical  aspect  of 
any  group,  the  five  aspect,  by  itself  as  a  separate  ele- 
mentary thought  in  his  mind. 

In  movements  the  same  procedure  is  followed.  A 
backward  child  can  say  th  in  common  words  but  cannot 
make  by  themselves  the  movements  needed  to  produce  it 
alone.     He  is  led  to  repeat  that,  those,  they,  this,  then, 


The  Law  of  Analysts  217 

breathe  and  similar  words  in  order  to  lift  into  separate 
existence  the  th  movement,  to  develop  direct  control  of  it. 

In  all  these  cases  the  method  taken  to  develop  into  a 
separate  idea  or  act  some  aspect  of  a  total  mental  state  or 
muscular  performance, — to  abstract,  that  is,  some  part 
or  quality  of  an  experience, — is  to  arouse  many  experi- 
ences in  which  that  aspect  or  part  or  quality  is  constantly 
present  but  with  in  each  case  different  surroundings  or 
context.  The  element  of  idea  or  impulse  which  is  thus 
felt  with  many  different  associates  comes  to  be  felt  with 
none  of  them,  to  be  felt  by  itself  as  an  idea,  to  be  inde- 
pendent of  any  of  them.  The  movement  which  is  thus 
made  with  many  different  associated  movements  comes  to 
be  made  by  itself  alone.  BACD,  EAFG,  HAIJ, 
K  A  L  M,  etc.,  result  in  a  new  A. 

It  thus  seems  to  be  the  general  law  of  mind  that  any 
element  of  mental  life  which  is  felt  as  a  part  of  many 
total  mental  states,  differing  in  all  else  save  its  presence, 
comes  thereby  to  be  felt  as  an  idea  by  itself,  and  that  any 
movement  which  has  been  made  as  a  part  of  many  com- 
plex movements  differing  in  all  else  save  its  presence 
comes  thereby  to  be  made  as  a  movement  by  itself.  This 
law  is  called  the  law  of  Dissociation  by  Varying  Con- 
comitants, or  the  Laiv  of  Analysis} 

§  39.  The  Inffuence  of  the  Law  of  Analysis 
In  the  arithmetic  of  the  primary  school  where  the 
meanings  of  the  numbers  from  one  to  twenty  and  their 

^  The  law  of  dissociation  is  really  only  one  case  of  the  law  of 
association  ;  it  is  the  multitude  of  connections  which  serves  to  dis- 
connect. The  same  general  principle  accounts  for  both  association 
and  dissociation,  although  the  results  of  its  workings  are  opposite 
in  the  two  cases.  When  one  thing  has  gone  with  another  it  tends 
to  call  it  up  and  to  fuse  with  it ;  but  when  one  thing  has  gone  with 
many  different  others  it  will  tend  to  call  up  each  of  them  a  little 
and  so  none  of  them  fully,  and,  instead  of  fusing  with  any  one  of 
them,  to  win  an  independent  existence. 
IS 


2i8  Dynamic  Psychology 

combinations  are  taught ;  in  all  inductive  work  in  science 
where  a  general  law  or  general  notion  is  evolved  from 
particular  series  of  events  or  cases ;  in  learning  the  mean- 
ing of  but,  and,  notwithstanding,  in  spite  of,  etc.,  from 
their  use  in  conversation  and  books;  in  comparing  one 
character  in  literature  or  history  with  others  to  bring 
out  essential  points  of  his  make-up — in  short  in  all  cases 
where  we  try  to  progress  from  vague  feelings  of  a  total 
fact  to  exact,  definite  feelings  of  its  elements  and  of  it  as 
the  compound  of  those  elements — we  depend  upon  the 
law  of  analysis  or  dissociation. 

This  law  is  the  basis  of  the  capacity  to  reason,  i.e.,  to 
think  out  the  solutions  of  novel  problems.  Indeed  it  is 
probable  that  to  the  workings  of  this  law  of  dissociation 
in  infancy  is  due  the  growth  of  thought  itself  and  of  all 
those  mental  states  which  we  call  ideas, — that  but  for  it 
mental  life  would  be  entirely  composed  of  feelings 
like  dizziness,  suffocation,  nausea,  weariness  or  faint- 
ness,  feelings  which  we  would  be  very  conscious  of  and 
would  react  to  violently,  but  which  we  could  not  turn 
into  continued  and  useful  thought. 

The  infant's  feelings  of  things,  qualities,  conditions 
and  relationships  are  nothing  more  than  vague  total  im- 
pressions of  this  person,  that  thing,  this  weather,  that 
stomach-ache  and  the  like.  Only  after  many  experiences, 
resulting  in  many  associations  and  comparisons,  have 
given  the  law  of  dissociation  an  opportunity  to  play  its 
role,  does  he  come  to  feel  the  sense  qualities  of  objects 
as  discriminated  elements,  to  feel  forms  and  colors  and 
sizes  and  shapes  distinct  from  each  other.  His  bottle,  for 
instance,  is  to  him  for  months  only  a  vaguely  sizable  thing 
to  be  taken  and  held  in  his  mouth.  Only  after  much 
experience  does  it  become  a  thing  so  long,  so  heavy  and  so 
colored.     Even    in    adults    much    of    mental    life    never 


The  La"jc  of  Analysis  219 

develops  into  definite  ideas.  How  few,  for  example,  are 
the  smells  which  we  feel  as  definitely  in  the  general  odor 
of  a  cook  shop  as  we  do  red  and  green  in  the  colors  of  a 
landscape. 

As  the  infant  gradually  dissociates  the  elements  of 
color,  form,  size  and  the  like  from  the  complex  things  in 
which  they  inhere,  so  the  school  boy  in  long  years  disso- 
ciates the  more  abstract  qualities,  such  as  justice,  law  or 
liberty.  And  to  the  end  of  life  a  thinking  man  will  be 
busy  in  analyzing  his  vague  impressions  and  opinions  into 
their  elements. 

The  elements  acquired  by  the  action  of  the  law  of 
dissociation  furnish  new  materials  for  the  law  of  associa- 
tion to  work  with.  As  soon  as  the  child  in  school  feels 
the  meanings  of  i,  2,  3,  4  and  5,  he  is  ready  to  form  the 
associations  i  and  2  are  3,  i  and  3  are  four,  i  and  4  are  5, 
2  and  3  are  5.  As  soon  as  a  new  movement  comes  under 
control,  i.e.,  can  be  made  by  itself,  it  enters  into  associa- 
tions with  other  movements  and  with  mental  states.  The 
first  mental  connections  are  between  particular  sensory 
situations  and  responses  thereto,  simple  modifications 
of  existing  instincts.  Starting  with  these  the  law  of  dis- 
sociation produces  the  feelings  of  common  objects, 
qualities,  acts  and  relations,  such  as  children  commonly 
manifest  in  the  third  year  of  life.  These  new  feelings  as 
fast  as  they  appear  become  associated  with  words,  acts 
and  with  each  other,  so  that  the  child  by  the  time  of 
entrance  to  school  has  thousands  of  associations  between 
ideas,  mostly  between  concrete  particulars.  With  these 
associations  further  action  of  the  law  of  dissociation  pro- 
duces general  and  abstract  ideas.  These  in  turn  form 
new  associations.  Thus  in  mental  growth  connection 
and  analysis,  association  and  dissociation,  putting  things 


220  Dynamic  Psychology 

together  and  breaking  things  up  into  parts,  constantly 
work  together. 

§  40.  The  Control  of  the  Process  of  Analysis 

The  conditions  favoring  the  analysis  of  a  definite  ele- 
ment out  of  a  vague  and  complex  total  fact  are : — 

1.  The  collection  of  a  number  of  total  facts  in  each  of 
which  (a)  the  element  is  as  obtrusive  as  possible,  as  little 
encumbered  by  irrelevant  detail  as  possible  and  in  which 
(b)  the  element's  concomitants  or  surroundings  vary. 
Thus  if  the  teacher  wishes  to  develop  in  a  pupil's  mind 
the  abstract  idea  of  the  passive  voice,  he  uses  such  exam- 
ples as:  he  is  struck,  they  were  accepted,  you  will  he 
applauded,  Grant  was  elected,  rather  than  the  repetition 
four  times  of,  /  am  satisfied.  For  in  the  last  example  the 
passive  element  is  not  at  all  promment;  the  pupil  may 
well  think  of  satisfied  as  an  adjective;  and  the  element  is 
not  thrown  into  relief  by  variations  in  the  other  features 
of  the  examples. 

2.  That  these  facts  be  compared  with  attention  di- 
rected toward  the  parts  or  elements  of  each  fact,  espe- 
cially toward  the  element  in  question.  In  the  illustration 
above,  attention  could  readily  be  directed  toward  the 
passive  voice  aspect  by  comparing  the  four  sentences  each 
with  its  corresponding  active  (he  is  struck,  he  strikes; 
they  were  accepted,  they  accepted,  etc.) 

3.  That  a  symbol  or  name  of  some  kind  be  ready  to  be 
associated  with  the  element  when  felt.  Unconnected 
feelings  cannot  maintain  an  existence  in  the  mmd ;  a  fact 
thought  of  without  a  name  of  some  sort  is  just  an  uncon- 
nected feeling.  Let  me  have  never  so  clear  an  idea  of  the 
thing,  I  shall  gain  by  having  also  associated  with  it  a 
name.     So  in  the  illustration  above  good  teachers  are 


The  Law  of  Analysis  221 

careful  to  give  the  name  'passive  voice'  as  soon  as  the 
pupil  has  the  feeling,  'subject  does  nothing,  something  is 
done  to  him.' 

To  assure  the  permanence  of  the  feeling,  repeated 
practice  in  detecting  the  element  in  new  complexes  is 
necessary.  So  the  teacher  sets  the  pupil  to  pick  out  all 
the  passives  he  can  on  a  page,  or  to  divide  a  mixed  list 
into  actives  and  passives,  or  to  perform  some  other  exer- 
cise to  the  same  end. 

The  conditions  that  favor  analysis  are  thus  those  that 
would  be  met  by  a  fertile  and  selective  mind,  one  that 
would  naturally  summon  together  many  facts  and  attend 
to  their  parts.  More  is  required  here  than  for  the  simple 
association  of  ideas  and  acts.  Hence  the  capacity  to 
dissociate  or  analyze  is  of  later  and  higher  development. 
Animals  possessing  the  former  lack  it.  Babies  form 
many  associative  habits  before  they  show  any  signs  of 
analysis.  In  feeble  minded  adults  analysis  develops  only 
to  a  slight  extent.  The  commonest  sense  elements,  such 
as  color,  size,  shape,  few,  many,  and  the  like,  are  known, 
but  to  feel  the  meaning  of  'twenty,'  or  of  'a  promise'  or  of 
'opposite'  is  beyond  their  power.  In  individuals  of  high 
intellectual  ability,  on  the  other  hand,  the  process  of  dis- 
sociation is  very  prominent. 

Exercises 

I.  Which  process,  association  or  dissociation,  is  involved  in 
each  of  the  following? 

(a)  in  learning  to  ride  a  bicycle. 

(b)  in  learning  a  poem  by  heart. 

(c)  in   learning  to    understand  the  difference  between 

the  present  tense  and  the  past  tense. 

(d)  in  learning  to   understand  the   difference  between 

by  to  express  means  and  by  to  express  agency. 

(e)  in   learning  the  meanings  of  the  numbers. 


222  Dynamic  Psychology 

(f)  in  learning  the  multiplication  table. 

(g)  in  learning  the  meanings  of  velocity  and  of  accel- 

eration, 
(h)     in  learning  to  spell. 

2.  For  which  is  dissociation  more  necessary,  (a)  learning 
the  grammar  of  a  language  or  learning  its  vocabulaory?  (b) 
Learning  algebra  or  learning  geometry?  (c)  Learning  physical 
geography  or  learning  commercial  geography? 

3.  (a)  What  associations  would  be  necessary  before  a  child 
could  by  dissociation  come  to  feel  the  meaning  of  iff  (b)  Of 
longer  than?     (c)   Of  positive,  comparative  and  superlative? 

4.  How  would  you  develop  in  the  mind  of  a  school-boy  a 
definite  and  independent  idea  of  acceleration,  or  of  wealth,  or  of 
reciprocity? 

References 

A.  James,  Briefer  Course,  XV. 

B.  James,  Principles,  XIIL     (502-508). 

§  41.  Physiological  Conditions  of  Human  Nature 

The  three  laws  presented  in  this  and  the  two  preceding 
chapters  summarize  the  method  of  action  of  nature  and 
nurture,  inborn  mental  constitution  and  acquired  modi- 
fications, in  its  most  essential  features.  The  intellect  and 
character  of  any  one  of  us  is  due  largely  to  the  operation 
of  these  three  laws.  Not  entirely,  however;  for  any 
human  being's  thought  and  conduct,  depending  as  they 
do  upon  the  action  of  his  nervous  system,  will  sometimes 
show  mysterious  alterations, — ^behavior  unexplainable  by 
the  laws  of  instinct,  association  and  dissociation.  The 
nervous  system  is  influenced  not  only  by  the  factors 
accounted  for  in  these  three  laws,  but  also  by  fatigue, 
drugs,  sickness,  the  decay  of  old  age,  shock,  the  chance 
variations  of  blood-pressure,  metabolism  and  the  like. 

It  is  necessary  in  a  brief  treatment  to  omit  the  facts 
that  are  known  concerning  the  action  of  these  forces,  as 


The  Law  of  Analysts  223 

well  as  the  many  problems  answers  to  which  are  yet  to 
be  discovered.  I  have  used  and  shall  in  the  future,  fre- 
quently use  the  phrase  'other  things  being  equal'  to  recall 
to  the  reader's  mind  the  fact  that  there  are  always  many 
complex  possibilities  for  mental  action  at  any  moment. 
Even  when  no  such  provisional  clause  is  in  the  text  the 
reader  should  supply  it  mentally.  He  should  not  forget, 
for  instance,  that  though  the  general  law  of  mental  life 
is  the  law  of  association  or  habit,  a  sufficient  dose  of 
hashish  will  keep  in  temporary  abeyance  the  most  fixed 
habits  of  perception ;  that  enough  alcohol  will  weaken  all 
inhibitory  associations;  that  the  law  of  frequency  will  be 
apparently  suspended  in  the  delirium  of  fever  or  even  in 
ordinary  sleep;  that  the  capacity  for  intellectual  achieve- 
ment may  be  weakened  by  disease  of  the  thyroid  gland; 
that  a  child's  temperament  or  disposition  will  suffer  com- 
plete change  during  an  attack  of  indigestion.  This 
caution  not  to  forget  the  real  and  frequent  influence  of 
direct  physiological  changes  in  the  nervous  system  upon 
human  intellect  and  character  ought  perhaps  to  be  re- 
peated at  the  beginning  of  every  chapter  from  now  on. 
But  I  shall  entrust  to  the  reader  the  duty  of  remembering 
it  for  himself. 


CHAPTER  XV 


The  Connections  Between  Sense  Stimuli  and  Men- 
tal States:  Connections  of  Impression 

§  42.  Inborn  and  Acquired  Connections  of  Impression 

Inborn  Connections.  —  Every  educated  person 
knows  that  some  sort  of  connection  exists  between  events 
taking  place  in  the  physical  world  and  his  mental  states; 
that  he  hears  sounds  because  there  are  sound-waves,  and 
smells  odors  when  certain  gases  are  present  in  the  atmos- 
phere. The  immediate  connection  is  between  the  action 
of  neurones  in  the  brain  and  the  mental  states ;  but  since 
these  neurones  are  aroused  to  action  by  afferent  neurones 
from  the  sense  organs,  and  since  these  afferent  neurones 
are  aroused  by  the  physical  event  either  directly  or 
through  some  physiological  process,  we  commonly  speak 
of  the  total  series  of  connections  between  the  physical 
event  and  the  mental  state  as  one  connection. 

Such  connections  are  due  to  inborn  capacities.  Sound 
waves  of  50-100  vibrations  per  second  arouse  a  feeling 
of  a  low  tone  and  those  of  10,000-20,000  vibrations  per 
second  arouse  a  feeling  of  a  high  tone,  simply  because 
man's  mind  is  so  constituted  by  nature  that  they  do. 
Ether  vibrations  make  us  feel  reds  and  greens  and  blues 
while  rapid  molecular  motion  makes  us  feel  warm,  just 
because  these  forms  of  connection  have  been  established 

324 


Connections  of  Impression  225 

by  natural  evolution. ^  Given  a  certain  physical  stimulus 
and  a  certain  feeling  follows. 

Acquired  Connections. — At  first  thought  this  seems 
to  be  the  end  of  the  matter ;  but,  as  was  briefly  stated  in 
Chapter  II,  §  8,  the  stimulus  itself  is  not  the  sole  cause 
of  the  mental  state.  To  the  question,  *'What  determines 
what  things  anyone  feels  at  any  moment?'*  common  sense 
gives  the  ready  answer,  ''That  which  is  there  to  be  sensed, 
— to  be  seen,  heard  or  touched."  But  common  sense  is 
only  partly  right.  The  physical  stimulus  affecting  the 
sense  organs  is  one,  but  only  one,  of  the  causes  which 
determine  what  the  percept  shall  be.  For  (i)  we  may 
feel  different  things,  have  different  percepts,  from  the 
same  stimulus;  moreover  (2)  we  may  have  the  same  per- 
cept from  different  stimuli;  and  in  the  third  place  (3)  we 
may  feel  a  thing  when  there  is  no  physical  stimulus  cor- 
responding to  it. 

Thus  (i)  the  same  cup  of  coffee  tastes  sweet  after 
quinine  and  bitter  after  honey;  the  same  light  is  bright 
by  night  and  dim  by  day ;  the  same  gray  looks  reddish  on 
a  green  background  and  greenish  on  a  red  background. 
The  same  air  waves  which  make  me  feel  a  vague  tumult 
of  sound,  make  the  musician  feel  the  tones  of  five  distinct 
instruments  combined  in  a  harmony;  the  same  mass  of 
colors  is  a  blur  to  me  and  a  definite  group  of  micro-organ- 
isms to  the  trained  microscopist. 

Thus  (2)  patches  of  quite  different  shades  may  all  be 

^There  is  no  absolute  necessity  that  the  connections  should  be 
as  they  are.  Man  might  conceivably  have  been  such  a  creature 
that  sound  waves  of  50-100  vibrations  would  make  him  feel  cold 
and  those  of  20,000-40,000  vibrations  make  him  feel  warm.  There 
might  conceivably  exist  connections  between  the  pressure  of  the  X- 
rays  and  feelings  of  some  sort  unlike  any  we  now  possess.  Or  we 
might  lack,  as  the  fishes  apparently  and  as  some  lower  animals  cer- 
tainly do,  any  connections  between  sound  waves  and  mental  states. 
The  existing  connections  represent  only  one  of  many  possible  ar- 
rangements. 


226  Dynamic  Psychology 

felt  as  the  same  green  (e.g.,  grass  in  the  sunshine  and  in 
the  shade)  ;  the  table  top  is  felt  to  be  a  rectangle,  though 
seen  as  a  sharp  rhombus;  in  a  brief  glance  at  the  letters 
'bad  oratory/  half  an  audience  saw  the  same  word  as 
when  the  letters  presented  were  'laboratory ;'  so  also  with 
'pencil'  and  'pencil.' 

Thus  (3)  occasionally  in  waking  hours,  and  custom- 
arily in  dreams,  we  see  and  hear  and  smell  and  taste 
things  though  neither  they  nor  anything  like  them  is 
present. 

Not  only  the  outside  stimulus,  but  also  the  inner  con- 
stitution of  the  individual's  mental  life,  decides  what  thing 
shall  be  felt.  There  is  more  to  perception  than  passive 
impressibility  by  external  forces.  Every  act  of  perception 
is  really  an  act  of  association.  What  is  felt  depends  not 
only  upon  how  the  afferent  neurones  are  stimulated,  but 
also  upon  what  neurones  they  in  turn  arouse;  not  only 
upon  what  the  external  object  is,  but  also  upon  (A)  the 
past  experiences  and  (B)  the  present  tendencies  of  the 
individual  who  perceives  it. 

(A)  The  musician  feels  the  sounds  made  by  the 
string  quintette  differently  from  the  untrained  person, 
because  he  has  in  the  past  attended  to  musical  sounds  and 
learned  to  discriminate  the  parts  of  a  harmony;  the 
audience  saw  pencil  as  pencil  because  the  pen  il  had  so 
often  connected  with  the  thought  pencil  in  their  previous 
reading.  (B)  The  coffee  tastes  now  sweet,  now  bitter, 
the  light  is  now  bright,  now  dim,  according  to  the  back- 
grounds of  taste  and  illumination  accompanying  them; 
the  'bad  oratory'  was  felt  as  'laboratory'  because  in  the 
minds  of  the  audience  (a  class  seated  in  a  laboratory 
where  they  had  been  doing  laboratory  work  for  the  month 
past)  the  thought  of  laboratory  was  especially  ready  to 
be  aroused,  was  in  a  line  of  little  resistance.     If  'labora- 


Connections  of  Impression  227 

tory'  had  been  shown  for  a  fraction  of  a  second  to  an 
audience  accustomed  to  listening  to  and  thinking  about 
speeches,  many  of  them  would  have  seen  it  as  'bad 
oratory.' 

§  43.  The  Law  of  Association  in  the  Case  of  Connections 
of  Impression 

In  General. — What  one  feels  at  any  given  sense 
stimulus  depends  then  upon  what  one  has  felt  and  upon 
what  one  is  feeling  at  the  time.  Not  only  the  mere  capaci- 
ties for  responding  to  certain  events  in  the  physical  world 
by  feelings  of  certain  qualities,  but  also  the  development 
of  these  capacities  by  training  and  their  dependence  upon 
the  particular  circumstances  attending  each  case  of  re- 
sponse, must  be  taken  into  account  in  a  study  of  the 
connections  between  sense  stimuli  and  mental  states. 
Nurture  modifies  nature  even  in  the  case  of  feelings  from 
the  senses.  The  connections  between  sense  stimuli  and 
mental  states  are  partly  instinctive  and  partly  learned. 
Perception  involves  the  influence  of  training  and  is 
explained  by  the  law  of  association  as  surely  as  is  the 
formation  of  habits ;  there  are  habits  of  perceiving  as 
truly  as  there  are  habits  of  thought  and  conduct.  The 
incoming  stimulus  from  any  set  of  afferent  neurones  may 
discharge  into  any  one  of  several  cell  groups ;  which  one 
it  will  arouse  depends  upon  the  general  laws  of  asso- 
ciation and  assimilation  deciding  which  connection  is 
strongest. 

In  Detail. — Other  things  being  equal  the  strongest 
connection  will  be  (i)  that  favored  by  inborn  structure, 
(2)  that  most  frequently  made,  (3)  the  most  recently 
made,  (4)  that  with  the  most  easily  excitable  mental  state 
and  (5)  that  most  in  harmony  with  the  general  set  of  the 


228  Dynamic  Psychology 

mind  at  the  time.  Illustrations  of  the  influence  of  each 
of  these  factors  may  be  found  in  anyone's  daily  experience, 
(i)  is  of  course  illustrated  in  every  minute  of  perceptual 
experience.  The  trained  nurse  reading  'abominable'  as 
'abdominal'  illustrates  (2)  ;  the  householder  who,  after  a 
burglary  at  his  house,  heard  every  noise  as  a  fumbling  at 
the  door  illustrates  a  combination  of  (3)  and  (4).  The 
psychology  class  who  saw  'psychogaly'  as  'psychology' 
illustrates  (5)  combined  with  (2)  and  (3).  The  author's 
name  was  heard  by  various  people  to  whom  he  was  intro- 
duced at  the  time  of  the  discovery  of  gold  in  x\laska,  as 
Klondike ;  and  an  old  lady  in  a  country  town  once  greeted 
him  as  Mr.  Corn-doctor. 

One  consequence  of  the  laws  of  association  and  assim- 
ilation in  the  case  of  connections  of  impression  is  that  any 
sense  stimulus  tends  to  be  felt  as  some  definite  'thing.' 
The  incoming  nerve  currents  have  by  the  law  of  diffusion 
to  go  somewhere  and  the  connections  which  have  been 
made  in  the  past  are  largely  with  cell  actions  correspond- 
ing to  feelings  of  'things.'  So  ink  blots  made  at  random 
often  strike  the  observer  as  pictures  of  real  objects;  the 
clouds  take  on  animal  forms ;  there  is  a  man  in  the  moon ; 
the  wind  in  the  trees  is  heard  as  a  'sighing.' 

The  Influence  of  the  Law  of  the  Mind's  Set. — 
Three  special  forms  of  the  influence  of  the  general  set  of 
the  mind,  of  the  mental  context  in  which  the  percept  is 
felt,  are  so  important  as  to  deserve  formulation  as  special 
laws.  The  first  and  most  general  is  the  Law  of  Relativity, 
that  any  stimulus  will  be  felt,  not  as  it  would  be  if  by 
itself  alone,  but  in  comparison  with  the  sensations  and 
percepts  which  accompany  or  precede  it.  Thus  a  gray 
on  a  black  background  will  look  whiter  than  when  on  a 
white  background ;  a  one-pound  weight  added  to  a  pound 
will  be  felt  as  an  increase,  but  will  not  when  added  to  a 


Connections  of  Impression  229 

hundred  pounds.  The  second  and  third  laws  refer  to 
special  cases  of  the  law  of  relativity.  The  Law  of  Dimin' 
ishing  Returns  from  increases  in  the  amount  of  a  stimulus 
(Weber's  law)  is  that  the  same  stimulus  will  produce  a 
more  intense  sensation  when  added  to  a  weak  stimulus 
than  when  added  to  a  strong  one.  Under  this  law  belongs 
the  case  of  the  pound  weight.  Similarly  an  inch  more 
makes  2  inches  perceptibly  longer,  but  adds  little  feeling 
of  length  to  ten  feet;  it  is  easy  to  distinguish  a  three 
candle  power  lamp  from  a  two  candle  power  lamp,  but 
between  a  two  hundred  and  three  and  a  two  hundred  and 
two  candle  power  lamp  practically  no  difference  can  be 
felt.  The  Law  of  Contrast  is  that  one  sensation  or  per- 
cept felt  with  or  after  another  tends  to  take  on  the  quality 
opposite  to  or  complementary  to  that  other.  When  the 
other  is  felt  with  it,  we  have  Simultaneous  Contrast; 
when  the  other  is  felt  before  it,  we  have  Successive  Con- 
trast. Thus  the  gray  on  a  black  looks  whiter  and  on  a 
white  blacker  than  it  would  by  itself ;  a  candle  light  looks 
brighter  in  the  dark  than  in  daylight;  a  tone  seems  lower 
after  a  high  than  after  a  low  one ;  lemonade  tastes  sweeter 
after  vinegar  than  after  honey ;  a  gray  on  red  looks 
greenish ;  on  blue,  yellowish ;  and  on  green,  reddish. 

Percepts,  Illusions  and  Hallucinations. — It  follows 
from  the  facts  so  far  stated  that  the  same  general  process 
causes  percepts,  illusions  and  hallucinations.  When  the 
word  beautiful  is  spoken  and  heard,  hearing  it  is  called  a 
percept;  when  dutiful  is  spoken  but  beautiful  heard,  hear- 
ing it  is  called  an  illusion;  when  nothing  is  spoken  (as  in 
a  dream)  but  beautiful  is  heard,  hearing  it  is  called  an 
hallucination.  In  all  three  cases  the  same  final  brain 
process  was  aroused,  the  difference  being  that  in  the  first 
case  one  afferent  process  excited  it,  in  the  second  a  slightly 
different  process,  and  in  the  third  no  afiferent  process  at  all 


230  Dynamic  Psychology 

but  some  inner  connection.  In  other  words,  when  the 
sense  stimulus  present  is  the  one  that  ordinarily  arouses 
the  mental  fact,  it  is  a  case  of  perception ;  when  the  sense 
stimulus  present  is  one  that  ordinarily  arouses  some  other 
mental  fact,  it  is  illusion ;  and  when  the  sense  stimulus  is 
nil,  it  is  hallucination. 

What  is  commonly  called  perception  is  a  mixture  of 
perception,  illusion  and  hallucination.  Thus  in  reading, 
some  of  the  words  which  we  feel  ourselves  to  see  are  not 
seen  at  all  and  others  are  seen  as  quite  different  from  their 
actual  printed  forms.  There  are  misspellings  in  almost 
every  book,  but  they  pass  unnoticed,  unseen  by  the  mental 
eye.  Parts  of  words,  even  whole  words,  are  often  not 
present  as  sensory  stimuli  at  all,  the  mind  making  them 
up  out  of  whole  cloth.  So  also  in  listening  to  spoken 
language  we  hear  words  which  the  ear  does  not  hear  at 
all.  If  one  says  rapidly  in  the  proper  context  'What  time 
tis  it?'  or  Tlease  pass  me  ge  butter,'  the  error  will  often 
be  undetected.  The  letter  t  is  often  pronounced  as  d  in 
such  words  as  ability,  certainty,  falsity,^  but  only  experts 
in  phonetics  notice  the  fact.  Again  and  again  in  rapid 
speech  words  are  totally  omitted  without  anyone  being 
the  wiser. 

§  44.  The  Control  of  Connections  of  Impression 
What  is  called  the  education  of  the  senses  and  training 
in  observation  might  better  be  called  training  in  acquiring 
associations  with  sense  stimuli.  The  difference  between 
the  untrained  and  the  trained  observer  lies  not  in  the 
action  of  the  sense  organs  but  in  the  previous  experience 
which  interprets  their  messages.  The  professional  tester 
of  tea  has  not  a  different  tongue  but  a  different  set  of 
experiences,  a  different  stock  of  associations  with  various 
*  Where  the  t  is  far  removed  from  the  accented  syllable. 


Connections  of  Impression  27)1 


X 
11 

2 
12 

3 
13 

4 
14 

6 
15 

6 
10 

7 
17 

8 
18 

e 

19 

to 

20 


Fig.  76. 


Stimuli.  The  man  of  science  sees  more  in  the  specimen 
because  he  knows  more  about  it.  One  does  not  learn  to 
see  by  perpetual  staring,  but  by  connecting  each  sight 
with  knowledge  about  the  thing  seen.  To  educate  the 
senses  means  ( i )  to  form  habits  of  systematic  rather  than 
hap-hazard  examination,  (2)  to  learn  to  recognize  ele- 
ments in  complexes  by  first  getting  used  to  them  singly, 
and  (3)  to  connect  each  sensory  stimulus  with  a  separate 
identifiable  feeling  and  with  knowledge  of  its  properties. 


232  Dynamic  Psychology 


11  « 

9  " 

IIJ" 

8  " 

18  «'- 
^h 

14  » 

5« 
ISO 

en 
ie« 

17  « 

Iffn 
to '5^ 


so  i« 


Fig.  77. 

Exercises 


1.  Read  again  §  8  and  recall  the  results  of  the  experiment 
there  described. 

2.  Illustrate  individual  differences  in  the  capacities  to  feel 
things  and  qualities  in  response  to  sensory  stimuli. 

3.  Illustrate  individual  differences  in  perception  due  to  dif- 
ferences in  previous  experience. 

4.  Illustrate  the  law  of  diminishing  returns  in  the  case  of 
the  perception  of  movements.    Of  tastes. 

5.  Classify  the  following  illusions  as   (A)   those  caused  by 


Connections  of  Impression  233 

the   strength  of   previous   habit  and    (B)    those   caused  by  the 
temporary  set  of  the  mind : — 

a.  "An  officer  who  superintended  the  exhuming  of  a  coffin 
rendered  necessary  through  a  suspicion  of  crime,  declared  that  he 
already  experienced  the  odor  of  decomposition,  though  it  was 
afterwards  found  that  the  coffin  was  empty."  (Quoted  from 
Carpenter's  Mental  Physiology  by  J.  Sully  in  Illusions  p. 
108.) 

b.  "I  never  feel  sure  after  wiping  the  blades  of  my  skates, 
that  they  are  perfectly  dry,  since  they  always  seem  more  or  less 
damp  to  my  hand."  (Sully.) 

c.  "If  we  are  seated  in  a  railway  train  which  is  quite  station- 
ary and  watch  through  the  window  a  train  passing  ours  on  a 
neighboring  track,  we  feel  our  own  train  to  be  in  motion  in  the 
opposite  direction. 

d.  "I  remember  one  night  in  Boston,  whilst  waiting  for  a 
'Mount  Auburn'  car  to  bring  me  to  Cambridge  reading  most 
distinctly  that  name  upon  the  signboard  of  a  car  on  which  (as  I 
afterward   learned)    North   Avenue    was   painted."     (James.) 

6.  Hold  one  hand  in  hot  and  the  other  in  cold  water  for  a 
few  seconds ;  then  put  them  both  in  the  same  dish  of  tepid  water. 
Compare  the  feelings  of  the  two  hands. 

Experiment  ig.  Color  Contrast. — Take  5  pieces  of  the  same 
gray  paper.  Lay  them  on  sheets  of  white,  black,  red,  green  and 
blue  paper.  Cover  with  very  thin  tissue  paper.  Compare  the 
five    grays. 

Take  two  pieces  of  the  same  green  paper.  Lay  one  on  a  red 
background,  the  other  on  a  background  of  its  own  color.  Cover 
as  before  and  compare  the  two  greens.  Do  similarily  with  red 
on  a  green  and  on  a  red  background. 

Experiment  20.  The  Law  of  Diminishing  Returns. —  (a) 
Look  at  line  No.  i  of  Fig.  76  then  at  line  No.  lA  of  Fig.  yj.  Is 
the  latter  shorter  or  longer  than  No.  i.  (Do  not  measure,  judge 
by  the  eye  alone.)  Compare  similarly  lines  11  and  11  A,  2  and 
2A,  etc.,  recording  each  judgment.  After  the  20  judgments  have 
been  recorded  measure  the  lines  and  compare  the  frequency  of 
right  judgments  in  the  case  of  lines  i-io  with  that  in  the  case  of 
lines  11-20. 

(b)  On  a  sheet  of  paper  10  inches  or  more  wide  rule  five  lines 
20,  40,  60,  80  and  100  millimeters  long  respectively.  Place  beside 
it  a  similar  sheet  and  draw  lines  as  nearly  equal  to  the  models 

16 


234 


Physiological  Psychology 


as  you  can  without  measuring  or  superposition.  Do  the  same 
thing  with  another  sheet,  and  continue  until  you  have  lo  sheets, 
each  with  five  lines  as  nearly  equal  to  the  original  models  as  you 
can  draw  them.  Find,  by  measuring,  the  error  made  in  each  of 
the  fifty  lines.  Compare  the  amount  of  the  error  for  the  20  mm. 
line  with  that  for  the  40  mm.  line  and  so  on  through  the  series. 

Experiment  21.  The  Law  of  Association  in  Perception. — 
Print  in  the  Same  style  and  size  each  of  the  following  words  upon 
a  slip  of  paper  and  paste  on  a  card  about  3^  by  i^  inches:  (i) 
good,  (2)  boy,  (3)  house,  (4)  pasent,  (5)  scarf,  (6)  sdirt,  (7) 
chipon,  (8)  feather,  (9)  tackle,  (10)  tooch  drwn,  (11)  genuine, 


Fig.  78. 


Fig.  79. 


(12)  meawing,  (13)  reaeoning,  (14)  initate,  (15)  stole,  (16) 
morning,    (17)   frequmtly,   (18)   constant,    (19)   embrarderg. 

Expose  each  (in  the  order  given  above)  for  one  or  two  tenths 
of  a  second  to  some  one  unacquainted  entirely  with  the  cards  or 
the  object  of  the  experiment,  and  have  him  write  down  what  he 
sees  in  each  case.  Explain  so  far  as  you  can  the  percepts  felt. 
Compare  the  records  of  men  and  women  in  the  case  of  words 
6,  7,  9,  10,  15,  and  19. 

Experiment  22.  Look  at  Fig.  78.  Does  it  seem  to  be  (i)  a 
folded  sheet  with  the  folded  edge  toward  you,  or  (2)  a  folded 
sheet  with  the  folded  edge  away  from  you,  or  (3)  a  group  of 
lines  on  a  flat  surface?  Continue  looking  at  it  steadily.  What 
happens?    Make  it  seem  like  (i)   (without  altering  the  figure  it- 


Connections  of  Impression 


235 


self  at  all).  Make  it  seem  like  (2).  What  do  you  do  to  make  it 
seem  like  (i)  ?  Shut  your  eyes;  imagine  a  sheet  of  cardboard  with 
the  folded  edge  away  from  you,  open  your  eyes  and  look  at  the 
figure.  Which  was  it  like,  (i),  (2)  or  (3)?  Make  it  seem  like 
(3).    Which  appearance  is  hardest  to  obtain:    (i),   (2)  or   (3)? 

Experiment  23.  How  many  blocks  are  there  in  Fig.  79? 
Continue  looking  at  it  steadily.     What  happens? 

Experiment  24.     How   many   different  appearances  can  you 


Fig.  80. 


get  from  Fig.  80?  Describe  each  of  them.  Why  does  it  seem 
like  an  object  of  three  dimensions  rather  than  of  two  only,  when 
it  really  is  all  in  one  plane? 

Experiment  25.  How  many  different  appearances  can  you 
get  from  Fig.  81  ?  Describe  each  of  them.  Which  is  the  easiest 
to  get  and  retain?     Why? 

7.     In  what  other  experiments  have  you  found  the  alternation 


236 


Dynamic  Psychology 


of  one  impression  with  another  in  somewhat  the  same  way  as 
happens  in  Experiment  22. 

8.  Illustrate  from  your  record  of  Experiment  22  the  state- 
ment: "What  thing  is  perceived  will  depend  upon  past  experi- 
ence." 

9.  Illustrate  similarly ;  "What  thing  is  perceived  will  depend 
upon  the  state  of  mind  at  the  time  of  perceiving." 


Fig.  81. 


10.  Illustrate  similarly;  "Perception  is  of  definite  and  prob- 
able things." 

11.  Illustrate  similarly  the  influence  of  frequency  of  con- 
nection in  determining  what  percept  a  given  sense  stimulus  will 
arouse. 

12.  From  your  records  of  Experiments  19  to  25  gather  all  the 
facts  you  can  in  support  of  any  statements  made  in  this  chapter. 

Arrange  these  facts  in  lists,  each  under  the  statement  which 
it  supports. 


Connections  of  Impression  237 

References 

A.  James,  Briefer  Course,  II.  (17-27),  XX.   (316-334)- 
Stout,  Manual,   125-140,   199-209. 

Titchener,  Outline,  §§  27-30. 

B.  Ebbinghaus,  Grundziige,  §§  44-47. 

James,  Principles,  XVII.    (9-31),  XIX.    (82-133). 
Wundt,  Physiologiscke  Psychologie,  IX.,  XII.-XV. 


CHAPTER  XVI 

The  Connections  Between  one  Mental  State  and 
Another 

§  45.  Associations  of  Ideas 

The  Problem  Stated. — The  problem  of  this  section 
may  be  stated  in  several  ways.  Given  any  mental  state 
not  due  to  a  sense  stimulus,  how  came  it  to  be  present? 
Given  any  mental  state,  what  other  mental  state  will  it  call 
up?  What  in  addition  to  sense  stimuli  determines  the 
order  of  our  thoughts  ?  What  laws  account  for  the  ways 
in  which  mental  states  are  connected  among  themselves? 
These  four  questions  are  substantially  the  same. 

The  first  member  of  the  connection,  i.e.,  the  mental 
state  that  calls  up,  may  be  termed  the  antecedent,  the 
stimulant  or  simply  Thought  i  ;  the  second  member  of  the 
connected  pair,  i.e.,  the  mental  state  that  is  called  up,  may 
be  termed  the  consequent,  sequent,  resultant  or  simply 
Thought  2.  Thought  i  may  be  a  mental  state  of  any 
sort;  but  Thought  2  cannot  be  a  sensation  or  percept  or 
any  feeling  that  results  directly  from  a  sense  stimulus,  for 
then  the  connection  would  necessarily  be  not  mental- 
mental,  but  physical-mental.  Thought  2  is  generally, 
perhaps  always,  an  image,  a  feeling  of  meaning  or  intel- 
lectual relationship,  or  a  judgment. 

The  complex  states  of  mind  which  we  ordinarily 
experience  are  the  results  of  both  the  antecedent  thought 
and  of  sense  stimuli ;  a  man  does  not  often  have  a  series 

238 


Purely  Mental  Connections  239 

of  mental  states  due  to  purely  mental  connections.  What 
he  sees  and  hears,  the  feelings  of  his  own  body,  and  other 
sensory  stimuli,  color  his  thoughts  and  may  redirect  them. 
Still  in  day  dreams,  in  serious  thought  on  intellectual 
problems  and  in  the  flow  of  undisturbed  memories,  when 
little  attention  is  paid  to  the  physical  world  and  to  the 
warmth  or  cold  or  pain  or  movements  of  the  body,  the 
course  of  thought  is  almost  exclusively  explainable  as  the 
result  of  purely  mental  connections.  And  in  any  case  we 
can  study  the  influence  of  the  present  thought  in  determin- 
ing the  future  apart  from  that  of  the  sense  stimuli  which 
are  also  acting. 

The  General  Law  of  Association  in  the  Case  of 
Purely  Mental  Connections. — Probably  none  of  the 
purely  mental  connections  are  inborn,  unlearned.  Nature 
does  not  apparently  provide  any  ready-made  apparatus 
for  such  connections  as  thinking  of  six  when  one  thinks 
of  three  and  three.  Our  rich  inheritance  of  connections 
between  sense  stimuli  and  mental  states,  sense  stimuli  and 
acts,  and  mental  states  and  acts,  is  in  sharp  contrast  to  our 
utter  poverty  with  respect  to  connections  between  one 
mental  state  and  another.  Nature  gives  only  the  general 
capacity  to  form  such  connections  as  soon  as  images, 
feelings  of  meaning  and  judgments  have  been  acquired. 
One  important  result  of  the  fact  that  all  purely  mental 
connections  are  due  to  nurture  is  that  there  is  far  less 
uniformity  among  human  beings  in  the  mental-mental 
than  in  the  physical-mental  connections.  Light  rays  of  a 
certain  vibration-rate  produce  in  seeing  persons  the  feel- 
ing of  red  with  comparatively  small  variations,  but  the 
sight  of  the  color  will  arouse  in  one  the  thought  of  red, 
in  another  of  roth,  in  another  of  rouge,  in  another  of 
corado,  according  to  the  connections  which  have  been 
acquired. 


240  Dynamic  Psychology 

The  mode  of  acquisition  of  the  purely  mental  con- 
nections is  by  the  action  of  the  general  law  of  association. 
The  most  frequent  reason  why  one  mental  state  calls  up 
the  thought  of  a  certain  object  is  that  it  has  been  its 
antecedent  in  our  previous  experience.  Thinking  of  6 
times  7  makes  us  think  of  42,  because  in  school  the  6  times 
7  was  deliberately  connected  with  42.  The  child  thinks 
of  the  word  dog  as  a  sequent  to  the  percept  of  the  animal 
because  he  has  heard  and  said  the  word  in  response  to 
that  percept  before.  All  associations  between  percept 
of  thing  and  name,  percept  of  relation  and  name,  percept 
of  image  of  thing  and  class-name,  between  sensation  and 
adjective,  and  the  like,  are  clearly  due  to  this  law.  Con-, 
sider  also  the  vast  number  of  mental  connections  which 
owe  their  origin  to  arithmetical  tables,  paradigms  and 
definitions  learned,  to  books  read,  to  sights  seen  and 
sounds  heard  in  sequence.  Throughout  life  we  put  one 
thing  after  another  in  order  that  the  thought  of  the  first 
may  call  up  the  thought  of  the  second.  The  mental  con- 
nections which  attract  our  notice  do  so  often  by  their  very 
abnormality  and  rareness  and  so  give  a  false  notion  of 
connections  in  general.  For  once  that  a  thought  calls  up 
some  unlikely  sequent,  there  are  a  hundred  times  that  it 
calls  up  the  object  which  the  law  of  association  would  lead 
us  to  expect.  The  law  of  association  applied  to  the 
formation  of  purely  mental  connections  may  be  roughly 
stated  as  follows :  Any  mental  state  will  be  followed  by 
that  mental  state  by  which  it  has  been  followed  in  the  past. 
A  fuller  statement  of  the  law  will  be  made  later  after 
certain  apparent  exceptions  to  it  have  been  examined. 

The  Law  of  Partial  Activity. — It  is  impossible  to 
explain  the  following  connections,  which  represent  a  very 
common  sort,  by  the  fact  of  Thought  i  having  been  fol- 
lowed by  Thought  2  in  the  past : — 


Purely  Mental  Connections  241 

Case  A.     Thought  i.     Of  a  large  piece  of  ice  in  a  cup  of 

iced  tea. 
Thought  2.     Of  the  ice  trust. 
Case  B.     Thought  i.     I  have  lots  of  curiosity. 
Thought  2.     Of  Eve. 
In  these  and  similar  cases  the  first  thought  as  a  whole 
has  surely  never  before  gone  with  the  second  thought. 
But  they  are  nevertheless  to  be  explained  by  the  law  of 
association,  for  although  Thought  i  has  never  been  fol- 
lowed by  Thought  2  in  either  case,  a  part  of  it  has.     In 
Case  A  the  image  or  word  ice  is  the  only  element  of  the 
total  thought  that   is  active  in  making  the  connection; 
in  Case  B  the  thought  of  curiosity  is  the  active  element. 
Tee — Ice  trust'  and  'Curiosity — Eve'  are  readily  explain- 
able by  the  law  of  association.     In  the  total  thought  some 
one  element  frequently,  indeed  usually,  will  be  thus  active. 
The  law  should  therefore  be  amended  so  as  to  read :     Any 
mental  state  will  he  followed  by  that  mental  state  by  which 
it  or  some  part  of  it  has  been  followed  in  the  past. 

A  Mental  State  Calls  Up  Its  Previous  Accompani- 
ments.— There     remain    still     some     apparently    unex- 
plained cases  such  as  the  following: 
Case  A.     Thought  i.     Percept  of  Mr.  S.  reciting. 

Thought  2.     Image  of  Mr.  S.  at  luncheon  the 
day  before. 
Case  B.     Thought  i.     Percept  of  the  moon. 

Thought  2.  Image  of  a  lamp  with  a  round 
globe  at  home. 
Here,  as  before,  only  a  part  of  Thought  i  is  operative, 
but  the  part  acts  not  by  calling  up  something  which  has 
followed  it,  but  something  which  has  been  simultaneous 
with  it  and  of  which  it  was  a  part.  The  feeling  of  Mr.  S. 
in  the  total  of  'Mr.  S.  reciting'  calls  up  the  feeling  of 
Mr.  S.  in  the  total  of  'Mr.  S.  at  luncheon.'     The  feeling 


242  Dynamic  Psychology 

of  bright  roundness  in  the  total,  'bright  roundness  up  in 
the  sky  there,'  calls  up  the  total,  'bright  roundness  of 
globe  with  rest  of  lamp.'  It  is  a  fact  that  mental  states 
connect  not  only  with  their  previous  sequents  but  also 
with  their  previous  accompaniments.  Association  is  not 
only  in  a  forward  but  also  in  a  sideways  direction.  The 
law  should  read,  'by  which  it  or  some  part  of  it  has  been 
followed  or  accompanied.' 

Purely  Mental  Connections  in  General. — The  facts 
of  mental  connections  so  far  presented  may  be  represented 
by  easy  symbols  as  follows  : — 

Let  X  be  a  total  thought  composed  of  the  elements  ABC 
"  y    "  "     "  "  *'  "     "         "  D  E  F 

i(     _      <(    <i        a  ((  ((  a       <(  a  r""  T^  T 

i(  ii    i(       <(  it  ti  a       (I  a  T  TT  T 

"  w  "  "     "  "  "  "    "        "        A  M  N 

Let  X  have  been  followed  by  y 
"A      "        "  "  "    z 

"  X       "        "      accompanied  by  v 
Then  x  may  call  up  y  because  y  has  followed  x  in  the  past. 
Or      X     "       "         z        "        z    "         "  a   part   of  x 

in  the  past. 
Or  X  may  call  up  v  because  v  has  accompanied  x  in  the 

past. 
Or  X  may  call  up  w  because  the  elements  M  N  have  ac- 
companied a  part  of  x  in  the  past. 
Cases  where  Thought  i  as  a  whole  leads  to  Thought  2 
are  called  cases  of  Total  Recall;  cases  where  a  part  of 
Thought  I  leads  to  Thought  2  are  called  cases  of  Partial 
Recall;  cases  where  some  one  element  or  feature  of 
Thought  I  leads  to  Thought  2  are  called  cases  of  Focal 
Recall.  These  names  are  not  well  chosen ;  for  they  would, 
according  to  the  common  use  of  language,  mean  that  all 
or  part  or  a  little  was  recalled;  they  should  mean  of  course 


Purely  Mental  Connections  243 

that  all  or  a  part  or  a  little  of  a  thought  is  active  in  recall- 
ing. Perhaps  Total,  Partial  and  Very  Partial  Activity 
would  be  more  useful  names.  Focal  Activity  is  only  the 
extreme  of  partial  activity. 

Cases  of  partial  or  focal  activity  in  which  the  recalling 
elements  are  present  not  only  in  Thought  i  but  also  in 
Thought  2,  cases,  that  is,  of  the  xw  type,  used  to  be 
called  cases  of  Association  by  Similarity.  In  such  cases 
Thought  I  and  Thought  2  will  of  course  be  more  or  less 
similar,  because  one  or  more  elements  are  the  same  in 
both,  but  they  are  not  connected  by  their  similarity.  Mere 
similarity  in  and  of  itself  has  no  tendency  to  result  in  con- 
nection. The  thought  of  a  red  brick  does  not  make  us 
keep  on  thinking  of  red  bricks. 

The  name  Association  by  Contiguity  has  been  used, 
first  to  denote  connections  between  things  which  exist 
together  in  time  or  space,  and  later  to  denote  all  con- 
nections of  the  X  y  or  x  z  or  x  V  types.  The  name  has 
outlived  its  usefulness. 

The  names  (i)  Persistent  and  (2)  Desistent  associa- 
tions have  been  used^  for  ( i )  cases  where  the  first  thought 
or  part  of  it  remains  and  is  an  element  in  the  sequent 
thought  and  (2)  cases  where  it  does  not. 

I  have  spoken  of  connections  between  one  mental  state 
and  another  and  of  connections  between  the  thought  of 
one  thing  and  the  thought  of  another  thing,  as  if  the  two 
phrases  meant  the  same.  They  really  do  not;  quite  dif- 
ferent mental  states  may  each  be  the  thought  of  the  same 
thing.  Thus  in  the  following  connections  the  second 
members  are  in  both  cases  the  thought  of  George  Eliot's 
novels,  but  they  are  different  mental  states : — 
A.     Thought  I.     Adam  Bede. 

2.     I  like  George  Eliot's  novels. 

*  By  Professor  M.  W.  Calkins. 


244  Dynamic  Psychology 

B.     Thought  I.     Adam  Bede. 

"         2.     I  dislike  George  Eliot's  novels. 

If  the  student  will  notice  his  own  trains  of  thought  he 
will  soon  conclude  that  one  mental  state  rarely  calls  up 
exactly  the  mental  state  which  has  in  the  past  followed  it. 
Suppose  mental  state  A  to  be  followed  by  mental  state  B ; 
suppose  that  later  A  recurs.  The  emotional  tone,  the  feel- 
ings of  the  accompanying  circumstances,  the  general  set- 
ting which  composed  in  large  measure  mental  state  B,  will 
in  all  probability  not  recur,  but  only  the  object  or  fact  felt 
as  the  core  of  B.  For  instance,  *amo,  amas,  amat'  is 
followed  originally  by  the  feeling,  'amamus;  I  am  sick 
of  this ;  how  hot  it  is !'  etc. ;  but  'amo,  amas,  amat'  in  my 
mind  to-day  calls  up  only  the  word  'amamus ;'  the  setting 
it  has,  if  any,  is  furnished  by  present  circumstances.  In 
short  what  is  called  up  in  Thought  2  is  some  object  or 
fact.  Just  how  the  object  is  felt  or  the  fact  regarded  is 
decided  by  present  circumstances  rather  than  by  the  way 
the  object  and  fact  were  felt  and  regarded  in  the  past 
when  connected  with  Thought  i.  The  reason  for  this  is 
that  the  settings  of  the  object  or  fact  in  its  original 
appearances  were  due  largely  to  the  sensory  stimuli  then 
active,  and  were  different  at  different  times.  In  recall 
(i)  the  sensory  stimuli  of  the  present  far  outweigh  any 
images  of  the  setting  of  earlier  appearances,  and  (2)  such 
images  mutually  interfere  because  of  their  unlikeness. 

The  Causes  in  Partial  Activity. — The  next  step  in 
an  account  of  mental  connections  is  to  explain  which 
part  of  Thought  i  will  in  cases  of  partial  activity  be 
operative  in  calling  up  the  coming  thought.  It  will, 
other  things  being  equal,  be  that  part  which  is  attended  to, 
which  is  interesting,  which  is  held  in  the  mind's  focus. 
Just  as  of  what  the  eyes  see  at  any  time,  only  the  part 
that  is  in  the  center  of  the  visual  field  arouses  a  clear  per- 


Purely  Mental  Connections  245 

cept ;  so  of  what  is  thought  at  any  time,  only  the  focal  part 
will  arouse  the  next  idea.  The  other  things  that  must  be 
equal  are  all  those  which  make  one  brain  process  more 
likely  to  discharge  than  another,  such  as  conditions  of 
nutrition,  blood  supply,  fatigue  and  the  like.  About 
these  little  is  known,  but  they  are  so  effective  as  to  prevent 
a  psychologist  from  prophesying  with  any  approach  to 
certainty  what  part  of  any  total  thought  will  count  in 
determining  the  next  thought.  If  a  school  boy  thinks, 
'Christmas  comes  on  December  25th,'  he  will  in  the  long 
run  be  reminded  of  gifts,  good  things  to  eat  and  festivi- 
ties, rather  than  of  'square  root,'  'what  is  the  etymology 
of  December,'  or  'December  has  31  days;'  the  element 
Christmas  being  active  rather  than  the  element  25th  or 
December.  But  on  any  one  occasion  these  or  other 
features  of  the  total  thought  may  chance  to  be  the  de- 
termining factor  of  the  next  thought. 

The  Causes  that  Determine  Which  One  of  Several 
Possible  Facts  Shall  be  Called  Up. — The  account  of 
mental  connections  so  far  given  is  adequate  to  explain 
why  any  mental  state  or  part  of  a  mental  state  calls  up  the 
idea  which  has  gone  with  it.  But  any  antecedent  may 
have  been  followed  by  several  different  ideas.  In  such 
cases  which  one  will  be  called  up  ?  Horse  has  gone  with 
wagon,  whip,  harness,  mane,  car,  barn,  stall,  etc.  Which 
of  these  former  associates  will  be  the  sequent  in  any  given 
case  when  horse  is  thought  of?  The  details  of  the  gen- 
eral law  of  association  contain  the  answer.  The  con- 
nection will  be  along  the  line  of  least  resistance.  The 
line  of  least  resistance  will  be  determined  by  the  frequency, 
recency,  vividness  and  resulting  satisfaction  of  the  con- 
nection, and  the  excitability  of  the  sequent  ideas. 

Resulting  satisfaction  plays  here  a  comparatively 
unimportant  part  directly  for  the  reason  stated  in  §  35 


246  Dynamic  Psychology 

that  in  itself  one  image,  feeling  of  meaning  or  judgment 
is  little  less  or  more  pleasant  than  another.  Horse- 
wagon,  horse-whip,  horse-harness,  are  as  feelings  alike 
indifferent.  Resultant  satisfaction  is  probably  a  partial 
explanation  of  the  frequency  of  rhyming  associations  and 
the  connection  of  certain  epithets  with  things.  The 
pleasure  in  the  rhyme  or  in  the  fitness  of  the  epithet  may 
fix  the  two  members  of  the  connection  firmly  together  so 
that  the  one  will  later  call  the  other  up.  Indirectly,  in  the 
guidance  of  the  process  of  association,  as  in  schools, 
resulting  satisfaction  and  discomfort  are  prime  causes. 

Frequency  of  connection  in  the  past  is  the  commonest 
cause  of  connection  in  the  future.  Thus  the  sight  of  a 
horse  is  almost  sure  to  call  up  the  word  horse,  no  matter 
what  else  it  may  call  up;  4X9  is,  in  an  educated  mind, 
almost  sure  to  produce  the  thought  of  36  if  it  has  any 
sequent.  In  all  cases  where  the  feeling  of  a  thing  or 
quality  calls  up  its  name,  where  the  sight  of  printed 
letters  calls  up  the  auditory  or  motor  image  of  a  word; 
where  a  word  in  one  language  calls  up  its  translation  in 
another ;  where  familiar  signals,  such  as  the  striking  of  a 
clock,  calls  up  their  corresponding  events,  and  in  many 
more, — frequency  is  the  cause.  No  further  illustrations 
are  needed;  they  may  be  found  in  the  trains  of  thought 
appearing  in  connection  with  almost  every  example  in 
arithmetic  done,  every  page  read,  every  hour  of  daily  life. 

That  the  recency  of  a  connection  between  one  thought 
and  another  increases  the  probability  that  the  first  will 
call  up  the  second  also  needs  no  proof  and  little  comment. 
Anyone's  mental  life  during  any  day  will  substantiate  and 
illustrate  the  fact.  The  following  are  actual  cases : — 
A.     Thought  I.     The  sight  of  some  fruit. 

"         2.     Mr.  S.  asked  me  this  morning  if  I  liked 
fruit. 


Purely  Mental  Connections  247 

B.  Thought  I.     Of  Spanish  wars. 

"         2.     Of  the  trouble  [then  arising]  in  Qiina. 

C.  Thought  I.     Of  cable  cars,  horse  cars  and  of  my  feet 

on  the  pavement. 
"         2.     Of  cable  cars  just  keeping  up  with  a 
horse     car     yesterday  —  dreadfully 
slow. 

That  one  thought  which  has  gone  with  another  in 
some  vivid,  intense  experience  will  be  more  likely  to  call 
it  up  than  to  call  up  some  other  to  which  it  led  in  the 
course  of  commonplace,  unattended-to  life  is  also  proved 
and  illustrated  by  everyone's  experience.  In  the  mind 
of  the  man  who  has  dined  with  the  king,  every  future 
meal  will  be  honored  by  his  majesty's  presence  in  imagina- 
tion. In  1 90 1  the  mention  of  the  word  anarchist  called 
up  in  every  mind  the  lamented  death  of  President  McKin- 
ley. 

Every  day  life  also  sufficiently  illustrates  the  fact  that 
a  half-awake,  ready- to-be-excited  idea,  one  due  to  some 
vivid  and  deep  impression,  is  especially  likely  to  be  called 
up.  We  all  know  to  our  discomfort  how  easily  the  events 
of  a  trip  to  Europe  are  called  up  in  our  friends'  minds; 
how  everything  will  remind  the  doting  mother  of  some 
saying  or  act  of  her  child;  how  quickly  conversation  in 
the  country  store  turns  to  the  great  event  of  the  burning 
of  Thomson's  cow-barn. 

Finally,  to  understand  which  of  its  former  associates 
any  mental  state  will  call  up  we  need  to  bear  constantly 
in  mind  the  caution  of  page  167.  It  was  there  stated  that 
the  action  of  the  brain  at  any  time  must  not  be  con- 
sidered as  a  definite  action  of  a  limited  number  of  neurones 
and  nothing  more,  but  as  such  definite,  special,  emphatic 
action  plus  more  or  less  action  in  a  whole  system  of 
neurones,   even  throughout  the  entire   nervous   system. 


248  Dynamic  Psychology 

The  nature  of  this  more  general  action  or  *set*  of  entire 
systems  might  be,  we  then  saw,  an  important  factor  in 
determining  into  what  neurones  the  specially  active 
neurone  group  would  discharge. 

This  fact  implies  concerning  the  connections  between 
one  mental  state  and  another  that  which  thought  any 
given  thought  will  call  up  of  the  many  that  it  might  call 
up,  will  be  determined  in  part  by  the  general  trend  of 
thought  at  the  time,  the  general  frame  or  set  of  mind  one 
is  in,  the  general  system  of  ideas  which  is  as  a  whole  more 
or  less  aroused  and  ready  to  appear.  For  example,  if  it 
is  vacation  time  and  I  am  digging  in  my  garden  and  a 
neighbor  leans  over  the  fence  and  says,  "What  do  you 
think  of  James?"  I  shall  probably  think,  "What  James?" 
If  I  were  in  a  class  room  in  the  university  and  a  student 
asked  the  same  question,  I  should  think  of  the  gifts  and 
work  of  the  eminent  psychologist. 

The  same  thought  may  arouse  different  associates 
according  to  whether  it  is  felt  in  one's  work  system  or  play 
system,  one's  week  day  or  Sunday  system ;  at  home  or  at 
school;  by  oneself  or  among  others;  in  one's  scientific 
or  one's  sentimental  system ;  in  the  mood  of  elation  or  of 
depression.  Besides  these  great  systems  there  are  multi- 
tudes of  lesser  systems,  each  exerting  its  influence  on  the 
direction  of  thoughts  that  occur  within  it.  Notice  how 
every  new  thought  in  the  following  reverie  is  due,  not  to 
the  previous  thought  alone,  but  also  to  the  general  system 
of  'African  war  affairs  :' — 

"Sensation  of  getting  warm  under  sun  while  walking  fast. 
Soldiers  in  Africa  compared  with  me. 
My  bag  not  like  soldier's  gun  but  officer's  sword. 
Officers  do  not  wear  swords,  but  I  saw  a  picture  of  one 

with  a  scabbard  recently. 
British  have  learned  a  lot  this  war. 


Purely  Mental  Connections  249 

Boers  taught  officers  to  quit  wearing  swords  by  shooting 
at  officers. 

Old  chivalric  notions  dying  out  of  warfare;  thought  of 
Fontenoy  and  the  silly  exchange  of  courtesies. 

Newspaper  tale  that  Roberts  has  society  men  on  his  staff 
as  well  as  real  men. 

Does  he  have  to? 

That's  why  he  keeps  ahead  of  Kitchener,  by  not  appear- 
ing harsh. 

What's  Kitchener  doing  as  chief  of  staff? 

Roberts  sending  him  to  relieve  Rushenburg,  something 
like  sending  him  to  the  Victoria  West  District. 

I  guess  they  work  separately  better  than  together. 

I  would  better  think  of  something  useful. 

I'll  work  up  this  train  of  thought." 

The  action  of  the  general  law  of  association  in  the 
case  of  connections  between  one  mental  state  and  another 
may  be  summarized  as  follows :  Any  fact  thought  of  will 
call  up  that  fact,  the  thought  of  which  has  accompanied 
or  followed  it  or  a  part  of  it  most  frequently,  most  re- 
cently, in  the  most  vivid  experience  and  with  the  most 
residtant  satisfaction,  and  which  is  most  closely  con- 
nected with  the  general  set  of  mind  at  the  time. 

The  physiological  basis  of  this  law  is  simply  that  of 
the  general  law  of  association,  the  neural  connections 
being  in  this  case  between  associative  neurones.  The 
connections  between  the  thought  of  one  object  and  that 
of  another  illustrate  the  general  law  of  the  transmission  of 
the  nervous  impulse  along  the  line  of  least  resistance  or 
closest  connection. 

Individual  Differences  in  Purely  Mental  Connec- 
tions.— Individuals  differ  tremendously  in  the  number 
of  purely  mental  connections  which  they  possess  and  in 
the  time  required  to  make  the  connection.  What  is  com- 
monly called  knowledge  is,  in  psychological  terms,  mental 
connections,  error  equalling  incorrect  connections  and 
17 


250  Dynamic  Psychology 

ignorance  the  absence  of  connections.  As  people  differ 
in  the  amount  of  information  possessed,  so  roughly  they 
differ  in  the  number  of  purely  mental  connections.  The 
differences  are  then  obviously  tremendous.  Individual 
differences  in  the  case  of  the  time  it  takes  for  one  idea  to 
call  up  another  have  been  proved  to  exist  by  actual  meas- 
urement. Even  among  so-called  ^normal'  children  the 
range  is  such  that  some  children  require  more  than  twice 
as  long  for  the  same  process.  If  so-called  deficient  chil- 
dren are  included  the  differences  are  much  more  pro- 
nounced. 

Before  leaving  this  general  discussion  of  the  laws  of 
the  connections  between  the  thought  of  one  object  and 
the  thought  of  another,  I  may  refer  the  reader  to  the 
warning  given  in  §  41.  Ideas  occasionally,  even  often, 
come  up  which  are  highly  improbable  so  far  as  frequency, 
recency,  vividness,  and  so  on  are  concerned,  and  which 
can  be  attributed  only  to  some  at  present  unaccountable 
disturbance  of  the  nervous  system, — some  process  of  in- 
ner change  that  is  beyond  our  ken.  In  sleep,  fevers  and 
mania  this  is  perhaps  the  rule. 

Exercises 

I.  How  does  the  following  anecdote  illustrate  the  general 
fact  that  any  idea  will  call  up  that  idea  which  has  gone  with  it 
or  a  part  of  it? 

Six  gentlemen,  all  unacquainted  each  with  the  others,  had 
been  conversing  in  a  railway  carriage.  One  oflFered  to  tell  the 
profession  of  each  of  the  others,  provided  they  answer  one  ap- 
parently irrelevant  question.  They  agreed.  "He  drew  five  leaves 
from  his  note-book,  wrote  a  question  on  each,  and  gave  one  to 
each  of  his  companions  with  the  request  that  he  write  the  answer 
below.  When  the  leaves  were  returned  to  aim,  he  turned,  after 
reading  them,  without  hesitation  to  the  others,  and  said  to  the 
first,  *You  are  a  man  of  science' ;  to  the  second,  'You  are  a  soldier' ; 
to  the  third,  'You  are  a  philologer*;  to  the  fourth,  'You  are  a 


Purely  Mental  Connections  251 

journalist';  to  the  fifth,  'You  are  a  farmer'.  All  admitted  that 
he  was  right,  whereupon  he  got  out  and  left  the  five  behind. 
Each  wished  to  know  v/hat  question  the  others  had  received; 
and  behold,  he  had  given  the  same  question  to  each.  It  ran  thus : 
'What  being  destroys  what  it  has  itself  brought  forth?' 
To  this  the  naturalist  had  answered,  'vital  force' ;  the  soldier, 
*war' ;  the  philologist,  'Kronos' ;  the  publicist,  'revolution' ;  the 
farmer,  'a  boar'."  (H.  Steinthal,  Einleitung  in  die  Psychologie 
und  Sprachwissenschaft,  pp.  166-167;  quoted  in  James',  Principles 
of  Psychology,  vol.  II.,  p.  108.) 

2.  Arrange  the  connections  given  below  in  three  groups  ac- 
cording to  the  amount  of  Thought  i  that  is  active  in  calling  up 
Thought  2. 

A.  Thought  I.     Seeing   a    wrought-iron   letter-rack    on   the 

breakfast  table. 
Thought  2.     I  thought,  'That  has  been  made  by  a  student 
in  the  manual  training  class.' 

B.  Thought  I.    2  of  A. 

"         2.     What  is  the  value  of  manual  training? 

C.  "         I.    2  of  B. 

"         2.     Men  engaged  in  education  are  now  looking 
to  the  practical  in  life. 

D.  Thought  I.     Thought  of  my  physician. 

"         2.  "         "  his  asking  me  to  study  medicine. 

E.  ''         I.    2  of  D. 

"         2.     Thought  of  my  replying  that  I  was  afraid  of 
contagious    diseases. 

F.  "         I.     3X9. 
"         2.     27. 

G.  "         I.     A  noun  is  the  name 

"         2 of  a   thing. 

3.  What  per  cent,  of  the  connections  in  each  of  the  following 
passages  exemplify  total  or  nearly  total  activity  of  the  antecedent 
thought?  Can  you  recall  other  quotations  showing  the  same  dif- 
ference? In  what  sort  of  intellects  are  mental  connections  made 
by  the  total  or  nearly  total  activity  of  the  antecedent? 

I.  "  'But  where  could  you  hear  it?'  cried  Miss  Bates.  'Where 
could  you  possibly  hear  it,  Mr.  Knightley?  For  it  is  not  five  min- 
utes since  I  received  Mrs.  Cole's  note — no,  it  cannot  be  more  than 
five — or  at  least  ten — for  I  had  got  my  bonnet  and  spencer  on. 


252  Dynamic  Psychology 

just  ready  to  come  out — I  was  only  gone  down  to  speak  to  Patty 
again  about  the  pork — Jane  was  standing  in  the  passage — were 
you  not,  Jane? — for  my  mother  was  so  afraid  that  we  had  not 
any  salting-pan  large  enough.  So  I  said  I  would  go  down  and 
see,  and  Jane  said:  "Shall  I  go  down  instead?  for  I  think  you 
have  a  little  cold,  and  Patty  has  been  washing  the  kitchen."  "Oh, 
my  dear,"  said  I — well,  and  just  then  came  the  note.  A  Miss  Haw- 
kins— that's  all  I  know — a  Miss  Hawkins,  of  Bath.  But,  Mr. 
Knightley,  how  could  you  possibly  have  heard  it?  for  the  very 
moment  Mr.  Cole  told  Mrs.  Cole  of  it,  she  sat  down  and  wrote 
to  me.  A  Miss  Hawkins — '"  (Jane  Austen,  ''Emma"  quoted 
by  James,  Principles  of  Psychology,  vol.  I,  p.  571.) 

n.  "She  always  was  clever,"  said  poor  Mrs.  Nickleby,  bright- 
ening up,  "always  from  a  baby.  I  recollect  when  she  was  only 
two  years  and  a  half  old,  that  a  gentleman  who  used  to  visit  very 
much  at  our  house — Mr.  Watkins,  you  know,  Kate,  my  dear,  that 
your  poor  papa  went  bail  for,  who  afterwards  ran  away  to  the 
United  States,  and  sent  us  a  pair  of  snow  shoes,  with  such  an  af- 
fectionate letter  that  it  made  your  poor  dear  father  cry  for  a  week. 
You  remember  the  letter?  In  which  he  said  that  he  was  very 
sorry  he  couldn't  repay  the  fifty  pounds  just  then,  because  his 
capital  was  all  out  at  interest,  and  he  was  very  busy  making  his 
fortune,  but  that  he  didn't  forget  you  were  his  god-daughter,  and 
he  should  take  it  very  unkind  if  we  didn't  buy  you  a  silver  coral 
and  put  it  down  to  his  old  account?  Dear  me,  yes,  my  dear,  how 
stupid  you  are!  and  spoke  so  affectionately  about  the  old  port 
wine  that  he  used  to  drink  a  bottle  and  a  half  of  every  time  he 
came.    You  must  remember,  Kate." 

"Yes,   yes,  mamma;    what   of   him?'* 

"Why,  that  Mr.  Watkins,  my  dear,"  said  Mrs.  Nickleby, 
slowly,  as  if  she  were  making  a  tremendous  effort  to  recollect 
.  something  of  paramount  importance ;  "that  Mr.  Watkins — he 
wasn't  any  relation.  Miss  Knag  will  understand,  to  the  Watkins 
who  kept  the  Old  Boar  in  the  village ;  by  the  by,  I  don't  remember 
whether  it  was  the  Old  Boar  or  the  George  the  Third,  but  it  was 
one  of  the  two,  I  know,  and  it's  much  the  same — that  Mr.  Watkins 
said,  when  you  were  only  two  years  and  a  half  old,  that  you  were 
one  of  the  most  astonishing  children  he  ever  saw.  He  did  indeed. 
Miss  Knag,  and  he  wasn't  at  all  fond  of  children,  and  couldn't 
have  had  the  slightest  motive  for  doing  it.  I  know  it  was  he  who 
said  so,  because  I  recollect  as  well  as  if  it  was  only  yesterday,  his 


Purely  Mental  Connections  253 

borrowing  twenty  pounds  of  her  poor  dear  papa  the  very  moment 
afterwards."     (Nicholas   Nickleby.) 

III.  "To  be,  or  not  to  be :  that  is  the  question : 
Whether  'tis  nobler  in  the  mind  to  suffer 

The   slings  and  arrows  of  outrageous   fortune, 

Or  to  take  arms  against  a  sea  of  troubles, 

And  by  opposing  end  them?     To  die:  to  sleep; 

No  more ;  and  by  a  sleep  to  say  we  end 

The  heart-ache  and  the  thousand  natural  shocks 

That  flesh  is  heir  to,  'tis  a  consummation 

Devoutly  to  be  wish'd.     To  die,  to  sleep; 

To  sleep :  perchance  to  dream ;  ay,  there's  the  rub ; 

For  in  that  sleep  of  death  what  dreams  may  come 

When  we  have  shuffled  off  this  mortal  coil, 

Must  give  us  pause :  there's  the  respect 

That  makes  calamity  of  so  long  life; 

For  who  would  bear  the  whips  and  scorns  of  time. 

The  oppressor's  wrong,  the  proud  man's  contumely. 

The  pangs  of  despised  love,  the  law's  delay, 

The  insolence   of  office   and  the   spurns 

That  patient  merit  of  the  unworthy  takes, 

When  he  himself  might  his  quietus  make 

With  a  bare  bodkin?  who  would   fardels  bear, 

To  grunt  and  sweat  under  a  weary  life, 

But  that  the  dread  of  something  after  death. 

The   undiscover'd  country   from   whose  bourn 

No  traveller  returns,  puzzles  the  will 

And  makes  us  rather  bear  those  ills  we  have 

Than  fly  to  others  that  we  know  not  of?" 

IV.  "Two  beggars  told  me 

I  could  not  miss  my  way:  will  poor  folks  lie, 
That  have  afflictions  on  them  knowing  'tis 

A  punishment  or  trial?    Yes;  no  wonder. 

When  rich  ones  scarce  tell  true.     To  lapse  in  fulness 

Is  sorer  than  to  lie  for  need,  and  falsehood 

Is  worse  in  kings  than  beggars.     My  dear  lord! 

Thou  art  one  o'  the  false  ones.     Now  I  think  on  thee. 

My  hunger's  gone;  but  even  before,  I  was 

At  point  to  sink  for  food.     But  what  is  this? 

Here  is  a  path  to  't:  'tis  some  savage  hold: 


254-  Dynamic  Psychology 

I  were  best  not  call ;  I  dare  not  call :  yet  famine. 
Ere  clean  it  o'erthrow  nature,  makes  it  valiant. 
Plenty  and  peace  breeds  cowards :  hardness  ever 
Of  hardiness  is  mother." 

{Cymheline,  Act  III.,  Scene  VI.) 

4.  (a)     Give  two  illustrations  of  connections  of  the  X  Y  type 

(see  page  242). 

(b)  Give  two  illustrations  of  connections  of  the  X  Z  type 

(see  page  242), 

(c)  Give  two  illustrations  of  connections  of  the  X  V  type 

(see  page  242). 

(d)  Give  two  illustrations  of  connections  of  the  X  W  type 

(see  page  242). 

5.  (a)  Which  element  of  the  total  thought,  'Tuesday,  elec- 
tion day,  being  a  holiday,  the  stores  will  be  closed,'  would  be  most 
likely  to  be  operative  in  calling  up  the  next  thought  in  the  mind 
of  a  candidate  for  office?  In  the  mind  of  a  school  boy?  In  the 
mind  of  a  housekeeper? 

(b)     Compose   a   similar  illustration. 

6.  (a)  Give  three  illustrations  of  one  idea  calling  up  a  cer- 
tain one  of  its  previous  associates  because  of  the  frequency  of  the 
connection,  (b)  Give  three  illustrations  of  the  power  of  recency 
of  connection,  (c)  Three  of  the  power  of  vividness.  Three  of 
the  power  of  membership  in  the  same  mental  system. 

7.  Give  the  most  probable  causes  for  the  connections  which 
are  shown  by  the  following  trains  of  thought.  That  is,  state  in 
the  case  of  each  connection  whether  the  sequent  was  called  up  be- 
cause it  was  the  only  connection  or  because  it  was  the  most  fre- 
quent connection  or  because  it  was  the  most  recent  or  because  it 
was  the  most  vivid,  etc. 

"I  saw  a  paper  which  I  had  written  for  the  course  in  phil- 
osophy. 

I  wondered  whether  the  paper  would  be  accepted. 

Then  I  wondered  what  criticism  I  would  get. 

That  reminded  me  that  I  must  study  my  philosophy  lesson. 

Then  I  thought  that  the  lesson  was  about  Aristotle. 

This  reminded  me  that  he  was  called  the  father  of  the  sciences. 

Then  I  thought  about  his  logic. 


Purely  Mental  Connections  255 

This  reminded  me  of  Harris'  treatment  of  logic  in  his  'Psy- 
chologic Foundations.' 

By  thinking  of  the  word  psychologic  I  thought  of  psychology. 
Then  I  thought  of  the  psychology  class. 
That  reminded  me  that  I  had  not  yet  written  out  any  train 
of  thought." 

"Yesterday  we  received  a  letter  from  my  sister  who  is  off  on  a 
yachting  trip.  One  of  the  men  on  board  is  a  young  fellow  who  is 
to  be  an  assistant  pastor  in  the  fall.  This  brought  up  the  church, 
and  then  came  the  school  where  I  teach,  which  is  just  beside  the 
church.  This  brought  up  one  of  my  old  pupils  who  is  now  in  Ger- 
many. Then  came  an  experience  that  my  brother,  who  has  just 
returned  from  India,  told  yesterday  of  being  cheated  in  a  bi- 
cycle tire  by  some  German.  The  thought  of  my  brother  suggested 
India  and  I  thought  of  some  snake  stories  that  he  had  told  about 
that  country.  The  snakes  suggested  something  I  had  seen  in  the 
morning  paper  about  some  albino  snakes  at  Bronx  Park." 

8.  Looking  in  turn  at  each  of  the  words  printed  below 
(keep  all  the  later  words  covered  by  a  card  until  the  first,  sec- 
ond and  so  on  have  been  allowed  to  call  up  their  associations) 
note  and  record  the  fact  which  it  calls  up.  State  the  apparent 
cause  for  each  of  the  connections  made. 

seven  dress 

name  potato 

dinner  game 

friend  psychology 

election  religion 

instinct  river 

house  fast 

picture  Japan 

association  easy 

home  walking 


§  46.  Memory 

Memory  and  the  Law  of  Association. — The  terms 
memory  and  remember  are  used  to  refer  to  ( i )  the  revival 
of  a  mental  fact  in  imagination,  (2)  the  revival  of  a  fact 
plus  the  feeling  of  its  having  been  in  one's  experience  at 


256  Dynamic  Psychology 

some  time  in  the  past,  (3)  the  revival  of  the  appropriate 
mental  fact  in  response  to  a  situation,  and  (4)  the  revival 
of  a  movement  or  set  of  movements.  The  causes  of  the 
revival  of  movements  will  be  stated  in  Chapter  XVIII. 
The  causes  of  the  revival  of  mental  facts  are  found  in 
the  general  laws  describing  the  formation  and  operation 
of  connections  between  one  mental  state  and  another,  the 
revival  of  mental  facts  being  simply  the  result  of  the  laws 
of  the  association  of  ideas. 

The  answer  that  has  been  given  to  the  question,  'Given 
any  mental  state,  what  idea  will  be  called  up  ?',  will  answer 
also  the  question,  'What  decides  whether  any  mental  fact 
shall  reappear  in  memory?'  The  only  need  for  a  sep- 
arate section  on  memory  is  that  some  new  questions  arise 
when  the  process  of  mental  connection  is  studied  from  the 
point  of  view  of  the  'to  be  recalled  fact'  rather  than  from 
the  point  of  view  of  the  'mental  fact  present.' 

The  probability  of  revival  of  any  mental  fact  depends 
upon  the  strength  of  the  original  impression  and  the  num- 
ber of  situations  which  lead  to  it.  If  fact  A  is  impressed 
deeply,  it  will  by  the  laws  of  intensity  tend  to  be  called  up. 
If  there  are  a  hundred  mental  states  which  have  led  to  fact 
A,  it  has  by  the  law  of  association  a  hundred  times  the 
chance  of  being  called  up  that  it  would  have  if  there  were 
only  one  mental  state  which  had  led  to  it. 

To  make  sure  that  a  mental  fact  will  reappear,  e.g., 
that  you  do  not  forget  to  write  a  letter  to  Mr.  A,  you  may 
either  fix  firmly  the  fact  by  attending  to  it,  repeating  it, 
etc. ;  or  you  may  arrange  so  that  many  of  the  day's  situa- 
tions will  call  up  the  fact  'Write  a  letter  to  Mr.  A,'  e.g., 
by  saying  to  yourself:  'After  dinner  I  must  write  to  A. 
When  I  get  home  I  must  write  to  A.  Before  I  go  to  bed 
I  must  write  to  A.     Do  nothing  until  A  is  written  to.' 

To  recall  a  fact  we  try  one  after  another  those  facts 


Purely  Mental  Connections  257 

which  have  gone  with  the  desired  fact  in  the  hope  that 
some  one  of  them  will  call  it  up.  Thus  in  trying  to  think 
of  a  certain  man's  name  we  think  of  the  different  occa- 
sions when  we  have  seen  and  spoken  to  him,  of  the  things 
he  did,  of  the  persons  who  also  know  and  may  have 
spoken  of  him,  of  his  appearance  and  ways  and  the  like, 
of  names  that  we  feel  are  like  his  name. 

Appropriate  Revival. — For  practical  purposes  it  is 
not  the  mere  revival  of  a  mental  fact  that  counts  but  its 
revival  at  the  proper  situation.  To  recall  this  man's 
name  is  useless  unless  it  is  recalled  at  the  sight  of  his  face. 
To  recall  1763  is  useless  unless  it  is  recalled  in  connection 
with  the  Treaty  of  Paris  or  some  other  relevant  fact.  To 
recall  8:42  is  useless  unless  it  is  recalled  in  connection 
with  'the  train  goes  at.'  Thus  the  problem  of  memory 
becomes  still  more  similar  to  that  of  the  association  of 
ideas  in  general.  In  arranging  for  the  revival  of  a  mental 
fact,  we  commonly  arrange  for  its  connection  with  a 
particular  situation.  We  try  to  make  sure  that  8  will  be 
thought  of  and  thought  of  after  4-\-4;  that  Shakspere  will 
be  thought  of  and  thought  of  with  Hamlet,  Lear  and 
Othello. 

Goodness  of  memory  depends  upon  the  permanence  of 
impressions,  the  permanence  of  connections,  their  number 
and  their  nature  or  arrangement.  To  have  a  first  class 
memory  one  must  retain  for  long  the  effects  of  an  impres- 
sion, must  retain  for  long  the  effects  of  a  connection, 
must  have  a  goodly  number  of  connections  and  must  have 
things  connected  in  logical,  useful  ways.  It  is  better,  for 
instance,  to  remember  amat  for  a  year  than  for  a  day  and 
to  keep  the  connection  'he  loves  is  amaf  for  a  year  than 
for  a  day ;  to  have  a  hundred  such  connections  rather  than 
one;  to  have  fifty  connections  like  he  loves — amat,  they 
love — amant,     I    love — amo,     amabat — he    was    loving, 


258  Dynamic  Psychology 

amaverant — ^they  had  loved,  rather  than  fifty  like  amo- 
amas,  amas-amat,  amat-amamus,  amamus-amatis,  amatis- 
amant,  amant-amabam. 

These  facts  are  well  illustrated  in  the  stock  methods  of 
memorizing ;  Repetition,  Concentration  and  Recall.  Repe- 
tition strengthens  both  the  impressions  and  the  connection 
between  them  and  is  easy  and  natural,  but  is  somewhat 
wasteful  of  time.  Concentration,  or  prolonged  attention 
to  the  fact  to  be  remembered,  strengthens  the  impressions 
and  the  connection  between  them  and  saves  time,  but  at 
the  expense  of  effort.  Recall  (i.e.,  the  expression  from 
within  of  the  fact  to  be  remembered,  after  one  or  more 
impressions  of  it  from  without)  gains  the  extra  advantage 
of  forming  the  connection  in  the  way  in  which  it  will  be 
required  to  act  later^  and  is  conceded  to  be  the  best  method 
of  the  three. 

The  general  permanence  of  impressions  and  con- 
nections, the  mere  retentiveness  of  the  mind,  is  decided 
largely  by  original  capacity  and  the  general  conditions  of 
bodily  health.  The  permanence  of  any  particular  im- 
pression or  connection  depends  also  upon  the  degree  of 
attention  given  to  it,  its  vividness,  and  the  frequency  of  its 
repetition.  The  number  of  connections  depends  upon 
experience  or  training.  The  choice  of  logical  and  useful 
connections  depends  upon  experience  as  directed  by  the 
capacity  to  see  the  essential  elements  in  situations. 

Individual  Differences  in  Memory. — Individual  dif- 
ferences in  the  power  to  remember  are  among  the  most 
striking  found  in  mental  life.  For  some  it  is  a  heavy 
burden  to  keep  in  mind  the  names  of  a  hundred  friends, 
the  necessary  detail  of  a  single  business  or  profession, 

*  The  connection  required  is  to  think  of  B  on  seeing  A ;  it  is 
therefore  nK^e  usefal  to  practice  'see  A  think  B'  rather  than  'see  A 
see  B.' 


Purely  Mental  Connections  259 

and  perhaps  a  hundreth  part  of  what  is  learned.  For 
others  there  seems  no  need  of  more  than  a  casual  impres- 
sion to  fix  a  thing  in  memory.  Of  such  a  one  James 
writes, 

"He  never  keeps  a  written  note  of  anything,  yet  is 
never  at  a  loss  for  a  fact  which  he  has  once  heard.  He 
remembers  the  old  addresses  of  all  his  New  York 
friends  living  in  numbered  streets,  addresses  which 
they  themselves  have  long  since  moved  away  from  and 
forgotten.  He  says  that  he  should  probably  recognize 
an  individual  fly,  if  he  had  seen  him  thirty  years  pre- 
vious— he  is,  by  the  way,  an  entomologist.  As  an  in- 
stance of  his  desultory  memory,  he  was-  introduced  to 
a  certain  colonel  at  a  club.  The  conversation  fell  upon 
the  signs  of  age  in  man.  The  colonel  challenged  him 
to  estimate  his  age.  He  looked  at  him,  and  gave  the 
exact  day  of  his  birth,  to  the  wonder  of  all.  But  the 
secret  of  this  accuracy  was  that,  having  picked  up 
some  days  previously  an  army-register,  he  had  idly 
turned  over  its  list  of  names,  with  dates  of  birth, 
graduation,  promotions,  etc.,  attached,  and  when  the 
colonel's  name  was  mentioned  to  him  at  the  club,  these 
figures,  on  which  he  had  not  bestowed  a  moment's 
thought,  involuntarily  surged  up  in  his  mind."^ 

These  differences  are  due  to  (i)  differences  in  the 
original  capacity  to  retain  impressions  and  connections, 
(2)  differences  in  interest  and  (3)  differences  in  the 
training  of  the  capacity.  The  excellent  memory  for 
names  as  connected  with  faces  so  often  found  amongst 
clergymen  and  politicians  is  probably  a  case  of  interest. 
Names  are  attended  to  and  thought  over  because  of  the 
professional  interest  in  them.  INIany  a  woman  of  gen- 
erally feeble  memory  can  remember  every  dress  she  has 
owned  since  she  was  ten  years  old.  The  reason  that  men 
of  poor  general  capacity  to  retain  do  as  well  as  they  do 
in  the  memory  work  of  science,  business  and  other  walks 

^Principles  of  Psychology,  I,  p.  661. 


26o  Dynamic  Psychology 

of  life  is  apparently  that  they  train  themselves  to  learn 
facts  in  the  most  logical  and.  useful  ways  and  so  get  on 
with  a  little  material  well  ordered. 

Exercises 

I.  What  means  do  you  yourself  take  to  make  sure  of  re- 
membering a  fact?     Explain  why  each  is  useful. 

2.  What  fact  probably  explains  both  of  the  following  cases  ? — 
A  young  man  knew  by  heart  a  large  percentage  of  the  products 

of  every  number  up  to  a  thousand  by  every  number  up  to  a  thou- 
sand; he  could  give  the  population  of  hundreds  of  cities  and 
counties.  He  did  not  remember  names  or  poetry  or  miscellaneous 
facts  much,  if  any,  better  than  a  person  of  moderately  good 
memory. 

An  ignorant  waiter,  whose  duty  it  was  to  care  for  hats  and 
coats  left  at  the  door  of  a  hotel  dining  room,  is  reported  to  have 
never  made  a  mistake  in  years  in  recalling  which  hat  belonged  to 
which  man  of  the  hundreds  who  came  to  the  hotel  each  day. 

3.  Which  would  be  the  better  way  to  commit  to  memory  a 
Speech,  to  sit  in  one's  chair  and  read  it  to  oneself  or  to  stand  up, 
and  say  it  out  loud? 

4.  Find  what  evidence  you  can  from  your  knowledge  of 
yourself  and  of  your  acquaintances  to  support  the  following  state- 
ments : — 

(a)  A  good  memory  over  a  short  interval  does  not  imply  a 
good  memory  over  a  long  interval,  (b)  A  good  logical  memory 
may  go  with  a  very  poor  verbal  memory,  (c)  Very  stupid 
people  may  have  excellent  memories. 

§  47.  The  Control  of  Purely  Mental  Connections 

Habit  Rules  Thought. — If  one  desires  to  have  one 
fact  call  up  another,  the  two  should  be  put  together. 
The  certainty  of  the  recall  will  depend  upon  the  frequency 
and  vigor  with  which  the  two  are  put  together.  Thought 
like  conduct  is  a  matter  of  habit,  and  habits  result  only 
from  painstaking  connections.  The  intellect  does  not 
work  logically  or  usefully  of  its  own  accord,  but  only  by 
being  practiced  in  or  habituated  to  logical  and  useful 


Purely  Mental  Connections  261 

associations  of  mental  facts.  For  instance,  the  person 
cannot  help  becoming  intellectually  commonplace  who 
habitually  listens  to  and  participates  in  such  talk  as: 
"I  saw  Mrs.  Jones  yesterday.  She  was  going  down 
town."  ''She  told  me  she  was  going  to  buy  a  hat." 
"Yes,  she  showed  it  to  me  this  morning.  She  said  it 
cost  twenty  dollars."  "I  don't  believe  she  paid  cash.  The 
Jones  live  away  beyond  their  income."  ''Mr.  Jones'  health 
is  not  very  good,  I'm  told ;  it  would  be  very  hard  for  them 
if  he  broke  down."  "It  has  been  a  terrible  winter  for 
sickness,"  etc.,  etc.,  etc. 

Adult  students  who  are  by  nature  of  a  superior  intel- 
lectual calibre  and  by  training  supplied  with  many  useful 
systems  of  connections  between  facts,  are  prone  to  forget 
the  bondage  to  purely  habitual  associations  which  masters 
less  gifted  and  less  mature  minds.  The  following  exam- 
ples will  help  to  make  real  the  true  state  of  affairs,  and  to 
emphasize  the  obvious  but  neglected  practical  rule :  Put 
together  facts  which  you  wish  to  go  together,  and  keep 
apart  facts  which  you  wish  to  be  separate : — 

Children  are  found  to  learn  long  division  far  more 
easily  if  in  short  division  they  are  taught  to  put  the  line 
above  or  at  the  right  of,  instead  of  below,  the  dividend 
and  the  quotient  above  the  line  or  to  the  right  of  it,  thus : 
4I  Tm  01*  4I1688I422.  The  reason  is  of  course  that  they 
are  saved  the  trouble  of  forming  a  new  and  contradictory 
set  of  associations  when  they  begin  long  division. 

Children  taught  the  numbers  from  i  to  20  and  then 
from  20  to  40  or  higher  are  found  to  have  difficulty,  after 
learning  to  write  those  from  20  to  40,  in  writing  those 
from  13  to  19,  although  in  their  first  learning  they  had  had 
no  trouble.  The  errors  made  are  writing  61  for  sixteen, 
81  for  eighteen  and  the  like.  The  reason  is  that  they  form 
with  the  numbers  above  twenty  the  association  of  putting 
the  digit  denoted  by  the  first  part  of  the  word  first  in  order 
and  the  digit  denoted  by  the  second  part  of  the  M^ord  sec- 


262  Dynamic  Psychology 

ond  in  order.  Thus  thirty-eight  is  38,  twenty-six  is  26. 
When  now  they  hear  sixteen  or  eighteen,  they  tend  to 
follow  the  recent  habit  of  making  the  order  of  digits  the 
order  of  the  syllables  of  the  word. 

Three  quarters  of  a  page  of  a  magazine  contained  an 
advertisement  of  the  Oneita  Clothing.  One  quarter  of  it 
contained  an  advertisement  of  the  Munsing  Clothing. 
Many  people  sent  to  the  Munsing  Company  orders  for  the 
Oneita  Clothing. 


Systems  of  Associations.  —  The  arrangement  of 
mental  connections  in  useful  systems  adds  greatly  to  their 
efficiency.  Just  as  science  orders  the  incoherent  mass  of 
experiences  of  the  world  at  large,  so  any  individual  may, 
by  having  facts  presented  to  him  in  coherent  systems  and 
by  being  encouraged  to  recall  facts  in  a  logical  order, 
become  a  more  efficient  thinker. 

The  capacity  to  make  connections  with  some  element 
of  the  antecedent  thought, — i.e.,  the  capacity  for  partial 
activity, — is  on  the  whole  more  valuable  than  that  for 
total  activity.  We  should  train  ourselves  to  survey  each 
fact  and  to  select  its  essential  element  or  feature  to  be  the 
antecedent  to  the  next  thought.  To  learn  the  gist  of  a 
passage  is  thus  often  a  more  profitable  task  than  to  learn 
it  verbatim. 

Apart  from  inborn  capacity  the  efficiency  of  a  man's 
memory  depends  on  his  general  health,  the  degree  of 
attention  he  bestows  on  facts,  the  care  with  which  he 
arranges  them  into  systems,  and  the  zeal  with  which  he 
works  over  these  facts,  recalling  them,  comparing  them 
and  thinking  about  them.  Any  training  which  teaches 
us  (i)  to  consider  facts  fully  and  thoughtfully,  (2)  to 
compare  them,  to  put  those  together  which  belong  to- 
gether and  to  study  their  relationships,  and  (3)  to  recall 
them  on  all  suitable  occasions,  so  as  to  connect  them  with 


Purely  Mental  Connections  263 

relevant  facts  of  daily  life,  will  improve  memories  so  far 
as  they  are  improvable. 

References 

A.  James,   Briefer   Course,   XVI.    (253-271),   XVIII. 
Stout,  Manual,  418-446. 

Titchener,  Outline,  §§  52-55. 

B.  Ebbinghaus,  Grundziige,  §§  60-64. 
James,  Principles,  XIV.,  XVI.  (653-689). 
Wundt,  Physiologische  Psychologie,  XIX.  (§§  1-4). 


CHAPTER  XVII 

The  Connections  Between  One  Mental  State  and 
Another  (Continued) 

§  48.  Purposive  Thinking 

Purposive  Thinking  Equals  Spontaneous  Thinking 
Plus  Selection. — ^We  distinguish  spontaneous  or  aim- 
less thinking  from  controlled  or  purposive  thinking.  In 
the  former  ideas  flow  on  at  random,  unchecked  by  any 
interference  on  the  part  of  our  general  intentions  and 
aiming  at  no  desired  goal.  The  prattle  of  babies,  the 
reveries  and  haphazard  trains  of  thought  which  come  as 
we  sit  idly  thinking  of  nothing  in  particular,  and  the 
majority  of  dreams  are  of  this  sort.  In  the  latter  some 
end  is  in  view;  our  thoughts  are  kept  so  far  as  may  be 
under  control  and  make  an  intelligible  sequence. 

The  connections  in  controlled  thinking  follow  the  same 
law  as  those  in  spontaneous  thinking.  The  difference  is 
that  in  controlled  thinking  each  thought  as  it  comes  is 
attended  to;  its  usefulness  is  judged  in  the  light  of  our 
general  system  of  ideas  and  purposes  concerning  the  topic 
in  hand ;  it  is  allowed  to  remain  and  influence  the  future 
course  of  thought  only  when  it  seems  fit.  So  also  of  any 
total  thought,  that  element  which  seems  most  useful  to  our 
purpose  is  definitely  selected,  attended  to  and  encouraged 
to  call  up  its  connections.  In  spontaneous  thinking  we 
take  whatever  comes.  In  controlled  thinking  we  select 
and  reject  in  view  of  the  goal  we  wish  to  attain. 

264 


Purely  Mental  Connections  265 

This  process  of  attentive  consideration  and  selection  or 
rejection  is  clearly  shown  in  the  search  for  a  proper  word 
to  express  a  meaning,  in  attempts  to  solve  problems  of  all 
sorts,  from  the  simplest  riddle  or  puzzle  to  the  most 
abstruse  question  in  mathematics  or  science,  and  in  sum- 
moning evidence  to  support  an  argument.  E.g.,  you  wish 
an  adjective  to  describe  a  person  who  habitually  enjoys 
what  you  do  to  entertain  him,  puts  himself  at  your  point 
of  view  and  disagrees  with  nobody.  You  think :  "Affa- 
ble— no !  that  means  more  active  effort  at  being  pleasant 
— agreeable — no  !  agreeing  would  do  better — apprecia- 
tive— yes !  but  that  doesn't  include  his  readiness  to  accept 
almost  any  statement — compliant  would  mean  that,  but 
misses  the  appreciative,  easily  suited  nature — complaisant 
— no !  that  isn't  it  at  all — suitable — we  ought  to  be  free  to 
use  suitable  to  mean  one  who  can  be  suited,  can  be 
pleased — pleasable  is  just  it  and  isn't  ambiguous.  That's 
the  word.     He  is  a  pleasable  man." 

The  Process  of  Selection. — Selection  and  survival 
of  the  fit  thoughts ;  inhibition  and  elimination  of  the  unfit 
— these  are  the  essentials  of  purposive  thinking.  The 
forces  that  select  and  inhibit  are  the  feeling  of  approval 
or  satisfaction  and  its  opposite.  The  inhibition  of  the 
unfit  thought  is  often  accompanied  by  feelings  of  effort; 
often  the  unfit  thought  is  banished  only  by  voluntary  at- 
tention to  something  else.  Thoughts  of  play  will  intrude 
while  the  pupil  is  working  out  a  problem  in  geometry, 
and  their  expulsion,  or, — what  is  the  same  thing, — the 
persistence  of  attention  to  the  geometry,  becomes  a  matter 
of  effort.  It  would  be  wrong,  however,  to  make  volun- 
tary attention  or  the  feeling  of  effort,  the  sine  qua  non 
of  purposive  thinking.  Efficient,  controlled  thought  may 
go  on  with  little  or  no  feeling  of  effort.  Connection  after 
connection  may  be  made,  all  leading  steadily  toward  the 

18 


i<^  Dynamic  Psychology 

desired  end;  irrelevant  ideas  may  occur  but  seldom  and, 
when  they  do  occur,  be  pushed  aside  without  any  strug- 
gle. The  following  account  by  Galton  of  his  own  thinking 
illustrates  this  and  also  the  general  characteristics  of  the 
process  of  connection  in  purposive  thinking. 

"When  I  am  engaged  in  trying  to  think  anything  out, 
the  process  of  doing  so  appears  to  me  to  be  this :  The 
ideas  that  lie  at  any  moment  within  my  full  consciousness 
seem  to  attract  of  their  own  accord  the  most  appropriate 
out  of  a  number  of  other  ideas  that  are  lying  close  at 
hand,  but  imperfectly  within  the  range  of  my  conscious- 
ness. There  seems  to  be  a  presence-chamber  in  my  mind 
where  full  consciousness  holds  court,  and  where  two  or 
three  ideas  are  at  the  same  time  an  audience,  and  an  ante- 
chamber full  of  more  or  less  allied  ideas,  which  is  situated 
just  beyond  the  full  ken  of  consciousness.  Out  of  this 
antechamber  the  ideas  most  nearly  allied  to  those  in  the 
presence-chamber  appear  to  be  summoned  in  a  mechani- 
cally logical  way,  and  to  have  their  turn  of  audience. 

"The  successful  progress  of  thought  appears  to  depend 
— first,  on  a  large  attendance  in  the  antechamber;  sec- 
ondly, on  the  presence  there  of  no  ideas  except  such  as 
are  strictly  germane  to  the  topic  under  consideration; 
thirdly,  on  the  justness  of  the  logical  mechanism  that 
issues  the  summons.  The  thronging  of  the  antechamber 
is,  I  am  convinced,  altogether  beyond  my  control ;  if  the 
ideas  do  not  appear,  I  cannot  create  them,  nor  compel 
them  to  come.  The  exclusion  of  alien  ideas  is  accom- 
panied by  a  sense  of  mental  effort  and  volition  whenever 
the  topic  under  consideration  is  unattractive,  otherwise  it 
proceeds  automatically,  for  if  an  intruding  idea  finds 
nothing  to  cling  to,  it  is  unable  to  hold  its  place  in  the 
antechamber,  and  slides  back  again.  An  animal  absorbed 
in  a  favorite  occupation  shows  no  sign  of  painful  effort  of 
attention;  on  the  contrary,  he  resents  interruption  that 
solicits  his  attention  elsewhere. 

"The  consequence  of  all  this  it  that  the  mind  frequently 
does  good  work  withoiit  the  slightest  exertion."^ 

^Inquiries  into  Hitman  Faculty,  p.  203. 


Purely  Mental  Connections  267 

§  49.  Reasoning 

The  word  reasoning  has  no  exact  accepted  meaning. 
Its  most  general  meaning,  which  will  be  adopted  here,  is 
purposive  thinking  which  solves,  or  tries  to  solve,  new 
problems.  The  man  who  thinks  of  whipping  his  horse 
to  make  him  go  out  from  his  barn,  does  not  reason.  But 
the  man  who,  when  the  horse  refuses  to  go  out,  procures 
a  bucket  of  oats,  lets  the  horse  begin  to  eat  them  and 
while  his  attention  is  thus  distracted,  gently  leads  it  out 
through  the  door,  reasons;  for  he  solves  a  problem  for 
which  ordinary  habits  of  thought  or  action  do  not  suffice. 
In  reasoning,  then,  we  deal  with  new  data  or  with  old 
data  in  new  ways ;  we  break  away  from  the  field  of  con- 
crete habits  and  particular  associations. 

Inductions  and  Deductions. — The  logic  books  divide 
reasonings  into  inductions,  in  which  the  examination 
of  many  particular  facts  leads  to  a  general  conclusion, 
and  deductions,  in  which  some  geiieral  conclusion  already 
found  leads  to  another  general  conclusion  or  to  a  judg- 
ment about  some  particular  fact.  When  a  student  finds 
that  hydrochloric  acid  and  zinc  produce  hydrogen  and 
chloride,  that  nitric  acid  and  silver  produce  certain  gases 
and  silver  nitrate  and  so  on,  and  therefore  concludes 
that  any  acid  will  combine  with  any  metal  to  form  a  salt, 
he  reasons  by  induction.  When  he  argues  that  since  the 
sum  of  the  three  angles  of  a  triangle  equals  two  right 
angles,  the  sum  of  the  two  acute  angles  of  a  right  triangle 
will  equal  one  right  angle,  or  that  the  three  angles  of 
such  and  such  a  particular  figure  will  equal  two  right 
angles,  he  reasons  by  deduction. 

In  both  cases  the  process  involves  the  analysis  of  facts 
into  their  elements  and  the  selection  of  the  element  that 
is,  or  is  thought  to  be,  instructive.     In  the  case  of  the 


268  Dynamic  Psychology 

inductive  reasoning,  the  student  must  have  thought,  not 
of  the  total  appearances  of  the  chemicals  with  which  he 
experimented,  but  of  the  elements;  acid-quality,  metal- 
quality  and  salt-quality.  In  the  first  case  of  deductive 
reasoning,  he  must  have  thought,  not  of  the  form  or  di- 
rection of  the  two  angles  of  a  right  triangle,  but  of  their 
equality  to  'three  angles  of  a  triangle  minus  one  right 
angle.'  In  the  second  he  discards  from  attention  all 
the  features  of  the  figure  (size,  shape,  etc.)  except  the 
'being  a  surface  inclosed  by  three  straight  lines  in  the 
same  plane.' 

The  important  factors  in  inductive  reasoning  are  fer- 
tility of  association,  to  call  up  a  sufficient  number  of 
particular  facts;  the  capacity  to  select  their  common  ele- 


B 

0 

FiG.   82. 

ments  by  the  working  of  the  law  of  dissociation ;  and  the 
capacity  to  judge  which  of  the  elements  is  the  essential 
one  for  the  end  in  view.  Fertility  of  knowledge,  power  of 
abstraction  and  sagacity  in  selection  make  the  efficient 
inductive  reasoner.  One  may  fail  by  not  having  the  facts 
to  begin  with,  by  not  being  able  to  analyze  them  or  by 
neglecting  their  vital  feature.  Thus  one  could  not  reason 
well  about  the  cause  of  malaria  who  had  never  studied 
cases  of  it,  or  who  could  not  separate  the  phenomenon  as 
a  whole  into  its  conditions,  cause,  symptoms,  effects,  and 
the  like;  and  one  could  never  get  the  right  answer  who 
studied  the  high  body-temperature,  or  the  mental  lassitude, 
or  the  occurrence  in  swampy  places,  neglecting  the  'hav- 
ing the  malarial  parasite  in  the  blood'  feature. 


Purely  Mental  Connections  269 

The  important  factors  in  deductive  reasoning  are  the 
power  of  abstraction,  enabling  one  to  break  up  a  given 
fact  into  its  elements,  fertility  of  knowledge  of  the  proper- 
ties of  these  elements  and  sagacity  in  the  choice  of  the 
essential  one.  To  take  a  very  simple  case,  to  prove  that  'if 
one  straight  line  cuts  another  straight  line,  the  vertical 
angles  are  equal,'  a  school-boy  must  be  able  to  think  of  the 
angle  AOB  (see  Fig.  82)  as  B  O  D— D  O  A  or  as 
A  O  C— B  O  C,  and  of  D  O  C  as  A  O  C— D  O  A  or  as 
B  O  D— B  O  C,  and  of  B  O  D  or  O  A  C  as  a  straight  line. 
He  must  have  the  sagacity  to  see  that  for  the  end  in  view 
he  must  think  of  A  O  B  as  B  O  D — D  O  A  in  combina- 
tion with  the  thought  of  D  O  C  as  A  O  C— D  O  A  or  of 
A  O  B  as  A  O  C — B  O  C  in  combination  with  the  thought 
of  D  O  C  as  B  O  D— B  O  C. 

To  take  another  case,  one  must,  to  draw  the  right 
conclusion  about  the  treatment  of  a  diseased  condition 
of  the  throat,  be  able  to  distinguish  its  different  symptoms, 
must  attend  to  the  presence  of  the  Klebs-Loeffler  bacillus 
as  the  vital  feature,  and  know  the  property  of  that  bacillus 
as  the  cause  of  diphtheria  and  the  property  of  diphtheria 
as  curable  by  antitoxin. 

We  may  expect  to  find  efficient  reasoning  only  where 
the  capacities  to  dissociate  and  to  make  associations  by 
partial  activity  are  well  developed.  Its  rarity  in  com- 
parison with  the  ability  to  learn  by  mere  association  and 
to  remember,  is  due  to  the  comparative  rarity  of  these  two 
capacities.  When  they  are  present  in  a  high  degree  and 
are  supported  by  a  wide  range  of  knowledge  about  the 
topic  in  question,  the  results  in  reasoning  seem  to  ordinary 
mortals  miraculous.  We  can  hardly  keep  from  believing 
that  the  flights  of  great  genius  are  the  result  of  an  inscrut- 
able capacity  for  being  right  where  others  are  wrong. 

It   is,  however,  possible  to  understand  the  miracle, 


270  Dynamic  Psychology 

The  purposive  thinking  of  the  genius  is  wonderful,  but 
not  because  it  is  of  a  mysteriously  different  kind  from  that 
of  ordinary  men.  The  marvel  is  in  the  superior  activity 
of  the  processes  of  dissociation  or  abstraction  by  which 
a  fact  reveals  to  the  genius  elements  or  aspects  never 
before  seen  in  it,  and  in  the  superior  fertility  by  which 
one  after  another  of  the  consequences  of  this  new  insight 
are  passed  in  review  and  so  used  to  test  its  value. 

Training  in  Reasoning. — (i)  Facts  to  reason  with 
are  the  first  essential  to  progress  in  reasoning.  It  is  by 
other  facts  that  the  pertinence  of  any  fact  is  judged;  it 
is  by  calling  up  some  decisive  fact  that  the  selected 
element  brings  the  thinker  nearer  to  the  desired  con- 
clusion. 

(2)  Practice  in  attending  to  the  parts  or  elements  of 
facts,  in  examining  each  detail,  in  thinking  of  things  not 
in  their  gross  total  appearance  but  in  their  different 
aspects  and  with  respect  to  their  different  features,  is  the 
second  essential.  The  student  must  learn  to  conquer 
facts  by  dividing  them. 

(3)  The  greatest  aid  in  this  process  is  comparison. 
Elements  appear  in  a  fact  when  it  is  in  juxtaposition  with 
others  which  would  never  be  noticed  in  it  by  itself. 
Thinking  things  together,  putting  them  in  groups,  looking 
for  similars  and  opposites,  supplanting  the  random  order 
of  the  world's  facts  by  an  arrangement  into  classes, — into 
likes  and  unlikes,  causes  and  effects,  conditions  and 
dependents  and  the  like, — is  the  preliminary  to  insight 
into  the  world's  nature.  It  furnishes  the  opportunity  for 
the  law  of  dissociation  to  operate. 

(4)  Practice  in  criticising  one's  ideas, — in  asking 
*Does  this  fit  the  problem?'  Ts  this  a  relevant,  useful 
idea?'  'Where  will  this  fact  lead?'  'Am  I  on  the  right 
track?' — will  improve  the  power  to  select  wisely  and  to 


Purely  Mental  Connections  271 

resist  the  attractions  of  unessential  ideas.  This  process 
of  criticism,  of  learning  to  judge  whether  the  idea  present 
is  the  one  essential  to  the  end  in  view,  will  be  improved 
(5)  by  knowledge  of  the  common  fallacies  of  mistakes 
to  which  thinking  is  subject,  and  of  the  useful  methods 
of  verification  of  thought  by  appeal  to  observation  and 
experiment.  Practice  in  detecting  fallacies  and  verifying 
conclusions  is  the  business  of  logic  and  scientific  method, 
not  of  psychology. 

Exercises 

1.  Which  of  the  trains  of  thought  of  question  3  of  the  ex- 
ercises following  §  45  seem  most  purposive  or  controlled? 

2.  In  which  case  is  it  harder  to  tell  whether  frequency,  re- 
cency or  intensity  is  the  cause  of  the  connection,  in  the  connec- 
tions of  passage  I.,  of  page  251  or  in  those  of  passage  IV.,  of 
page  253? 

3.  Why? 

4.  Notice  what  happens  as  you  try  to  think  of  a  word  mean- 
ing 'not  capable  of  being  taken  away  from  or  given  away  by  the 
possessor.' 

5.  Note  what  happens  in  your  mental  life  when  you  think 
out  the  answer  to  the  question,  'What  are  the  opposites  of  be- 
cause, if,  and,  adroit,  loquacious,  to  degrade?' 

6.  Prove  the  following  proposition :  The  diagonals  of  a 
rectangle  are  equal.  Write  down  every  idea  you  have  in  the 
course  of  thinking  out  the  proof.  After  you  have  finished,  ex- 
amine the  series  of  ideas  recorded  and  note  instances  of  selection 
and  of  rejection. 

7.  Compare  a  passage  involving  reasoning  with  a  simple 
descriptive  passage  of  equal  length : — ^ 

(a)  In  the  number  of  general  notions. 

(b)  "     "         "  "    abstract  notions. 

(c)  "      "         "  "    intellectual  relationships. 

(d)  "     "         *'  "    associations    by   focal    activity. 
Experiment  26.     Spontaneous   and  Controlled  Association. — 

Cover  the  lists  of  words  printed  below  and  look  at  them  only  as 
necessary  for  the  experiment. 

*  Selections  of  the  one  sort  will  be  readily  found  in  text  boo'^s 
on  mathematics,  physics,  economics  and  the  like  ;  and  of  the  other 
sort  in  novels  or  biographies. 


272 


Dynamic  Psychology 


Get  a  friend  to  measure,  with  a  stop  watch  if  one  is  obtain- 
able, the  time  taken  in  calling  up  the  things  or  words  suggested 
by  the  words  in  list  A.  That  is,  uncover  the  words  at  a  given 
signal,  looking  at  the  first  word.  As  soon  as  any  thing  or  word 
comes  to  your  mind,  look  at  the  second ;  as  soon  as  it  arouses  an 
idea  look  at  the  third  and  so  on.  When  the  tenth  word  has 
called  up  its  associated  idea  record  the  time  that  has  elapsed  in 
seeing  the  ten  words  and  thinking  of  ten  things. 

Do  the  same  with  lists  B,  C  and  D  except  that  the  idea  called 
up  must  mean  in  every  case  the  opposite  of  the  thing  or  quality 
meant  by  the  printed  word  (e.  g.,  for  work  j-ou  must  think  play, 
or  be  idle  or  the  like,  for  friend  you  must  think  enemy  or  foe  or 
the  like). 

Compare  the  times  taken  in  the  four  cases.  Record,  so  far 
as  you  can  remember  them,  any  instances  of  the  inhibition  of 
irrelevant  or  misleading  ideas  that  came  to  mind  in  the  course 
of  thinking  of  the  opposites  of  list  D. 


A. 

B. 

C. 

D. 

house 

day 

permanent 

proud 

tree 

long 

to   spend 

weary 

child 

boy 

to  reveal 

permit 

time 

white 

motion 

genuine 

art 

outside 

separate 

to   respect 

London 

good 

rude 

precise 

Napoleon 

poor 

simple 

obnoxious 

think 

to  hate 

grand 

unitary 

red 

yes 

frequently 

scatter 

enough 

above 

broken 

particular 

Experiment  27.  Spontaneous  and  Controlled  Association. — 
(a)  With  pencil  in  hand  read  the  passage  that  follows,  writing 
in  each  of  the  blank  spaces  the  very  first  word  that  comes  to  mind 
as  you  read.  Have  some  one  note  the  number  of  seconds  which 
the  experiment  takes.  Read  the  same  passage  as  before,  writ- 
ing in  each  of  the  blank  spaces  the  word  which  seems  to  you  the 
right  one.  Have  some  one  note  the  time  taken  as  before.  Des- 
cribe the  differences  between  the  two  mental  processes. 

The  world  is  too  much  with  us;  late  and  soon. 

Getting  and  spending,  we  lay  waste  our  powers : 

Little  we  see  in  Nature  that  is  ■ ; 

We  have  given  our  hearts  away,  a boon ! 


Purely  Mental  Connections  273 

The  Sea  that  bares  her  bosom  to  the  moon; 

The  winds  that  will  be at  all  ; 

And  are  up-gathered  now  like flowers; 

For  this,  for ,  we  are  out  of  tune; 

It  moves  us  not     Great  God !  I'd  rather  be 

A suckled  in  a  creed  -; 

So  might  I,  standing  on  this  lea, 

Have  that  would  make  me  less ; 


Have  sight  of  Proteus  rising  from  the  sea ; 

Or  hear  old  Triton  blow  his  wreathed  horn. 

(b)     Do  likewise  with  the  following  passage : — 

Transportation.  —  The     transporting     of     running 

water  as  the  sixth-power  of  the  velocity.     Even  at  this 

enormous  of  increase,  blocks  of  stone  of  many  hundreds  of 

tons  weight,  such  as  are  often  found  in  the  of  glaciers, 

would  require,  if  carried  by ^  an  almost  incredible  . 

But  glaciers  carry resting  on  their  surfaces,  and  therefore 

of  all  sizes,  with  ease.     Rock-fragments  of  thousands  of 

tons are by  them  and  left  in path  by  retreat. 

Again:  fragments  carried  by  water  are  always  more  or  less 
bruised,  worn,  and  rounded,  while  fragments  carried  on  the  sur- 
face of are .     Again,  water-currents  set  down  blocks 

of  stone  in positions ;  while  glaciers,  in  their  slow  melting, 

often   leave  them  perched  in  positions,  and  even   some- 
times  as   rocking-stones. 

References 

A.  James   Briefer  Course,  XVI.     (271-279),   XXII. 
Stout,  Manual,  447-458. 

Titchener,  Outline,  §§  84-85. 

B.  James,  Principles,  XXII. 


CHAPTER  XVIII 

The  Connections  Between  Mental  States  and  Acts: 
Connections  of  Expression 

§  50.  The  General  Laws  of  Human  Action 

The  same  laws  which  describe  the  connections  between 
sense  stimuli  and  mental  states  and  between  one  mental 
state  and  another,  apply  to  the  connections  between  mental 
states  and  movements. 

The  Law  of  Instinct. — Given  any  mental  state,  that 
movement  will  be  made  which  the  inborn  constitution  of 
the  nervous  system  has  connected  with  the  mental  state 
or  part  of  it.  The  baby  reaches  for  a  bright  object  seen 
because  by  inner  organization  that  sense-presentation  con- 
nects with  that  act.  For  the  same  reason  he  puts  the 
object  into  his  mouth  when  he  feels  it  within  his  grasp. 
The  boy  puts  up  his  arm  and  wards  off  a  blow,  and 
strikes  back  at  the  giver  of  the  blow,  because  his  brain 
is  so  organized  by  nature  as  to  connect  those  responses 
with  those  situations. 

The  Law  of  Association. — Given  any  mental  state, 
that  movement  will  be  made  which  has  been  connected 
with  it  or  part  of  it  most  frequently,  most  recently,  in  the 
most  vivid  experience  and  with  the  most  resulting  satis- 
faction, and  which  has  been  so  connected  with  the  general 
system  of  thought  and  conduct  present.  We  say  five 
when  we  think  five ;  we  take  off  our  clothes  when  we 
decide  to  go  to  bed  ;  we  shake  hands  with  a  caller ;  we  pat 
a  dog ;  we  stroke  a  kitten ;  we  put  a  hat  on  our  head  and  a 

274 


Connections  of  Expression  275 

coat  over  our  shoulders — because  in  the  past  we  have  done 
so  and  without  discomfort.  Each  of  the  factors  noted 
finds  illustrations  in  any  day's  experiences. 

We  put  cheese  in  our  mouths  and  keep  soap  out  of  our 
mouths,  put  our  hands  in  water  and  not  in  fire,  because 
the  opposite  connections  have  brought  discomfort.  We 
say  man  and  not  mensch  or  honime  when  we  mean  a  man, 
or  sit  on  chairs  rather  than  on  the  floor,  chiefly  because 
we  have  made  those  connections  so  often.  We  say,  'How 
do  you  do,'  to  a  friend  if  we  see  him  on  the  street  but  do 
not  if  we  see  him  in  church,  because  the  connection  made 
in  the  case  of  the  general  system  has  been  avoided  in  the 
case  of  the  'in  church'  system.  For  the  same  reason  the 
girl  in  her  'teens  may  be  of  a  delicate  and  ethereal  appetite 
in  her  'party  system'  and  in  the  presence  of  strangers, 
but  seizes  and  devours  'pork  and  beans,  and  beef  and 
greens'  in  the  'at  home  in  the  pantry'  system.  Recency 
is  not  so  common  an  influence  in  the  case  of  connections 
of  expression  as  it  is  in  the  case  of  purely  mental  con- 
nections. Its  influence  is  clearly  seen,  however,  in  the 
experience,  common  in  pronunciation,  typewriting  and 
games  of  skill,  of  repeating  two  or  three  times  within  a 
few  minutes  an  error  or  blunder  once  made.  So  also,  if 
you  have  been  signing  ten  or  twelve  letters  with  someone 
else's  name  and  then  turn  to  a  letter  of  your  own,  you  will 
often  perform  the  recent  act  instead  of  the  right  and  far 
more  frequent  one.  The  influence  of  vividness  or  in- 
tensity is  often  hard  to  separate  from  that  of  satisfaction 
and  discomfort,  but  is  witnessed  by  such  facts  as  the 
following:  In  walking  up  a  flight  of,  say,  eight  steps 
which  we  traverse  often  in  the  day  time,  we  always  then 
step  out  forward  instead  of  up  after  the  eighth  step  is 
reached.  Yet  in  walking  up  them  in  the  dark  the  situa- 
tion 'eighth  step  reached'  does  not  securely  produce  the 


2'j6  Dynamic  Psychology 

movement  of  stepping  out  forward,  for,  though  so  fre- 
quently made,  the  situation  and  act  have  lacked  vividness, 
have  been  only  in  the  margin  of  thought  and  little 
attended  to,  since  in  day-light  the  vivid  and  attended-to 
facts  have  been  the  sight  of  the  steps  and  their  sur- 
roundings. 

The  Law  of  Assimilation  in  the  Case  of  Connec- 
tions of  Expression. — If  the  mental  state  is  a  new  one, 
that  movement  will  follow  it  which  would  follow  a  famil- 
iar state  like  it.  Thus  the  person  unused  to  the  para- 
phernalia of  the  breakfast  table  responds  to  the  sight  of  a 
finger  bowl  by  drinking  from  it ;  the  baby  runs  to  pick  up 
a  bird;  Sir  Walter  Raleigh's  servant  threw  a  bucket  of 
water  on  him  when  he  saw  him  smoking  a  pipe. 

The  fact  of  instinct,  the  general  law  of  association  and 
its  supplement,  the  law  of  assimilation,  thus  are  operative 
in  the  case  of  the  facts  of  conduct  as  well  as  in  the  case  of 
those  of  sense  perception  and  thought. 

The  Law  of  Analysis. — The  application  of  the  law 
of  dissociation  or  analysis  to  movements  was  made  in 
Chapter  XIV.  Suffice  it  to  say  that  elements  of  complex 
movements  come  to  appear  in  isolation  when  the  same 
movement  has  been  made  in  many  different  combinations 
and  that  after  they  acquire  thus  an  independent  existence, 
they  enter  into  new  combinations  resulting  in  what  are 
apparently  totally  new  acts.  Thus  from  the  complex 
movements  involved  in  its  cries  and  prattling  the  infant 
develops  by  dissociation  the  elementary  movements  in- 
volved in  articulate  speech  and  gradually  combines  these 
elements  by  association  into  new  words  and  phrases. 

§  51.  The  Will:  Spontaneous  and  Purposive  Action. 

Exceptions  to  the  General  Law. — No  one  will  deny 
that  nine  out  of  ten  or  even  nine  hundred  and  ninety-nine 


Connections  of  Expression  277 

out  of  a  thousand  of  human  acts  occur  in  accord  with 
these  general  laws.  But  do  these  laws  not  break  down 
in  the  case  of  the  few,  but  real  and  tremendously  sig- 
nificant connections  when  by  an  effort  of  will  we 
supplant  the  pleasurable  by  a  painful,  the  frequent  by  a 
new,  connection?  Can  man  not  act  against  instinct, 
habit  and  desire  by  force  of  pure  will?  Such  possible 
exceptions  to  the  common  laws  of  human  behavior  may 
best  be  examined  after  a  distinction  between  spontaneous 
and  controlled  action,  similar  to  the  distinction  made  in 
the  case  of  thought,  has  been  explained. 

Spontaneous  and  Controlled  Action. — Spontaneous, 
unintentional  and  involuntary  are  three  synonymous 
names  applied  to  behavior  where  the  act  follows  the  men- 
tal state  without  any  consciousness  of  purpose,  is  done 
without  foresight.  Controlled,  purposive  or  voluntary 
action  means,  on  the  contrary,  behavior  in  which  a  pur- 
pose is  felt,  in  which  we  think  what  we  are  about  and  act 
with  foresight.  To  think,  'I  must  read  that  book  now,' 
and  to  take  and  open  the  volume,  is  a  case  of  voluntary 
action.  When,  after  I  begin  to  read,  my  eyes  continue 
to  move  back  and  forth  across  the  page,  the  action  is 
involuntary. 

Spontaneous  actions  may  be  with  or  without  con- 
sciousness. For  instance,  when  one's  eyes  move  in 
ordinary  reading,  he  may  not  know  whether  they  move  or 
not,  and  almost  never  knows  the  frequent  stops  which 
they  make  in  the  course  of  a  line.  The  name,  Automatic 
Action,  is  used  for  spontaneous  action  without  conscious- 
ness. Purposive  action  as  defined  is  never  unconscious. 
Spontaneous  action  is  never  accompanied  by  the  feeling 
of  effort.  Purposive  action  may  or  may  not  be  accom- 
panied by  the  feeling  of  effort. 

Purposive  action  may  occur  with  or  without  delibera- 


278  Dynamic  Psychology 

tion.  Seeing  a  pin,  picking  it  up  and  putting  it  in  the 
pincushion ;  taking  a  sheet  of  paper  on  thinking  of  a  letter 
to  be  written ;  going  to  the  door  on  hearing  the  sound  of 
the  door-bell — are  cases  of  action  without  deliberation. 
Seeking  a  snake  and  picking  it  up,  if  done  by  one  who 
abhors  their  slimy  writhing  but  wishes  to  secure  a  speci- 
men for  a  scientific  friend ;  taking  a  sheet  of  paper,  if  done 
after  an  argument  as  to  whether  one  can  or  cannot  afford 
to  order  a  certain  book;  walking  toward  the  door  as  the 
result  of  choosing  to  play  rather  than  work — are  cases  of 
action  after  deliberation. 

The  feeling  of  effort  is  present  only  in  the  case  of 
deliberative  action  and  not  always  then.  In  deliberative 
action  alternatives  are  present,  from  which  we  select. 
Whenever  the  selected  alternative  is  unattractive,  is  a 
course  of  action  contrary  to  natural  personal  cravings, 
its  acceptance  is  accompanied  by  a  feeling  of  effort.  Or, 
conversely,  when  a  rejected  alternative  is  attractive,  is  a 
course  of  action  agreeable  to  natural  personal  cravings, 
its  inhibition  is  accompanied  by  a  feeling  of  effort. 

The  Nature  of  the  Control. — The  control  of  actions 
means  the  control  of  the  mental  states  leading  to  them. 
In  no  case  do  we  control  acts  directly,  but  only  by  arous- 
ing or  repressing  the  feelings  which  would  lead  to  the  acts. 
In  trying  to  produce  an  act  we  try  to  put  ourselves  in  the 
frame  of  mind  which  will  be  followed  by  that  act.  The 
struggle  to  keep  from  doing  a  certain  thing  is  the  struggle 
to  keep  in  check  or  to  banish  utterly  the  feelings  that  will 
issue  in  the  undesired  movements.  Of  course,  of  these 
two  processes  the  former  involves  also  putting  out  of 
mind  ideas  which  will  prevent  the  desired  act,  and  the 
latter  keeping  in  mind  ideas  which  will  prevent  the  un- 
desired act.  Thus  to  produce  the  act  of  mailing  a  letter 
we  try  simply  to  remember  'mail  letter,  mail  letter.'     To 


Connections  of  Expression  279 

keep  from  going  to  sleep  we  wash  our  eyes  in  cold  water 
to  stop  their  heavy,  drooping  feeling;  we  stand  up  and 
shake  ourselves  to  banish  the  relaxation  of  the  muscles; 
we  say  to  ourselves,  'Go  to  sleep  at  this  hour  with  all  these 
tasks  undone, — nonsense !',  to  drive  out  the  willingness  to 
lie  back  and  snooze. 

The  proper  frame  of  mind  necessary  to  produce  an 
act  often  implies  the  feeling  of  consent,  the  feeling  of 
*Yes !  Let  connections  be  made.  There  is  no  need  of 
further  postponement.  Go  ahead !'  Just  as  in  purposive 
thought,  after  the  contemplation  of  an  idea  which  has 
satisfied  us  with  its  usefulness  as  a  step  in  the  argument, 
we  may  feel  a  peculiar,  'AH  right,  that  will  do,'  which 
means  that  no  further  deliberation  is  necessary;  so  in 
purposive  action,  the  contemplation  of  an  impulse  to 
action  often  ends  in  an  'All  right,  that  will  do.'  Similarly 
the  proper  frame  of  mind  necessary  to  prevent  an  act 
often  contains  as  an  important  element  the  feeling  of 
denial,  the  feeling  of,  'No !  No !  Halt  connections ! 
Wait !'  This  also  has  its  counterpart  in  the  control  of 
thought. 

In  every  respect,  then,  the  control  of  purposive  action 
is  the  same  process  as  the  control  of  thought.  The  same 
selective  agency,  attention,  chooses  what  thought  shall 
determine  action.  As  in  reasoning  the  sequent  thought 
is  not  created  but  only  chosen  ("if  the  ideas  do  not 
appear,  I  cannot  create  them,  nor  compel  them  to  come"), 
so  in  conduct  the  act  is  created  or  'willed'  not  directly,  but 
only  indirectly  through  such  manipulation  of  the  mental 
state  as  will  make  it  the  necessary  sequent.  What  is 
directly  selected  or  rejected  in  action,  as  in  thought,  is  a 
mental  state.  The  only  difference  is  that  the  associate, 
the  sequent,  is  in  the  one  case  an  idea,  in  the  other  a 
movement. 


28o  Dynamic  Psychology 

The   Real   Meaning   of  Acts   of   Pure  Will.— The 

facts  stated  in  the  preceding  paragraphs  provide  the  real 
meaning  and  the  explanation  of  those  cases  where  man 
appears  to  act  contrary  to  the  laws  of  association,  in  spite 
of  instinctive  tendencies,  pleasurable  consequences  and 
frequency  of  connection,  by  an  exertion  of  pure  will. 
They  show  first  of  all  that  the  exertion  of  pure  will 
influences  acts  only  indirectly  by  influencing  mental 
states.  The  will  to  do  a  thing  is  the  will  to  keep  a  frame 
of  mind  that  will  result  in  the  doing  of  that  thing.  "The 
will  is  a  relation  between  the  mind  and  its  ideas.''  "The 
point  to  which  the  will  is  directly  applied  is  always  an 
idea."  We  do  not  choose  movements,  but  the  ideas  lead- 
ing to  movements.  In  the  second  place,  the  contradic- 
tion of  the  laws  of  association  is  not  real,  only  apparent. 
The  ascetic  who  scourges  himself  really  illustrates  those 
very  laws,  in  particular  the  law  of  partial  activity;  for  his 
act  is  the  sequent,  not  of  the  mere  total  mental  state  'whip 
in  hand,'  but  of  the  thought,  'Strike,  bruise,  crucify  your 
flesh,  feel  pain  for  the  glory  of  God !  Yes !  Yes !',  to 
which  his  act  is  the  natural  sequent.  The  connection 
would  be  unexpected  if  the  instinctive  tendencies  felt  were 
those  of  self-preservation,  but  they  are  not :  they  are  those 
of  self-sacrifice.  It  would  be  unexpected  if  the  painful 
consequences  were  attended  to,  but  they  are  not:  the 
satisfaction  of  repentance,  restitution  and  peace  is  the 
main  resultant.  It  would  be  unexpected  if  the  ante- 
cedent state  of  mind  were  that  which  an  ordinary  mortal 
would  face  when  thinking  of  giving  himself  a  beating, 
but  it  is  not :  the  'Yes !  Yes',  the  feeling  of  acceptance, 
means  that  the  ideas  that  would  lead  to  opposing  acts  are 
all  banished  and  that  the  way  is  open  and  unimpeded  to 
the  movements  of  scourging  oneself,  which  are,  in  view 
of  the  circumstances,  the  most  frequent  connection.     In 


Connections  of  Expression  281 

the  third  place,  since  the  exertion  of  pure  will  works  al- 
ways upon  mental  states,  it  is  a  feature  of  thought  as  well 
as  of  conduct.  Man  contributes  to  the  world  by  knowl- 
edge and  belief  in  the  same  way  as  by  choice  and  action. 
The  real  fact  to  which  experiences  of  the  choice  of  the 
hard  instead  of  the  easy  and  the  rare  instead  of  the  usual, 
refer, — the  real  meaning  of  the  exertion  of  pure  will, — 
is  the  law  of  partial  activity, — the  power  of  man  to 
attend  to  and  cherish  whatever  frame  of  mind  appeals 
to  his  general  purpose  in  life  or  to  the  ideal  of  the  moment. 
In  rational  thinking  he  may  discard  the  customary  and 
obvious  in  favor  of  some  abstract  element  which  appeals 
perhaps  to  none  but  him.  In  controlled  action  he  may 
banish  ordinary  likes  and  dislikes,  usual  habits  and  im- 
pulses, and  elevate  to  the  leadership  of  his  mind  some 
ideal  purpose, — some  motive  which  defies  the  claims  of 
the  majority  of  men  and  even  those  of  his  own  past.  His 
will  is  free  in  the  sense  that  at  any  moment  what  he  will 
attend  to  and  cherish  depends  upon  him,  upon  his  attitude 
toward  the  situation  he  confronts.  Whether  it  is  free  in 
the  further  sense  that  this  attitude  would  be  unpredictable 
even  by  a  perfect  intelligence  that  knew  his  inborn  nature 
and  entire  previous  experience,  is  a  question  unanswered 
by  science  and  disputed  by  philosophers. 

§  52.  The  Nature  of  the  Mental  States  Which  Precede 
Movements 
The    Problem. — Psychologists    have    argued    much 
about  what  kinds  of  mental  states  are  the  antecedents 
of  movements  in  purposive  action.     The  arguments  con- 
cern chiefly  (i)  the  so-called  feelings  of  innervation,  (2) 
the  feeling  of  decision,  of  consent,  of  'let  this  act  be/  the 
Hat,  and  (3)  the  memory  images  of  the  feelings  produced 
by  the  movement, 
19 


282  Dynamic  Psychology 

By  feelings  of  innervation  are  meant  feelings  directly 
due  to  the  passage  of  the  nervous  impulse  to  efferent 
neurones  and  through  them  to  the  muscles.  It  is  very 
doubtful  whether  any  feelings  are  so  caused.  They  cer- 
tainly are  not  essential  to  the  execution  of  a  purposely 
made  movement.  The  feeling  of  decision  has  been 
already  described.  Though  of  frequent  occurrence, 
notably  in  action  after  deliberation,  it  cannot  be  regarded 
as  a  sine  qua  non  of  purposive  action,  as  defined  in  this 
book ;  for  of  the  thousand  intentional  acts  of  a  day,  only 
a  small  number  are  preceded  by  it.  The  memory  images 
of  the  feelings  produced  by  the  movement  are  of  two 
sorts,  Resident  and  Remote.  By  resident  feelings  are 
meant  the  feelings  of  tension,  movement  and  the  like  of 
the  moving  part,  due  to  the  movement  itself.  By  remote 
feelings  are  meant  the  feelings  of  any  sort  secondarily 
caused  by  the  movement,  e-g.,  the  sound  due  to  the  move- 
ments of  saying  a  word,  the  pressure  due  to  grasping  a 
stick,  or  the  sight  of  the  clinching  and  clinched  fist  due 
to  the  same  movements. 

Any  Variety  of  Mental  State  May  Precede  a  Volun- 
tary Act. — Nearly  all  writers  on  psychology  seem  sure 
that  some  special  sort  of  feelings  must  be  present  in 
purposive  action.  Some  think  the  feeling  of  decision 
must  always  be  there ;  some  think  that  feelings  of  innerva- 
tion must  be  there ;  nearly  all  think  that  at  least  memory 
images  of  the  feelings  produced  by  the  movement  must 
be  there.  Only  recently  has  it  been  argued  that  after  all 
there  is  no  justification  for  the  assumption  that  any 
peculiar  sort  of  feeling  is  a  necessary  element  of  pur- 
posive action ;  that  really  any  mental  state  whatever  may 
he  the  antecedent  of  an  intentional  act.  Yet  this  seems 
easily  demonstrable.  For  instance,  I  just  now  completed 
the  purposive  action  of  writing,  'Yet  this  seems  easily 


Connections  of  Expression  283 

demonstrable.'  The  act  was  certain  finger  and  arm 
movements  and  certain  eye  movements  involved  in  guid- 
ing them.  But  my  antecedent  state  of  mind  contained 
no  images  whatever  of  feelings  in  my  fingers,  arms  or 
eyes,  nor  even  of  the  sight  of  the  words.  It  was  simply 
the  judgment,  'Yet  this  seems  easily  demonstrable,'  felt 
with  the  auditory  images  of  the  words.  A  few  hours  ago 
I  signed  a  lease,  and  I  can  confidently  affirm  that  the 
thought  antecedent  to  the  act  contained  no  images  of  any 
sensations  in  any  way  connected  with  the  act  of  writing 
my  name,  but  only  the  auditory  images,  'He  came  to  my 
terms  after  all.'  Professor  James,  who  maintains  that 
''whether  or  no  there  be  anthing  else  in  the  mind  at  the 
moment  when  we  consciously  will  a  certain  act,  a  mental 
conception  made  up  of  these  sensations  (of  the  movement's 
results)  *  *  *  must  be  there,"  (Principles,  Vol.  II,  p. 
492)  gives  illustrations  which  prove  precisely  that  the 
antecedent  to  a  movement  need  never  have  been  its 
result.  "We  say,  T  must  go  downstairs,'  and  ere  we 
know  it  we  have  risen,  walked  and  turned  the  handle  of  a 
door."  (Idem.  p.  519)  "Hallo!  I  must  lie  here  no 
longer,"  is  the  antecedent  to  getting  out  of  bed.     (Idem. 

p.  524). 

The  Feelings  Produced  by  a  Movement  Rarely 
Cause  It. — In  fact,  the  doctrine  that  the  image  of 
some  one  of  the  previous  results  or  effects  of  a  movement 
is  its  necessary  antecedent  in  purposive  action  makes  the 
perversest  of  mistakes.  The  antecedent  is  some  one  of  its 
previous  preliminaries  or  causes.  Occasionally  what  was 
first  a  result  or  efifect  of  a  movement  may  later  be  thought 
of  as  a  preliminary,  and  so  become  its  antecedent  in  still 
later  connections,  but  in  general  what  has  led  to  a  move- 
ment, not  what  has  come  after  it,  will  lead  to  it  on  future 
occasions.     It  is  not  the  image  of  a  mouth  full  of  liquid 


284  Dynamic  Psychology 

but  the  sight  of  the  bottle,  that  makes  the  baby  reach  out 
its  hands.  It  is  not  the  feehng  of  a  brush  on  one's 
head,  but  the  thought  'I  must  comb  my  hair,'  that  assists 
our  toilet.  It  is  not  the  thought  of  feeling  warm  but  of 
feeling  cold,  that  commonly  makes  one  build  a  fire.  It  is 
the  thought  of  a  bill  as  due,  not  as  having  been  paid, 
which  makes  us  draw  a  check.  We  do  not  move  our  eyes 
so  as  to  focus  them  on  an  object  because  we  see  it  clearly, 
but  because  we  don't.  We  do  not  eat  because  we  feel  full 
in  imagination,  but  because  we  feel  empty  in  reality. 

Motives. — So  also  there  is  no  need  of  restricting  the 
word  motive  to  any  particular  class  of  feelings.  Any 
mental  state  may  serve  as  a  motive.  For  a  motive  to 
an  act  is  simply  any  fact  which  assists  to  be  present 
and  to  be  approved,  a  mental  state  which  will  have  the  act 
as  its  sequent.  A  motive  against  the  act  is  simply  any 
fact  which  hinders  the  presence  and  approval  of  a  mental 
state  which  will  have  the  act  as  its  sequent.  One  of  the 
most  artificial  doctrines  about  human  nature  which  has 
ever  acquired  prominence  is  the  doctrine  that  pleasure 
and  pain,  felt  or  imagined,  are  the  only  motives  to  action, 
that  a  human  being  is  constantly  making  a  conscious  or 
unconscious  calculation  of  the  amount  of  each  which  the 
contemplated  act  will  produce,  and  that  his  entire  behavior 
is  the  result  of  such  a  lifelong  series  of  complicated  sums 
in  addition  and  substraction.  Pleasure  and  pain  do  play 
a  leading  role  in  determining  action,  but  the  cast  of 
characters  includes  also  percepts,  ideas  and  emotions  of 
all  sorts. 

Exercises 

I.  State  in  the  case  of  each  of  the  following  whether  it  is  an 
instinctive  or  an  acquired  connection: — 

Situation  Response 

a.    A  bright  light.  Blinking 


Connections  of  Expression  285 


b. 

A  bright  light. 

Pulling  down  a  curtain. 

c. 

Feeling  cold. 

Shivering. 

d. 

Feeling  cold. 

Opening  a  radiator. 

e. 

The  sight  of  a  cup  of  tea. 

Drinking   it. 

f. 

The  sight  of  an  approaching 

missile. 

Dodging  it. 

g- 

Feeling  sleepy. 

Closing  the  eyes. 

h. 

The  thought,  Tt  is  breakfast 

time'. 

Getting  up  from  bed. 

i. 

The  sight  of  a  book. 

Opening  it  at  the   first  page. 

J- 

Falling. 

Clutching  at  objects. 

k. 

A  blow  received. 

A  blow  given. 

2.  Which  three  cf  the  following  involve  many  movements 
acquired  through  dissociation  from  more  complex  movements? — 
Running,  wrestling,  singing,  playing  the  piano,  climbing,  writing. 

3.  (a)  Give  two  cases  of  connections  of  expression  acquired 
chiefly  by  reason  of  resulting  satisfaction,  (b)  Two  acquired 
chiefly  by  reason  of  resulting  discomfort,  (c)  Two  acquired 
chiefly  by  reason  of  mere  frequency. 

4.  Give  five  instances  of  connections  all  ending  in  the  act  of 
shaking  hands,  the  act  being  in  one  case  spontaneous  and  uncon- 
scious, in  the  second  case  spontaneous  but  conscious,  in  the  third 
case  purposive  but  without  deliberation  or  effort,  in  the  fourth 
case  purposive  and  with  deliberation  but  without  effort,  and  in 
the  fifth  case  with  both  deliberation  and  effort. 

5.  Give  five  similar  instances  of  connections  all  ending  in 
the   act  of  saying,   'Yes'. 

6.  Which  part  of  the  following  train  of  thought  would  prob- 
ably be  operative  in  arousing  action  (a)  in  a  gourmand,  (b)  in  a 
philanthropist,  (c)  in  a  proud  and  honest  business  man,  (d)  in  a 
dandy? — 'T  have  only  ten  dollars.  I  owe  Jones  eight.  How 
hungry  I  am.  That  woman  opposite  looks  half-starved.  Her 
clothes  are  as  shabby  as  mine." 

7.  In  a  railroad  accident  a  lady  was  mortally  injured.  Hav- 
ing but  a  few  hours  to  live  she  begged  her  husband  not  to  leave 
her.  The  surgeon  called  him  to  help  rescue  the  passengers  still 
confined  in  the  wreck.  What  will  decide  which  thing  the  man 
will  do? 

8.  What  statements  in  §  51  support  the  following? — "Every 
act  of  will  requires  attention  and  every  concentration  of  atten- 
tion is  an  act  of  will."     (Preyer.) 


j86  Dynamic  Psychology 

§  53-  Suggestion  and  Imitation 

In  General. — To  produce  a  given  act  in  any  person 
implies  the  arousal  in  him  of  the  mental  state  which  has 
that  act  as  its  sequent.  If  the  act  is  the  inevitable  sequent 
of  the  mental  state,  this  is  sufficient.  To  make  a  baby 
cry,  it  is  sufficient  to  make  it  feel  severe  pain.  To  make 
a  man  eat,  it  is  sufficient  in  almost  all  cases  to  make  him 
feel  very  hungry.  But  usually  the  act  will  only  follow 
the  mental  state  on  condition  that  the  latter  is  without 
opposition,  is  attended  to  exclusively,  is  freed  from  the 
influence  of  conflicting  ideas.  To  produce  a  given  act  in 
any  person  thus  commonly  implies  the  arousal  of  the 
mental  state  which  has  that  act  as  its  sequent  and  also  the 
suppression  of  conflicting  or  competing  mental  states. 

Conflicting  ideas  may  be  (i)  prevented  from  appear- 
ing at  all  or  (2)  inhibited  in  the  course  of  deliberation. 
They  may  be  inhibited  by  motives  in  the  shape  of  prom- 
ises, arguments,  entreaties,  threats  and  the  like  which 
weaken  them  or  which  strengthen  contrary  ideas. 

Suggestion. — There  will  therefore  be  two  methods 
of  arousing  an  act:  (i)  by  Suggestion  and  (2)  by  Per- 
suasion. In  cases  of  suggestion,  the  idea  which  tends 
to  result  in  the  act  is  so  aroused  in  the  mind  that  few  or 
no  conflicting  ideas  will  appear ;  the  person  is  prevented 
so  far  as  possible  from  deliberating,  in  the  hope  that  the 
mere  tendency  of  the  idea  itself  to  work  out  into  the  act 
will  suffice.  In  cases  of  persuasion,  the  idea  which  tends 
to  result  in  the  act  is  so  aroused  in  the  mind  that  it  will 
possess  motives  to  support  it  even  at  the  cost  of  the 
arousal  of  conflicting  ideas  as  well ;  the  person  is  encour- 
aged to  deliberate  and  to  consider  the  motives  in  the  hope 
that  those  favoring  the  act  will  prevail. 

The  power  of  suggestion  depends  upon  the  fact  that 
any  idea  does  tend  to  result  in  its  appropriate  act  if  no 


Connections  of  Expression  £87 

competing  idea  or  physical  impediment  prevents  it. 
Suggestion  as  a  method  of  control  is  especially  useful 
(i)  in  cases  where  the  individual  could  not  rightly  value 
the  motives,  and  (2)  in  cases  where  it  is  important  that 
the  individual  should  do  the  right  thing,  but  is  relatively 
unimportant  that  he  should  learn  to  righdy  value  the 
motives.  Thus  to  argue  with  a  homicidal  maniac  would 
be  folly,  and  to  attempt  to  teach  a  three-year-old  child 
why  he  should  not  cry,  would  be  a  waste  of  time.  It  is 
much  better  to  say  to  the  maniac  who  approaches  with 
drawn  knife,  'You  have  forgotten  your  spectacles,'  and  to 
the  crying  baby,  'Now  you  are  really  one  of  the  bravest 
boys,  I  know\  Just  a  minute  and  you  won't  cry  any 
more.  I  know  you  didn't  mean  to.  You  are  all  right 
now.*  Suggestion  as  a  method  of  control  is  risky  in 
cases  where  training  in  judgment  and  choice  is  one  chief 
benefit  of  the  act.  It  is  bad  for  any  rational  being  to  be 
forever  hoodwinked  into  doing  this,  that  and  the  other. 

Differences  in  the  degree  of  suggestibility, — in  the 
tendency  to  accept  ideas  and  neglect  conflicting  ideas, — 
are  important  amongst  individual  differences.  Some 
people  live  continually  in  a  state  approaching  that  of  a 
hypnotized  person.  They  do  and  believe  whatever  they 
are  told ;  they  never  make  a  logical  decision ;  they  are  the 
prey  of  the  last  person  who  sees  them.  At  the  other 
extreme  is  the  stolid  but  hard-headed  type  that  figures 
everything  out,  that  greets  the  most  adroit  suggestion 
with  a,  'Huh  !  So  you  want  me  to  do  something.  Well ! 
I'll  think  it  over.'  When  only  half  awake,  when  asleep, 
and  above  all  in  the  hypnotic  and  certain  other  trance 
states  we  all  lapse  into  a  more  and  more  suggestible 
condition. 

Imitation. — The  word  imitation  is  now  used  in 
psychology  to  mean  two  different  facts.     The  first  is  the 


288  Dynamic  Psychology 

general  fact  of  the  repetition  of  one  man's  thoughts  and 
acts  by  other  men.  In  this  sense  imitation  means  the 
opposite  of  invention,  and  includes  perhaps  ninety-nine 
per  cent,  of  life ;  for  a  really  new  thing  in  thought  or  con- 
duct is  extremely  rare.  The  second  meaning  is  the  fact 
of  the  influence  of  the  concrete  behavior  of  one  individual 
upon  other  individuals,  as  opposed  to  the  influence  of 
explanations,  commands,  lessons  and  the  like.  In  this 
narrower  sense  imitation  means  the  influence  of  personal 
example.  It  is  imitation  in  this  second  sense  that  will  be 
discussed  here. 

Among  the  most  numerous  and  the  most  important 
causes  of  the  ideas  producing  action  in  a  human  being 
are  the  acts  of  other  human  beings.  Manners,  accent, 
the  usages  of  language,  style  in  dress  and  appearance, — 
in  a  word,  the  minor  phases  of  human  behavior, — are 
guided  almost  exclusively  by  them.  They  also  control  the 
morals,  business  habits  and  political  action  of  many  men 
on  many  occasions.  As  the  physical  environment  decides 
in  large  measure  what  things  a  man  shall  see  and  hear, 
so  the  social  environment  decides  in  large  measure  what 
he  shall  do  and  feel. 

The  acts  of  other  people  exert  a  twofold  influence: 
(i)  that  of  stimuli  to  action  and  (2)  that  of  models  by 
which  the  satisfactoriness  of  an  act  is  judged.  Thus  (i) 
A's  going  to  school  may  arouse  in  B  the  idea  and  act  of 
going  to  school,  or  (2)  A's  style  of  speech  may  be  B's 
model,  to  speak  as  A  does  giving  him  satisfaction  and  so 
being  the  goal  of  his  trials.  As  stimuli  to  action  other 
people's  acts  are  as  a  rule  more  potent  than  explanations, 
precepts  and  advice  because  they  are  clear  and  concrete. 
It  is,  for  instance,  easy  to  shozu  a  servant  how  to  turn  on 
and  off  the  electric  light  in  a  room,  but  very  hard  to  tell 
him  how.     They  also  have  strong  suggestive  force,  since 


Connections  of  Expression  289 

to  see  other  people  doing  a  thing  inhibits  any  ideas  of  the 
act's  impossibiHty  or  undesirabiHty.  If  everyone  else  is 
rushing  down  the  street,  the  idea  of  so  doing  tends  to  be 
deprived  of  opposition. 

As  models  by  which  to  judge  one's  own  acts,  the  acts 
of  other  people  have  the  advantage  over  abstract  prin- 
ciples or  verbal  descriptions,  of  being  far  more  clear  and 
vivid.  No  explanation  of  the  essentials  of  a  graceful 
gesture  can  in  these  respects  equal  the  actual  sight  of  it  as 
made  by  the  teacher.  The  student  of  music  can  compare 
the  tone  he  produces  with  that  actually  produced  by  his 
master  far  better  than  with  an  ideal  constructed  from 
general  statements. 

Exercises 

1.  What  statements  in  §  53  support  the  following? — 
"What  we  do,  when  we  want  to  pursue  any  line  of  conduct, 

is  to  hold  that  action  clearly  in  mind  and  dismiss  all  impeding 
or  inhibiting  thoughts.  When  we  want  to  influence  any  one  to 
do  a  particular  thing,  we  try  so  to  present  it  to  him  that  it  com- 
pletely fills  his  mind.  We  try  to  get  him  to  think  of  the  action 
without  thinking  of  any  contradictory  action.  If  we  want  him  to 
go  West,  we  can  accomplish  the  result  if  we  can  get  him  to 
think  of  going  West  without  having  the  ideas  of  going  East  or 
of  standing  still  arise  in  his  mind  and  check  action.  If  you 
can  get  him  to  think  of  going  to  Kansas  City  over  the  Chi- 
cago &  Alton,  he  will  go  to  Kansas  City  over  the  Chicago  & 
Alton,  and  nothing  but  a  competing  idea  or  physical  impediment 
can  stop  him.  If  Tie  is  so  taken  up  with  the  idea  of  Chicago 
&  Alton  that  the  name  of  no  other  means  of  transportation 
enters  his  mind,  and  if  he  is  so  situated  that  no  physical  impedi- 
ment (sickness,  lack  of  money,  etc.)  hinders  him,  he  will  start 
at  once  to  go  to  the  destination  thought  of  and  over  the  route 
thought  of.  All  we  can  do  is  to  get  the  thought  into  the  mind 
and  in  an  automatic  manner  the  thought  will  suggest  the  action." 
(Scott,  Theory  of  Advertising,  pp.  51-52.) 

2.  Read  Mark  Antony's  speech  over  Caesar's  body  {Julius 
Caesar,  Act  III.,  Scene  II.,  passim).    Note  three  or  four  parts 


tgo  Dynamic  Psychology 

which  make  prominent  use  of  suggestion  and  three  or  four  parts 
which  make  prominent  use  of  persuasion. 

3.  Why  do  political  parties  spend  money  in  printing  such 
apparently  unconvincing  stuff  as,  'Vote  Under  the  Eagle',  or 
'Vote  the  Straight  Democratic  Ticket?' 

4.  Collect  from  magazines  four  advertisements  that  depend 
for  success  chiefly  upon  suggestion.  Four  that  depend  chiefly  on 
persuasion. 

5.  What  risk  is  run  by  the  parent  or  teacher  who  in  educat- 
ing children  relies  upon  suggestion  and  imitation  rather  than 
argument  and  principles? 


§  54.  Individual  Differences  in  the  Life  of  Action 

Their  Amount. — Individuals  differ  by  inborn  con- 
stitution with  respect  to  the  intensity  of  certain  desires 
and  interests,  the  capacities  for  connecting  acts  with  men- 
tal states  speedily,  surely  and  permanently,  the  capacities 
for  attending  to  abstract  considerations,  the  capacities  for 
resisting  the  strain  of  eflfort,  and  the  other  factors  which 
influence  human  action.  They  differ  by  training  in  the 
kinds  of  mental  states  which  they  feel,  in  the  elements  of 
these  to  which  they  attend,  in  the  acts  which  are  con- 
nected therewith  and  in  the  ways  in  which  the  inborn 
instincts  and  capacities  just  mentioned  are  modified. 
There  is  perhaps  no  desire  so  universal  as  not  to  be  absent 
in  some  human  being  and  no  connection  between  mental 
state  and  act  so  absurd  and  unlikely  as  not  to  have  some- 
where existed.  I  dare  say  that  the  thought  of  four  times 
seven  may  have  made  some  maniac  jump  with  glee,  and 
impelled  some  other  to  cut  his  throat.  The  differences 
in  inborn  desires  and  interests  and  tendencies  to  action 
will,  in  general,  be  less  than  the  differences  in  inborn 
capacities  to  connect  and  attend,  and  these  will,  in  gen- 
eral, be  less  than  the  differences  in  acquired  ideas  and 
habits. 


Connections  of  Expression  291 

Little  is  known  of  the  amounts  of  difference  in  these 
various  respects  or  of  the  types  or  species  of  character 
into  which  human  beings  may  perhaps  be  divided.  Any- 
one may  at  least  be  sure  that  it  is  unsafe  to  prophesy  the 
behavior  of  anyone  else  on  the  basis  of  what  he  himself 
would  do  and  that  it  is  unjust  to  judge  the  behavior  of 
anyone  else  on  the  basis  of  the  motives  which  he  himself 
would  have  felt.  The  following  differences  and  types, 
by  no  means  exactly  duplicated  in  reality,  are  worthy  of 
study  as  samples  of  present  incomplete  knowledge  of 
individual  differences  in  controlled  action : — 

Differences  in  the  Antecedents  of  Action. — Individ- 
uals may  be  ranked  in  a  series  according  to  the  extent  to 
which  abstract  ideas  serve  as  the  antecedents  of  action. 
At  one  extreme  are  those  men  and  women  who,  like  the 
lower  animals,  react  only  to  some  concrete  particular 
situation.  They  live  by  special  habits,  not  by  general 
rules.  They  can  work  for  a  man,  but  not  for  a  cause. 
They  can  fight  a  lire  or  a  seen  enemy,  but  not  a  principle 
like  falsity  or  injustice.  They  can  worship  an  idol  or  a 
saint,  but  not  truth  or  righteousness.  At  the  other 
extreme  are  those  who  can  break  up  a  total  fact  into  its 
elements  and  react  to  one  quality  whenever  found,  to 
injustice  whether  experienced  from  friend  or  enemy,  to 
truth  whether  found  in  their  creed  or  another's.  Such 
men  and  women  progress  from  special  habits  to  general 
principles  of  behavior,  originate  customs  and  modify 
social  codes.  They  include  the  geniuses  of  action,  and 
also  its  fanatics.  Most  men  and  women  occupy  stations 
near  the  middle  of  such  a  scale.  They  act  in  the  main  in 
response  to  concrete  facts,  but  possess  a  few  general  prac- 
tices, avoiding  'crime,'  refusing  to  be  'unladylike,'  and 
doing  'their  duty,'  when  an  act  possesses  sufficiently 
obviously  the  abstract  quality  in  question. 


392  Dynamic  Psychology 

The  Impulsive  Type. — Individuals  may  also  be 
ranked  in  a  series  according  to  the  strength  of  the  ten- 
dency of  a  mental  state  to  call  up  action  compared  with 
its  tendency  to  call  up  another  mental  state.  At  one 
extreme  is  the  man  or  woman  who  can  hardly  have  any 
idea  without  following  it  by  its  connected  act.  'John  is  in 
town ;  let's  go  and  see  John,'  and  he  seizes  his  hat. 
'Where  is  my  hat?',  and  she  runs  about  in  search  for  it. 
At  the  other  extreme  is  the  one  who  can  rarely  get  so  far 
as  to  do  anything  about  anything.  'John  is  in  town.  I 
wonder  where  he  lives.  Would  he  be  at  home  now  if  we 
should  call?  Perhaps  he  won't  want  visitors  yet.  It's 
a  disagreeable  day  anyway.  He  rather  likes  company, 
though.  It  would  take  all  the  evening.  I'm  not  sure 
what  I'd  best  do,'  and  so  on.  'Where  is  my  hat?  I 
probably  may  not  find  it  if  I  look  for  it.  It  will  do  no 
harm  to  go  out  bare-headed.  Still  it  would  look  queer. 
I  wonder  if  it  is  in  that  closet.  Perhaps  I'd  better  look. 
Still  I  feel  sure  I  had  it  in  this  room.  Where  shall  I  look 
for  it?',  and  so  on  for  twice  the  time  it  would  take  to 
ransack  the  house.  The  first  extreme  we  may  call  the 
Impulsive,  the  latter  the  reflective,  or,  still  better,  since 
reflective  is  commonly  used  of  necessary  thoughtfulness, 
the  Pondering,  individual.  As  before,  most  of  us  occupy 
a  station  midway  between  the  extremes.  The  terms 
(A)  Explosive  Will  and  (B)  Obstructed  Will,  have  been 
used  by  Professor  James,  and  others  following  him,  to 
refer  to  these  extreme  types  and  also  in  general  to  (A) 
individuals  who  act  too  much,  too  quickly  and  in  the 
wrong  direction  because  impulses  are  too  strong  and 
inhibition  too  weak,  and  to  (B)  individuals  who  act  too 
little,  too  late  and  in  the  wrong  direction  because  impulses 
are  too  weak  and  inhibitions  too  strong. 


Connections  of  Expression  293 

§  55.  The  Control  of  the  Life  of  Action 

The  good  and  efficient  character  implies  the  subjuga- 
tion of  those  instinctive  tendencies  to  action  which  injure 
oneself  or  others,  the  energetic  action  of  desirable  ones, 
the  presence  of  worthy  ideals  and  the  connection  of  these 
with  appropriate  acts,  a  multiplicity  of  useful  habits,  the 
power  to  see  and  react  to  the  element  of  a  situation  which 
w^ill  issue  in  an  act  producing  the  best  results,  the  power 
to  react  to  barren  abstractions  such  as  ought,  right  and 
true,  the  power  to  delay  decision  until  enough  evidence 
is  in  to  warrant  one  in  deciding,  the  power  to  refrain  from 
delaying  it  too  long,  and  the  power  to  stand  the  strain  of 
effort  implied  in  choosing  a  relatively  unattractive  course 
of  behavior. 

The  Elements  of  Moral  Training. — The  training  of 
character  is  correspondingly  complex.  Useful  instincts 
must  be  given  a  chance  to  exercise  themselves  and  become 
habits.  Harmful  instinctive  responses  must  be  inhibited 
through  lack  of  stimulus,  through  the  substitution  of  de- 
sirable ones  or  through  actual  resultant  discomfort,  as 
best  fits  each  special  case.  The  mind  must  be  supplied 
with  noble  ideas  through  the  right  examples  at  home,  in 
school,  in  the  world  at  large  and  in  books.  These  ideas 
must  be  made  to  issue  in  appropriate  action  or  they  may 
be  worse  than  useless.  The  capacity  to  examine  any 
situation  and  see  what  the  essential  fact  in  it  which  should 
decide  action  is,  must  be  constantly  exercised  and  guided. 
The  habits  of  letting  Tt  is  right'  or  Tt  is  best'  or  Tt  will 
be  for  the  real  welfare  of  the  world'  or  the  like,  be  an 
absolutely  final  warrant  for  action  must  be  firmly  fixed. 
The  will  must  be  prevented  alike  from  precipitate  re- 
sponses and  from  dawdling  indecision.  The  power  to 
banish  from  mind  attractive  but  unworthv  ideas,  and  to 


294  Dynamic  Psychology 

go  on  one's  way  regardless  of  the  effort  involved  in  so 
doing,  must  be  gradually  built  up.  Especially  important 
is  the  actual  formation  of  definite  habits.  If  a  man  does 
what  is  useful  and  right  he  will  soon  gain  proper  ideas 
of  social  efficiency  and  of  morals.  If  he  learns  to  do  the 
right  thing  in  a  thousand  particular  situations,  he  will,  so 
far  as  he  has  the  capacity,  gain  the  power  to  see  what  act 
a  new  situation  demands.  If  he  is  made  to  obey  a  thou- 
sand particular,  'This  is  right's  and  That  is  right's,  he 
will,  so  far  as  he  has  the  capacity,  come  to  connect  respect 
and  obedience  with  the  abstractly  right  and  true.  If  he 
does  what  he  has  to  do  well  and  treats  his  fellow  beings 
as  he  should  in  the  thousands  of  situations  of  the  ordinary 
course  of  life,  he  will  gain  the  power  to  conquer  attractive 
counter-impulses. 

Common  Mistakes  in  Moral  Training. — The  com- 
monest error  is  to  expect  people  to  become  efficient  and 
decent  by  some  mysterious  influences  from  lessons  or 
sermons  or  good  resolutions  or  what  not.  We  forget 
that  character  means  the  connections  between  mental 
states  and  acts,  and  that  the  only  way  to  have  connections 
is  to  make  them.  Men  become  efficient  and  decent  only 
by  behaving  efficiently  and  decently.  To  work  is  the 
only  cure  for  laziness ;  to  give  is  the  only  cure  for  stingi- 
ness ;  to  tell  the  truth  is  the  only  cure  for  lying. 

There  are  many  more  blunders  in  our  dealings  with 
ourselves  and  other  men  from  which  knowledge  of  the 
psychology  of  human  action  should  rescue  us.  Of  these, 
two  or  three  are  so  common  as  to  deserve  special  men- 
tion : — ' 

(i)  To  fail  to  foster  the  desirable  instincts.  Babies 
are  rarely  given  much  attention  except  when  their  parents 
are  annoyed  by  them  or  wish  to  pet  and  display  them. 
They  get  nothing  but  neglect  for  playing  quietly,  but  are 


Connections  of  Expression  295 

fondled  and  bribed  when  they  become  sufficiently  obnox- 
ious. When  by  chance  they  behave  modestly  and 
obediently,  they  are  unnoticed;  but  their  early  efforts  at 
impertinence,  self-will  and  vanity  arouse  amusement  and 
comment.  By  the  time  the  two-year-old  baby  has  be- 
come a  ten-year-old  boy  the  result  is  often  intolerable, 
and  the  father  who  laughed  at  the  infantile  self-will  is 
amazed  to  find  an  ill-mannered,  selfish,  petulant  son.  He 
then  makes  an  equal  error,  expecting  (2)  to  inhibit 
directly  by  resulting  discomfort  a  fully  formed  habit. 
He  scolds  and  punishes  the  boy  for  the  acts  he  encouraged 
in  the  baby.  He  may  mend  the  boy's  manners,  but  he 
loses  his  confidence.  He  may  prevent  certain  acts  for  the 
time  being,  but  they  will  probably  recur  when  the  boy 
becomes  old  enough  to  fear  punishment  no  longer,  or 
when  circumstances  are  such  that  the  act  will  not  be 
discovered. 

(3)  To  value  the  feeling  of  effort  for  its  own  sake. 
The  feeling  of  effort  is  found  in  efficient  and  good  men ; 
it  is  a  frequent  accompaniment  of  great  and  noble  deeds. 
As  a  result  we  tend  to  think  of  it  as  itself  a  desirable 
thing,  and  to  use  its  presence  as  a  test  of  the  value  of  any 
act.  'This  is  hard;  therefore  it  is  right.  I  do  not  wish 
to  do  this ;  therefore  I  ought,'  was  a  common  enough 
reasoning  of  our  Puritan  ancestors.  'You  do  not  wish 
to  do  this;  therefore  you  ought,'  was  still  commoner. 
And  to-day  many  a  one  does,  and  makes  others  do,  useless 
acts  because  they  are  hard  and  because  their  doing  will 
test  and  increase  the  power  to  stand  the  strain  of  effort. 
This  is  doubly  a  mistake.  The  chance  to  improve  char- 
acter by  the  performance  of  concretely  useful  acts, 
productive  of  concretely  useful  habits,  is  wasted ;  and  the 
one  who  makes  the  effort,  stands  the  strain,  is  being 
taught  the  lesson  that,  though  he  does  stand  the  strain, 


296  Dynamic  Psychology 

nothing  comes  of  it,  unless  perhaps  this  power  of  con- 
centration about  which  his  master  disclaims.  There  are 
enough  useful  acts  to  be  done  to  give  all  the  training  in 
self-control  that  anyone  could  ask,  and  these  will  increase 
self-control  far  more  surely,  for  they  will  demonstrate 
that  it  is  worth  while. 

(4)  To  regard  quantify  of  action  as  a  sign  of  energy. 
It  is  an  American  fashion  to  regard  repose  as  indolence 
and  'hustle'  as  accomplishment.  But  in  reality  a  vast 
amount  of  action  may  come  from  a  small  amount  of 
energy,  when  none  is  expended  for  inhibition  and  control. 
In  well-directed  action  far  more  energy  is  consumed  in 
restraining  and  guiding  conduct  than  in  merely  arousing 
it.  Indeed,  over-action  is  a  recognized  symptom  of 
nervous  weakness.  Men  learn  efficiency  in  action  by 
learning  to  omit  erroneous  acts  and  to  keep  all  acts  under 
rigid  control.  Not  quantity,  but  balance, — the  preserva- 
tion of  the  golden  mean  in  action, — is  the  best  symptom 
of  energy  or  strength. 

Exercises 

1.  Illustrate  from  your  own  acquaintance  or  from  fiction, 
extreme  inability  to  act  on  abstract  and  general  ideas. 

2.  Illustrate  similarly  a  predominant  tendency  for  ideas  to 
call  up  other  ideas  rather  than  acts. 

3.  Illustrate  similarly  an  explosive  will  due  to  excessive  im- 
pulsion. 

4.  Illustrate  similarly  an  explosive  will  due  to  a  lack  of  inhi- 
bition. 

5.  Illustrate  similarly  an  obstructed  will  due  to  excessive  in- 
hibition. 

6.  Illustrate  similarly  an  obstructed  will  due  to  a  lack  of 
impulsion. 

7.  What  did  Dr.  Clouston  probably  mean  by  this  state- 
ment: "You  Americans  wear  too  much  expression  on  your  faces 
The   duller  countenances   of  the   British   population  be^* 


Connections  of  Expression  297 

token  a  better  scheme  of  life."     (Quoted  by  James  in  his  Talks 
to  Teachers  on  Psychology,  p.  208.) 

References 

A.  James,  Briefer  Course,  XXVI. 
Stout,  Manual,  581-616. 
Titchener,   Outline,  §§  62-69. 
Angell,  Psychology,  XX.,  XXL,  XXII. 

B.  Ebbinghaus,  Grundziige,  §§  68-69. 
James,  Principles,  XXVI. 

Wundt,  Physiologische  Pyschologie,  XVII. 

References  on  Imitation  and  Suggestion 

Stout,  Manual,  269-275. 

James,   Principles,   XXVII. 

Wundt,  Physiologische  Psychologie,  XX    (§  3). 


20 


CHAPTER  XIX 

Movements 

§  56.  Acts  of  Skill 

So  far  the  connections  of  mental  states  with  bodily 
movements  have  been  treated  broadly  and  from  the  point 
of  view  of  the  general  conduct  of  life.  From  this  point 
of  view  the  exact  nature  of  the  movement  is  of  little  con- 
sequence, the  main  issue  being  whether  or  not  a  movement 
of  a  certain  general  character  shall  or  shall  not  be  made. 
In  the  case  of  what  are  called  acts  of  skill  the  same  gen- 
eral problem  appears,  but  the  main  issue  is  now :  Just 
what  movement  shall  be  made;  just  how  extensive  or 
energetic  or  long  in  duration  shall  it  be?  Life  as  a  whole 
is  made  up  of  both  such  movements  as  are  made  in  play- 
ing chess,  where  what  you  do  counts,  and  of  such  move- 
ments as  are  made  in  billiards  or  lawn  tennis,  where  the 
thing  of  importance  is  hoiu  you  do  it.  The  question 
before  was :  'Given  any  mental  state,  what  thing  shall  be 
done?'  The  question  now  is:  'What  causes  a  certain 
definite,  precise  movement  or  series  of  movements?' 

The  Acquisition  of  Skill. — The  same  law  of  asso- 
ciation operates  here  as  elsewhere.  A  single  illustration 
will  suffice.  In  drawing  a  straight  line,  the  situation  is 
the  sight  of  the  paper,  the  feeling  of  the  pencil  and  of 
one's  arm  and  fingers  in  position,  and  the  command  or 
idea  that  is  connected  with  the  act  of  drawing  a  straight 
line.     As  the  movement  is  made  new  sensations  arise 


Movements 


299 


from  the  sight  of  so  much  of  the  line  as  has  been  already 
drawn,  from  the  movements  already  made  and  from  the 
new  position  taken ;  the  continuation  of  the  movement  is 
the  sequent  of  these  as  well  as  of  the  original  mental 
state ;  and  so  on  until  the  movement  is  complete,  each 
successive  part  of  the  movement  furnishing  new  sensa- 
tions which,  arousing  their  appropriate  connections, 
modify  the  further  course  of  the  movement.  Let  the 
reader  draw  rapidly  a  line  between  the  two  lines  of  Fig.  83 


■I  ■   I 


runununi 


Fig.  83. 


without  touching  either  and  he  will  realize  this  process  of 
continual  arousal  of  alterations  in  the  movement  by  new 
sensations  produced  by  it.  When  you  see  the  pencil  going 
too  far  down  toward  one  line,  you  alter  its  direction; 
when  you  have  made  one  or  two  touches,  you  decrease  the 
speed.  Just  how  you  initiate,  guide  and  alter  your  move- 
ment will  depend  upon  what  inborn  capacity  for  steadiness 
and  precision  of  movement  you  possess  and  what  previous 
practice  you  have  had;  i.e.,  upon  what  connections  have 


300  Dynamic  Psychology 

been  made  between  this  and  that  guiding  sensation  and 
this  or  that  alteration  of  the  movement. 

Motor  Skill  means  the  existence  of  certain  connections 
whereby  the  guiding  sensations  arouse  appropriate  move- 
ments. Practice  means  the  formation  of  such  connec- 
tions. A  skilled  movement  may  commonly  be  divided 
into  the  coarser  adjustments  with  which  it  starts  and  the 
Uner  adjustments  which  come  into  play  in  response  to  the 
guiding  sensations.  Thus,  in  driving  a  nail,  lifting  the 
hammer  and  letting  it  start  downwards  are  the  coarser 
adjustments ;  the  finer  adjustments  enter  as  it  approaches 
the  nail  and  we  regulate  its  direction  and  force.  In  play- 
ing the  violin,  the  first  movements  in  drawing  the  bow  are 
comparatively  coarse  adjustments,  the  exact  degree  of 
tension,  pressure  and  the  like  being  determined  by  finer 
adjustments  made  during  the  movement.  In  planing  a 
board  the  movement  is  begun  with  a  coarse  adjustment, 
followed  by  finer  adjustments  made  in  response  to  the 
feelings  of  pressure,  the  sight  of  the  board  to  be  planed 
and  so  on. 

The  Mental  Factors  in  Motor  Skill. — Motor  skill  is 
thus  by  no  means  a  matter  of  delicacy  of  movement  alone. 
It  implies  also  the  capacity  to  receive  and  attend  to  the 
fine  differences  in  sensations  which  are  the  guides  to  the 
finer  adjustments,  and,  most  important  of  all,  the  capacity 
to  make  connections  between  sensations  and  movements, 
to  eliminate  the  unnecessary  and  undesirable  movements. 
These  capacities  improve  with  maturity,  and  with  train- 
ing, provided  the  successful  connections  are  rewarded  by 
resultant  satisfaction.  As  a  general  rule  the  capacities 
for  the  coarser  adjustments  mature  earlier  in  life  than 
those  for  the  finer  adjustments. 

Skill  in  movements  is  by  no  means  primarily  a  matter 
of  the  arms  and  hands.     The  movements  of  the  vocal 


Movements  301 

chords  in  speech  and  singing  and  of  the  eyes  in  bringing 
objects  into  clearest  vision  are  among  the  most  deHcately 
adjusted  movements  made  by  man.  In  most  handicrafts 
the  eyes  co-operate  in  the  movements  as  well  as  furnish 
guiding  sensations.  The  movements  of  the  facial  muscles 
by  which  interest,  amusement,  enthusiasm  and  the  like 
are  expressed,  are  often  extremely  delicate  and  in  the  case 
of  actors  may  be  the  result  of  long  continued  practice. 

Skill  is  improved  by  ( i )  deliberately  following  certain 
rules  which  can  be  learned  by  mere  thought,  and  (2)  by 
unconsciously  dropping  inefficient  and  emphasizing 
efficient  connections  in  the  course  of  practice.  The  first 
factor,  the  learning  by  explanations,  may  be  called  the 
acquisition  of  Form;  the  second  factor,  the  learning  by 
trial  and  error,  or  better  by  the  selection  of  chance  suc- 
cesses, may  be  called  the  acquisition  of  Execution.  The 
golf  player  may  learn  outright  what  is  the  right  way  to 
hit  the  ball,  how  and  where  to  stand,  how  to  hold  the  club, 
and  the  like.  This  is  learning  form.  But  the  actual 
associations  between  the  sight  of  the  ball  and  the  exact 
movements  necessary  to  drive  it  a  hundred  and  sixty 
yards,  must  be  patiently  built  up  by  the  'try,  try  again' 
method. 

Exercises 

Experiment  28.  The  Acquisition  of  Skill. — Make  some  new 
combination  of  movements;  e.  g.,  that  of  drawing  a  circle  with 
one  hand  while  drawing  a  straight  line  with  the  other.  Repeat 
the  process  until  a  fair  degree  of  skill  is  secured.  Notice  the 
tendency  for  the  two  hands  to  move  in  accord  and  the  difficulty  at 
the  start  of  inhibiting  undesirable  movements.  Note  any  in- 
stances of  movements  hard  to  avoid  because  of  their  frequent 
connection  with  similar  situations  in  the  past. 

Experiment  29.  The  Iniluence  of  Practice  on  Motor  Skill. — 
Procure  some  book  or  magazine  which  you  are  free  to  mark  or 
destroy.   Select  50  pages,  in  each  of  which  the  space  between  lines 


302  Dynamic  Psychology 

of  print  is  the  same.  Cut  them  so  as  to  leave  21  lines  on  each 
page.  Have  ready  a  sharp  pencil,  and  a  watch  with  a  second 
hand.  At  a  fixed  time,  say  when  the  minute  hand  is  at  14  and  the 
second  hand  at  60,  begin  to  draw  a  line  between  every  two  lines 
of  print  as  fast  as  you  can  without  touching  the  print  in  any  place. 
Draw  first  between  the  first  and  second  lines  from  left  to  right, 
then  around  the  right  end  of  the  second  line  and  back  between 
the  second  and  third  lines  from  right  to  left  and  so  on  until  20 
lines  have  been  drawn.  Note  and  record  the  time  of  completion 
and  so  obtain  the  number  of  seconds  taken  to  make  the  movements. 

Make  in  all  30  or  more  20-Iine  tests.  Do  not  make  more  than 
5  or  6  at  a  time.  Try  to  keep  the  number  of  touches  at  zero  and 
to  reduce  the  time  to  as  low  a  figure  as  possible.  Compare  the 
first  4  with  the  last  4  records  with  respect  to  time  (and  touches, 
if  any  were  made).  Compare  the  first,  second,  third  and  last 
quarters  of  the  total  series.  Make  as  clear  and  complete  a  state- 
ment as  you  can  of  the  effect  of  the  practice. 

If  this  experiment  were  to  be  used  as  a  means  of  measuring 
the  influence  of  practice  with  certainty  and  precision,  what  pre- 
cautions should  be  taken  with  respect  to  avoiding  the  influence  of 
unfair  physical  conditions  (e.  g.,  light),  fatigue,  variations  in 
interest  and  attention  and  other  disturbing  factors? 

§  57.  The  Connections  between  Sense  Stimitli  and 
Movements 

Automatic  Connections. — If  the  order  of  our  chap- 
ters were  the  order  of  the  development  of  mental  life,  the 
connections  between  physical  stimulations  of  the  sense 
organs  and  bodily  movements  would  have  been  the  first 
group  of  connections  described.  Physical  stimuli  con- 
nect with  movements  earlier  in  life  than  they  connect 
with  sense  impressions  and  long  before  sense  impressions 
connect  with  other  mental  states. 

The  order  is  in  fact : — 

(i)   Connections  of  physical  stimuli  with  movements. 

(2)  Connections  of  physical  stimuli  with  sense  im- 
pressions, emotions  and  other  feelings  of  the 
first  intention. 


Movements  303 

•    (3)   Connections    of    sense    impressions    with   move- 
ments. 
(4)   Connections  of  one  mental  state  with  another  and 
of  mental  states  of  the  second  and  third  inten- 
tions with  movement. 
The  early  connections  between  stimulus  and  move- 
ment  are   all    unlearned   or   instinctive.     The    increased 
heart-beat  in  response  to  physical  activity,  the  primitive 
embryonic  movements,  the  reaction  of  the  pupil  to  light 
and   the   like    are   samples   of   the   provision   by   nature 
of  responses  to  stimuli  which  are  not  even  felt.     Many 
such  connections  persist.     Processes  go  on  in  the  body  in 
response  to  external  and  internal  stimuli  which  are  not 
dreamt  of  in  the  philosophy  of  conscious  life. 

There  is  a  second  group  of  such  connections  which 
come  much  later  in  life  and  represent  the  relics  of  pro- 
cesses which  originally  involved  physical  stimulus,  feel- 
ings of  the  first  intention  and  bodily  movement.  By 
continued  use  such  connections  come  to  drop  the  middle 
term.  For  instance,  walking  involves,  at  first,  sensations 
of  sight,  pressure,  position  and  motion,  which  connect 
with  the  appropriate  movements  of  the  legs  and  balancing 
muscles ;  but  in  adult  life  we  walk  along  absorbed  in  con- 
versation or  thought  with  apparently  no  such  sensations. 
I  say  'apparently'  because  it  is  conceivable  that  the  feel- 
ings are  there  but  so  little  attended  to  as  to  pass  un- 
noticed. At  all  events  they  are  so  little  in  evidence  that 
for  practical  purposes  they  may  be  considered  absent. 

When  the  physical  stimulus  arouses  a  movement 
directly  instead  of  via  some  feeling,  the  response  is  called 
an  Automatic  Movement  or  an  Automatic  Act,  and  a  se- 
ries of  such  connections  is  called  automatic  conduct  or  au- 
tomatic behavior  or  automatic  action.  Instinctive  auto- 
matic behavior  is  probably  common  in  the  very  low  forms 


304  Dynamic  Psychology 

of  animal  life,  such  as  the  protozoa,  and  in  human  life 
before,  and  perhaps  for  some  weeks  after,  birth.  It 
persists  in  many  of  the  fundamental  physiological  ac- 
tivities. Acquired  automatic  hehavior  represents  nature's 
economy  in  leaving  unattended  to,  and  even  unfelt,  those 
stimuli  to  which  we  have  gained  a  perfect  habit  of 
response.  Just  as  the  thought  of  2  times  8  produces  the 
thought  of  16  without  the  reappearance  of  the  long 
process  of  learning  which  was  originally  necessary,  so  the 
touch  of  the  pavement  produces  the  act  of  walking  with- 
out perhaps  any  feeling  whatever. 

There  are  all  degrees  of  weakening  of  the  mental 
state  in  habitual  connections,  from  the  connection  so 
firmly  fixed  that  no  sensation  can  be  discerned,  up  to  the 
connection  in  which  attention  is  just  beginning  to  be 
somewhat  freed  from  thinking  one  by  one  of  the  sensa- 
tions which  guide  the  movement.  In  learning  to  play  a 
piece  on  the  piano,  to  ride  a  bicycle  or  to  knit,  one  grad- 
ually passes  from  full  consciousness  of  what  one  sees  and 
hears  and  does  to  such  an  almost  complete  absence  of 
feelings  concerned  with  the  act  that  one  can  think  of 
something  else  at  the  time  with  no  effort  whatever. 

The  Function  of  Automatic  Connections. — The 
saving  of  time  due  to  this  release  of  attention,  and,  per- 
haps, of  all  feeling,  from  fully  formed  habits,  is  enormous. 
In  so  far  as  the  movements  of  the  eyes  in  reading  become 
automatic,  attention  can  be  devoted  to  the  meaning  of  the 
words  read ;  in  so  far  as  the  movements  necessary  to  feed 
oneself  become  automatic,  the  newspaper  can  be  devoured 
with  the  breakfast.  If  the  operations  of  dressing,  eating, 
walking,  reading,  sewing  and  the  like  were  all  accom- 
panied by  the  attentive  consciousness  which  went  with 
them  in  their  early  appearances,  half  our  days  would  be 
spent   in   getting   them    done.     It   is   necessary    for   the 


Movements  305 

efficiency  of  mental  life  that  many  habits  should  be  made 
thus  self-controlHng,  should  be  practiced  until  they  make 
no  demands  upon  mental  life  proper.  Indeed  in  general 
we  think  about  things  so  as  eventually  to  do  them  without 
thought.  It  should  be  the  fate  of  every  connection  to 
progress  toward  automatic  behavior.  It  is  extravagant 
to  waste  attention  on  minor  connections  which  do  not 
deserve  it  A  student  who  was  forced  by  circumstances 
to  spend  much  time  in  the  society  of  some  stupid  people, 
found  that  by  making  automatic  the  habit  of  responding 
to  a  certain  general  tone  by  'Exactly'  or  'Certainly/  to 
another  tone  by  'Indeed!'  or  'Well!  Well!'  and  to  still 
another  by,  'Your  own  judgment  on  that  question  would 
be  better  than  mine,'  she  could  carry  on  her  own  medita- 
tions almost  as  well  as  if  by  herself.  One  reason  perhaps 
for  the  absent-mindedness  of  gifted  men  is  that  they  have 
learned  to  leave  all  the  small  matters  of  life  to  take  care 
of  themselves  and  so  occasionally  blunder  by  making  an 
automatic  response  at  an  improper  time.  It  is  better  to 
occasionally  enter  a  neighbor's  house,  or  try  to  light  the 
gas  with  a  pencil  or  greet  your  wife  on  the  street  with 
a  pleasant  'And  how  is  your  husband's  health  ?',  than  to 
think  all  day  long  about  trifles. 

Exercises 

1.  Name  six  instinctive  automatic  connections. 

2.  What  name  is  given  in  §  4  to  the  instinctive  automatic 
connections  ? 

3.  Observe  by  looking  in  a  glass  what  happens  to  the  pupils 
of  your  eyes  when  you  come  into  a  bright  room  after  eight  or  ten 
minutes  in  a  very  dark  room.  Would  you  know  what  happened 
to  them  from  direct  feeling  alone? 

4.  Name  six  acquired  connections  which  you  make  auto- 
matically or  nearly  so. 

5.  The  conjurer  Houdin  is  reported  to  have  been  able  to 
keep  four  balls  in  the  air  quite  automatically,  in  fact  to  do  so 


3o6  Dynamic  Psychology 

while  steadily  reading  a  book.     Give  similar  instances  showing 
the  degree  of  complexity  possible  in  automatic  connections. 

6.  Which  would  be  harder,  to  learn  to  walk  and  sew  at 
the  same  time  or  to  read  and  sew  at  the  same  time? 

7.  Why  is  to  learn  to  talk  and  sew  at  the  same  time  easier 
than  either? 

§  58.  Movements  as  Antecedents 

Movements,  though  they  do  not  directly  arouse,  do 
indirectly  react  on  mental  states.  Any  movement  serves 
as  a  stimulus  to  the  sense  organs, — of  the  eye,  if  it  is  seen ; 
of  the  skin,  if  it  causes  tension  or  folding;  of  the  joints,  if 
a  bone  is  moved ;  of  the  muscle  itself  in  any  case.  Every 
turn  of  the  eyes,  every  change  of  facial  expression,  every 
contraction  of  the  vocal  chords,  every  posture  of  the  body, 
every  extension  of  flexion  of  a  finger,  thus  plays  a  part  in 
determining  the  course  of  the  stream  of  thought.  Just 
as  a  multitude  of  sights  and  sounds  sets  at  work  the  forces 
of  sensation  and  produces  new  mental  states,  so  the  mul- 
tiplicity of  bodily  movements  produces  a  crop  of  second- 
arily caused  sensations,  which  feature  in  later  thought. 

Just  what  and  how  great  a  part  movements  play  as 
stimuli  to  sensations,  is  not  known.  But  it  is  surely  not 
unimportant.  The  images  of  words  in  which  thought  is 
carried  on  are  often  motor  images  of  the  movements 
made  in  speech.  The  feelings  of  strain,  irritation  and 
perplexity,  are  very  probably  due  to  conditions  of  general 
muscle  tension.  One  theory  of  the  fusion  of  sensations 
into  percepts  is  that  we  feel  as  one  thing  whatever  com- 
bination of  sensations  is  responded  to  by  a  single  move- 
ment or  a  connected  series  of  movements.  Some  thinkers 
assert  that  without  bodily  movement,  controlled  thought 
cannot  even  take  place.  The  feeling  of  self  or  person- 
ality, which  is  one  element  of  almost  all  mental  states,  is 
in  large  measure  due  to  the  ever  present  stimuli  from  the 


Movements 


307 


muscular  tension  of  the  body,  the  unnoticed  movements  of 
breathing,  and  the  Hke.  The  feeHngs  of  the  distances  of 
objects  arise  in  part  from  feeHngs  of  the  movements  of 
the  eyes  made  in  converging  for  near  and  diverging  for 
far  objects.  General  satisfaction  and  dissatisfaction  are, 
by  one  theory,  explained  as  the  feelings  caused  by  move- 
ments of  extension  or  approach  and  of  flexion  or  with- 
drawal respectively. 

From  these  and  similar  facts  and  theories,  it  is  certain 
that  the  indirect  contribution  of  movements  to  thoughts 
and  feelings  is  a  large  one,  and  one  upon  which  man  relies 
for  the  material  for  some  of  his  most  important  judg- 
ments. 

Exercises 

I.  Which  looks  longer  in  Fig.  84,  the  vertical  or  the  hori- 
zontal line?  Measure  the  lines.  What  fact,  in  addition  to  the 
fact  that  it  is  harder  to  move  the  eyes  in  a  vertical  than  a  horizon- 
tal direction,  is  needed  to  explain  the  appearance? 


Fig.  84. 


2.     Can  you  discover  in  yourself  feelings  due  to  movements 
of  the  sort  described  in  the  following  passages? — 


3o8  Dynamic  Psychology 

"In  consenting  and  negating,  and  in  making  a  mental  effort, 
the  movements  seem  more  complex,  and  I  find  them  harder  to 
describe.  The  opening  and  closing  of  the  glottis  play  a  great 
part  in  these  operations,  and,  less  distinctly,  the  movements  of 
the  soft  palate,  etc.,  shutting  off  the  posterior  nares  from  the 
mouth.  My  glottis  is  like  a  sensitive  valve,  intercepting  my 
breath  instantaneously  at  every  mental  hesitation  or  felt  aversion 
to  the  objects  of  my  thought,  and  as  quickly  opening,  to  let  the 
air  pass  through  my  throat  and  nose,  the  moment  the  repugnance 
is  overcome.  The  feeling  of  the  movement  of  this  air  is,  in  me, 
one  strong  ingredient  of  the  feeling  of  assent.  The  movements 
of  the  muscles  of  the  brow  and  eyelids  also  respond  very  sensi- 
tively to  every  fluctuation  in  the  agreeableness  or  disagreeable- 
ness  of  what  comes  before  my  mind. 

In  effort  of  any  sort,  contractions  of  the  jaw-muscles  and  of 
those  of  respiration  are  added  to  those  of  the  brow  and  glottis, 
and  thus  the  feeling  passes  out  of  the  head  properly  so  called." 
James,  Principles,  I.,  301. 

Experiment  30.  Movements  as  Stimuli  to  Mental  States. — 
Lie  down  and  let  all  your  muscles  relax  until  you  are  perfectly 
limp  and  easy  and  without  any  tension  anywhere.  Let  the  mus- 
cles of  the  face  relax  as  well  as  those  of  the  rest  of  the  body. 
Rest  thus  for  ten  minutes  or  more.  Then  jump  up,  frown,  set 
your  teeth,  clinch  your  fists  and  stalk  back  and  forth  with  quick, 
vigorous  and  jerky  movements.  How  did  you  feel  in  the  two 
cases  ? 

References 

A.  James,  Briefer  Course,  XXIII.,  X. 
Stout,  Manual,  99-102. 

B.  Ebbinghaus,    Grundziige,   §   65. 
James,  Principles,  XXIII.,  IV. 

Wundt,  Physiologische  Psychologic  XIV.,  §  3. 


CHAPTER  XX 

Selective  Processes 

§  59.  Attention  and  Neglect 

Attention. — In  the  last  seven  chapters  are  frequent 
references  to  the  facts  of  attention,  the  fact  (i)  that  of 
any  mental  state  some  one  portion  is  predominant, — is 
more  likely  than  others  to  be  operative  in  causing  the 
sequent  mental  state  or  act;  and  the  fact  (2)  that  of  many 
feelings  felt,  only  a  few  are  noticed,  dwelt  upon,  allowed 
to  play  leading  parts  in  influencing  the  future  course  of 
thought  and  action.  Chapter  VII  contained  a  brief 
description  of  the  facts  of  attention.  It  is  now  necessary 
to  study  their  causation ;  to  answer  the  questions :  'What 
determines  which  part  of  a  mental  state  will  be  focal? 
Which  mental  states  will  be  selected,  dwelt  upon,  allowed 
to  weigh  heavily  in  mental  life  and  conduct?' 

Here  as  elsewhere  (i)  original  nature,  (2)  the  in- 
fluence of  experience  and  (3)  accidental  causes  share  in 
producing  the  result.  What  will  be  felt  as  clear,  em- 
phatic and  focal,  what  will  be  selected  and  dwelt  upon, 
what  in  short  will  be  attended  to,  by  any  individual,  will 
be  that  mental  state  or  that  feature  of  a  mental  state 
which  is  attractive  because  of  ( i )  the  original  tendencies 
to  attend  with  which  nature  endows  us,  because  of  (2) 
the  habits  of  attention  which  have  been  found  by  the 
individual  in  question  to  be  desirable  or  because  of  (3) 
some  accidental  cause.    The  original  tendencies  to  attend 

309 


310  Dynamic  Psychology 

may  be  called  instinctive  interests;  the  acquired  tenden- 
cies to  attend  may  be  called  acquired  interests. 

Instinctive  Attention. — Some  of  the  more  important 
instinctive  tendencies  are  to  attend,  other  things  being 
equal  to: — 
(i)   Moving  objects  rather  than  still  objects. 

(2)  Other  human  beings  and  living  animals  rather  than 

plants  or  inanimate  objects. 

(3)  Clear  rather  than  obscure  or  indefinite  objects. 

(4)  Intense  rather  than  weak  stimuli. 

(5)  Novel  rather  than  familiar  objects  (unless  the  latter 

have   special   advantages). 

(6)  Pleasurable  rather  than  painful  stimuli. 

(7)  Expected  rather  than  unexpected  stimuli. 

These  tendencies  are  fairly  common  to  all  human  beings, 
though  individual  differences  exist  with  respect  to  the 
amount  of  strength  of  each. 

Like  instincts  in  general,  these  instinctive  interests 
may  be  delayed.  Obvious  illustrations  are  the  interest 
in  living  animals  and  the  interest  in  the  opposite  sex. 
Little  is  known  of  the  exact  time  of  maturing  of  in- 
stinctive tendencies  to  attend,  because  in  actual  life  the 
influence  of  original  nature  is  often  inextricably  con- 
joined with  that  of  experience.  No  one  can  yet  say,  for 
instance,  how  far  the  tendency  to  attend  to  the  number 
aspect  of  any  stimulus, — to  count  objects, — is  a  delayed 
.instinct  and  how  far  it  is  an  acquired  habit. 

Acquired  Attention — In  habits  of  attention  there  is 
amongst  individuals  a  tremendous  diversity  due  to  the 
moderate  differences  in  the  instinctive  tendencies  from 
which  the  habits  develop,  the  greater  differences  in 
capacities,  and  the  still  greater  differences  in  the  exper- 
iences which  life  affords  to  different  individuals.  We  all 
come  to  attend  in  general  to  spoken  words  more  than  to 


Selective  Processes  311 

coughs,  laughs,  sneezes  and  the  Hke ;  to  facial  expression 
more  than  to  movements  of  the  chest;  to  the  weather 
more  than  to  the  character  of  the  soil.  In  these  cases 
experience  teaches  all  much  the  same  lessons.  But  on 
the  whole  each  individual  acquires  interests  in  a  special 
circle  of  friends,  special  divisions  of  knowledge,  a  special 
profession  or  trade,  a  special  locality,  and  so  with  the 
many  objects  of  modern  civilized  life. 

The  forces  in  forming  habits  of  attention,  and  in 
deciding  what  thing  or  feature  out  of  several  will  in  any 
given  situation  be  attended  to,  are  the  frequency,  recency 
and  intensity  of  attention  to  the  thing  on  previous  occa- 
sions, resultant  pleasure,  and  harmony  with  the  general 
set  of  the  mind.  Of  these,  resultant  pleasure  is  by  far 
the  most  important.  Mere  frequency  and  recency  of 
attention  will  in  fact  produce  inattention  or  disregard  if 
the  consequences  are  unsatisfactory  or  even  indifferent; 
for  frequency  breeds  familiarity  and  monotony  and  by 
original  nature  the  familiar  and  monotonous  is  disre- 
garded in  favor  of  the  novel.  In  the  long  run  attention 
is  more  and  more  given  to  those  things  attention  to  which 
produces  felt  satisfaction. 

Voluntary  Attention. — So-called  voluntary  atten- 
tion,— i.e.,  attending  with  effort  and  deliberately  neglect- 
ing the  thing  which  appeals  to  instinctive  interests  or 
pleasurable  habits  of  attention, — seems  unexplainable  by 
the  laws  of  instinct  and  association.  Why,  for  instance, 
does  a  boy  attend  with  effort  to  the  words  of  his  spelling 
lesson  when  the  sound  of  a  band  and  the  vision  through 
the  window  of  a  circus  parade  invite  him?  As  a  matter 
of  fact  he  usually  does  not.  When  he  does,  it  is  because 
some  idea  or  feeling  in  connection  with  the  situation 
makes  the  attending  to  the  spelling  words  more  satis- 
factory to  him  than  attending  to  the  parade.     In  and  of 


312  Dynamic  Psychology 

themselves  the  spelling  words  would  speedily  give  way 
to  the  parade.  But  the  situation  is:  'spelling  words  to 
look  at  and  think  of — please  father — show  my  grit — Vm 
weak  if  I  don't  do  it — of  course  they  must  be  learned  first, 
und  the  like,'  and  if  these  ideals  of  duty  and  achievement 
are  highly  enough  esteemed,  the  spelling  words  are 
clothed  with  an  attractiveness  derived  from  remote  aims 
and  enjoyments  which  is  stronger  and  wins.  It  is  not 
that  the  unsatisfying  conquers  the  desirable;  but  that 
what  is  undesirable  in  itself  may  be  so  suffused  by  the 
desirability  of  its  connections  as  to  seem  the  more  desira- 
ble to  the  total  frame  of  mind.  It  is  not  that  men  attend, 
some  only  to  the  attractive  and  others,  of  a  firmer  fibre,  to 
the  repugnant.  The  real  difference  is  that  some  feel 
satisfaction  only  in  the  directly  pleasurable,  the  selfish 
rewards,  the  narrow  and  immediate  outcome;  whereas 
others  feel  satisfaction  in  the  prospects  of  far  off  benefits, 
in  the  welfare  of  others,  and  in  the  general  and  eventual 
outcome  which  their  entire  system  of  ideas  and  purposes 
holds  in  view.  The  thing  to  be  accounted  for  is  not  a 
difference  in  the  laws  of  attention  but  a  difference  in 
taste  or  preference.  Whether  the  proverbial,  There  is 
no  accounting  for  tastes'  be  true  or  not  will  be  seen  in  a 
later  section.  The  fact  of  moment  here  is  the  fortunate 
one  that  men  may  have  a  preference  for  the  eventually 
useful,  the  abstractly  good  and  the  eternally  right  as  well 
as  for  beer  and  skittles. 

The  case  of  voluntary  attention,  attention  against 
resistance,  is  one  case  of  the  general  fact  of  derived 
attention.  Any  thing  may  gain  attention  not  only  from 
its  intrinsic  quahties  (immediate  attention),  but  also 
from  its  associations.  Derived  attention  may  or  may  not 
imply  effort,  may  minister  to  higher  or  lower  impulses. 
Attention  to  a  dollar  bill  is  derived  but  commonly  implies 


Selective  Processes  313 

no  feeling  of  effort.  Fagin's  attention  to  Oliver  Twist, 
derived  from  the  idea  of  making  him  a  thief,  was  of 
course  in  the  service  of  a  distinctly  low  motive. 

One  more  fact  of  the  development  of  tendencies  to 
attend  deserves  notice, — namely,  that  an  object  which 
originally  is  attended  to  with  effort  so  often  comes  after 
a  time  to  be  attended  to  without  effort.  To  look  at  the 
printed  words  in  a  story  book  and  to  think  of  '4  and  7 
are  11'  and  the  like  in  doing  sums  in  addition,  imply 
effort  in  the  7  year  old  child  in  school,  but  none  in  the 
practiced  reader  and  accountant. 

Getting  rid  of  the  feeling  of  effort  is  due  to  getting 
rid  of  irrelevant  impulses  or  ideas  which  need  checking 
or  inhibition,  and  to  the  strengthening  of  the  relevant  im> 
pulses  or  ideas  by  their  repetition  and  resulting  satis- 
faction. Just  as  a  person  could  free  life  as  a  whole  from 
the  feeling  of  effort,  if  the  tendencies  to  do  every  thing 
that  he  had  to  do  were  made  a  hundred  times  as  strong 
and  the  tendencies  to  do  everything  that  he  must  not  do 
were  reduced  ninety-nine  per  cent,  in  strength;  so  in  a 
single  process  of  life  like  reading,  effort  vanishes  in  pro- 
portion as  the  tendencies  to  do  what  must  be  done  in 
reading  (e.g.,  to  move  the  eyes  to  a  point  on  the  line)  are 
strengthened  and  the  tendencies  to  do  what  must  not  be 
done  (e.g.,  to  move  the  eyes  away  from  the  point  before 
the  words  are  perceived)  are  weakened.  There  is  no 
mysterious  law  that  effort  decreases  with  repetition.  It 
does  not  except  in  so  far  as  the  need  for  inhibition 
decreases. 

Neglect. — Selecting  one  thing  implies  the  disregard 
of  other  things.  For  one  feature  of  a  mental  state  to  be 
focal,  others  must  be  kept  in  the  margin.  Attention  has, 
as  its  corollary  or  negative  aspect,  neglect.^     The  same 

^  The  term  inhibition  is  the  one  commonly  used  for  this  process 
21 


314  Dynamic  Psychology 

process  is,  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  thing  selected, 
attention,  and,  from  that  of  the  thing  disregarded,  neglect. 
The  account  just  given  is  then  as  applicable  to  the  latter 
as  to  the  former.  Tendencies  to  neglect,  like  tendencies 
to  attend,  are  partly  inborn  and  partly  acquired.  The 
laws  of  their  acquisition  are  the  same ;  discomfort  being 
the  rejecting  and  dissociating  force  as  satisfaction  is  the 
emphasizing  and  associating  force. 

Neglect  may  be  intrinsic  or  derived,  according  as  the 
object  is  in  itself  unattractive  or  repellent,  or  has  grafted 
upon  it  the  unattractiveness  or  repulsiveness  of  its  mental 
associates.  Neglect  may  be  with  or  without  a  feeling  of 
strain  or  effort. 

§  60.  Satisfaction  and  Discomfort 

Two  facts,  resulting  satisfaction  and  resulting  dis- 
comfort, have  been  constantly  invoked  as  causes  of 
changes  in  the  life  of  thought  and  action.  The  reader 
is  acquainted  with  these  facts  in  his  own  experience  but 
certain  knowledge  about  their  presence  and  causation 
needs  statement  here.  To  explain  fully  why  any  human 
being  thinks  and  feels  and  acts  as  he  does,  it  is  necessary 
to  know  what  circumstances  will  give  him  the  feelings  of 
satisfaction  and  of  discomfort.  Having  learned  that 
connections  productive  of  satisfaction  are  selected  for 
survival  and  that  connections  productive  of  discomfort 
are  eliminated,  the  final  step  is  to  learn  what  sort  of  result 
is  satisfying. 

of  disregard  or  neglect.  The  word  inhibition  is  however  used  also 
to  mean  the  prevention  of  atiy  tendency,  of  tendencies  to  move,  to 
perceive,  to  associate  ideas  and  the  like  as  well  as  the  prevention 
of  tendencies  to  attend  to  an  object.  It  is  best  to  avoid  ambiguity 
by  using  rejection  or  neglect  to  refer  to  the  negative  aspect  of  at- 
tention and  keeping  inhibition  for  the  more  general  fact  of  preven- 
tion. 


Selective  Processes  315 

Original  nature  decides  this  in  part.  Man  is  so  con- 
stituted by  nature  that  certain  stimuH  produce  feelings  of 
satisfaction  and  others  discomfort.  Sweet  tastes,  rhyth- 
mical sounds,  movements  after  rest,  relaxation  of  the 
muscles  after  fatigue,  the  moderate  action  of  the  senses 
of  vision,  hearing  and  smell,  are  thus  satisfying  to  well 
nigh  everyone.  The  free  exercise  of  instinctive  tenden- 
cies to  take,  hold,  play,  sleep,  run,  fondle  and  the  like,  is 
an  almost  equally  important  source  of  satisfaction.  Sen- 
sory pains  from  blows,  cuts,  burns,  diseases  and  the  like ; 
certain  sensations  and  emotions  such  as  hunger,  thirst, 
fatigue,  fear,  anxiety ;  restraint  from  the  exercise  of 
instinctive  tendencies,  as  by  capture,  confinement  or  the 
obstruction  of  movement,  are  for  the  same  reason  uncom- 
fortable. Let  us  call  these  two  classes  of  feelings. 
Original  SatisHers  and  Original  Troiiblers. 

Original  nature  alone  is  obviously  insufficient  to 
account  for  all  likes  and  dislikes ;  for  they  differ  much 
with  different  individuals,  change  much  with  age  and  alter 
quickly  with  training.  Whether  any  given  result  shall 
be  satisfying  or  uncomfortable  depends  in  part  upon  what 
it  has  been  associated  with.  The  rule  is  that,  other  things 
being  equal,  any  feeling  will  be  satisfying  which  has  been 
associated  with  original  satisfiers,  and  that  any  feeling 
will  be  uncomfortable  which  has  been  associated  with 
original  troublers.  Thus  'to  have  the  bottle'  becomes  a 
satisfactory  result  to  the  baby,  being  suffused  with  the 
feeling  originally  felt  only  with  the  result  'food  in  mouth.' 
After  the  satisfyingness  has  been  acquired  from  connec- 
tion with  an  original  satisfier,  it  can  spread  further. 
Later  'to  see  the  bottle  being  brought'  and  later  still  'to 
be  told  "You  shall  have  your  milk,"  '  acquire  in  turn  this 
aura  of  satisfyingness.  The  discomfort  of  the  blow 
spreads  to  the  sight  of  the  uplifted  hand,  and  from  there 


3i6  Dynamic  Psychology 

to  the  sound  of  the  spoken  threat.  No  matter  how  barren 
of  instinctive  pleasurableness  a  condition  may  be,  it  may 
become  the  most  cherished  and  satisfying  of  feeHngs.  'I 
am  doing  God's  will/  *I  am  serving  tbe  state,'  and  'I  am 
hunting  the  truth,'  have  ruled  men's  lives  in  spite  of  their 
lack  of  intrinsic  satisfaction. 

The  general  laws  of  instinct  and  of  association  thus 
account  for  the  satisfying  and  uncomfortable  qualities  of 
different  feelings  as  well  as  for  the  connections  amongst 
stimuli,  mental  states  and  movements.  How  the  satis- 
faction following  upon  a  connection  strengthens  it,  and 
how  the  discomfort  following  upon  a  connection  weakens 
it,  must  be  left  unanswered  questions.  Neither  psy- 
chology nor  physiology  has  yet  anything  much  better  than 
a  guess  to  offer  to  this,  the  most  fundamental  question  of 
the  mental  life  of  man  and  of  the  animal  kingdom  as  a 
whole.  All  that  can  be  said  is  that  the  original  satisfiers 
are  as  a  rule  events  useful  for  the  survival  of  the  species 
and  the  original  troublers  are  as  a  rule  events  disadvan- 
tageous to  the  survival  of  the  species;  consequently  any 
means  by  which  the  former  could  reinforce  the  connec- 
tions causing  them  and  the  latter  weaken  the  connections 
causing  them  would,  when  evolved,  be  maintained  by 
natural  selection.  Perhaps  their  respective  influences  on 
the  blood  supply  constitute  such  a  means. 

§  6i.  Conclusion  of  Part  III 

Complex  as  is  a  human  life,  it  is  at  bottom  explainable 
by  a  few  principles.  The  presence  of  original  tendencies 
to  connections  and  of  satisfaction  and  discomfort  as  quali- 
ties of  certain  feelings,  the  power  of  satisfaction  to 
strengthen  the  connections  producing  it  and  of  dis- 
comfort to  weaken  those  producing  it,  the  natural 
influence   of   frequency,   recency  and   intensity  on   con- 


Conclusion  of  Pari  IJJ  317 

nections: — these  are  the  ultimate  laws  of  dynamic  psy- 
chology. Of  these  the  only  one  unexplained  by  the 
general  laws  of  living  beings  is  the  power  of  satisfaction 
and  discomfort. 

The  development  of  a  human  mental  life  may  be 
likened  to  that  of  the  animal  kingdom  as  a  whole.  The 
present  animal  kingdom  is  the  result  of  the  existence  in 
the  past  of  many  variations,  the  elimination  of  those 
which  did  not  fit  the  environment  so  as  to  survive,  and  the 
persistence  of  the  others  through  heredity.  The  eliminat- 
ing agent  in  this  case  is  death.  Any  man's  intellect  and 
character  are  the  results  of  the  existence  in  his  past  of 
many  connections,  the  elimination  of  those  which  did  not 
fit  their  environmicnt  so  as  to  bring  satisfaction,  and  the 
persistence  of  the  others  through  the  law  of  association. 
The  eliminating  agent  in  this  case  is  dissatisfaction  and 
the  environment  is  not  the  physical  world  alone  but  also 
the  greater  universe  of  passions  and  ideals,  of  wrong  and 
right,  of  falsehood  and  truth. 

It  is  often  said  that  there  is  and  can  be  no  science  of 
human  nature,  that  it  is  impossible  to  do  more  than  make 
shrewd  guesses  as  the  poets,  story-writers  and  proverb- 
makers  do.  The  progress  of  psychology  is,  however, 
gradually  proving  the  assertion  false.  Even  in  the  ele- 
mentary and  untechnical  account  of  psychology  presented 
in  these  few  pages,  there  is  given  enough  evidence  to 
justify  the  faith  that  human  life  can  be  the  object  of 
systematic  and  verified  knowledge.  Nor  are  the  facts  of 
psychology  so  chaotic  and  fragmentary  as  is  generally 
supposed.  Although  yet  far  from  the  perfection  of  full 
explanation  by  a  few  general  laws  which  is  being  reached 
in  the  case  of  physical  facts,  they  are  nevertheless  being 
more  and  more  reduced  to  order  and  summarized  under 
simple  laws.     In  Part  I  the  rich  variety  of  human  thought 


3i8  Dynamic  Psychology 

and  feeling  was  shown  to  be  after  all  divisible  into  three 
natural  groups;  first,  feelings  of  direct  experience;  sec- 
ond, reproductions  of  direct  experience;  and  third,  feel- 
ings meaning  or  referring  to  direct  experience.  In 
Part  II  the  tremendously  complex  physical  basis  of  mental 
life,  the  nervous  system,  was  shown  to  be  essentially  the 
sum  of  the  connections  between  sensitive  areas  of  the 
body  and  motor  organs,  the  same  bodily  organ,  the 
neurone,  being  always  the  connecting  agent.  In  Part  III 
it  has  been  shown  that  in  great  measure  the  intellects  and 
characters  of  men  are  explainable  by  a  single  law,  and  that 
in  the  case  of  certain  facts  psychology  possesses  the  final 
warrant  of  a  science,  the  power  to  predict  the  future. 


CHAPTER  XXI 

Conclusion  :  The  Relations  of  Psychology 
§  62.  The  Science  of  Psychology  as  a  Whole 

In  this  book  only  the  more  elementary  and  funda- 
mental facts  and  laws  of  mental  life  have  been  presented. 
A  complete  account  of  the  science  of  psycholog>'  would 
require  many  volumes.  We  have  studied  only  the  more 
general  facts  of  ordinary  human  mental  life,  but  psy- 
chology deals  also  with  the  details  of  sensations,  the 
associations  of  ideas  and  the  like,  with  the  facts  of 
abnormal  and  diseased  minds  and  with  the  mental 
processes  of  animals.  I  have,  as  a  rule,  described  only 
those  facts  which  may  be  appreciated  by  simple  observa- 
tions and  reflection,  but  psychology  uses  also  intricate 
analysis,  elaborate  experiments,  exact  measurements  and 
wide  comparisons.  The  subject  matter  of  psychology 
covers  a  wide  range  of  facts,  and  these  are  studied  by 
many  different  methods. 

Such  a  book  as  this  can,  of  course,  be  but  the  slightest 
beginning  of  a  study  of  psychology, — of  the  thoughts  and 
feelings  of  men,  their  relation  to  the  nervous  system  and 
the  human  actions  which  they  arouse  and  guide.  The 
field  of  the  science  is  so  wide,  and  the  methods  of  studying 
it  so  various  that  any  one  small  book  can  present  only  the 
most  general  principles  and  offer  only  the  simplest  kind  of 
an  introduction  to  psychology  as  a  whole.  During  the 
year  1903  alone  there  were  published  over  two  thousand 

319 


320  Conclusion 

books  and  articles  on  psychology  or  allied  topics,  written 
by  recognized  scientific  workers.  These  included  studies 
of  the  psychology  of  children  as  well  as  of  adults;  studies 
of  the  insane,  of  the  feeble-minded  and  of  animals  as  well 
as  of  ordinary  human  beings ;  studies  of  the  growth  and 
decay  of  mind  as  well  as  analysis  of  its  normal  conditions ; 
studies  of  the  deeper  realities  behind  human  lives  as  well 
as  of  mental  facts  taken  at  their  face  value.  The  psy- 
chologists who  wrote  them  used  in  some  cases  observation 
and  reflection,  in  other  cases  comparison,  experiment  and 
measurements.  In  many  cases  all  these  methods  were 
employed.  The  subject  ranged  from  The  Psychology 
of  Advertising  to  The  Psychology  of  Religion^  from 
Habit  Formation  in  the  Crawfish  to  the  Aesthetics  of 
Unequal  Division. 

The  Subject  Matter  of  Psychology. — The  chief 
divisions  of  psychology  and  the  subject  matter  dealt  with 
by  each  are: 

General  Psycholog}^ :  The    ordinary   mental   life   of 

human  beings. 

Individual  Psychology :       The  nature  and  amount  of  the 

mental  differences  which  are 
found  among  human  beings. 

Abnormal  Psychology :      Exceptional      and      unhealthy 

mental  traits. 
Child  Psychology:  The  mental  life  of  children. 

The  grozvth  of  mental  life  in  the  individual  and  in  the 
race  is  often  regarded  as  a  special  division  of  psychology 
and  called  Genetic  Psychology. 

Animal  Psychology :  The  mental   life  and  ways  of 

learning  of  the  lower  ani- 
mals. 


The  Relations  of  Psychology 


321 


Physiological  Psycholog}'' :  The  relations   between  mental 

life  and  conditions  of  the 
body,  especially  of  the  nerv- 
ous system.  The  division 
of  psychology  dealing  with 
the  relation  of  stimulus  to 
sensation  is  called  Psycho- 
physics. 

Social  Psychology :  Those    aspects    of   mental    life 

which  are  connected  with 
the  influence  of  human  be- 
ings on  one  another  and  the 
action  of  human  beings  in 
groups. 

Educational  Psychology :    Those    aspects    of   mental   life 

which  are  connected  with 
the  production  of  changes 
in  human  beings,  especially 
by  consciously  directed  hu- 
man influences. 

Philosophical  Psychology :  The  fundamental  realities  be- 
hind the  facts  of  mental  life. 
The  place  of  mental  life  in 
the  universe  as  a  whole. 

The  Methods  of  Psychology. — The  chief  methods  of 
studying  mental  facts  and  the  names  commonly  given  to 
them  are : 

Observation:  Mental  facts  are  noticed  (i)  directly  in 
oneself  by  introspection,  or  (2)  indi- 
rectly in  others  by  studying  their  be- 
havior and  their  statements  about  their 
mental  lives. 


322 


Conclusion 


Analysis :  Complex  mental  facts  are  broken  up  into 

their    elements.     The    composition    of 
mental  states  is  studied. 
Experiment:        Mental   facts   are  noticed  under  special 

conditions  arranged  for  the  purpose. 
Measurement:     Quantitative    estimates   of   mental    facts 

and  their  relationships  are  made. 
Comparison :  Any  one  group  of  mental  facts  is  studied 
in  the  light  of  others.  Human  mental 
life  is  studied  in  connection  with  animal 
mental  life.  Adult  minds  are  com- 
pared with  the  minds  of  children ;  nor- 
mal mental  conditions  with  abnormal, 
etc. 
Reflection :  All  methods  imply  the  thoughtful,  logical 

consideration  of  facts. 
Any  one  of  the  kinds  of  subject  matter  may  be  studied 
by  several  methods.  For  instance,  Child  Psychology  may 
be  studied  by  all  the  methods  except  by  direct  introspec- 
tive observation.  It  could  be  so  studied  if  there  were 
children  who  were  also  psychological  students.  Each 
method  is,  however,  in  the  present  state  of  the  science, 
more  appropriate  to  some  kinds  of  subject  matter  than  to 
others.  Thus  animal  psychology  is  very  often  compara- 
tive; philosophical  psychology  is  rarely  aided  by  experi- 
ments or  measurements;  individual  pschology  is  much 
more  frequently  quantitative  than  is  social  psychology. 
The  tendency  of  the  present  time  is  to  rely  less  on  mere 
observation  and  analysis  and  more  upon  carefully  planned 
experiments  conducted  with  quantitative  precision. 

§  63.  The  Relations  of  Psychology  to  Other  Sciences 

Psychology   is   related   to   other    sciences   both   as    a 
dependent  and  as  a  contributor.     It  needs  the  results  of 


The  Relations  of  Psychology  323 

physiology  to  explain  the  action  of  the  nervous  system 
which  is  the  basis  of  mental  life  as  we  know  it.  It  sup- 
plies or  should  supply  the  fundamental  principles  upon 
which  sociology,  economics,  history,  anthropology,  lin- 
guistics and  the  other  sciences  dealing  with  human 
thought  and  action  should  be  based. 

The  connection  between  psychology  and  physiology 
has  been  illustrated  so  often  in  this  book  as  to  need  no 
further  comment.  Everywhere  we  have  to  seek  for  the 
physiological  basis  of  mental  facts  and  connections. 
Through  physiology,  ps^xhology  makes  connection  with 
anatomy,  physics  and  chemistry.  The  structure  of  the 
body  must  be  known  if  we  are  to  understand  the  action 
of  the  sense  organs,  central  nervous  system  and  muscles. 
The  nature  of  the  physical  forces  must  be  known  if  we  are 
to  understand  the  ways  in  which  the  sense  organs  are 
stimulated  by  outside  events.  With  some  of  the  physical 
sciences,  such  as  geology,  astronomy,  physical  geography, 
paleontology,  botany  and  mineralogy,  psychology  has  only 
the  most  remote  relations. 

With  the  non-physical  sciences,  the  connections  should 
naturally  be  closer.  The  story  of  human  life  as  told  by 
anthropology  and  history;  the  picture  of  man's  dealings 
with  man  given  by  sociology ;  the  analysis  which  econom- 
ics makes  of  human  action  in  the  production,  distribution 
and  consumption  of  wealth ;  the  record  of  the  processes  of 
human  thought  which  is  stored  up  in  languages, — all 
these  should  furnish  material  for  the  student  of  human 
thought,  feeling  and  action.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
facts  and  laws  of  psychology, — its  account  of  why 
human  beings  think  and  feel  and  act  as  they  do, — should 
provide  the  general  basis  for  the  interpretation  and 
explanation  of  the  great  events  studied  by  history,  the 
complex  activities  of  civilized  society,  the  motives  that 


324  Conclusion 

control  the  action  of  labor  and  capital,  and  the  causes  to 
which  linguistic  inventions  and  modifications  are  due. 
Theoretically,  history,  sociology,  economics,  linguistics 
and  the  other  'humanities'  or  sciences  of  human  affairs 
are  all  varieties  of  psychology.  But  in  fact  the  connec- 
tions have  not  been  close.  These  sciences  have  not 
attained  sufficient  insight  into  general  principles  or  suffi- 
cient precision  in  the  knowledge  of  details  to  offer  psy- 
chology very  many  valuable  contributions.  And  psy- 
chology, for  the  same  reasons  and  also  because  the  greater 
part  of  its  endeavors  so  far  have  been  confined  to  the  one 
problem  of  the  way  we  come  to  feel  the  world  of  things, — 
to  perceive  space,  color,  form,  movement,  weight  and  the 
like, — has  not  been  a  necessity  to  students  of  these 
sciences.  On  the  whole,  psychology  has  at  present  more 
to  gain  than  give.  But  in  the  future  psychology  will 
undoubtedly  assume  the  relation  to  the  other  sciences  of 
human  affairs  which  physics  now  holds  to  geology, 
meteorology,  astronomy  and  the  like;  it  will  become  the 
fundamental  science  in  the  mental  world. 

§  64.  The  Relations  of  Psychology  to  the  Arts 

The  sciences  state  facts  and  laws;  the  arts  give  rules 
for  practical  procedure.  Science  seeks  to  know  the 
world;  the  arts,  to  control  it.  Each  art  is  or  should  be 
dependent  upon  some  science  or  sciences  for  its  general 
principles.  Thus  the  rules  of  the  art  of  architecture 
should  be  derived  from  the  laws  of  mechanics,  aesthetics, 
etc. ;  the  practice  of  medicine  and  surgery  should  be 
founded  in  the  sciences  of  physiology,  pathology,  bac- 
teriology, anatomy,  etc. ;  the  art  of  steel-making  depends 
upon  the  facts  of  chemistry  and  metallurgy. 

If  there  were  a  complete  science  of  psychology, — if 
the  laws  of  human  nature  were  fully  known, — all  the  arts 


The  Relations  of  Psychology  325 

concerned  with  human  thought,  feeHng  and  action  would 
be  based  upon  it.  The  orator  and  actor  would  seek  from 
psychology  knowledge  of  the  laws  governing  the  feelings 
of  an  audience ;  the  man  of  business  would  ask  from  psy- 
chology an  account  of  the  motives  which  influence  men 
in  buying  and  selling;  the  teacher  would  derive  his 
methods  from  a  consideration  of  the  psychological  laws 
of  learning;  the  statesman  would  study  psychology  to 
find  the  probable  effect  on  a  population  of  a  certain  law 
or  policy ;  the  manufacturer  would  obtain  the  advice  of  a 
psychological  expert  concerning  the  conditions  under 
which  his  employees  would  work  most  intelligently  and 
efficiently. 

Psychology  is  not  sufficiently  advanced  as  yet  to  give 
the  man  engaged  in  the  control  of  human  forces  much 
more  useful  knowledge  than  he  can  obtain  by  direct 
observation  of  his  own  special  problems  and  common 
sense  inferences  from  what  he  sees  in  daily  life.  And 
the  only  practical  sphere  in  which  there  has  yet  been  any 
important  relation  between  the  science  of  psychology  and 
the  arts  of  control  over  mental  life  is  that  of  education. 
In  this  case  the  value  of  the  science  has  been  perhaps 
exaggerated.  The  art  of  teaching  has  been  improved  by 
being  based  upon  the  science  of  psychology,  but  not  so 
much  as  one  might  hope. 

As  the  science  progresses,  it  will  more  and  more  pro- 
vide with  useful  rules  all  the  arts  that  aim  to  influence 
men,  and  will  more  and  more  be  recognized  as  a  part  of 
the  equipment  of  the  teacher,  business  man,  clergyman, 
employer,  statesman  or  writer.  Even  now  there  are  signs 
of  a  rapidly  growing  recognition  of  its  importance  by 
practical  men. 

Psychology  and  Education. — Education  was  men- 
tioned as  the  one  art  which  has  been  commonly  supposed 


326  Conclusion 

to  rest  upon  a  foundation  of  psychology.  The  supposi- 
tion has  a  far  better  warrant  now  than  it  had  fifty  or  even 
ten  years  ago. 

Besides  the  general  recommendations  concerning  the 
best  ways  to  get  boys  and  girls  to  study,  to  notice,  attend 
to,  understand,  remember  and  apply  knowledge,  to  form 
habits  and  develop  capacities,  which  spring  out  of  the 
facts  of  general  psychology,  there  are  three  lines  of  special 
psychological  knowledge  which  are  influencing  the  prac- 
tical work  of  education,  (i)  The  psychology  of  child- 
hood has  acquired  facts  concerning  instinctive  tendencies, 
the  gradual  maturing  of  capacities,  the  tendencies  useful 
and  harmful  in  children's  habits  of  observing,  associating 
and  reasoning,  the  actual  kinds  and  amounts  of  knowledge 
which  they  may  be  expected  to  possess  at  different  ages 
and  under  different  conditions,  their  likes  and  dislikes,  the 
relation  of  their  mental  to  their  physical  well  being  and 
the  like.  You  will  hardly  find  a  book  or  address  on  the 
art  of  teaching  before  1890,  which  pays  any  attention  to 
the  fact  of  instinctive  tendencies  and  you  will  hardly  find 
one  after  1900  which  does  not.  The  knowledge  of  these 
facts  is  altering  the  treatment  of  children  in  homes  as 
well  as  in  schools.  (2)  The  results  of  researches  in 
dynamic  psychology,  mostly  quantitative,  into  the  nature 
and  amount  of  individual  differences,  the  relative  shares 
of  original  nature  and  experience  in  the  formation  of 
human  intellect  and  character,  the  relationships  between 
various  factors  in  education  and  certain  traits  of  mind, 
and  other  allied  topics,  are  being  studied  by  the  men  and 
women  who  plan  educational  systems,  construct  the  pro- 
grams of  studies  for  the  schools  and  select  the  methods 
of  teaching  to  be  followed, — who,  that  is,  administer  the 
affairs  of  education.  For  instance,  the  old  practice  of 
trying  to  get  everyone  in  a  class  to  the  same  level  of 


The  Relations  of  Psychology  327 

achievement  is  fast  vanishing  as  a  result  of  increasing 
knowledge  of  individual  differences.  (3)  The  detailed 
studies  of  special  topics,  such  as  the  time  taken  to  per- 
ceive objects,  or  the  nature  of  eye-movements,  or  the 
course  of  fatigue,  or  the  relation  of  motor  skill  to  intel- 
lectual capacity,  frequently  provide  some  fact  or  theory 
upon  which  those  who  have  charge  of  school  systems  or 
classes  of  scholars  base  changes  in  their  practice.  For 
instance,  manual  training,  though  introduced  into  the 
schools  largely  because  of  the  belief  that  in  some  subtle 
way  the  acquisition  of  bodily  skill  improved  the  intellec- 
tual powers,  is  coming  year  by  year,  as  later  studies  show 
this  relationship  between  bodily  skill  and  intellect  to  be 
not  at  all  close,  to  base  its  claims  rather  upon  the  value 
of  the  knowledge  of  physical  things,  the  appreciation  of 
industry  and  art,  the  actual  skill  and  the  interest  in  con- 
structive activity  which  it  produces. 

§  65.  The  Relations  of  Psychology  to  the  Personal  Con- 
duct of  Life 

Knowledge  of  psychology  should  make  one  better 
at>ie  to  control  his  own  mental  life.  Man  is  more  nearly 
master  of  his  own  intellect  and  character  than  of  anything 
else  in  nature.  The  mind  is  readily  influenced,  the  nerv- 
ous system  being  the  most  modifiable  of  all  the  bodily 
organs,  and  one  has  a  power  over  himself  that  he  has  over 
no  other  mind.  'Psychologist,  improve  thyself  is  an  even 
more  just  command  than  'Physician,  heal  thyself.' 

The  application  of  psychological  knowledge  to  th<» 
work  of  self-improvement  has  important  limitations,  how- 
ever. The  first  is  due  to  the  same  fact  that  limits  its 
application  to  the  arts  of  controlling  others, — the  incom- 
pleteness of  the  science :  we  do  not  know  enough  about 
psychology  to  give  us  self-knowledge  and  self-control. 


328  Conclusion 

In  the  second  place,  making  the  most  of  one's  own  intellect 
and  character  depends  largely  upon  the  knowledge  of 
one's  own  individual  psychology,  of  the  mental  character- 
istics peculiar  to  oneself,  of  one's  special  variations  from 
the  common  human  type.  But  this  knowledge  the  study 
of  general  psychology  does  not  supply ;  it  must  be  gained 
by  direct  observation.  In  the  third  place,  the  habit  of 
taking  an  impartial,  purely  scientific  view  of  oneself  is 
rare.  To  see  ourselves  as  others  see  us,  or  as  a  scientific 
observer  would  see  us — who  of  us  even  tries  to  do  that? 

Even  with  the  limitations  of  the  inadequacy  of  psy- 
chology, the  indispensability  of  direct  observation  of 
individual  make-up,  and  the  rarity  of  a  scientific  attitude 
toward  oneself,  psychology  can  minister  to  the  art  of  self- 
improvement.  Although  this  book  presents  but  the  out- 
lines of  the  science,  it  should  teach  a  number  of  lessons 
in  the  conduct  of  life.  A  brief  mention  of  some  of  these 
may  indicate  what  the  student  could  expect  from  further 
knowledge  of  psychology. 

It  is  a  natural  tendency,  when  disturbed  by  any  un- 
pleasant fact,  to  do  one  thing  after  another  blindly  in  the 
hope  of  getting  rid  of  or  altering  the  fact.  This  holds 
of  mental  as  well  as  bodily  life.  If  we  find  that  we  are 
not  very  well  liked  by  some  companion,  we  do  this  or  that 
to  please  him  in  a  hit  or  miss  fashion ;  if  we  grow  irritable 
during  the  day,  we  try  to  work  it  off  in  a  fit  of  scolding  or 
we  go  out  doors  for  a  tramp  or  we  do  nothing;  if  we 
become  discouraged  and  pessimistic,  we  resort  to  prayer 
or  to  drink  or  to  a  change  of  air  as  our  habits  may  be, 
from  no  rational  idea  of  what  is  the  matter  with  us  or 
what  is  its  best  remedy.  Now  every  step  in  psychological 
study  teaches  us  that  for  everything  in  mental  life  there 
is  a  reason,  that  what  anyone  thinks  c.  feels  or  does  at 
any  time  is  the  result  of  causes,  and  that  these  are  to  at 


The  Relations  of  Psychology  329 

least  some  extent  knowable.  When  in  mental  difficulty, 
do  not  worry  or  aimlessly  try  this  or  that,  but  seek  the 
reason,  is  the  plain  teaching  of  psychology.  The  advice 
is  worth  following.  The  cause  will  not  always  be  found ; 
when  it  is  found,  to  avoid  it  or  to  find  a  remedy  for  its 
action  will  in  some  cases  be  impossible.  But  there  will 
be  very  many  cases  where  an  intelligent  search  for  the 
reason  of  a  mental  fact  will  soon  disclose  both  it  and  the 
means  of  preventing  it. 

Too  often  the  energy  of  life  is  wasted  in  sickly  thought 
or  unproductive  emotion.  Life  is  wrecked  morally  for 
anyone  who  is  content  with  fine  thoughts  and  fine  feelings. 
Psychology,  in  teaching  us  that  the  function  of  mental 
life  is  to  arouse  and  guide  action,  warns  us  against  the 
errors  of  the  sentimentalist  and  emotional  enthusiast. 
The  lessons  of  church  and  of  school  are  unfortunately 
often  insufficient,  and  even  misleading,  here.  To  feel  love 
toward  God  and  righteousness,  to  thrill  with  admiration 
for  the  heroes  of  history  and  fiction,  to  say  fine  things 
about  truth  and  duty — these  are  too  often  accepted  as 
virtues  in  and  of  themselves.  Psychology  teaches  us  that 
they  are  worthy  only  in  so  far  as  they  are  expressed  in 
worthy  conduct, — that,  as  mere  feelings,  they  may  even 
be  vices  because  they  may  encourage  the  habit  of  feeling 
satisfied  with  being  a  wolf  in  action  with  a  sheep's  cloth- 
ing of  sentiment.  This  is  a  sound  lesson.  Not  only  the 
hateful  Pecksniffs  and  the  charming  Sentimental  Tommys, 
but  every  one  of  us,  needs  it.  You  think  and  feel  so  as 
to  do,  and  what  you  do — that  and  that  alone  you  will 
really  be. 

It  is  a  common  fallacy  in  human  conduct  to  try  to  do  a 
thing  merely  because  someone  else  has  done  it  with  suc- 
cess. Jones  made  a  fortune  by  speculating  in  stocks. 
Why  not  I?     Miss   Smith  went  on  the  stage  and  is  a 

22 


330  Conclusion " 

great  actress.  Why  not  I  ?  The  reason  why  is  that  you 
are  not  Jones  or  Miss  Smith.  The  fallacy  is  the  neglect 
of  differences  in  capacity.  To  know  our  powers  and  our 
limitations  is  the  first  step  in  using  them  wisely.  Many 
of  our  failures  are  due  to  forgetfulness  of  our  limita- 
tions; many  of  our  missed  opportunities  are  due  to  for- 
getfulness of  our  powers.  We  spoil  a  first  rate  artisan 
to  make  an  inferior  lawyer.  She  who  might  be  happy 
and  useful  as  a  wife  and  mother  becomes  a  dissatisfied 
and  inefficient  teacher.  Psychology  teaches  us  to  take 
stock  of  our  mental  equipment  and  to  wisely  dispose  our 
forces  in  the  attack  on  life's  problems,  to  seek  carefully 
for  the  lines  of  least  resistance. 

Perhaps  the  most  important  of  all  the  practical  lessons 
of  psychology  is  furnished  by  the  general  law  of  the 
modification  of  the  mind  by  every  thought  and  feeling 
and  act  of  a  man's  life.  Common  experience  teaches  us 
in  a  vague  and  partial  way  that  what  we  are  at  any  time 
depends  upon  what  we  have  been  and  done  in  the  past; 
but  life  is  so  complex  and  the  causes  of  the  growth  of 
intellect  and  character  are  so  hidden  that  unless  we  have 
studied  mental  life  scientifically  we  are  almost  sure  to 
make  two  errors, — to  suppose  (i)  that  much  in  our  lives 
is  due  to  chance  and  (2)  that  by  an  act  of  will  we  can  at 
any  time  blot  out  the  past  and  begin  again.  Psychology 
proves  and  reinforces  the  practical  conclusion  of  the  wise 
men  of  all  ages  that  every  thought  and  act  of  life  counts, 
that  we  build  the  ladder  by  which  we  climb,  that  nothing 
happens  by  chance.  Though  we  seem  to  forget  what  we 
learn,  each  mental  acquisition  really  leaves  its  mark  and 
makes  future  judgments  more  sagacious;  a  few  indul- 
gences in  some  useless  or  bad  habit  are  of  small  conse- 
quence but  they  are  of  some  consequence ;  nothing  of 
good  or  evil  is  ever  lost ;  we  may  forget  and  forgive,  but 


The  Relations  of  Psychology  331 

the  neurones  never  forget  or  forgive.  Balzac  somewhere 
says  that  if  a  young  man  is  upright  and  honorable  till  he  is 
twenty-five  he  can  never  become  thoroughly  vicious.  It 
is  certain  that  every  worthy  deed  represents  a  modification 
of  the  neurones  of  which  nothing  can  ever  rob  us. 
Every  event  of  a  man's  mental  life  is  written  indelibly  in 
the  brain's  archives,  to  be  counted  for  or  against  him,  not 
at  some  far  off  judgment  day,  but  in  every  future  step  of 
his  mental  career.  We  must  learn  then  that  no  intellec- 
tual or  moral  response  is  without  importance  and  dignity. 
The  influence  of  each  one  lasts  as  long  as  life ;  the  little 
things  prepare  for  the  great ;  no  effort  for  truth  and  right 
is  ever  a  waste ;  no  error  should  ever  be  without  regret. 
We  must  learn  to  have  full  confidence  that  we  shall  think 
wisely  and  act  nobly  in  face  of  the  great  problems  and 
decisions,  if  we  do  the  measure  of  our  duty  by  the  common 
day's  work  of  thought  and  action.  Our  only  responsi- 
bility toward  the  unknown  is  to  do  our  best  by  the  known. 
He  who  is  faithful  in  a  very  little  is  given  authority  over 
ten  cities. 

Man  not  only  creates  his  own  future  by  the  responses 
he  makes  from  moment  to  moment;  he  also  creates  in 
some  measure  his  own  present  by  his  power  to  select  what 
features  of  his  surroundings  shall  influence  him.  The 
psychology  of  attention  should  teach  us  that  in  some 
degree  we  can  literally  make  the  world.  We  can  avoid 
the  pain  and  distress  and  cherish  the  joy  and  hope.  It  is 
our  choice  whether  the  world  shall  be  sordid  and  mean 
or  inspiring  and  noble, — shall  be  ugly  or  beautiful,  en- 
couraging or  disheartening.  There  is  no  place  in  nature 
so  repellent  as  to  possess  no  feature  which  attention  might 
select  to  enjoy ;  nor  is  there  any  place  so  lovely  as  not  to 
make  dissatisfied  one  who  should  focus  a  fault-finding 
mind  on  some  one  of  its  details.     We  are  as  truly  and 


33^  Conclusion 

perhaps  as  much  rulers  as  victims  of  circumstances.  As 
saints  burning  at  the  stake  have  felt  only  the  joy  of 
v^orship,  so  we  may  refine  away  the  dross  from  life  simply 
by  not  attending  to  it.  To  banish  great  physical  pain  or 
impressive  misfortune  is  perhaps  too  much  to  expect  of 
ordinary  mortals,  but  surely  there  is  no  excuse  for  any 
student  of  psychology  who  does  not  keep  his  stream  of 
attentive  thought  turned  away  from  minor  discomforts 
and  mishaps,  petty  irrelevancies  and  idle  regrets. 

One  of  our  chief  practical  problems  is  to  conduct  life 
so  that  we  may  think  and  act  rightly  with  as  little  effort 
or  strain  as  possible.  Effort  or  strain  is  what  makes  work 
unpleasant  in  the  doing  and  destructive  of  mental  health, 
and  the  worker  a  trial  to  all  his  friends  and  associates. 
It  is  our  duty  to  them  and  to  ourselves  to  work  easily, 
without  fatigue  and  irritation.  Psychology  teaches  us 
that  mental  activity  is  in  itself  pleasant,  that  to  think  is 
more  enjoyable  than  to  be  empty-minded,  that  the  effort 
and  strain  of  thought  and  action  are  not  concerned  with 
the  actual  thinking  and  doing,  but  with  not  thinking  and 
not  doing, — with  inhibiting  irrelevant  ideas  and  undesir- 
able impulses.  The  effort  involved  in  reasoning  we  found, 
in  Chapter  XVII,  to  be  due  to  the  irruption  into  our 
stream  of  thought  of  ideas  which  did  not  fit  our  purposes 
and  so  needed  to  be  promptly  ruled  out  of  the  mind's 
court;  the  effort  involved  in  voluntary  action  we  found, 
in  Chapter  XVIII,  to  be  due  to  the  rise  of  impulses  which 
conscience  or  wisdom  could  not  approve  and  which  the 
will  must  promptly  squelch.  The  effort  of  being  indus- 
trious is  the  eft'ort  not  to  heed  the  calls  of  idle  pleasures. 
We  become  weary,  worn  and  peevish  because  of  what  we 
do  not  do. 

Psychology  offers  us  help  in  two  ways.  In  the  first 
place  tension  and  effort  may  be  lessened  by  so  arranging 


The  Relations  of  Psychology  333 

circiimstances  that  undesirable  ideas  and  impulses  requir- 
ing inhibition  will  seldom  appear.  The  school-boy  who 
cannot  do  his  lessons  in  the  midst  of  the  family  circle 
often  works  successfully  if  given  a  study  room  for  him- 
self. Men  for  whom  the  moral  life  was  a  bitter  and 
wearying  struggle  have  found  peace  and  rest  in  the 
monastery.  Every  intelligent  worker  soon  learns  that 
discretion  is  often  the  better  part  of  valor,  that  to  avoid 
temptation  is  often  wiser  than  to  resist  it.  Psychology 
also  teaches  us  to  distinguish  between  those  impulses 
which  should  be  overcome  by  never  letting  them  come  to 
the  front,  and  those  which  should  be  faced  and  conquered 
outright.  The  rule  is  simple.  Any  undesirable  impulses 
which  must  be  often  met  sooner  or  later  need  to  be  abso- 
lutely inhibited :  any  which  are  transitory,  infrequent  and 
unnecessary  in  life  may  best  be  avoided.  It  is  the  error 
of  the  weak  individual  to  always  either  yield  or  avoid ;  it 
is  the  error  of  the  strong  mind  to  make  needless  victories, 
expensive  in  their  tax  on  the  power  of  inhibition ;  it  is  the 
error  of  all  of  us  to  fight  useless  battles, — useless  either 
because,  being  weak,  we  are  sure  to  be  beaten  or  because, 
though  strong,  we  gain  victory  at  too  great  a  cost. 

In  the  second  place  much  of  the  need  for  voluntary 
inhibition  is  due  to  a  misleading  notion  taught  to  many  of 
us  in  school  that  the  harder  work  we  make  of  any  mental 
task,  the  better  we  shall  do  it.  T  must  now  make  a  tre- 
mendous effort  at  concentration,  bend  all  my  energies  to 
the  work,  gird  up  my  loins  for  an  intense  fight,'  we  say, 
with  the  expectation  that  the  amount  of  effort  that  we 
expend  will  decide  the  amount  of  work  that  we  get  done. 
Nothing  could  be  more  perverse.  Other  things  being 
equal,  the  more  easily  we  work,  the  more  we  shall  accom- 
plish. The  success  of  mental  work  is  measured  by  the 
amount  done  and  its  quality,  not  by  the  feelings  we  have 


334  Conclusion 

when  doing  it.  The  most  efficient  workers  make  the  least 
display  of  effort;  and  the  best  men  and  women  morally 
are  those  who  do  what  is  right  with  the  least  moral  strug- 
gle. The  mental  attitude  toward  intellectual  work  should 
be  to  think,  not  of  our  efforts,  but  of  the  problem  in  hand. 
We  should  do  right  with  as  little  trouble  to  ourselves  or 
anyone  else  as  may  be. 

As  a  last  illustration  of  the  applications  of  psychology 
to  the  practical  control  of  life,  we  may  take  the  outcome 
of  the  general  fact  that  our  feelings  of  things  and  of 
personal  conditions  are  due  to  conditions  of  the  body. 
Common  sense  has  by  the  present  day  come  to  agree  that 
a  headache  is  more  likely  to  come  from  overeating  or 
eye  strain  than  from  anxiety  or  disappointed  love,  and 
that  the  temper  and  peevishness  of  children  are  caused  by 
improper  food  rather  than  by  the  sin  of  Adam.  Psy- 
chology extends  the  lesson  through  the  entire  realm  of 
sensation  and  the  sensory  emotions.  Of  course,  improv- 
ing one's  health  is  not  the  only  way  to  improve  one's 
temper,  but  it  is  the  easiest.  Correcting  eye  defects  is  not 
the  only  way  to  increase  the  quantity  of  one's  mental 
work,  but  it  is  one  of  the  most  profitable.  A  sagacious 
school  principal  who  realized  the  effect  of  the  physical 
functions  on  intellect  and  disposition  remarked  that  he 
looked  especially  for  teachers  who  had  strong  'insides.' 
Certainly  one  of  the  best  means  of  preserving  intellectual 
vigor  and  emotional  balance  Is  to  maintain  healthy 
'insides.' 

These  samples  may  serve  to  show  that  psychology  has 
a  real  bearing  upon  mental  hygiene.  At  the  present  time 
its  recommendations  are  necessarily  somewhat  vague,  but 
with  every  advance  in  the  science  of  mental  facts  we  may 
rightly  expect  a  corresponding  advance  in  the  art  of  con- 
trolling them. 


The  Relations  of  Psychology  335 

Concerning  the  general  position  of  psychology 
amongst  other  sciences  and  in  relation  to  the  arts,  the 
facts  given  in  this  chapter  emphasize  the  incorrectness 
of  the  common  notion  of  psychology  as  a  study  apart  from 
the  recognized  sciences  and  devoid  of  meaning  for  the 
practical  affairs  of  life.  On  the  contrary  psychology  is 
intimately  connected  with  the  biological  and  social 
sciences  and  is  likely  in  the  future  to  become  one  of  the 
most  useful  of  them  to  the  practical  man. 

References 

A.  Stout,  Manual,  14-32. 
Titchener,  Outline,  §§  5-6. 
Angell,  Psychology,  pp.  3-10. 

B.  Ebbinghaus,  Grundzuge ,  §  6. 
James,  Principles,  VII. 


336  Topics  for  Special  Study 

Topics  for  Special  Study 

The  topics  and  references  given  below  are  chosen  to 
meet  the  needs  of  students  in  their  first  year  of  psycho- 
logical work,  who  wish  or  need  to  make  an  intensive 
study  of  several  topics.  Those  marked  (A)  may  conven- 
iently be  studied  by  all  students  and  even  before  any  text- 
book is  completed.  Those  marked  (B)  should  in  most 
cases  be  studied  only  by  interested  and  capable  students 
and  after  the  text-book  is  nearly  or  quite  completed. 

The  aim  in  the  selection  of  references  has  been  not 
only  to  name  books  and  articles  by  thoroughly  qualified 
experts,  but  also  to  name  only  those  which  are  not  too 
advanced  for  college  students,  which  can  be  readily  ob- 
tained by  the  ordinary  college  or  normal  school  class,  and 
which  exist  in  an  English  text.  Books  known  to  be  out 
of  print,  such  as  Galton's  'Inquiries  into  Human  Faculty/ 
are  for  this  reason  rejected;  and  articles  in  periodicals 
which  the  student  would  be  unable  to  buy  and  of  which 
a  single  copy  or  none  would  be  found  in  his  institution's 
library,  are  used  very  sparingly.  It  is  unfortunately  true 
that  not  one  in  fifty  amongst  college  and  normal  school 
students  of  psychology  can  read  a  technical  book  in  a  for- 
eign language.  All  the  books  referred  to  may  well  be 
bought  for  the  library  of  any  institution  which  offers  in- 
struction in  psychology. 

In  some  cases  the  reference  is  not  to  pages  to  be  read 
but  to  sets  of  experiments  to  be  done.  Such  cases  are 
marked  Experimental. 

(A)  I.  The  Nervous  System.  The  Growth  of  the  Brain,  by 
H.  H.  Donaldson,  or  The  Anatomy  of  the  Central 
Nervous  System,  etc.,  by  L.  Edinger  (translation). 

(A)  2.  Sensations.  Chapters  I-VII  of  An  Introduction  to 
Physiological  Psychology,  by  T.  Ziehen  (translation), 
or  The  Analysis  of  Sensations,  by  E.  Mach  (transla- 
tion). 


Topics  for  Special  Study  337 

(A)  3.  The  Sense  Organs.  The  Physiology  of  the  Senses,  by 
J.   G.   M'Kendrick  and  W.  Snodgrass. 

(A)  4.  The  Experimental  Study  of  Connections  of  Impression. 
Chapters  V  and  VI  of  Analytical  Psychology,  by  L. 
Witmer.    Experimental. 

(A)     5.    Vision.    Sight,  by  J.  Le  Conte. 

(A)  6.     Color  Vision.     The  Colour  Sense,  by  Grant  Allen,  or 

Colour  Blindness  and  Colour  Perception,  by  F.  W. 
Edridge-Green. 

(B)  7.     Hearing.    L' Audition,  by  P.   Bonnier. 

(A)  8.     The    Experimental    Study   of    Perception.     Chapters   I 

and  IV  of  Analytical  Psychology,  by  L.  Witmer. 
Experimental. 

(B)  9.     The  Perception  of  Space.     Chapter  XX  of  The  Princi- 

ples of  Psychology,  by  W.  James,  or  Studies  in  Audi- 
tory and  Visual  Space-Perception,  by  A.  H.  Pierce. 

Illusions.    Illusions,  by  J.  Sully. 

Hallucinations.  Hallucinations  and  Illusions,  by  E. 
Parish    (translation). 

Apperception.  Apperception,  by  K.  Lange  (transla- 
tion). 

Apperception.  The  Reading  of  Words;  A  Study  in 
Apperception  (in  the  American  Journal  of  Psychol- 
ogy, 1897,  VIII,  315-393),  by  W.  B.  Pillsbury  and 
The  Apperception  of  the  Spoken  Sentence  (in  the 
American  Journal  of  Psychology,  1900,  XII,  80-130), 
by  W.  C.  Bagley. 

(A)  14.     Attention.     The  Psychology  of  Attention,  by  T.  Ribot. 

(B)  15.     Imagery.      Mental    Imagery     (Monograph    Supplement 

No.  7  of  the  Psychological  Review),  by  W.  Lay, 
or  An  Essay  on  the  Creative  Imagination,  by  T.  Ribot 
(translation). 

(A)  16.     Memory.  Memory,  by  F.  W.  Colgrove,  or  La  memoir e, 

by   J.   J.   Van  Biervliet. 

(B)  17.     The    Association    of    Ideas.     Association    (Monograph 

Supplement  No.  2  of  the  Psychological  Review),  by 
M.   W.    Calkins,   or   Uassociation   des   idees,  by   E. 
Claparede. 
(B)  18.    Reasoning.    The  Psychology  of  Reasoning,  by  A.  Binet 
(translation). 


(A) 

10. 

(A) 

II. 

(A) 

12 

(B) 

13- 

338  Topics  for  Special  Study 

(A)  19.  The  Physiological  Basis  of  the  Emotions.  Chapter 
XXV  of  The  Principles  of  Psychology,  by  W.  James 
and  Les  emotions  or  Ueber  Gemiithsbewegungen,  by 
C.  Lange   (translations  from  the  Danish). 

(A)  20.     The  Expression  of  the  Emotions.     The  Expression  of 

the   Emotions,   by  C.  Darwin. 

(B)  21.     Fear.    Fear,  by  A.  Mosso  (translation)  and  A  Study  of 

Fears  (in  the  American  Journal  of  Psychology,  1897, 

VIII,   147-249),  by  G.   S.  Hall. 
(B)  22.     Anger.    A  Study  of  Anger   (in  the  American  Journal 

of  Psychology,  1899,  X,  516-591),  by  G.  S.  Hall. 
(B)  23.    Joy.     The   Emotion    of   Joy    (Monograph    Supplement 

No.  9,  of  the  Psychological  Review),  by  G.  V.  N. 

Dearborn. 
(A)  24,     The  Instincts  of  Animals.    Habit  and  Instinct,  by  C. 

L,    Morgan. 

(A)  25.     The  Instincts  of  Man.     Chapter  XXIV  of  The  Princi- 

ples of  Psychology,  by  W.  James  and  Chapters  III- 
XIII  of  The  Fundamentals  of  Child  Study,  by  E.  A. 
Kirkpatrick. 

(B)  26.     Movement.    Le   mouvement,  by   R.    S.    Woodworth. 

(A)  27.     Suggestion   and    Hypnotism.     Chapter   XXVI   of    The 

Principles  of  Psychology,  by  W.  James  and  one  of 
the  following:  Hypnotism,  by  A.  Moll  (translation); 
Hypnotism,  by  J.  M.  Bramwell;  The  Psychology  of 
Suggestion,  by  B.  Sidis. 

(B)  28.     Diseases  of  the  Will.    Diseases  of  the  Will,  by  T.  A. 

Ribot  (translation)  and  Les  obsessions  et  les  impul- 
sions, by  E.  Regis  and  A.  Pitres. 

(B)  29.  The  Self.  Chapter  X  of  The  Principles  of  Psychology, 
by  W.  James  and  Chapter  VII  of  Book  IV  of  A 
Manual  of  Psychology,  by  G.  F.  Stout. 

(B)  30.  Physical  and  Mental  Fatigue.  Fatigue,  by  A.  Mosso 
(translation),  or  La  fatigue  intellectuelle,  by  A. 
Binet  and  V.  Henri. 

(A)  31.    Dreams.     Chapter  IV  of  Sleep,  by  M.   de  Manaceine 

(translation)   and  Les  reves,  by  P.  Tissie. 

(B)  32.     The  Acquisition  of  Skill.    Studies  in  the  Psychology  of 

the  Telegraphic  Language  (in  the  Psychological  Re- 
view, 1897,  IV,  27-53  and  1899,  VI,  346-375),  by  W. 
L.   Bryan   and   N.   Harter,  or   The  Practice  Curve 


Topics  for  Special  Study  339 

(Monograph  Supplement  No.  19  of  the  Psycholog- 
ical Review),  by  J.  H.  Bair,  or  Studies  in  the 
Psychology  and  Physiology  of  Learning  (in  the 
American  Journal  of  Psychology,  1903,  XIV,  201- 
251),  by  E.  J.  Swift. 

(A)  33.     The    Inheritance    of    Mental     Capacities.     Hereditary 

Genius,  by  F.  Galton,  or  Mental  and  Moral  Heredity 
in  Royalty,  by  F.  A.  Woods. 

(B)  34.     Sex  Differences  in  Mental  Traits.     Chapters  VI-VIII, 

XII-XVI  and  XVIII  of  Man  and  Woman,  by  H. 
Ellis,  and  Mental  Traits  of  Sex,  by  H.  B.  Thompson, 

(A)  35.  Experimental  Psychology.  Experimental  Psychology 
and  Culture,  by  G.  M.  Stratton,  or  The  New  Psy- 
chology, by  E.  W.  Scripture,  or  Analytical  Psychol- 
ogy, by  L.  Witmer. 

(A)  36.  The  Psychology  of  Infancy.  The  Mind  of  the  Child, 
by  T.  W.  Preyer  (translation),  or  First  Steps  in 
Mental  Growth,  by  D.  R.  Major. 

(A)  ^y.  The  Psychology  of  Childhood.  Studies  of  Childhood, 
by  J.  Sully,  or  The  Fundamentals  of  Child  Study, 
by  E.  A.  Kirkpatrick,  or  Notes  on  Child  Study,  by 
E.  L,  Thorndike. 

(A)  38.     The  Mental  Life  of  Animals.    Animal  Behavior,  by  C. 

L.  Morgan,  or  Animal  Intelligence  (Monograph  Sup- 
plement No.  8  of  the  Psychological  Review),  by 
E.  L.  Thorndike. 

(B)  39.     The  Psychology  of  Primitive  Man.     The  Basis  of  Social 

Relations,  by  D.  G.  Brinton,  or  Primitive  Culture,  by 
E.  B.  Tylor. 

(A)  40.  The  Psychology  of  Races.  The  Psychology  of  Peo- 
ples, by  G.  Le  Bon  (translation),  or  La  psychologic 
du  peuple  frangais,  by  A.  Fouillee,  or  The  Russian 
People  (in  The  Expansion  of  Russia,  by  A.  N. 
Rambard),  by  Novikov  Yakov. 

(A)  41.  The  Psychology  of  Insanity.  The  Pathology  of  Mind, 
by  H.  Maudsley,  or  Sanity  and  Insanity,  by  C.  Mer- 
cier. 

(A)  42.  The  Psychology  of  Intellectual  Superiority,  English 
Men  of  Science,  by  F.  Galton  and  A  Study  of  British 
Genius,  by  H.  Ellis. 


340  Topics  for  Special  Study 

(B)  43.  The  Psychology  of  the  Feeble-minded.  The  Mental 
Affections  of  Children,  by  W.  W.  Ireland,  or  The 
Psychology  of  Mentally  Deficient  Children,  by  N. 
Norsworthy  or  Mental  Defectives,  by  M.  W.  Barr. 

(A)  44.  The  Psychology  of  the  Mob.  The  Crowd,  by  G.  Le 
Bon  (translation),  or  L' opinion  et  la  foule,  by  G. 
Tarde. 

(A)  45.  The  Psychology  of  the  Criminal.  The  Criminal,  by 
H.  Ellis. 

(A)  46.     The  Psychology  of  the  Deaf-Blind.     The  Story  of  My 

Life,  by  Helen  Keller,  or  Laura  Bridgman,  by  M.  H. 
Elliott  and  F.  H.  Hall  and  the  article  on  Laura 
Bridgman  in  Aspects  of  German  Culture,  by  G.  S. 
Hall. 

(B)  47-     The    Psychology  of   the   Weather.     The    Weather,  by 

E.  G.  Dexter. 

(A)  48.  The  Psychology  of  Play.  The  Play  of  Animals  and 
The  Play  of  Man,  both  by  K.  Groos   (translations). 

(A)  49.  The  Psychology  of  Religion.  The  Varieties  of  Re- 
ligious Experience,  by  W.  James,  or  The  Psychology 
of  Religion,  by  E.  D.  Starbuck,  or  The  Spiritual  Life 
and  The  Religion  of  a  Mature  Mind,  both  by  G.  A. 
Coe. 

(A)  50.     The  Psychology  of  the  Occult.    Fact  and  Fable  in  Psy- 

chology, by  J.  Jastrow. 

(B)  51.     The   Psychology  of   Speech.     The   Faculty  of  Speech, 

by  J.  Collins,  or  Aphasia,  by  F.   Bateman. 

(B)  52.  The  Development  of  Speech.  Chapter  V  of  The  Psy- 
chology of  Childhood,  by  F.  Tracy,  and  Die  Entwick- 
lung  von  Sprachen  und  Denken  beim  Kinde,  by  W. 
Ament. 

(B)  53.  The  Psychology  of  Reading.  On  the  Psychology  and 
Physiology  of  Reading  (in  the  American  Journal  of 
Psychology  1900,  XI,  283-302  and  1901,  XII,  292- 
312),  by  E.  B.  Huey,  or  Psychologische  Unter- 
suchungen  iiber  das  Lesen,  by  B.  Erdmann  and  R. 
Dodge,  or  The  Psychology  of  Reading,  by  W.  F. 
Dearborn. 

(B)  54.  The  Psychology  of  Spelling.  Spelling  in  the  Elemen- 
tary School,  by  O.  P.  Cornman. 

(B)  55.  The  Psychology  of  Arithmetic.  The  Psychology  of 
Number,  by  J.  A.  McLellan  and  J.  Dewey. 


Topics  for  Special  Study  341 

(B)  56.  The  Psychology  of  Writing.  Zur  Psychologie  des 
Schreihens,  by  W.    Preyer. 

(A)  57.  The  Psychology  of  Advertising.  The  Theory  of  Ad- 
vertising, by  W.  D.  Scott,  and  On  the  Psychology  of 
Advertising,  by  Harlow  Gale  (pp.  39-69  of  his  Psy- 
chological Studies). 

(A)  58.     Psychology  and  Philosophy.     An  Introduction  to  Phil- 

osophy, by  F.  Paulsen  (translation)  and  Chapters  V 
and  VI  of  The  Principles  of  Psychology,  by  W. 
James. 

(B)  59.     Psychology   and    Philosophy.     Why   the   Mind   Has    a 

Body,  by  C.  A.  Strong,  or  The  Philosophy  of  Mind, 
by  G.  T.  Ladd. 

(B)  60.  Psychology  and  Ethics.  The  Psychology  of  Ethics,  by 
D.   Irons. 

(B)  61.  Psychology  and  Aesthetics.  Aesthetic  Principles,  by 
H.  R.  Marshall. 

(B)  62.  Psychology  and  Sociology.  The  Psychic  Factors  of 
Civilization,  by  L.  F.  Ward,  or  The  Principles  of  So- 
ciology, by  F.  H.  Giddings,  or  The  Laws  of  Imita- 
tion, by  G.  Tarde  (translation),  or  Etudes  de  psy- 
chologie sociale,  by  G.  Tarde. 

(B)  63.  Psychology  and  Economics.  La  psychologie  Scono- 
mique,  by  G.  Tarde. 

(A)  64.  Psychology  and  Education.  Talks  to  Teachers  on  Psy- 
chology, by  W.  James,  or  Genetic  Psychology  for 
Teachers,  by  C.  H.  Judd,  or  Herbartian  Psychology 
Applied  to  Education,  hy  J.  Adams,  or  The  Principles 
of  Teaching,  by  E.  L.  Thorndike,  or  The  Psychologi- 
cal Principles  of  Education,  by  H.  H.  Home. 

Bibliographies  of  Psychology 

The  books  and  articles  on  psychology  which  have  been 
written  since  the  beginning  of  1894  are  carefully  indexed 
in  the  annual  'Psychological  Index'  of  the  Psychological 
Review.  A  selected  bibliography  containing  the  titles 
of  all  important  books  on  psychology  is  being  published 
as  a  volume  of  the  Dictionary  of  Philosophy  and  Psychol- 
ogy, edited  by  J.  M.  Baldwin. 


342  Bibliographies 

Guidance  in  the  selection  of  reading  may  be  best  ob- 
tained from  the  reviews  of  psychological  books  found  in 
the  leading  psychological  journals.  Those  in  English 
are:  Mind:  A  Quarterly  Review  of  Psychology  and  Phil- 
osophy; The  American  Journal  of  Psychology;  The  Psy- 
chological Review;  The  British  Journal  of  Psychology; 
and  The  Journal  of  Philosophy,  Psychology  and  Scientific 
Methods.  Nature  and  Science  also  furnish  trustworthy 
guidance. 


INDEX 
Illustrations 

Page 

1.  Ambiguous  and  hidden  pictures 41 

2.  The    brain   and    spinal   cord 122 

3.  The   cerebrum    123 

4.  A  section  of  the  brain  as  it  appears  to  the  naked  eye. . .  .   124 

5.  Sketches    of    neurones 125 

6-1 1.     Drawings  of  the  finer  structure  of  the  brain 128-131 

12-16.  Micro-photographs  of  the  finer  structure  of  the  brain.  132 
17.  A  section  of  the  brain  as  it  appears  to  the  naked  eye. .  132 
18-23.     Drawings  of  neurones  and  parts  of  neurones. ..  .133-136 

24.  Scheme  showing  sheaths  of  a  neurone 137 

25.  Drawings    showing    sheaths    of    neurones 137 

26-29.     Micro-photographs  of  neurones  and  parts  of  neurones.  136 

30-37.     Drawings  of  different  varieties  of  neurones 138-141 

38-40.     Micro-photographs  of  different  varieties  of  neurones  140 

41.     Scheme  showing  connections  of  neurones 142 

42-43.     Drawings   showing   connections   of   neurones 143 

44-47.     Schematic     representations    of   the     arrangement     of 

neurones    150-153 

48-55.     Drawings   of    sensory   neurone-endings 154-156 

48.  Neurone   endings   in   the   epidermis 154 

49.  Corpuscle   of   RuffinI 155 

50.  Tendon    with    nerve-plaque 155 

52.  Taste    buds 156 

53.  Neurone   endings  in  the   ear 156 

54.  Neurone  endings  in  the  nose 156 

55.  Nervous  elements  of  the  retina 156 

56.  Ending  of  a  motor  neurone 157 

57  and  58.     Sensory  areas  in  the  cortex 159 

59  and  60.     Motor  areas  in  the  cortex 160 

61.     The   neural    correlate   of    perception 171 

62-67.     Diagrams  for  experiments  on  the  blind  spot 177-179 

343 


344  Index 

Page 
68-73.    Diagrams  for  experiments  in  binocular  vision...  181-182 

74.  Apparatus  for  experiments  on  animal  learning 200 

75.  A  diagram  to  illustrate  the  influence  of  the  law  of  the 

mind's    set    206 

76  and  77.    Diagrams  to  test  the  law  of  relativity 231-232 

78-81.     Diagrams  to  illustrate  the  law  of  association  in  per- 
ception       234-236 

82.  A  diagram  for  an  experiment  in  purposive  thinking....  268 

83.  A  diagram  for  an  experiment  in  the  accuracy  of  movement    299 

84.  A  diagram  for  an  experiment  in  the  influence  of  move- 

ments   as    antecedents 307 


Experiments 

Faec 

1.  Pressure    spots 32 

2.  Cold    spots     33 

3.  The    threshold    for    pressure 33 

4.  The  mixture  of  taste  and  smell 34 

5.  Sensations    and    percepts 41 

6.  Percept    and    stimulus 42 

7.  After-images    and    recalled    images 57 

8.  The    duration   of  mental   processes 96 

9.  The  fluctuations   of    attention 106 

10.  The  relative  time  of  focal  and  marginal  thinking. .....   106 

11.  The  influence  of  attention   on   memory 107 

12.  The   aid  of  attention  in   analysis 107 

13.  The  influence  of  the  absence  of  neurone  endings  in  a  por- 

tion of  a  sensitive  surface 177 

14.  15  and  16.     Sensations  from  bilaterally  symmetrical  sensi- 

tive   surfaces     179 

17.  Instincts   of    the    reflex    type 198 

18.  The   modifiability   of   instincts 198 

19.  Color    contrast 233 

20.  The  law  of  diminishing  returns 233 

21.  The  law  of  association  in  perception 234 

22.  23,  24   and   25.     Apperception 234-235 

26  and  27.     Spontaneous  and   controlled  association 271-273 

28.  The   acquisition   of   skill 301 

29.  The  influence  of  practice  on  motor  skill 301 

30.  Movements  as  stimuli  to  mental  states 308 


Index 


345 


Names  and  Subjects 


Abstract  ideas,  6,  68. 

Abstraction    {See    Analysis). 

Acquired  Tendencies,  described, 
14  f. ;  in  general,  184  ff. ;  199 
ff. ;  in  perception,  225  ff. ;  in 
the  connections  of  ideas,  239 
ff. ;  in  connections  of  expres- 
sion, 274  ff. ;  to  attend,  loi  f. ; 
to  feel  satisfaction  and  dis- 
comfort, 315  f. 

Action,  10  ff.  {See  also  Expres- 
sion,   connections    of). 

Adaptation,  113  f. 

Adjustments,  in  motor  skill,  300. 

Aesthetic  feelings,  80  ff. 

Affection  {See  Emotions,  Sat- 
isfaction  and  Discomfort). 

Afferent   {See  Sensory). 

After-images,    57. 

AiKiNS,  H.  A.,  72. 

Analogy,  response  by,  211  ff. 

Analysis,  and  attention,  103; 
the  law  of,  215  ff. 

Animals,  mental  states  of,  no, 
221,  320. 

Apperception  {See  Impression, 
connections  of  and  Associa- 
tions of  ideas). 

Applications  of  psychology,  in 
the  case  of  instincts,  196  f.,  of 
the  law  of  association,  209  f. ; 
of  connections  of  impression, 
230  f. ;  of  memory,  260  ff. ;  of 
reasoning,  270  f . ;  of  action, 
293  ff. ;  to  the  arts,  325  f. ;  to 
the  personal  conduct  of  life, 
327  ff. 

Assimilation,  211,  213,  2y6. 

Association,  connections  of,  14; 
23 


of  ideas,  17,  238  ff. ;  the  law 
of,  199  ff. ;  227  f.,  234,  239  f., 
274  ff.,  298  f.,  309  ff.,  315  f- 

Associations  of  ideas,  238  ff. ; 
and  the  general  law  of  asso- 
ciation, 239  f. ;  the  law  of 
partial  activity  in,  240  f. ; 
simultaneous  and  successive^ 
241  f. ;  laws  of,  242;  by 
similarity,  243;  by  contiguity, 
243 ;  selection  among  sequent 
ideas,  244  ff. ;  individual  dif- 
ferences in,  249  f. ;  control  of, 
260  ff. ;  and  memory,  255  f. ; 
and  purposive  thinking,  264. 

Associative  neurones,    148   f. 

Attention,  the  nature  of,  94  ft., 
98;  varieties  of,  99  f . ;  volun- 
tary and  involuntary,  100  f. ; 
native  and  acquired,  loi  f . ; 
immediate  and  derived,  102 
f. ;  sensorial  and  intellectual, 
103;  and  analysis,  105;  func- 
tion of,  118;  law  of  associa- 
tion in  habits  of,  309  ff. ;  and 
neglect,  313    f. 

Auditory  images,  43,  47,  49. 

Auditory  sensations,  25,  29. 

Automatism,   302  ff. 

Axis-cylinder  process  {See 
Axone). 

Axone,   132,   137, 


Bain,  A.,  44. 

Baldwin,  J.   M.,  76. 

Barker,  L.  R,  121, 154, 155, 156, 

160. 
Blind   spot,   177    ff. 


346 


Index 


Blood  supply,  the  influence  of 
on  mental  life,  222, 

Bodily  expression,  of  emotions, 
81  f. ;  of  mental  states  in  gen- 
eral, III  f. 

Brain    {See   Nervous   system). 

BuNGE,    154. 


Cajal,  Ramon  y.,  131. 

CalkinSj  M.  W.,  91. 

Capacities,  defined,  17;  attri- 
butes of,  191  f. ;  specialization 
of,  192  f. ;  control  of,  196  f. 

Cells,  of  nervous  system  {See 
Neurones). 

Cerebrum  {See  Nervous  sys- 
tem). 

Choice,  87  f. 

Ciaccio^  155. 

Classification,  of  mental  states 
in  general,  3ff.,  108  ff . ;  of 
movements,  11  f.;  of  con- 
nections, 12  ff, ;  of  sensations, 
24  ff. ;  of  percepts,  39  f. ;  of 
images,  43  f. ;  of  feelings  of 
relationships,  61  f. ;  of  feelings 
of  meaning,  67  f. ;  of  judg- 
ments, 72;  of  emotions,  75 
ff. ;  of  attention  99  f . ;  of 
neurones,  147  ff. ;  of  the  sub- 

.  ject  matter  of  psychology 
320  f. ;  of  the  methods  of 
psychology,   321    f. 

Clouston,  297. 

Collaterals,  132  ff. 

Color,  sensations  of,  24,  26; 
contrast,  229  232. 

Complex   mental    states,   8,   92. 

Concepts,  described,  6,  68 ;  func- 
tion   of,    116;     physiological 


basis  of,  175.  {See  also 
Meaning,    feelings    of). 

Conduct  {See  Expression,  con- 
nections   of). 

Conductivity  of  neurones,  145  f. 

Connections,  in  general,  12  ff.; 
functions  of,  117  f . ;  original 
and  acquired,  165  ff . ;  phys- 
iological basis  of,  222  f. ;  the 
formation  of.  Chapter  XIII; 
of  impression.  Chapter  XV; 
between  one  mental  state  and 
another,  Chapters  XVI  and 
XVII ;  of  expression,  Chap- 
ters XVIII  and  XIX. 

Consciousness  {See  Mental 
states). 

Contiguity,  association  by,  243. 

Continuity  of  mental  life,  94. 

Contrast,    229,    232. 

Coordination  of  movements, 
298  ff. 

Cortex  of  cerebrum,  121,  124, 
128,   129  and  Figs.  13-16. 

Curiosity,  190. 


Decision,  87  f. 

Deduction,  267  ff. 

Deliberation,    87. 

Dendrites,    132,    137. 

Desire,  87. 

Discomfort,  influence  of  on 
connections,  166,  188,  200,  203, 
204ff.,  245  f.,  265,  275;  in- 
stinctive sources  of,  315;  the 
acquisition     of     feelings     of, 

31S  ff.^ 
Dissociation,  215   ff. 
Duration,     of     sensations,     22', 

of  mental  states  in  general,  96. 


Index 


347 


Eberth,  154. 

Edinger,  L.,  121,  124,  128,  130, 
132,  141,  154. 

Education  (See  Applications  of 
psychology). 

Efferent  neurones  (See  Motor 
neurones). 

Effort,  89,  100  f. ;  295  f. ;  phys- 
iological   basis    of,    174. 

Emotions,  defined,  7,  74;  and 
sensations,  75 ;  classification 
of,  75  ff. ;  aesthetic,  80  f . ; 
bodily  expression  of,  81  f. ; 
and  action,  82;  development 
of,  82  f. ;  function  of,  117; 
physiological  basis  of,  172  ff. ; 
James-Lange  theory  of,  172 
f.,    174. 

End  organs  (See  Sense  organs 
and   Motor   organs). 

Expression,  movements  of,  11; 
of  the  emotions,  81  f. ;  the  law 
of,  162  f. ;  connections  of, 
274  ff. ;  connections  of  ex- 
pression and  the  law  of  in- 
stinct, 274;  and  the  law  of 
association,  274  ff . ;  and  the 
law  of  assimilation,  276;  and 
the  law  of  analysis,  276 ;  spon- 
taneous and  purposive,  276 
ff. ;  individual  differences  in, 
290  ff. ;  the  control  of,  293  ff. 

Extensity  of  sensations,  23. 


Facts,  feelings  of,  58  ff. 

Fatigue  of  neurones,  167. 

Flechsig,    p.,   159. 

Frequency  of  connections  as  a 
cause  of  their  permanence, 
204,  206,  227  f.,  245  ff.,  274  ff. 


Functions  of  mental  states,  iii 
ff. ;  of  sensations,  114;  of  per- 
cepts, 114  f. ;  of  images,  115; 
of  memories,  115;  of  feelings 
of  relationships,  115  f . ;  of 
feelings  of  meaning,  116;  of 
emotions,  117;  of  the  connec- 
tions of  mental  states,  117  f . ; 
of  selective  processes,  118;  of 
automatism,  304  f. 

Galton,   F.,   53   ff.,  266. 

General  notions  (See  Con- 
cepts). 

Gustatory  sensations  (See 
Tastes). 

Habits,  16,  199,  302.     (See  also 

Association,  the  law  of,   and 

Connections). 
Hallucinations,    described,    35 ; 

physiological    basis    of,    171 ; 

causes  of,  229  f. 
Heredity,    194  ff. 
HoRSLEY,    v.,    160. 
Huxley,   T.    H.,    45. 

Ideas,  association  of  (See  As- 
sociation). 

Illusions,  defined,  35 ;  physi- 
ological basis  of,  171;  causes 
of,  229. 

Imagery,    (See  Images). 

Images,  defined,  5,  43 ;  classifi- 
cation of,  43  f. ;  variation  in, 
45  ff. ;  types  of  individuals 
with  respect  to,  49 ;  and  per- 
cepts, 49  f. ;  productive  and 
reproductive,  50  f. ;  and  feel- 
ings of  meaning,  68  f. ;  of 
emotions,  8^;  function  of,  115. 


348 


Index 


Imitation,  287  ff. 

Impression,  connections  of  224 
ff. ;  inborn,  224  f. ;  acquired, 
225  ff. ;  law  of  association  in 
the  case  of,  227  ff. ;  control  of, 
230  f. 

Impulses,  85   ff. 

Inattention,   104   f. 

Individual  differences,  in  im- 
agery, 45  ff. ;  in  original  ten- 
dencies, 193  f. ;  in  purely  men- 
tal connections,  249  ff. ;  in 
connections  of  expression, 
290  ff. 

Individual  notions,  described,  6, 
68;  function  of,  116;  physio- 
logical basis   of,    175    f. 

Induction,  267  ff. 

Inferences,    17. 

Inhibition,  as  a  feature  of  at- 
tention, loi,  313  ff. ;  as  a  func- 
tion of  the  nervous  system, 
163  f. ;  of  instincts,  188  f. ;  in 
purposive  thinking,  265  ff. ; 
in  motor  skill,  299  ff. ;  and 
effort  wasted,  332. 

Instincts,  defintd,  15  f . ;  187;  de- 
layed, 187  f. ;  transitory,  188; 
and  habits,  188  f.;  199  ff-J 
indefiniteness  of,  189  f . ;  hu- 
man, 190  f. ;  individual  differ- 
ences in,  193  ff. ;  the  control 
of,  196  f. 

Intensity,  of  sensations,  23;  of 
mental  states  in  general,  96; 
as  a  cause  of  the  formation 
of  connections,  166,  207,  247, 
275- 

Interest,  309  ff.     (^See  also  un- 


der Attention  and  Satisfac- 
tion). 

James,  W.,  3,  22,  42,  44,  46,  47, 
51,  57,  60,  80,  93,  95,  172,  252, 
259,   283,  297. 

Judgments,  defined,  7,  71 ; 
classification  of,  72;  and 
reasoning,  71  f. 

Kinaesthetic  sensations  {See 
Movement,   sensations   of). 

v.    KOELLIKER,    A.,    121,    129,    I3O, 

135,  136,  137,  138,  139,  140- 

Ladd,   G.   T.,  3. 

Lange,   C,    172. 

Lay,    W.,    48,    49. 

V.    Lenhossek,    M.,    121,    135, 

136,  140,  156. 
Localization,  of  brain  functions, 

158  ff. 

McCosH,   J.,  3. 

Meaning,  feelings  of,  described, 
6,  65  ff. ;  classification  of,  67 
f. ;  and  images,  68  f. ;  and 
reasoning,  69  f. ;  functions  of, 
116.  {See  also  under  Indi- 
vidual notions.  Concepts  and 
Abstract    ideas.) 

Medullary  sheath,  134  ff. 

Memories,  described,  5  f.,  50  ff. ; 
function  of,  115. 

Memory,  and  the  law  of  asso- 
ciation, 255  ff. ;  appropriate 
revival  in,  257  f. ;  individual 
differences  in,  258  f. ;  the  con- 
trol of,  260  ff. 

Mental  states,  in  general,  i  ff., 
92   ff.;   function   of,    iii    ff. ; 


Index 


349 


physiological  basis  of,  169  ff. 
{See  also  under  Sensations, 
percepts,    etc.). 

Modifiability  of  the  nervous  sys- 
tem, 146  f. 

Moral    training,    298    ff. 

Motor  images,  43    ff. 

Motor  neurones,   147  f. 

Motor  organs,  157  f. 

Movements,  in  general,  10  ff. ; 
classification  of,  11  f . ;  sensa- 
tions due  to,  306  ff. ;  connec- 
tions involving,  298  ff. 

Native  tendencies  {See  Original 
tendencies). 

Nervous  system,  gross  struc- 
ture, 120  ff. ;  finer  structure, 
125  ff. ;  action  of  the,  144  ff. ; 
arrangement  of  the  elements 
of,  147  ff. ;  and  mental  states, 
169    ff. 

Neurones,  in  relation  to  the 
nervous  system,  125  ff. ; 
structure  of,  132  ff. ;  varieties 
of,  138  ff. ;  connections  of, 
139,  141  ff. ;  functions  of,  144 
ff. ;  arrangement  of,  147  ff. 

Original  tendencies,  defined,  14; 
attributes  of,  184  ff. ;  in  per- 
ception, 224  f. ;  and  purely 
mental  connections,  239;  io 
action,  274;  to  automatic  re- 
sponses, 303;  in  attention, 
310;  to  feel  satisfaction  and 
discomfort,  315.  {See  also 
Instincts    and    Capacities) . 

Partial  activity,  the  general  law 


of,  206  f. ;  in  connections  be- 
tween one  mental  state  and 
another,  240  f. ;  in  connec- 
tions of  expression,  280  f. 

Perception  (vS'^^  Impression, 
connections    of). 

Percepts,  described,  5,  35  ff. ; 
and  stimuli,  36  ff. ;  and  sen- 
sations, 39;  classification  of, 
39  ff. ;  function  of,  114  f . ; 
physiological  basis   of,   171. 

Personal  feeling  as  a  quality  of 
mental  states  in  general,  93. 

Persuasion,    286. 

Powers,    16. 

Pre-perception,  235  f. 

Psychology,  the  subject  matter 
of,  I  ff.;  319  ff.;  abnormal, 
320;  individual,  320;  of  chil- 
dren, 320;  animal,  320;  physi- 
ological, 120  ff.,  321 ;  sociolog- 
ical, 321 ;  educational,  321 ; 
methods  of,  321  f . ;  the  rela- 
tions of,  to  other  sciences,  322 
ff. ;  to  the  arts,  324  ff. ;  to 
education,  325  ;  to  the  personal 
conduct   of  life,  2>2y  ff. 

Purposive  action  {See  under 
Expression,    connections    of). 

Purposive  thinking,  264  ff. ;  and 
spontaneous  thinking,  264  f. ; 
selection  in,  265  f. ;  and  reas- 
oning, 267  ff. 

Qualities,  feelings    of,    19   ff. 
Quality,  of  sensations,    23   f. 

Range,    of    sensations,    28. 

Reactions,    17. 

Reasoning,   describe<i,    17,   267; 


350 

and  feelings  of  relationship, 
63  f.;  and  feelings  of  mean- 
ing, 69  f.;  and  iudgments, 
71  f. ;  inductive  a"d  deauctive, 
267  ff.;  factors  in,  209  L; 
training  in,  270  f. 

Recency  of  connections,  166, 
207,  245  ff.,  275. 

Reflexes,  15,  198. 

Relationships,  feelings  of,  de- 
scribed, 7,  58  f • ;  attributes  of, 
59  ff. ;  classification  of,  61  f .  *, 
and  logical  thought,  62;  de- 
velopment of,  63  f.;  function 
of,  115  f.;  psychological  basis 
of,   174  ff- 

Relativity,    law   of,   228. 

Resistance,  law  of  least,  164  f. 

Response,  i7- 

Retzius,    G.,    154- 

RoYCE,  J.,   78. 

RUFFINI,     155. 


Satisfaction,  influence  of  on 
connections,  166,  200  ff.,  245 
f .,  265,  274  f. ;  the  source  of, 
31S   ff. 

SCHAEFER,      160. 

Scope  of  psychology,  319  ff- 

Scott,  W.  D.,  289. 

Selection,  309  ff-  (^^^  also  At- 
tention). 

Sensations,  defined,  5,  19  ff. ; 
pure  sensations,  21 ;  elemen- 
tary sensations,  22 ;  attributes, 
22  ff. ;  classification  of,  24  ff. ; 
and  stimuli,  28  ff. ;  and  per- 
cepts, 39;  and  emotions,  75; 
functions  of,  114  f.;  physio- 


Index 


logical  basis  of,  170  f. ;  caused 
by  movements,  306  ff. 

Sense  organs,  154  ff. ;  and  sen- 
sations, 24  ft'. 

Sense  stimun,  connectioiu  of 
with  mental  states  {See  Im- 
pression) ;  connections  of 
with  movements,  302  f. 

Sensitivity  of  neurones,   144  f. 

Sensory    neurones,    147    f. 

Sheath   of    Schwann,    134,    137. 

Similarity,   association   by,  243. 

Skill    in    movement,    298    ff. 

Social  implications  of  mental 
life,    94. 

Spontaneous  action  {See  Ex- 
pression,  connections   of). 

Spontaneous  thinking  {See  As- 
sociations   of    Ideas). 

Starr,  M.  A.,  121,  132,  136,  140. 

Steinthal,    H.,   251. 

Stimulus,  17  {See  also  under 
Sensations). 

Stricker,   S.,   47   f. 

Stout,   G.   F.,   3,  31. 

Suggestion,    286    ff. 

Synapsis,    141. 

Tastes,  26,   29,   34. 
Things,  feelings  of,  35  ff. 
Threshold    of  sensations,   28. 

TiTCHENER,    E.    B.,    3,    41,    78. 

Van  Gehuchten,  A.,  121,  122, 

123,    131,   133    138,   143,    152, 

153,    156,    157,    159- 
Variations   in  individuals    {See 

Individual    differences). 
Vision,  binocular,  179  ff.     {See 

also  Sensations). 


Index  351 

Volition  {See  Expression,  con-  Weber's  Law,  229,  233. 

nectionsof).  Will,    7,  85  ff.     {See  also  Ex- 
Voluntary  {See  Purposive  :  See  pression,  connections  of). 

also  under  Attention  and  Ex-  Wish,     87. 

pression,  connections  of).  Wundt,  W.,  ^^. 


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